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-rw-r--r--src/or/rendclient.c179
1 files changed, 139 insertions, 40 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c
index 3a0cd1a66..bb4bd9bfd 100644
--- a/src/or/rendclient.c
+++ b/src/or/rendclient.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2012, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2013, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
/**
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include "connection_edge.h"
#include "directory.h"
#include "main.h"
+#include "networkstatus.h"
#include "nodelist.h"
#include "relay.h"
#include "rendclient.h"
@@ -23,6 +24,7 @@
#include "rephist.h"
#include "router.h"
#include "routerlist.h"
+#include "routerset.h"
static extend_info_t *rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(
const rend_cache_entry_t *rend_query,
@@ -43,7 +45,7 @@ rend_client_purge_state(void)
void
rend_client_introcirc_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ)
{
- tor_assert(circ->_base.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING);
+ tor_assert(circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING);
tor_assert(circ->cpath);
log_info(LD_REND,"introcirc is open");
@@ -56,7 +58,7 @@ rend_client_introcirc_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ)
static int
rend_client_send_establish_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ)
{
- tor_assert(circ->_base.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND);
+ tor_assert(circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND);
tor_assert(circ->rend_data);
log_info(LD_REND, "Sending an ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS cell");
@@ -65,6 +67,14 @@ rend_client_send_establish_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ)
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL);
return -1;
}
+
+ /* Set timestamp_dirty, because circuit_expire_building expects it,
+ * and the rend cookie also means we've used the circ. */
+ circ->base_.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
+
+ /* We've attempted to use this circuit. Probe it if we fail */
+ pathbias_count_use_attempt(circ);
+
if (relay_send_command_from_edge(0, TO_CIRCUIT(circ),
RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS,
circ->rend_data->rend_cookie,
@@ -99,16 +109,17 @@ rend_client_reextend_intro_circuit(origin_circuit_t *circ)
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL);
return -1;
}
+ // XXX: should we not re-extend if hs_circ_has_timed_out?
if (circ->remaining_relay_early_cells) {
log_info(LD_REND,
- "Re-extending circ %d, this time to %s.",
- circ->_base.n_circ_id,
+ "Re-extending circ %u, this time to %s.",
+ (unsigned)circ->base_.n_circ_id,
safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(extend_info)));
result = circuit_extend_to_new_exit(circ, extend_info);
} else {
log_info(LD_REND,
- "Closing intro circ %d (out of RELAY_EARLY cells).",
- circ->_base.n_circ_id);
+ "Closing intro circ %u (out of RELAY_EARLY cells).",
+ (unsigned)circ->base_.n_circ_id);
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
/* connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit will launch a new intro circ. */
result = 0;
@@ -117,6 +128,16 @@ rend_client_reextend_intro_circuit(origin_circuit_t *circ)
return result;
}
+/** Return true iff we should send timestamps in our INTRODUCE1 cells */
+static int
+rend_client_should_send_timestamp(void)
+{
+ if (get_options()->Support022HiddenServices >= 0)
+ return get_options()->Support022HiddenServices;
+
+ return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "Support022HiddenServices", 1, 0, 1);
+}
+
/** Called when we're trying to connect an ap conn; sends an INTRODUCE1 cell
* down introcirc if possible.
