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Diffstat (limited to 'src/or/entrynodes.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/entrynodes.c | 2327 |
1 files changed, 2327 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..957217ac6 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c @@ -0,0 +1,2327 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2013, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file entrynodes.c + * \brief Code to manage our fixed first nodes for various functions. + * + * Entry nodes can be guards (for general use) or bridges (for censorship + * circumvention). + **/ + +#include "or.h" +#include "circpathbias.h" +#include "circuitbuild.h" +#include "circuitstats.h" +#include "config.h" +#include "confparse.h" +#include "connection.h" +#include "connection_or.h" +#include "control.h" +#include "directory.h" +#include "entrynodes.h" +#include "main.h" +#include "microdesc.h" +#include "networkstatus.h" +#include "nodelist.h" +#include "policies.h" +#include "router.h" +#include "routerlist.h" +#include "routerparse.h" +#include "routerset.h" +#include "transports.h" +#include "statefile.h" + +/** Information about a configured bridge. Currently this just matches the + * ones in the torrc file, but one day we may be able to learn about new + * bridges on our own, and remember them in the state file. */ +typedef struct { + /** Address of the bridge. */ + tor_addr_t addr; + /** TLS port for the bridge. */ + uint16_t port; + /** Boolean: We are re-parsing our bridge list, and we are going to remove + * this one if we don't find it in the list of configured bridges. */ + unsigned marked_for_removal : 1; + /** Expected identity digest, or all zero bytes if we don't know what the + * digest should be. */ + char identity[DIGEST_LEN]; + + /** Name of pluggable transport protocol taken from its config line. */ + char *transport_name; + + /** When should we next try to fetch a descriptor for this bridge? */ + download_status_t fetch_status; + + /** A smartlist of k=v values to be passed to the SOCKS proxy, if + transports are used for this bridge. */ + smartlist_t *socks_args; +} bridge_info_t; + +/** A list of our chosen entry guards. */ +static smartlist_t *entry_guards = NULL; +/** A value of 1 means that the entry_guards list has changed + * and those changes need to be flushed to disk. */ +static int entry_guards_dirty = 0; + +static void bridge_free(bridge_info_t *bridge); +static const node_t *choose_random_entry_impl(cpath_build_state_t *state, + int for_directory, + dirinfo_type_t dirtype, + int *n_options_out); +static int num_bridges_usable(void); + +/** Return the list of entry guards, creating it if necessary. */ +const smartlist_t * +get_entry_guards(void) +{ + if (! entry_guards) + entry_guards = smartlist_new(); + return entry_guards; +} + +/** Check whether the entry guard <b>e</b> is usable, given the directory + * authorities' opinion about the router (stored in <b>ri</b>) and the user's + * configuration (in <b>options</b>). Set <b>e</b>->bad_since + * accordingly. Return true iff the entry guard's status changes. + * + * If it's not usable, set *<b>reason</b> to a static string explaining why. + */ +static int +entry_guard_set_status(entry_guard_t *e, const node_t *node, + time_t now, const or_options_t *options, + const char **reason) +{ + char buf[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1]; + int changed = 0; + + *reason = NULL; + + /* Do we want to mark this guard as bad? */ + if (!node) + *reason = "unlisted"; + else if (!node->is_running) + *reason = "down"; + else if (options->UseBridges && (!node->ri || + node->ri->purpose != ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE)) + *reason = "not a bridge"; + else if (options->UseBridges && !node_is_a_configured_bridge(node)) + *reason = "not a configured bridge"; + else if (!options->UseBridges && !node->is_possible_guard && + !routerset_contains_node(options->EntryNodes,node)) + *reason = "not recommended as a guard"; + else if (routerset_contains_node(options->ExcludeNodes, node)) + *reason = "excluded"; + else if (e->path_bias_disabled) + *reason = "path-biased"; + + if (*reason && ! e->bad_since) { + /* Router is newly bad. */ + base16_encode(buf, sizeof(buf), e->identity, DIGEST_LEN); + log_info(LD_CIRC, "Entry guard %s (%s) is %s: marking as unusable.", + e->nickname, buf, *reason); + + e->bad_since = now; + control_event_guard(e->nickname, e->identity, "BAD"); + changed = 1; + } else if (!*reason && e->bad_since) { + /* There's nothing wrong with the router any more. */ + base16_encode(buf, sizeof(buf), e->identity, DIGEST_LEN); + log_info(LD_CIRC, "Entry guard %s (%s) is no longer unusable: " + "marking as ok.", e->nickname, buf); + + e->bad_since = 0; + control_event_guard(e->nickname, e->identity, "GOOD"); + changed = 1; + } + + if (node) { + int is_dir = node_is_dir(node) && node->rs && + node->rs->version_supports_microdesc_cache; + if (options->UseBridges && node_is_a_configured_bridge(node)) + is_dir = 1; + if (e->is_dir_cache != is_dir) { + e->is_dir_cache = is_dir; + changed = 1; + } + } + + return changed; +} + +/** Return true iff enough time has passed since we last tried to connect + * to the unreachable guard <b>e</b> that we're willing to try again. */ +static int +entry_is_time_to_retry(entry_guard_t *e, time_t now) +{ + long diff; + if (e->last_attempted < e->unreachable_since) + return 1; + diff = now - e->unreachable_since; + if (diff < 6*60*60) + return now > (e->last_attempted + 60*60); + else if (diff < 3*24*60*60) + return now > (e->last_attempted + 4*60*60); + else if (diff < 7*24*60*60) + return now > (e->last_attempted + 18*60*60); + else + return now > (e->last_attempted + 36*60*60); +} + +/** Return the node corresponding to <b>e</b>, if <b>e</b> is + * working well enough that we are willing to use it as an entry + * right now. (Else return NULL.) In particular, it must be + * - Listed as either up or never yet contacted; + * - Present in the routerlist; + * - Listed as 'stable' or 'fast' by the current dirserver consensus, + * if demanded by <b>need_uptime</b> or <b>need_capacity</b> + * (unless it's a configured EntryNode); + * - Allowed by our current ReachableORAddresses config option; and + * - Currently thought to be reachable by us (unless <b>assume_reachable</b> + * is true). + * + * If the answer is no, set *<b>msg</b> to an explanation of why. + * + * If need_descriptor is true, only return the node if we currently have + * a descriptor (routerinfo or microdesc) for it. + */ +static INLINE const node_t * +entry_is_live(entry_guard_t *e, int need_uptime, int need_capacity, + int assume_reachable, int need_descriptor, const char **msg) +{ + const node_t *node; + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + tor_assert(msg); + + if (e->path_bias_disabled) { + *msg = "path-biased"; + return NULL; + } + if (e->bad_since) { + *msg = "bad"; + return NULL; + } + /* no good if it's unreachable, unless assume_unreachable or can_retry. */ + if (!assume_reachable && !e->can_retry && + e->unreachable_since && !entry_is_time_to_retry(e, time(NULL))) { + *msg = "unreachable"; + return NULL; + } + node = node_get_by_id(e->identity); + if (!node) { + *msg = "no node info"; + return NULL; + } + if (need_descriptor && !node_has_descriptor(node)) { + *msg = "no descriptor"; + return NULL; + } + if (get_options()->UseBridges) { + if (node_get_purpose(node) != ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE) { + *msg = "not a bridge"; + return NULL; + } + if (!node_is_a_configured_bridge(node)) { + *msg = "not a configured bridge"; + return NULL; + } + } else { /* !get_options()->UseBridges */ + if (node_get_purpose(node) != ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL) { + *msg = "not general-purpose"; + return NULL; + } + } + if (routerset_contains_node(options->EntryNodes, node)) { + /* they