diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/or/rendservice.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/or/rendservice.c | 99 |
1 files changed, 67 insertions, 32 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index 8a0171170..440359a32 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include "config.h" #include "directory.h" #include "networkstatus.h" +#include "nodelist.h" #include "rendclient.h" #include "rendcommon.h" #include "rendservice.h" @@ -291,7 +292,7 @@ parse_port_config(const char *string) * normal, but don't actually change the configured services.) */ int -rend_config_services(or_options_t *options, int validate_only) +rend_config_services(const or_options_t *options, int validate_only) { config_line_t *line; rend_service_t *service = NULL; @@ -409,7 +410,7 @@ rend_config_services(or_options_t *options, int validate_only) if (strspn(client_name, REND_LEGAL_CLIENTNAME_CHARACTERS) != len) { log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient contains an " "illegal client name: '%s'. Valid " - "characters are [A-Za-z0-9+-_].", + "characters are [A-Za-z0-9+_-].", client_name); SMARTLIST_FOREACH(clients, char *, cp, tor_free(cp)); smartlist_free(clients); @@ -904,8 +905,9 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, time_t now = time(NULL); char diffie_hellman_hash[DIGEST_LEN]; time_t *access_time; - or_options_t *options = get_options(); + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + tor_assert(!(circuit->build_state->onehop_tunnel)); tor_assert(circuit->rend_data); base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1, @@ -956,6 +958,29 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, "PK-encrypted portion of INTRODUCE2 cell was truncated."); return -1; } + + if (!service->accepted_intros) + service->accepted_intros = digestmap_new(); + + { + char pkpart_digest[DIGEST_LEN]; + /* Check for replay of PK-encrypted portion. It is slightly naughty to + use the same digestmap to check for this and for g^x replays, but + collisions are tremendously unlikely. + */ + crypto_digest(pkpart_digest, (char*)request+DIGEST_LEN, keylen); + access_time = digestmap_get(service->accepted_intros, pkpart_digest); + if (access_time != NULL) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Possible replay detected! We received an " + "INTRODUCE2 cell with same PK-encrypted part %d seconds ago. " + "Dropping cell.", (int)(now-*access_time)); + return -1; + } + access_time = tor_malloc(sizeof(time_t)); + *access_time = now; + digestmap_set(service->accepted_intros, pkpart_digest, access_time); + } + /* Next N bytes is encrypted with service key */ note_crypto_pk_op(REND_SERVER); r = crypto_pk_private_hybrid_decrypt( @@ -996,7 +1021,9 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, v3_shift += 4; if ((now - ts) < -1 * REND_REPLAY_TIME_INTERVAL / 2 || (now - ts) > REND_REPLAY_TIME_INTERVAL / 2) { - log_warn(LD_REND, "INTRODUCE2 cell is too %s. Discarding.", + /* This is far more likely to mean that a client's clock is + * skewed than that a replay attack is in progress. */ + log_info(LD_REND, "INTRODUCE2 cell is too %s. Discarding.", (now - ts) < 0 ? "old" : "new"); return -1; } @@ -1033,7 +1060,7 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, } else { char *rp_nickname; size_t nickname_field_len; - routerinfo_t *router; + const node_t *node; int version; if (*buf == 1) { rp_nickname = buf+1; @@ -1060,8 +1087,8 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, len -= nickname_field_len; len -= rp_nickname - buf; /* also remove header space used by version, if * any */ - router = router_get_by_nickname(rp_nickname, 0); - if (!router) { + node = node_get_by_nickname(rp_nickname, 0); + if (!node) { log_info(LD_REND, "Couldn't find router %s named in introduce2 cell.", escaped_safe_str_client(rp_nickname)); /* XXXX Add a no-such-router reason? */ @@ -1069,7 +1096,7 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, goto err; } - extend_info = extend_info_from_router(router); + extend_info = extend_info_from_node(node); } if (len != REND_COOKIE_LEN+DH_KEY_LEN) { @@ -1079,7 +1106,7 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, } /* Check if we'd refuse to talk to this router */ - if (options->ExcludeNodes && options->StrictNodes && + if (options->StrictNodes && routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeNodes, extend_info)) { log_warn(LD_REND, "Client asked to rendezvous at a relay that we " "exclude, and StrictNodes is set. Refusing service."); @@ -1098,12 +1125,16 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, /* Check whether there is a past request with the same Diffie-Hellman, * part 1. */ - if (!service->accepted_intros) - service->accepted_intros = digestmap_new(); - access_time = digestmap_get(service->accepted_intros, diffie_hellman_hash); if (access_time != NULL) { - log_warn(LD_REND, "Possible replay detected! We received an " + /* A Tor client will send a new INTRODUCE1 cell with the same rend + * cookie and DH public key as its previous one if its intro circ + * times out while in state CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT . + * If we received the first INTRODUCE1 cell (the intro-point relay + * converts it into an INTRODUCE2 cell), we are already trying to + * connect to that rend point (and may have already succeeded); + * drop this cell. */ + log_info(LD_REND, "We received an " "INTRODUCE2 cell with same first part of " "Diffie-Hellman handshake %d seconds ago. Dropping " "cell.", @@ -1360,6 +1391,7 @@ rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit) crypto_pk_env_t *intro_key; tor_assert(circuit->_base.