*/
@@ -132,9 +153,10 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
crypt_path_t *cpath;
off_t dh_offset;
crypto_pk_t *intro_key = NULL;
+ int status = 0;
- tor_assert(introcirc->_base.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING);
- tor_assert(rendcirc->_base.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY);
+ tor_assert(introcirc->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING);
+ tor_assert(rendcirc->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY);
tor_assert(introcirc->rend_data);
tor_assert(rendcirc->rend_data);
tor_assert(!rend_cmp_service_ids(introcirc->rend_data->onion_address,
@@ -161,7 +183,8 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
}
}
- return -1;
+ status = -1;
+ goto cleanup;
}
/* first 20 bytes of payload are the hash of Bob's pk */
@@ -184,13 +207,16 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
smartlist_len(entry->parsed->intro_nodes));
if (rend_client_reextend_intro_circuit(introcirc)) {
+ status = -2;
goto perm_err;
} else {
- return -1;
+ status = -1;
+ goto cleanup;
}
}
if (crypto_pk_get_digest(intro_key, payload)<0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't hash public key.");
+ status = -2;
goto perm_err;
}
@@ -200,12 +226,14 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
cpath = rendcirc->build_state->pending_final_cpath =
tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(crypt_path_t));
cpath->magic = CRYPT_PATH_MAGIC;
- if (!(cpath->dh_handshake_state = crypto_dh_new(DH_TYPE_REND))) {
+ if (!(cpath->rend_dh_handshake_state = crypto_dh_new(DH_TYPE_REND))) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't allocate DH.");
+ status = -2;
goto perm_err;
}
- if (crypto_dh_generate_public(cpath->dh_handshake_state)<0) {
+ if (crypto_dh_generate_public(cpath->rend_dh_handshake_state)<0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't generate g^x.");
+ status = -2;
goto perm_err;
}
}
@@ -221,7 +249,14 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN);
v3_shift += 2+REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN;
}
- set_uint32(tmp+v3_shift+1, htonl((uint32_t)time(NULL)));
+ if (rend_client_should_send_timestamp()) {
+ uint32_t now = (uint32_t)time(NULL);
+ now += 300;
+ now -= now % 600;
+ set_uint32(tmp+v3_shift+1, htonl(now));
+ } else {
+ set_uint32(tmp+v3_shift+1, 0);
+ }
v3_shift += 4;
} /* if version 2 only write version number */
else if (entry->parsed->protocols & (1<<2)) {
@@ -253,9 +288,10 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
dh_offset = MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1+REND_COOKIE_LEN;
}
- if (crypto_dh_get_public(cpath->dh_handshake_state, tmp+dh_offset,
+ if (crypto_dh_get_public(cpath->rend_dh_handshake_state, tmp+dh_offset,
DH_KEY_LEN)<0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't extract g^x.");
+ status = -2;
goto perm_err;
}
@@ -269,6 +305,7 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, 0);
if (r<0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Internal error: hybrid pk encrypt failed.");
+ status = -2;
goto perm_err;
}
@@ -288,7 +325,8 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
introcirc->cpath->prev)<0) {
/* introcirc is already marked for close. leave rendcirc alone. */
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't send INTRODUCE1 cell");
- return -2;
+ status = -2;
+ goto cleanup;
}
/* Now, we wait for an ACK or NAK on this circuit. */
@@ -297,14 +335,21 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
/* Set timestamp_dirty, because circuit_expire_building expects it
* to specify when a circuit entered the _C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT
* state. */
- introcirc->_base.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
+ introcirc->base_.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
+
+ pathbias_count_use_attempt(introcirc);
+
+ goto cleanup;
- return 0;
perm_err:
- if (!introcirc->_base.marked_for_close)
+ if (!introcirc->base_.marked_for_close)
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(introcirc), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL);
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(rendcirc), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL);
- return -2;
+ cleanup:
+ memwipe(payload, 0, sizeof(payload));
+ memwipe(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
+
+ return status;
}
/** Called when a rendezvous circuit is open; sends a establish
@@ -312,7 +357,7 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
void
rend_client_rendcirc_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ)
{
- tor_assert(circ->_base.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND);
+ tor_assert(circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND);
log_info(LD_REND,"rendcirc is open");
@@ -322,6 +367,32 @@ rend_client_rendcirc_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ)
}
}
+/**
+ * Called to close other intro circuits we launched in parallel
+ * due to timeout.
