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Diffstat (limited to 'src/or/entrynodes.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/entrynodes.h | 132 |
1 files changed, 132 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.h b/src/or/entrynodes.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e229f3b79 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.h @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2013, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file entrynodes.h + * \brief Header file for circuitbuild.c. + **/ + +#ifndef TOR_ENTRYNODES_H +#define TOR_ENTRYNODES_H + +#if 1 +/* XXXX NM I would prefer that all of this stuff be private to + * entrynodes.c. */ + +/** An entry_guard_t represents our information about a chosen long-term + * first hop, known as a "helper" node in the literature. We can't just + * use a node_t, since we want to remember these even when we + * don't have any directory info. */ +typedef struct entry_guard_t { + char nickname[MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1]; + char identity[DIGEST_LEN]; + time_t chosen_on_date; /**< Approximately when was this guard added? + * "0" if we don't know. */ + char *chosen_by_version; /**< What tor version added this guard? NULL + * if we don't know. */ + unsigned int made_contact : 1; /**< 0 if we have never connected to this + * router, 1 if we have. */ + unsigned int can_retry : 1; /**< Should we retry connecting to this entry, + * in spite of having it marked as unreachable?*/ + unsigned int path_bias_noticed : 1; /**< Did we alert the user about path + * bias for this node already? */ + unsigned int path_bias_warned : 1; /**< Did we alert the user about path bias + * for this node already? */ + unsigned int path_bias_extreme : 1; /**< Did we alert the user about path + * bias for this node already? */ + unsigned int path_bias_disabled : 1; /**< Have we disabled this node because + * of path bias issues? */ + unsigned int path_bias_use_noticed : 1; /**< Did we alert the user about path + * use bias for this node already? */ + unsigned int path_bias_use_extreme : 1; /**< Did we alert the user about path + * use bias for this node already? */ + unsigned int is_dir_cache : 1; /**< Is this node a directory cache? */ + time_t bad_since; /**< 0 if this guard is currently usable, or the time at + * which it was observed to become (according to the + * directory or the user configuration) unusable. */ + time_t unreachable_since; /**< 0 if we can connect to this guard, or the + * time at which we first noticed we couldn't + * connect to it. */ + time_t last_attempted; /**< 0 if we can connect to this guard, or the time + * at which we last failed to connect to it. */ + + double circ_attempts; /**< Number of circuits this guard has "attempted" */ + double circ_successes; /**< Number of successfully built circuits using + * this guard as first hop. */ + double successful_circuits_closed; /**< Number of circuits that carried + * streams successfully. */ + double collapsed_circuits; /**< Number of fully built circuits that were + * remotely closed before any streams were + * attempted. */ + double unusable_circuits; /**< Number of circuits for which streams were + * attempted, but none succeeded. */ + double timeouts; /**< Number of 'right-censored' circuit timeouts for this + * guard. */ + double use_attempts; /**< Number of circuits we tried to use with streams */ + double use_successes; /**< Number of successfully used circuits using + * this guard as first hop. */ +} entry_guard_t; + +entry_guard_t *entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(const char *digest); +void entry_guards_changed(void); +const smartlist_t *get_entry_guards(void); +int num_live_entry_guards(int for_directory); + +#endif + +void remove_all_entry_guards(void); + +void entry_guards_compute_status(const or_options_t *options, time_t now); +int entry_guard_register_connect_status(const char *digest, int succeeded, + int mark_relay_status, time_t now); +void entry_nodes_should_be_added(void); +int entry_list_is_constrained(const or_options_t *options); +const node_t *choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state); +const node_t *choose_random_dirguard(dirinfo_type_t t); +int entry_guards_parse_state(or_state_t *state, int set, char **msg); +void entry_guards_update_state(or_state_t *state); +int getinfo_helper_entry_guards(control_connection_t *conn, + const char *question, char **answer, + const char **errmsg); + +void mark_bridge_list(void); +void sweep_bridge_list(void); + +int routerinfo_is_a_configured_bridge(const routerinfo_t *ri); +int node_is_a_configured_bridge(const node_t *node); +void learned_router_identity(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, + const char *digest); +struct bridge_line_t; +void bridge_add_from_config(struct bridge_line_t *bridge_line); +void retry_bridge_descriptor_fetch_directly(const char *digest); +void fetch_bridge_descriptors(const or_options_t *options, time_t now); +void learned_bridge_descriptor(routerinfo_t *ri, int from_cache); +int any_bridge_descriptors_known(void); +int entries_known_but_down(const or_options_t *options); +void entries_retry_all(const or_options_t *options); + +int any_bridge_supports_microdescriptors(void); +const smartlist_t *get_socks_args_by_bridge_addrport(const tor_addr_t *addr, + uint16_t port); + +int any_bridges_dont_support_microdescriptors(void); + +void entry_guards_free_all(void); + +const char *find_transport_name_by_bridge_addrport(const tor_addr_t *addr, + uint16_t port); +struct transport_t; +int get_transport_by_bridge_addrport(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, + const struct transport_t **transport); + +int transport_is_needed(const char *transport_name); +int validate_pluggable_transports_config(void); + +double pathbias_get_close_success_count(entry_guard_t *guard); +double pathbias_get_use_success_count(entry_guard_t *guard); + +#endif + |