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO); + tor_assert(!(circuit->build_state->onehop_tunnel)); tor_assert(circuit->cpath); tor_assert(circuit->rend_data); @@ -1378,7 +1410,7 @@ rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit) /* If we already have enough introduction circuits for this service, * redefine this one as a general circuit or close it, depending. */ if (count_established_intro_points(serviceid) > NUM_INTRO_POINTS) { - or_options_t *options = get_options(); + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); if (options->ExcludeNodes) { /* XXXX in some future version, we can test whether the transition is allowed or not given the actual nodes in the circuit. But for now, @@ -1502,6 +1534,7 @@ rend_service_rendezvous_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit) tor_assert(circuit->_base.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND); tor_assert(circuit->cpath); tor_assert(circuit->build_state); + tor_assert(!(circuit->build_state->onehop_tunnel)); tor_assert(circuit->rend_data); hop = circuit->build_state->pending_final_cpath; tor_assert(hop); @@ -1630,12 +1663,14 @@ directory_post_to_hs_dir(rend_service_descriptor_t *renddesc, for (j = 0; j < smartlist_len(responsible_dirs); j++) { char desc_id_base32[REND_DESC_ID_V2_LEN_BASE32 + 1]; char *hs_dir_ip; + const node_t *node; hs_dir = smartlist_get(responsible_dirs, j); if (smartlist_digest_isin(renddesc->successful_uploads, hs_dir->identity_digest)) /* Don't upload descriptor if we succeeded in doing so last time. */ continue; - if (!router_get_by_digest(hs_dir->identity_digest)) { + node = node_get_by_id(hs_dir->identity_digest); + if (!node || !node_has_descriptor(node)) { log_info(LD_REND, "Not sending publish request for v2 descriptor to " "hidden service directory %s; we don't have its " "router descriptor. Queuing for later upload.", @@ -1812,19 +1847,19 @@ void rend_services_introduce(void) { int i,j,r; - routerinfo_t *router; + const node_t *node; rend_service_t *service; rend_intro_point_t *intro; int changed, prev_intro_nodes; - smartlist_t *intro_routers; + smartlist_t *intro_nodes; time_t now; - or_options_t *options = get_options(); + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); - intro_routers = smartlist_create(); + intro_nodes = smartlist_create(); now = time(NULL); for (i=0; i < smartlist_len(rend_service_list); ++i) { - smartlist_clear(intro_routers); + smartlist_clear(intro_nodes); service = smartlist_get(rend_service_list, i); tor_assert(service); @@ -1844,8 +1879,8 @@ rend_services_introduce(void) service. */ for (j=0; j < smartlist_len(service->intro_nodes); ++j) { intro = smartlist_get(service->intro_nodes, j); - router = router_get_by_digest(intro->extend_info->identity_digest); - if (!router || !find_intro_circuit(intro, service->pk_digest)) { + node = node_get_by_id(intro->extend_info->identity_digest); + if (!node || !find_intro_circuit(intro, service->pk_digest)) { log_info(LD_REND,"Giving up on %s as intro point for %s.", safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(intro->extend_info)), safe_str_client(service->service_id)); @@ -1865,8 +1900,8 @@ rend_services_introduce(void) smartlist_del(service->intro_nodes,j--); changed = 1; } - if (router) - smartlist_add(intro_routers, router); + if (node) + smartlist_add(intro_nodes, (void*)node); } /* We have enough intro points, and the intro points we thought we had were @@ -1895,26 +1930,26 @@ rend_services_introduce(void) #define NUM_INTRO_POINTS_INIT (NUM_INTRO_POINTS + 2) for (j=prev_intro_nodes; j < (prev_intro_nodes == 0 ? NUM_INTRO_POINTS_INIT : NUM_INTRO_POINTS); ++j) { - router_crn_flags_t flags = CRN_NEED_UPTIME; + router_crn_flags_t flags = CRN_NEED_UPTIME|CRN_NEED_DESC; if (get_options()->_AllowInvalid & ALLOW_INVALID_INTRODUCTION) flags |= CRN_ALLOW_INVALID; - router = router_choose_random_node(intro_routers, - options->ExcludeNodes, flags); - if (!router) { + node = router_choose_random_node(intro_nodes, + options->ExcludeNodes, flags); + if (!node) { log_warn(LD_REND, "Could only establish %d introduction points for %s.", smartlist_len(service->intro_nodes), service->service_id); break; } changed = 1; - smartlist_add(intro_routers, router); + smartlist_add(intro_nodes, (void*)node); intro = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_intro_point_t)); - intro->extend_info = extend_info_from_router(router); + intro->extend_info = extend_info_from_node(node); intro->intro_key = crypto_new_pk_env(); tor_assert(!crypto_pk_generate_key(intro->intro_key)); smartlist_add(service->intro_nodes, intro); log_info(LD_REND, "Picked router %s as an intro point for %s.", - safe_str_client(router_describe(router)), + safe_str_client(node_describe(node)), safe_str_client(service->service_id)); } @@ -1933,7 +1968,7 @@ rend_services_introduce(void) } } } - smartlist_free(intro_routers); + smartlist_free(intro_nodes); } /** Regenerate and upload rendezvous service descriptors for all |