asked for it, they get it */ + need_uptime = need_capacity = 0; + } + if (node_is_unreliable(node, need_uptime, need_capacity, 0)) { + *msg = "not fast/stable"; + return NULL; + } + if (!fascist_firewall_allows_node(node)) { + *msg = "unreachable by config"; + return NULL; + } + return node; +} + +/** Return the number of entry guards that we think are usable. */ +int +num_live_entry_guards(int for_directory) +{ + int n = 0; + const char *msg; + if (! entry_guards) + return 0; + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry) { + if (for_directory && !entry->is_dir_cache) + continue; + if (entry_is_live(entry, 0, 1, 0, !for_directory, &msg)) + ++n; + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(entry); + return n; +} + +/** If <b>digest</b> matches the identity of any node in the + * entry_guards list, return that node. Else return NULL. */ +entry_guard_t * +entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(const char *digest) +{ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry, + if (tor_memeq(digest, entry->identity, DIGEST_LEN)) + return entry; + ); + return NULL; +} + +/** Dump a description of our list of entry guards to the log at level + * <b>severity</b>. */ +static void +log_entry_guards(int severity) +{ + smartlist_t *elements = smartlist_new(); + char *s; + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e) + { + const char *msg = NULL; + if (entry_is_live(e, 0, 1, 0, 0, &msg)) + smartlist_add_asprintf(elements, "%s [%s] (up %s)", + e->nickname, + hex_str(e->identity, DIGEST_LEN), + e->made_contact ? "made-contact" : "never-contacted"); + else + smartlist_add_asprintf(elements, "%s [%s] (%s, %s)", + e->nickname, + hex_str(e->identity, DIGEST_LEN), + msg, + e->made_contact ? "made-contact" : "never-contacted"); + } + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(e); + + s = smartlist_join_strings(elements, ",", 0, NULL); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(elements, char*, cp, tor_free(cp)); + smartlist_free(elements); + log_fn(severity,LD_CIRC,"%s",s); + tor_free(s); +} + +/** Called when one or more guards that we would previously have used for some + * purpose are no longer in use because a higher-priority guard has become + * usable again. */ +static void +control_event_guard_deferred(void) +{ + /* XXXX We don't actually have a good way to figure out _how many_ entries + * are live for some purpose. We need an entry_is_even_slightly_live() + * function for this to work right. NumEntryGuards isn't reliable: if we + * need guards with weird properties, we can have more than that number + * live. + **/ +#if 0 + int n = 0; + const char *msg; + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + if (!entry_guards) + return; + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry, + { + if (entry_is_live(entry, 0, 1, 0, &msg)) { + if (n++ == options->NumEntryGuards) { + control_event_guard(entry->nickname, entry->identity, "DEFERRED"); + return; + } + } + }); +#endif +} + +/** Largest amount that we'll backdate chosen_on_date */ +#define CHOSEN_ON_DATE_SLOP (30*86400) + +/** Add a new (preferably stable and fast) router to our + * entry_guards list. Return a pointer to the router if we succeed, + * or NULL if we can't find any more suitable entries. + * + * If <b>chosen</b> is defined, use that one, and if it's not + * already in our entry_guards list, put it at the *beginning*. + * Else, put the one we pick at the end of the list. */ +static const node_t * +add_an_entry_guard(const node_t *chosen, int reset_status, int prepend, + int for_discovery, int for_directory) +{ + const node_t *node; + entry_guard_t *entry; + + if (chosen) { + node = chosen; + entry = entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(node->identity); + if (entry) { + if (reset_status) { + entry->bad_since = 0; + entry->can_retry = 1; + } + entry->is_dir_cache = node->rs && + node->rs->version_supports_microdesc_cache; + if (get_options()->UseBridges && node_is_a_configured_bridge(node)) + entry->is_dir_cache = 1; + return NULL; + } + } else if (!for_directory) { + node = choose_good_entry_server(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL, NULL); + if (!node) + return NULL; + } else { + const routerstatus_t *rs; + rs = router_pick_directory_server(MICRODESC_DIRINFO|V3_DIRINFO, + PDS_FOR_GUARD); + if (!rs) + return NULL; + node = node_get_by_id(rs->identity_digest); + if (!node) + return NULL; + } + if (node->using_as_guard) + return NULL; + if (entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(node->identity) != NULL) { + log_info(LD_CIRC, "I was about to add a duplicate entry guard."); + /* This can happen if we choose a guard, then the node goes away, then + * comes back. */ + ((node_t*) node)->using_as_guard = 1; + return NULL; + } + entry = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(entry_guard_t)); + log_info(LD_CIRC, "Chose %s as new entry guard.", + node_describe(node)); + strlcpy(entry->nickname, node_get_nickname(node), sizeof(entry->nickname)); + memcpy(entry->identity, node->identity, DIGEST_LEN); + entry->is_dir_cache = node_is_dir(node) && node->rs && + node->rs->version_supports_microdesc_cache; + if (get_options()->UseBridges && node_is_a_configured_bridge(node)) + entry->is_dir_cache = 1; + + /* Choose expiry time smudged over the past month. The goal here + * is to a) spread out when Tor clients rotate their guards, so they + * don't all select them on the same day, and b) avoid leaving a + * precise timestamp in the state file about when we first picked + * this guard. For details, see the Jan 2010 or-dev thread. */ + entry->chosen_on_date = time(NULL) - crypto_rand_int(3600*24*30); + entry->chosen_by_version = tor_strdup(VERSION); + + /* Are we picking this guard because all of our current guards are + * down so we need another one (for_discovery is 1), or because we + * decided we need more variety in our guard list (for_discovery is 0)? + * + * Currently we hack this behavior into place by setting "made_contact" + * for guards of the latter variety, so we'll be willing to use any of + * them right off the bat. + */ + if (!for_discovery) + entry->made_contact = 1; + + ((node_t*)node)->using_as_guard = 1; + if (prepend) + smartlist_insert(entry_guards, 0, entry); + else + smartlist_add(entry_guards, entry); + control_event_guard(entry->nickname, entry->identity, "NEW"); + control_event_guard_deferred(); + log_entry_guards(LOG_INFO); + return node; +} + +/** Choose how many entry guards or directory guards we'll use. If + * <b>for_directory</b> is true, we return how many directory guards to + * use; else we return how many entry guards to use. */ +static int +decide_num_guards(const or_options_t *options, int for_directory) +{ + if (for_directory && options->NumDirectoryGuards != 0) + return options->NumDirectoryGuards; + return options->NumEntryGuards; +} + +/** If the use of entry guards is configured, choose more entry guards + * until we have enough in the list. */ +static void +pick_entry_guards(const or_options_t *options, int for_directory) +{ + int changed = 0; + const int num_needed = decide_num_guards(options, for_directory); + + tor_assert(entry_guards); + + while (num_live_entry_guards(for_directory) < num_needed) { + if (!add_an_entry_guard(NULL, 0, 0, 0, for_directory)) + break; + changed = 1; + } + if (changed) + entry_guards_changed(); +} + +/** How long (in seconds) do we allow an entry guard to be nonfunctional, + * unlisted, excluded, or otherwise nonusable before we give up on it? */ +#define ENTRY_GUARD_REMOVE_AFTER (30*24*60*60) + +/** Release all storage held by <b>e</b>. */ +static void +entry_guard_free(entry_guard_t *e) +{ + if (!e) + return; + tor_free(e->chosen_by_version); + tor_free(e); +} + +/** + * Return the minimum lifetime of working entry guard, in seconds, + * as given in the consensus networkstatus. (Plus