+ */
+static void
+rend_client_close_other_intros(const char *onion_address)
+{
+ circuit_t *c;
+ /* abort parallel intro circs, if any */
+ for (c = circuit_get_global_list_(); c; c = c->next) {
+ if ((c->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING ||
+ c->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT) &&
+ !c->marked_for_close && CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(c)) {
+ origin_circuit_t *oc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(c);
+ if (oc->rend_data &&
+ !rend_cmp_service_ids(onion_address,
+ oc->rend_data->onion_address)) {
+ log_info(LD_REND|LD_CIRC, "Closing introduction circuit %d that we "
+ "built in parallel (Purpose %d).", oc->global_identifier,
+ c->purpose);
+ circuit_mark_for_close(c, END_CIRC_REASON_TIMEOUT);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
/** Called when get an ACK or a NAK for a REND_INTRODUCE1 cell.
*/
int
@@ -331,10 +402,10 @@ rend_client_introduction_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ,
origin_circuit_t *rendcirc;
(void) request; // XXXX Use this.
- if (circ->_base.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT) {
+ if (circ->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT) {
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,
- "Received REND_INTRODUCE_ACK on unexpected circuit %d.",
- circ->_base.n_circ_id);
+ "Received REND_INTRODUCE_ACK on unexpected circuit %u.",
+ (unsigned)circ->base_.n_circ_id);
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
return -1;
}
@@ -345,6 +416,10 @@ rend_client_introduction_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ,
#endif
tor_assert(circ->rend_data);
+ /* For path bias: This circuit was used successfully. Valid
+ * nacks and acks count. */
+ pathbias_mark_use_success(circ);
+
if (request_len == 0) {
/* It's an ACK; the introduction point relayed our introduction request. */
/* Locate the rend circ which is waiting to hear about this ack,
@@ -361,7 +436,7 @@ rend_client_introduction_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ,
/* Set timestamp_dirty, because circuit_expire_building expects
* it to specify when a circuit entered the
* _C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED state. */
- rendcirc->_base.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
+ rendcirc->base_.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
} else {
log_info(LD_REND,"...Found no rend circ. Dropping on the floor.");
}
@@ -369,6 +444,9 @@ rend_client_introduction_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ,
circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circ),
CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACKED);
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
+
+ /* close any other intros launched in parallel */
+ rend_client_close_other_intros(circ->rend_data->onion_address);
} else {
/* It's a NAK; the introduction point didn't relay our request. */
circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING);
@@ -525,7 +603,7 @@ rend_client_purge_last_hid_serv_requests(void)
if (old_last_hid_serv_requests != NULL) {
log_info(LD_REND, "Purging client last-HS-desc-request-time table");
- strmap_free(old_last_hid_serv_requests, _tor_free);
+ strmap_free(old_last_hid_serv_requests, tor_free_);
}
}
@@ -602,7 +680,8 @@ directory_get_from_hs_dir(const char *desc_id, const rend_data_t *rend_query)
directory_initiate_command_routerstatus_rend(hs_dir,
DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_RENDDESC_V2,
ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL,
- !tor2web_mode, desc_id_base32,
+ tor2web_mode?DIRIND_ONEHOP:DIRIND_ANONYMOUS,
+ desc_id_base32,
NULL, 0, 0,
rend_query);
log_info(LD_REND, "Sending fetch request for v2 descriptor for "
@@ -659,10 +738,17 @@ rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(const rend_data_t *rend_query)
time(NULL), chosen_replica) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Internal error: Computing v2 rendezvous "
"descriptor ID did not succeed.");
- return;
+ /*
+ * Hmm, can this write anything to descriptor_id and still fail?
+ * Let's clear it just to be safe.
+ *
+ * From here on, any returns should goto done which clears
+ * descriptor_id so we don't leave key-derived material on the stack.