CHOSEN_ON_DATE_SLOP, + * so that we can do the chosen_on_date randomization while achieving the + * desired minimum lifetime.) + */ +static int32_t +guards_get_lifetime(void) +{ + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); +#define DFLT_GUARD_LIFETIME (86400 * 60) /* Two months. */ +#define MIN_GUARD_LIFETIME (86400 * 30) /* One months. */ +#define MAX_GUARD_LIFETIME (86400 * 1826) /* Five years. */ + + if (options->GuardLifetime >= 1) { + return CLAMP(MIN_GUARD_LIFETIME, + options->GuardLifetime, + MAX_GUARD_LIFETIME) + CHOSEN_ON_DATE_SLOP; + } + + return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "GuardLifetime", + DFLT_GUARD_LIFETIME, + MIN_GUARD_LIFETIME, + MAX_GUARD_LIFETIME) + CHOSEN_ON_DATE_SLOP; +} + +/** Remove any entry guard which was selected by an unknown version of Tor, + * or which was selected by a version of Tor that's known to select + * entry guards badly, or which was selected more 2 months ago. */ +/* XXXX The "obsolete guards" and "chosen long ago guards" things should + * probably be different functions. */ +static int +remove_obsolete_entry_guards(time_t now) +{ + int changed = 0, i; + int32_t guard_lifetime = guards_get_lifetime(); + + for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(entry_guards); ++i) { + entry_guard_t *entry = smartlist_get(entry_guards, i); + const char *ver = entry->chosen_by_version; + const char *msg = NULL; + tor_version_t v; + int version_is_bad = 0, date_is_bad = 0; + if (!ver) { + msg = "does not say what version of Tor it was selected by"; + version_is_bad = 1; + } else if (tor_version_parse(ver, &v)) { + msg = "does not seem to be from any recognized version of Tor"; + version_is_bad = 1; + } else { + char *tor_ver = NULL; + tor_asprintf(&tor_ver, "Tor %s", ver); + if ((tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.1.0.10-alpha") && + !tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.1.2.16-dev")) || + (tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.2.0.0-alpha") && + !tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.2.0.6-alpha")) || + /* above are bug 440; below are bug 1217 */ + (tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.2.1.3-alpha") && + !tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.2.1.23")) || + (tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.2.2.0-alpha") && + !tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.2.2.7-alpha"))) { + msg = "was selected without regard for guard bandwidth"; + version_is_bad = 1; + } + tor_free(tor_ver); + } + if (!version_is_bad && entry->chosen_on_date + guard_lifetime < now) { + /* It's been too long since the date listed in our state file. */ + msg = "was selected several months ago"; + date_is_bad = 1; + } + + if (version_is_bad || date_is_bad) { /* we need to drop it */ + char dbuf[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1]; + tor_assert(msg); + base16_encode(dbuf, sizeof(dbuf), entry->identity, DIGEST_LEN); + log_fn(version_is_bad ? LOG_NOTICE : LOG_INFO, LD_CIRC, + "Entry guard '%s' (%s) %s. (Version=%s.) Replacing it.", + entry->nickname, dbuf, msg, ver?escaped(ver):"none"); + control_event_guard(entry->nickname, entry->identity, "DROPPED"); + entry_guard_free(entry); + smartlist_del_keeporder(entry_guards, i--); + log_entry_guards(LOG_INFO); + changed = 1; + } + } + + return changed ? 1 : 0; +} + +/** Remove all entry guards that have been down or unlisted for so + * long that we don't think they'll come up again. Return 1 if we + * removed any, or 0 if we did nothing. */ +static int +remove_dead_entry_guards(time_t now) +{ + char dbuf[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1]; + char tbuf[ISO_TIME_LEN+1]; + int i; + int changed = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(entry_guards); ) { + entry_guard_t *entry = smartlist_get(entry_guards, i); + if (entry->bad_since && + ! entry->path_bias_disabled && + entry->bad_since + ENTRY_GUARD_REMOVE_AFTER < now) { + + base16_encode(dbuf, sizeof(dbuf), entry->identity, DIGEST_LEN); + format_local_iso_time(tbuf, entry->bad_since); + log_info(LD_CIRC, "Entry guard '%s' (%s) has been down or unlisted " + "since %s local time; removing.", + entry->nickname, dbuf, tbuf); + control_event_guard(entry->nickname, entry->identity, "DROPPED"); + entry_guard_free(entry); + smartlist_del_keeporder(entry_guards, i); + log_entry_guards(LOG_INFO); + changed = 1; + } else + ++i; + } + return changed ? 1 : 0; +} + +/** Remove all currently listed entry guards. So new ones will be chosen. */ +void +remove_all_entry_guards(void) +{ + char dbuf[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1]; + + while (smartlist_len(entry_guards)) { + entry_guard_t *entry = smartlist_get(entry_guards, 0); + base16_encode(dbuf, sizeof(dbuf), entry->identity, DIGEST_LEN); + log_info(LD_CIRC, "Entry guard '%s' (%s) has been dropped.", + entry->nickname, dbuf); + control_event_guard(entry->nickname, entry->identity, "DROPPED"); + entry_guard_free(entry); + smartlist_del(entry_guards, 0); + } + log_entry_guards(LOG_INFO); + entry_guards_changed(); +} + +/** A new directory or router-status has arrived; update the down/listed + * status of the entry guards. + * + * An entry is 'down' if the directory lists it as nonrunning. + * An entry is 'unlisted' if the directory doesn't include it. + * + * Don't call this on startup; only on a fresh download. Otherwise we'll + * think that things are unlisted. + */ +void +entry_guards_compute_status(const or_options_t *options, time_t now) +{ + int changed = 0; + digestmap_t *reasons; + + if (! entry_guards) + return; + + if (options->EntryNodes) /* reshuffle the entry guard list if needed */ + entry_nodes_should_be_added(); + + reasons = digestmap_new(); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry) + { + const node_t *r = node_get_by_id(entry->identity); + const char *reason = NULL; + if (entry_guard_set_status(entry, r, now, options, &reason)) + changed = 1; + + if (entry->bad_since) + tor_assert(reason); + if (reason) + digestmap_set(reasons, entry->identity, (char*)reason); + } + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(entry); + + if (remove_dead_entry_guards(now)) + changed = 1; + if (remove_obsolete_entry_guards(now)) + changed = 1; + + if (changed) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry) { + const char *reason = digestmap_get(reasons, entry->identity); + const char *live_msg = ""; + const node_t *r = entry_is_live(entry, 0, 1, 0, 0, &live_msg); + log_info(LD_CIRC, "Summary: Entry %s [%s] is %s, %s%s%s, and %s%s.", + entry->nickname, + hex_str(entry->identity, DIGEST_LEN), + entry->unreachable_since ? "unreachable" : "reachable", + entry->bad_since ? "unusable" : "usable", + reason ? ", ": "", + reason ? reason : "", + r ? "live" : "not live / ", + r ? "" : live_msg); + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(entry); + log_info(LD_CIRC, " (%d/%d entry guards are usable/new)", + num_live_entry_guards(0), smartlist_len(entry_guards)); + log_entry_guards(LOG_INFO); + entry_guards_changed(); + } + + digestmap_free(reasons, NULL); +} + +/** Called when a connection to an OR with the identity digest <b>digest</b> + * is established (<b>succeeded</b>==1) or has failed (<b>succeeded</b>==0). + * If the OR is an entry, change that entry's up/down status. + * Return 0 normally, or -1 if we want to tear down the new connection. + * + * If <b>mark_relay_status</b>, also call router_set_status() on this + * relay. + * + * XXX024 change succeeded and mark_relay_status into 'int flags'. + */ +int +entry_guard_register_connect_status(const char *digest, int succeeded, + int mark_relay_status, time_t now) +{ + int changed = 0; + int refuse_conn = 0; + int first_contact = 0; + entry_guard_t *entry = NULL; + int idx = -1; + char buf[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1]; + + if (! entry_guards) + return 0; + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e) { + tor_assert(e); + if (tor_memeq(e->identity, digest, DIGEST_LEN)) { + entry = e; + idx = e_sl_idx; + break; + } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(e); + + if (!entry) + return 0; + + base16_encode(buf, sizeof(buf), entry->identity, DIGEST_LEN); + + if (succeeded) { + if (entry->unreachable_since) { + log_info(LD_CIRC, "Entry guard '%s' (%s) is now reachable again. Good.", + entry->nickname, buf); + entry->can_retry = 0; + entry->unreachable_since = 0; + entry->last_attempted = now; + control_event_guard(entry->nickname, entry->identity, "UP"); + changed = 1; + } + if (!entry->made_contact) { + entry->made_contact = 1; + first_contact = changed = 1; + } + } else { /* ! succeeded */ + if (!entry->made_contact) { + /* We've never connected to this one. */ + log_info(LD_CIRC, + "Connection to never-contacted entry guard '%s' (%s) failed. " + "Removing from the list. %d/%d entry guards usable/new.", + entry->nickname, buf, + num_live_entry_guards(0)-1, smartlist_len(entry_guards)-1); + control_event_guard(entry->nickname, entry->identity, "DROPPED"); + entry_guard_free(entry); + smartlist_del_keeporder(entry_guards, idx); + log_entry_guards(LOG_INFO); + changed = 1; + } else if (!entry->unreachable_since) { + log_info(LD_CIRC, "Unable to connect to entry guard '%s' (%s). " + "Marking as unreachable.", entry->nickname, buf); + entry->unreachable_since = entry->last_attempted = now; + control_event_guard(entry->nickname, entry->identity, "DOWN"); + changed = 1; + entry->can_retry = 0; /* We gave it an early chance; no good. */ + } else { + char tbuf[ISO_TIME_LEN+1]; + format_iso_time(tbuf, entry->unreachable_since); + log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Failed to connect to unreachable entry guard " + "'%s' (%s). It has been unreachable since %s.", + entry->nickname, buf, tbuf); + entry->last_attempted = now; + entry->can_retry = 0; /* We gave it an early chance; no good. */ + } + } + + /* if the caller asked us to, also update the is_running flags for this + * relay */ + if (mark_relay_status) + router_set_status(digest, succeeded); + + if (first_contact) { + /* We've just added a new long-term entry guard. Perhaps the network just + * came back? We should give our earlier entries another try too, + * and close this connection so we don't use it before we've given + * the others a shot. */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e) { + if (e == entry) + break; + if (e->made_contact) { + const char *msg; + const node_t *r = entry_is_live(e, 0, 1, 1, 0, &msg); + if (r && e->unreachable_since) { + refuse_conn = 1; + e->can_retry = 1; + } + } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(e); + if (refuse_conn) { + log_info(LD_CIRC, + "Connected to new entry guard '%s' (%s). Marking earlier " + "entry guards up. %d/%d entry guards usable/new.", + entry->nickname, buf, + num_live_entry_guards(0), smartlist_len(entry_guards)); + log_entry_guards(LOG_INFO); + changed = 1; + } + } + + if (changed) + entry_guards_changed(); + return refuse_conn ? -1 : 0; +} + +/** When we try to choose an entry guard, should we parse and add + * config's EntryNodes first? */ +static int should_add_entry_nodes = 0; + +/** Called when the value of EntryNodes changes in our configuration. */ +void +entry_nodes_should_be_added(void) +{ + log_info(LD_CIRC, "EntryNodes config option set. Putting configured " + "relays at the front of the entry guard list."); + should_add_entry_nodes = 1; +} + +/** Update the using_as_guard fields of all the nodes. We do this after we + * remove entry guards from the list: This is the only function that clears + * the using_as_guard field. */ +static void +update_node_guard_status(void) +{ + smartlist_t *nodes = nodelist_get_list(); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(nodes, node_t *, node, node->using_as_guard = 0); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry) { + node_t *node = node_get_mutable_by_id(entry->identity); + if (node) + node->using_as_guard = 1; + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(entry); +} + +/** Adjust the entry guards list so that it only contains entries from + * EntryNodes, adding new entries from EntryNodes to the list as needed. */ +static void +entry_guards_set_from_config(const or_options_t *options) +{ + smartlist_t *entry_nodes, *worse_entry_nodes, *entry_fps; + smartlist_t *old_entry_guards_on_list, *old_entry_guards_not_on_list; + tor_assert(entry_guards); + + should_add_entry_nodes = 0; + + if (!options->EntryNodes) { + /* It's possible that a controller set EntryNodes, thus making + * should_add_entry_nodes set, then cleared it again, all before the + * call to choose_random_entry() that triggered us. If so, just return. + */ + return; + } + + { + char *string = routerset_to_string(options->EntryNodes); + log_info(LD_CIRC,"Adding configured EntryNodes '%s'.", string); + tor_free(string); + } + + entry_nodes = smartlist_new(); + worse_entry_nodes = smartlist_new(); + entry_fps = smartlist_new(); + old_entry_guards_on_list = smartlist_new(); + old_entry_guards_not_on_list = smartlist_new(); + + /* Split entry guards into those on the list and those not. */ + + routerset_get_all_nodes(entry_nodes, options->EntryNodes, + options->ExcludeNodes, 0); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_nodes, const node_t *,node, + smartlist_add(entry_fps, (void*)node->identity)); + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e, { + if (smartlist_contains_digest(entry_fps, e->identity)) + smartlist_add(old_entry_guards_on_list, e); + else + smartlist_add(old_entry_guards_not_on_list, e); + }); + + /* Remove all currently configured guard nodes, excluded nodes, unreachable + * nodes, or non-Guard nodes from entry_nodes. */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_nodes, const node_t *, node) { + if (entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(node->identity)) { + SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(entry_nodes, node); + continue; + } else if (routerset_contains_node(options->ExcludeNodes, node)) { + SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(entry_nodes, node); + continue; + } else if (!fascist_firewall_allows_node(node)) { + SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(entry_nodes, node); + continue; + } else if (! node->is_possible_guard) { + smartlist_add(worse_entry_nodes, (node_t*)node); + SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(entry_nodes, node); + } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node); + + /* Now build the new entry_guards list. */ + smartlist_clear(entry_guards); + /* First, the previously configured guards that are in EntryNodes. */ + smartlist_add_all(entry_guards, old_entry_guards_on_list); + /* Next, scramble the rest of EntryNodes, putting the guards first. */ + smartlist_shuffle(entry_nodes); + smartlist_shuffle(worse_entry_nodes); + smartlist_add_all(entry_nodes, worse_entry_nodes); + + /* Next, the rest of EntryNodes */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_nodes, const node_t *, node) { + add_an_entry_guard(node, 0, 0, 1, 0); + if (smartlist_len(entry_guards) > options->NumEntryGuards * 10) + break; + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node); + log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "%d entries in guards", smartlist_len(entry_guards)); + /* Finally, free the remaining previously configured guards that are not in + * EntryNodes. */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(old_entry_guards_not_on_list, entry_guard_t *, e, + entry_guard_free(e)); + + update_node_guard_status(); + + smartlist_free(entry_nodes); + smartlist_free(worse_entry_nodes); + smartlist_free(entry_fps); + smartlist_free(old_entry_guards_on_list); + smartlist_free(old_entry_guards_not_on_list); + entry_guards_changed(); +} + +/** Return 0 if we're fine adding