+ */
+ goto done;
}
if (directory_get_from_hs_dir(descriptor_id, rend_query) != 0)
- return; /* either success or failure, but we're done */
+ goto done; /* either success or failure, but we're done */
}
/* If we come here, there are no hidden service directories left. */
log_info(LD_REND, "Could not pick one of the responsible hidden "
@@ -670,6 +756,10 @@ rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(const rend_data_t *rend_query)
"we already tried them all unsuccessfully.");
/* Close pending connections. */
rend_client_desc_trynow(rend_query->onion_address);
+
+ done:
+ memwipe(descriptor_id, 0, sizeof(descriptor_id));
+
return;
}
@@ -818,7 +908,7 @@ rend_client_rendezvous_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
(void) request;
(void) request_len;
/* we just got an ack for our establish-rendezvous. switch purposes. */
- if (circ->_base.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND) {
+ if (circ->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND) {
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,"Got a rendezvous ack when we weren't expecting one. "
"Closing circ.");
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
@@ -829,7 +919,14 @@ rend_client_rendezvous_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY);
/* Set timestamp_dirty, because circuit_expire_building expects it
* to specify when a circuit entered the _C_REND_READY state. */
- circ->_base.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
+ circ->base_.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
+
+ /* From a path bias point of view, this circuit is now successfully used.
+ * Waiting any longer opens us up to attacks from Bob. He could induce
+ * Alice to attempt to connect to his hidden service and never reply
+ * to her rend requests */
+ pathbias_mark_use_success(circ);
+
/* XXXX This is a pretty brute-force approach. It'd be better to
* attach only the connections that are waiting on this circuit, rather
* than trying to attach them all. See comments bug 743. */
@@ -847,8 +944,8 @@ rend_client_receive_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
crypt_path_t *hop;
char keys[DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN];
- if ((circ->_base.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY &&
- circ->_base.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED)
+ if ((circ->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY &&
+ circ->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED)
|| !circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath) {
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,"Got rendezvous2 cell from hidden service, but not "
"expecting it. Closing.");
@@ -868,9 +965,9 @@ rend_client_receive_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
tor_assert(circ->build_state);
tor_assert(circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath);
hop = circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath;
- tor_assert(hop->dh_handshake_state);
+ tor_assert(hop->rend_dh_handshake_state);
if (crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN,
- hop->dh_handshake_state, (char*)request,
+ hop->rend_dh_handshake_state, (char*)request,
DH_KEY_LEN,
keys, DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN)<0) {
log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't complete DH handshake.");
@@ -886,8 +983,8 @@ rend_client_receive_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
goto err;
}
- crypto_dh_free(hop->dh_handshake_state);
- hop->dh_handshake_state = NULL;
+ crypto_dh_free(hop->rend_dh_handshake_state);
+ hop->rend_dh_handshake_state = NULL;
/* All is well. Extend the circuit. */
circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED);
@@ -1172,11 +1269,11 @@ rend_parse_service_authorization(const or_options_t *options,
strmap_t *parsed = strmap_new();
smartlist_t *sl = smartlist_new();
rend_service_authorization_t *auth = NULL;
+ char descriptor_cookie_tmp[REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN+2];
+ char descriptor_cookie_base64ext[REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN_BASE64+2+1];
for (line = options->HidServAuth; line; line = line->next) {
char *onion_address, *descriptor_cookie;
- char descriptor_cookie_tmp[REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN+2];
- char descriptor_cookie_base64ext[REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN_BASE64+2+1];
int auth_type_val = 0;
auth = NULL;
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl, char *, c, tor_free(c););
@@ -1222,7 +1319,7 @@ rend_parse_service_authorization(const or_options_t *options,
descriptor_cookie);
goto err;
}
- auth_type_val = (descriptor_cookie_tmp[16] >> 4) + 1;
+ auth_type_val = (((uint8_t)descriptor_cookie_tmp[16]) >> 4) + 1;
if (auth_type_val < 1 || auth_type_val > 2) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Authorization cookie has unknown authorization "
"type encoded.");
@@ -1253,6 +1350,8 @@ rend_parse_service_authorization(const or_options_t *options,
} else {
strmap_free(parsed, rend_service_authorization_strmap_item_free);
}
+ memwipe(descriptor_cookie_tmp, 0, sizeof(descriptor_cookie_tmp));
+ memwipe(descriptor_cookie_base64ext, 0, sizeof(descriptor_cookie_base64ext));
return res;
}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.4) at 2024-05-25 19:09:06 +0000