arbitrary routers out of the + * directory to our entry guard list, or return 1 if we have a + * list already and we must stick to it. + */ +int +entry_list_is_constrained(const or_options_t *options) +{ + if (options->EntryNodes) + return 1; + if (options->UseBridges) + return 1; + return 0; +} + +/** Return true iff this node can answer directory questions about + * microdescriptors. */ +static int +node_understands_microdescriptors(const node_t *node) +{ + tor_assert(node); + if (node->rs && node->rs->version_supports_microdesc_cache) + return 1; + if (node->ri && tor_version_supports_microdescriptors(node->ri->platform)) + return 1; + return 0; +} + +/** Return true iff <b>node</b> is able to answer directory questions + * of type <b>dirinfo</b>. */ +static int +node_can_handle_dirinfo(const node_t *node, dirinfo_type_t dirinfo) +{ + /* Checking dirinfo for any type other than microdescriptors isn't required + yet, since we only choose directory guards that can support microdescs, + routerinfos, and networkstatuses, AND we don't use directory guards if + we're configured to do direct downloads of anything else. The only case + where we might have a guard that doesn't know about a type of directory + information is when we're retrieving directory information from a + bridge. */ + + if ((dirinfo & MICRODESC_DIRINFO) && + !node_understands_microdescriptors(node)) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +/** Pick a live (up and listed) entry guard from entry_guards. If + * <b>state</b> is non-NULL, this is for a specific circuit -- + * make sure not to pick this circuit's exit or any node in the + * exit's family. If <b>state</b> is NULL, we're looking for a random + * guard (likely a bridge). If <b>dirinfo</b> is not NO_DIRINFO, then + * only select from nodes that know how to answer directory questions + * of that type. */ +const node_t * +choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state) +{ + return choose_random_entry_impl(state, 0, 0, NULL); +} + +/** Pick a live (up and listed) directory guard from entry_guards for + * downloading information of type <b>type</b>. */ +const node_t * +choose_random_dirguard(dirinfo_type_t type) +{ + return choose_random_entry_impl(NULL, 1, type, NULL); +} + +/** Helper for choose_random{entry,dirguard}. */ +static const node_t * +choose_random_entry_impl(cpath_build_state_t *state, int for_directory, + dirinfo_type_t dirinfo_type, int *n_options_out) +{ + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + smartlist_t *live_entry_guards = smartlist_new(); + smartlist_t *exit_family = smartlist_new(); + const node_t *chosen_exit = + state?build_state_get_exit_node(state) : NULL; + const node_t *node = NULL; + int need_uptime = state ? state->need_uptime : 0; + int need_capacity = state ? state->need_capacity : 0; + int preferred_min, consider_exit_family = 0; + int need_descriptor = !for_directory; + const int num_needed = decide_num_guards(options, for_directory); + + if (n_options_out) + *n_options_out = 0; + + if (chosen_exit) { + nodelist_add_node_and_family(exit_family, chosen_exit); + consider_exit_family = 1; + } + + if (!entry_guards) + entry_guards = smartlist_new(); + + if (should_add_entry_nodes) + entry_guards_set_from_config(options); + + if (!entry_list_is_constrained(options) && + smartlist_len(entry_guards) < num_needed) + pick_entry_guards(options, for_directory); + + retry: + smartlist_clear(live_entry_guards); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry) { + const char *msg; + node = entry_is_live(entry, need_uptime, need_capacity, 0, + need_descriptor, &msg); + if (!node) + continue; /* down, no point */ + if (for_directory) { + if (!entry->is_dir_cache) + continue; /* We need a directory and didn't get one. */ + } + if (node == chosen_exit) + continue; /* don't pick the same node for entry and exit */ + if (consider_exit_family && smartlist_contains(exit_family, node)) + continue; /* avoid relays that are family members of our exit */ + if (dirinfo_type != NO_DIRINFO && + !node_can_handle_dirinfo(node, dirinfo_type)) + continue; /* this node won't be able to answer our dir questions */ +#if 0 /* since EntryNodes is always strict now, this clause is moot */ + if (options->EntryNodes && + !routerset_contains_node(options->EntryNodes, node)) { + /* We've come to the end of our preferred entry nodes. */ + if (smartlist_len(live_entry_guards)) + goto choose_and_finish; /* only choose from the ones we like */ + if (options->StrictNodes) { + /* in theory this case should never happen, since + * entry_guards_set_from_config() drops unwanted relays */ + tor_fragile_assert(); + } else { + log_info(LD_CIRC, + "No relays from EntryNodes available. Using others."); + } + } +#endif + smartlist_add(live_entry_guards, (void*)node); + if (!entry->made_contact) { + /* Always start with the first not-yet-contacted entry + * guard. Otherwise we might add several new ones, pick + * the second new one, and now we've expanded our entry + * guard list without needing to. */ + goto choose_and_finish; + } + if (smartlist_len(live_entry_guards) >= num_needed) + goto choose_and_finish; /* we have enough */ + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(entry); + + if (entry_list_is_constrained(options)) { + /* If we prefer the entry nodes we've got, and we have at least + * one choice, that's great. Use it. */ + preferred_min = 1; + } else { + /* Try to have at least 2 choices available. This way we don't + * get stuck with a single live-but-crummy entry and just keep + * using him. + * (We might get 2 live-but-crummy entry guards, but so be it.) */ + preferred_min = 2; + } + + if (smartlist_len(live_entry_guards) < preferred_min) { + if (!entry_list_is_constrained(options)) { + /* still no? try adding a new entry then */ + /* XXX if guard doesn't imply fast and stable, then we need + * to tell add_an_entry_guard below what we want, or it might + * be a long time til we get it. -RD */ + node = add_an_entry_guard(NULL, 0, 0, 1, for_directory); + if (node) { + entry_guards_changed(); + /* XXX we start over here in case the new node we added shares + * a family with our exit node. There's a chance that we'll just + * load up on entry guards here, if the network we're using is + * one big family. Perhaps we should teach add_an_entry_guard() + * to understand nodes-to-avoid-if-possible? -RD */ + goto retry; + } + } + if (!node && need_uptime) { + need_uptime = 0; /* try without that requirement */ + goto retry; + } + if (!node && need_capacity) { + /* still no? last attempt, try without requiring capacity */ + need_capacity = 0; + goto retry; + } +#if 0 + /* Removing this retry logic: if we only allow one exit, and it is in the + same family as all our entries, then we are just plain not going to win + here. */ + if (!node && entry_list_is_constrained(options) && consider_exit_family) { + /* still no? if we're using bridges or have strictentrynodes + * set, and our chosen exit is in the same family as all our + * bridges/entry guards, then be flexible about families. */ + consider_exit_family = 0; + goto retry; + } +#endif + /* live_entry_guards may be empty below. Oh well, we tried. */ + } + + choose_and_finish: + if (entry_list_is_constrained(options)) { + /* We need to weight by bandwidth, because our bridges or entryguards + * were not already selected proportional to their bandwidth. */ + node = node_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(live_entry_guards, WEIGHT_FOR_GUARD); + } else { + /* We choose uniformly at random here, because choose_good_entry_server() + * already weights its choices by bandwidth, so we don't want to + * *double*-weight our guard selection. */ + node = smartlist_choose(live_entry_guards); + } + if (n_options_out) + *n_options_out = smartlist_len(live_entry_guards); + smartlist_free(live_entry_guards); + smartlist_free(exit_family); + return node; +} + +/** Parse <b>state</b> and learn about the entry guards it describes. + * If <b>set</b> is true, and there are no errors, replace the global + * entry_list with what we find. + * On success, return 0. On failure, alloc into *<b>msg</b> a string + * describing the error, and return -1. + */ +int +entry_guards_parse_state(or_state_t *state, int set, char **msg) +{ + entry_guard_t *node = NULL; + smartlist_t *new_entry_guards = smartlist_new(); + config_line_t *line; + time_t now = time(NULL); + const char *state_version = state->TorVersion; + digestmap_t *added_by = digestmap_new(); + + *msg = NULL; + for (line = state->EntryGuards; line; line = line->next) { + if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "EntryGuard")) { + smartlist_t *args = smartlist_new(); + node = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(entry_guard_t)); + /* all entry guards on disk have been contacted */ + node->made_contact = 1; + smartlist_add(new_entry_guards, node); + smartlist_split_string(args, line->value, " ", + SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0); + if (smartlist_len(args)<2) { + *msg = tor_strdup("Unable to parse entry nodes: " + "Too few arguments to EntryGuard"); + } else if (!is_legal_nickname(smartlist_get(args,0))) { + *msg = tor_strdup("Unable to parse entry nodes: " + "Bad nickname for EntryGuard"); + } else { + strlcpy(node->nickname, smartlist_get(args,0), MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1); + if (base16_decode(node->identity, DIGEST_LEN, smartlist_get(args,1), + strlen(smartlist_get(args,1)))<0) { + *msg = tor_strdup("Unable to parse entry nodes: " + "Bad hex digest for EntryGuard"); + } + } + if (smartlist_len(args) >= 3) { + const char *is_cache = smartlist_get(args, 2); + if (!strcasecmp(is_cache, "DirCache")) { + node->is_dir_cache = 1; + } else if (!strcasecmp(is_cache, "NoDirCache")) { + node->is_dir_cache = 0; + } else { + log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Bogus third argument to EntryGuard line: %s", + escaped(is_cache)); + } + } + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(args, char*, cp, tor_free(cp)); + smartlist_free(args); + if (*msg) + break; + } else if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "EntryGuardDownSince") || + !strcasecmp(line->key, "EntryGuardUnlistedSince")) { + time_t when; + time_t last_try = 0; + if (!node) { + *msg = tor_strdup("Unable to parse entry nodes: " + "EntryGuardDownSince/UnlistedSince without EntryGuard"); + break; + } + if (parse_iso_time(line->value, &when)<0) { + *msg = tor_strdup("Unable to parse entry nodes: " + "Bad time in EntryGuardDownSince/UnlistedSince"); + break; + } + if (when > now) { + /* It's a bad idea to believe info in the future: you can wind + * up with timeouts that aren't allowed to happen for years. */ + continue; + } + if (strlen(line->value) >= ISO_TIME_LEN+ISO_TIME_LEN+1) { + /* ignore failure */ + (void) parse_iso_time(line->value+ISO_TIME_LEN+1, &last_try); + } + if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "EntryGuardDownSince")) { + node->unreachable_since = when; + node->last_attempted = last_try; + } else { + node->bad_since = when; + } + } else if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "EntryGuardAddedBy")) { + char d[DIGEST_LEN]; + /* format is digest version date */ + if (strlen(line->value) < HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1+1+1+ISO_TIME_LEN) { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "EntryGuardAddedBy line is not long enough."); + continue; + } + if (base16_decode(d, sizeof(d), line->value, HEX_DIGEST_LEN)<0 || + line->value[HEX_DIGEST_LEN] != ' ') { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "EntryGuardAddedBy line %s does not begin with " + "hex digest", escaped(line->value)); + continue; + } + digestmap_set(added_by, d, tor_strdup(line->value+HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1)); + } else if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "EntryGuardPathUseBias")) { + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + double use_cnt, success_cnt; + + if (!node) { + *msg = tor_strdup("Unable to parse entry nodes: " + "EntryGuardPathUseBias without EntryGuard"); + break; + } + + if (tor_sscanf(line->value, "%lf %lf", + &use_cnt, &success_cnt) != 2) { + log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Malformed path use bias line for node %s", + node->nickname); + continue; + } + + if (use_cnt < success_cnt) { + int severity = LOG_INFO; + /* If this state file was written by a Tor that would have + * already fixed it, then the overcounting bug is still there.. */ + if (tor_version_as_new_as(state_version, "0.2.4.13-alpha")) { + severity = LOG_NOTICE; + } + log_fn(severity, LD_BUG, + "State file contains unexpectedly high usage success " + "counts %lf/%lf for Guard %s ($%s)", + success_cnt, use_cnt, + node->nickname, hex_str(node->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); + success_cnt = use_cnt; + } + + node->use_attempts = use_cnt; + node->use_successes = success_cnt; + + log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Read %f/%f path use bias for node %s", + node->use_successes, node->use_attempts, node->nickname); + + /* Note: We rely on the < comparison here to allow us to set a 0 + * rate and disable the feature entirely. If refactoring, don't + * change to <= */ + if (pathbias_get_use_success_count(node)/node->use_attempts + < pathbias_get_extreme_use_rate(options) && + pathbias_get_dropguards(options)) { + node->path_bias_disabled = 1; + log_info(LD_GENERAL, + "Path use bias is too high (%f/%f); disabling node %s", + node->circ_successes, node->circ_attempts, node->nickname); + } + } else if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "EntryGuardPathBias")) { + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + double hop_cnt, success_cnt, timeouts, collapsed, successful_closed, + unusable; + + if (!node) { + *msg = tor_strdup("Unable to parse entry nodes: " + "EntryGuardPathBias without EntryGuard"); + break; + } + + /* First try 3 params, then 2. */ + /* In the long run: circuit_success ~= successful_circuit_close + + * collapsed_circuits + + * unusable_circuits */ + if (tor_sscanf(line->value, "%lf %lf %lf %lf %lf %lf", + &hop_cnt, &success_cnt, &successful_closed, + &collapsed, &unusable, &timeouts) != 6) { + int old_success, old_hops; + if (tor_sscanf(line->value, "%u %u", &old_success, &old_hops) != 2) { + continue; + } + log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Reading old-style EntryGuardPathBias %s", + escaped(line->value)); + + success_cnt = old_success; + successful_closed = old_success; + hop_cnt = old_hops; + timeouts = 0; + collapsed = 0; + unusable = 0; + } + + if (hop_cnt < success_cnt) { + int severity = LOG_INFO; + /* If this state file was written by a Tor that would have + * already fixed it, then the overcounting bug is still there.. */ + if (tor_version_as_new_as(state_version, "0.2.4.13-alpha")) { + severity = LOG_NOTICE; + } + log_fn(severity, LD_BUG, + "State file contains unexpectedly high success counts " + "%lf/%lf for Guard %s ($%s)", + success_cnt, hop_cnt, + node->nickname, hex_str(node->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); + success_cnt = hop_cnt; + } + + node->circ_attempts = hop_cnt; + node->circ_successes = success_cnt; + + node->successful_circuits_closed = successful_closed; + node->timeouts = timeouts; + node->collapsed_circuits = collapsed; + node->unusable_circuits = unusable; + + log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Read %f/%f path bias for node %s", + node->circ_successes, node->circ_attempts, node->nickname); + /* Note: We rely on the < comparison here to allow us to set a 0 + * rate and disable the feature entirely. If refactoring, don't + * change to <= */ + if (pathbias_get_close_success_count(node)/node->circ_attempts + < pathbias_get_extreme_rate(options) && + pathbias_get_dropguards(options)) { + node->path_bias_disabled = 1; + log_info(LD_GENERAL, + "Path bias is too high (%f/%f); disabling node %s", + node->circ_successes, node->circ_attempts, node->nickname); + } + + } else { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unexpected key %s", line->key); + } + } + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(new_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e) { + char *sp; + char *val = digestmap_get(added_by, e->identity); + if (val && (sp = strchr(val, ' '))) { + time_t when; + *sp++ = '\0'; + if (parse_iso_time(sp, &when)<0) { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Can't read time %s in EntryGuardAddedBy", sp); + } else { + e->chosen_by_version = tor_strdup(val); + e->chosen_on_date = when; + } + } else { + if (state_version) { + e->chosen_by_version = tor_strdup(state_version); + e->chosen_on_date = time(NULL) - crypto_rand_int(3600*24*30); + } + } + if (e->path_bias_disabled && !e->bad_since) + e->bad_since = time(NULL); + } + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(e); + + if (*msg || !set) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(new_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e, + entry_guard_free(e)); + smartlist_free(new_entry_guards); + } else { /* !err && set */ + if (entry_guards) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e, + entry_guard_free(e)); + smartlist_free(entry_guards); + } + entry_guards = new_entry_guards; + entry_guards_dirty = 0; + /* XXX024 hand new_entry_guards to this func, and move it up a + * few lines, so we don't have to re-dirty it */ + if (remove_obsolete_entry_guards(now)) + entry_guards_dirty = 1; + + update_node_guard_status(); + } + digestmap_free(added_by, tor_free_); + return *msg ? -1 : 0; +} + +/** Our list of entry guards has changed, or some element of one + * of our entry guards has changed. Write the changes to disk within + * the next few minutes. + */ +void +entry_guards_changed(void) +{ + time_t when; + entry_guards_dirty = 1; + + /* or_state_save() will call entry_guards_update_state(). */ + when = get_options()->AvoidDiskWrites ? time(NULL) + 3600 : time(NULL)+600; + or_state_mark_dirty(get_or_state(), when); +} + +/** If the entry guard info has not changed, do nothing and return. + * Otherwise, free the EntryGuards piece of <b>state</b> and create + * a new one out of the global entry_guards list, and then mark + * <b>state</b> dirty so it will get saved to disk. + */ +void +entry_guards_update_state(or_state_t *state) +{ + config_line_t **next, *line; + if (! entry_guards_dirty) + return; + + config_free_lines(state->EntryGuards); + next = &state->EntryGuards; + *next = NULL; + if (!entry_guards) + entry_guards = smartlist_new(); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e) { + char dbuf[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1]; + if (!e->made_contact) + continue; /* don't write this one to disk */ + *next = line = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(config_line_t)); + line->key = tor_strdup("EntryGuard"); + base16_encode(dbuf, sizeof(dbuf), e->identity, DIGEST_LEN); + tor_asprintf(&line->value, "%s %s %sDirCache", e->nickname, dbuf, + e->is_dir_cache ? "" : "No"); + next = &(line->next); + if (e->unreachable_since) { + *next = line = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(config_line_t)); + line->key = tor_strdup("EntryGuardDownSince"); + line->value = tor_malloc(ISO_TIME_LEN+1+ISO_TIME_LEN+1); + format_iso_time(line->value, e->unreachable_since); + if (e->last_attempted) { + line->value[ISO_TIME_LEN] = ' '; + format_iso_time(line->value+ISO_TIME_LEN+1, e->last_attempted); + } + next = &(line->next); + } + if (e->bad_since) { + *next = line = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(config_line_t)); + line->key = tor_strdup("EntryGuardUnlistedSince"); + line->value = tor_malloc(ISO_TIME_LEN+1); + format_iso_time(line->value, e->bad_since); + next = &(line->next); + } + if (e->chosen_on_date && e->chosen_by_version && + !strchr(e->chosen_by_version, ' ')) { + char d[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1]; + char t[ISO_TIME_LEN+1]; + *next = line = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(config_line_t)); + line->key = tor_strdup("EntryGuardAddedBy"); + base16_encode(d, sizeof(d), e->identity, DIGEST_LEN); + format_iso_time(t, e->chosen_on_date); + tor_asprintf(&line->value, "%s %s %s", + d, e->chosen_by_version, t); + next = &(line->next); + } + if (e->circ_attempts > 0) { + *next = line = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(config_line_t)); + line->key = tor_strdup("EntryGuardPathBias"); + /* In the long run: circuit_success ~= successful_circuit_close + + * collapsed_circuits + + * unusable_circuits */ + tor_asprintf(&line->value, "%f %f %f %f %f %f", + e->circ_attempts, e->circ_successes, + pathbias_get_close_success_count(e), + e->collapsed_circuits, + e->unusable_circuits, e->timeouts); + next = &(line->next); + } + if (e->use_attempts > 0) { + *next = line = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(config_line_t)); + line->key = tor_strdup("EntryGuardPathUseBias"); + + tor_asprintf(&line->value, "%f %f", + e->use_attempts, + pathbias_get_use_success_count(e)); + next = &(line->next); + } + + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(e); + if (!get_options()->AvoidDiskWrites) + or_state_mark_dirty(get_or_state(), 0); + entry_guards_dirty = 0; +} + +/** If <b>question</b> is the string "entry-guards", then dump + * to *<b>answer</b> a newly allocated string describing all of + * the nodes in the global entry_guards list. See control-spec.txt + * for details. + * For backward compatibility, we also handle the string "helper-nodes". + * */ +int +getinfo_helper_entry_guards(control_connection_t *conn, + const char *question, char **answer, + const char **errmsg) +{ + (void) conn; + (void) errmsg; + + if (!strcmp(question,"entry-guards") || + !strcmp(question,"helper-nodes")) { + smartlist_t *sl = smartlist_new(); + char tbuf[ISO_TIME_LEN+1]; + char nbuf[MAX_VERBOSE_NICKNAME_LEN+1]; + if (!entry_guards) + entry_guards = smartlist_new(); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e) { + const char *status = NULL; + time_t when = 0; + const node_t *node; + + if (!e->made_contact) { + status = "never-connected"; + } else if (e->bad_since) { + when = e->bad_since; + status = "unusable"; + } else { + status = "up"; + } + + node = node_get_by_id(e->identity); + if (node) { + node_get_verbose_nickname(node, nbuf); + } else { + nbuf[0] = '$'; + base16_encode(nbuf+1, sizeof(nbuf)-1, e->identity, DIGEST_LEN); + /* e->nickname field is not very reliable if we don't know about + * this router any longer; don't include it. */ + } + + if (when) { + format_iso_time(tbuf, when); + smartlist_add_asprintf(sl, "%s %s %s\n", nbuf, status, tbuf); + } else { + smartlist_add_asprintf(sl, "%s %s\n", nbuf, status); + } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(e); + *answer = smartlist_join_strings(sl, "", 0, NULL); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl, char *, c, tor_free(c)); + smartlist_free(sl); + } + return 0; +} + +/** A list of configured bridges. Whenever we actually get a descriptor + * for one, we add it as an entry guard. Note that the order of bridges + * in this list does not necessarily correspond to the order of bridges + * in the torrc. */ +static smartlist_t *bridge_list = NULL; + +/** Mark every entry of the bridge list to be removed on our next call to + * sweep_bridge_list unless it has first been un-marked. */ +void +mark_bridge_list(void) +{ + if (!bridge_list) + bridge_list = smartlist_new(); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, b, + b->marked_for_removal = 1); +} + +/** Remove every entry of the bridge list that was marked with + * mark_bridge_list if it has not subsequently been un-marked. */ +void +sweep_bridge_list(void) +{ + if (!bridge_list) + bridge_list = smartlist_new(); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, b) { + if (b->marked_for_removal) { + SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(bridge_list, b); + bridge_free(b); + } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(b); +} + +/** Initialize the bridge list to empty, creating it if needed. */ +static void +clear_bridge_list(void) +{ + if (!bridge_list) + bridge_list = smartlist_new(); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, b, bridge_free(b)); + smartlist_clear(bridge_list); +} + +/** Free the bridge <b>bridge</b>. */ +static void +bridge_free(bridge_info_t *bridge) +{ + if (!bridge) + return; + + tor_free(bridge->transport_name); + if (bridge->socks_args) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(bridge->socks_args, char*, s, tor_free(s)); + smartlist_free(bridge->socks_args); + } + + tor_free(bridge); +} + +/** If we have a bridge configured whose digest matches <b>digest</b>, or a + * bridge with no known digest whose address matches any of the + * tor_addr_port_t's in <b>orports</b>, return that bridge. Else return + * NULL. */ +static bridge_info_t * +get_configured_bridge_by_orports_digest(const char *digest, + const smartlist_t *orports) +{ + if (!bridge_list) + return NULL; + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, bridge) + { + if (tor_digest_is_zero(bridge->identity)) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(orports, tor_addr_port_t *, ap) + { + if (tor_addr_compare(&bridge->addr, &ap->addr, CMP_EXACT) == 0 && + bridge->port == ap->port) + return bridge; + } + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ap); + } + if (digest && tor_memeq(bridge->identity, digest, DIGEST_LEN)) + return bridge; + } + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(bridge); + return NULL; +} + +/** If we have a bridge configured whose digest matches <b>digest</b>, or a + * bridge with no known digest whose address matches <b>addr</b>:<b>/port</b>, + * return that bridge. Else return NULL. If <b>digest</b> is NULL, check for + * address/port matches only. */ +static bridge_info_t * +get_configured_bridge_by_addr_port_digest(const tor_addr_t *addr, + uint16_t port, + const char *digest) +{ + if (!bridge_list) + return NULL; + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, bridge) + { + if ((tor_digest_is_zero(bridge->identity) || digest == NULL) && + !tor_addr_compare(&bridge->addr, addr, CMP_EXACT) && + bridge->port == port) + return bridge; + if (digest && tor_memeq(bridge->identity, digest, DIGEST_LEN)) + return bridge; + } + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(bridge); + return NULL; +} + +/** Wrapper around get_configured_bridge_by_addr_port_digest() to look + * it up via router descriptor <b>ri</b>. */ +static bridge_info_t * +get_configured_bridge_by_routerinfo(const routerinfo_t *ri) +{ + bridge_info_t *bi = NULL; + smartlist_t *orports = router_get_all_orports(ri); + bi = get_configured_bridge_by_orports_digest(ri->cache_info.identity_digest, + orports); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(orports, tor_addr_port_t *, p, tor_free(p)); + smartlist_free(orports); + return bi; +} + +/** Return 1 if <b>ri</b> is one of our known bridges, else 0. */ +int +routerinfo_is_a_configured_bridge(const routerinfo_t *ri) +{ + return get_configured_bridge_by_routerinfo(ri) ? 1 : 0; +} + +/** Return 1 if <b>node</b> is one of our configured bridges, else 0. */ +int +node_is_a_configured_bridge(const node_t *node) +{ + int retval = 0; + smartlist_t *orports = node_get_all_orports(node); + retval = get_configured_bridge_by_orports_digest(node->identity, + orports) != NULL; + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(orports, tor_addr_port_t *, p, tor_free(p)); + smartlist_free(orports); + return retval; +} + +/** We made a connection to a router at <b>addr</b>:<b>port</b> + * without knowing its digest. Its digest turned out to be <b>digest</b>. + * If it was a bridge, and we still don't know its digest, record it. + */ +void +learned_router_identity(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, + const char *digest) +{ + bridge_info_t *bridge = + get_configured_bridge_by_addr_port_digest(addr, port, digest); + if (bridge && tor_digest_is_zero(bridge->identity)) { + char *transport_info = NULL; + const char *transport_name = + find_transport_name_by_bridge_addrport(addr, port); + if (transport_name) + tor_asprintf(&transport_info, " (with transport '%s')", transport_name); + + memcpy(bridge->identity, digest, DIGEST_LEN); + log_notice(LD_DIR, "Learned fingerprint %s for bridge %s%s.", + hex_str(digest, DIGEST_LEN), fmt_addrport(addr, port), + transport_info ? transport_info : ""); + tor_free(transport_info); + } +} + +/** Return true if <b>bridge</b> has the same identity digest as + * <b>digest</b>. If <b>digest</b> is NULL, it matches + * bridges with unspecified identity digests. */ +static int +bridge_has_digest(const bridge_info_t *bridge, const char *digest) +{ + if (digest) + return tor_memeq(digest, bridge->identity, DIGEST_LEN); + else + return tor_digest_is_zero(bridge->identity); +} + +/** We are about to add a new bridge at <b>addr</b>:<b>port</b>, with optional + * <b>digest</b> and <b>transport_name</b>. Mark for removal any previously + * existing bridge with the same address and port, and warn the user as + * appropriate. + */ +static void +bridge_resolve_conflicts(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, + const char *digest, const char *transport_name) +{ + /* Iterate the already-registered bridge list: + + If you find a bridge with the same adress and port, mark it for + removal. It doesn't make sense to have two active bridges with + the same IP:PORT. If the bridge in question has a different + digest or transport than <b>digest</b>/<b>transport_name</b>, + it's probably a misconfiguration and we should warn the user. + */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, bridge) { + if (bridge->marked_for_removal) + continue; + + if (tor_addr_eq(&bridge->addr, addr) && (bridge->port == port)) { + + bridge->marked_for_removal = 1; + + if (!bridge_has_digest(bridge, digest) || + strcmp_opt(bridge->transport_name, transport_name)) { + /* warn the user */ + char *bridge_description_new, *bridge_description_old; + tor_asprintf(&bridge_description_new, "%s:%s:%s", + fmt_addrport(addr, port), + digest ? hex_str(digest, DIGEST_LEN) : "", + transport_name ? transport_name : ""); + tor_asprintf(&bridge_description_old, "%s:%s:%s", + fmt_addrport(&bridge->addr, bridge->port), + tor_digest_is_zero(bridge->identity) ? + "" : hex_str(bridge->identity,DIGEST_LEN), + bridge->transport_name ? bridge->transport_name : ""); + + log_warn(LD_GENERAL,"Tried to add bridge '%s', but we found a conflict" + " with the already registered bridge '%s'. We will discard" + " the old bridge and keep '%s'. If this is not what you" + " wanted, please change your configuration file accordingly.", + bridge_description_new, bridge_description_old, + bridge_description_new); + + tor_free(bridge_description_new); + tor_free(bridge_description_old); + } + } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(bridge); +} + +/** Return True if we have a bridge that uses a transport with name + * <b>transport_name</b>. */ +int +transport_is_needed(const char *transport_name) +{ + if (!bridge_list) + return 0; + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridge_list, const bridge_info_t *, bridge) { + if (bridge->transport_name && + !strcmp(bridge->transport_name, transport_name)) + return 1; + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(bridge); + + return 0; +} + +/** Register the bridge information in <b>bridge_line</b> to the + * bridge subsystem. Steals reference of <b>bridge_line</b>. */ +void +bridge_add_from_config(bridge_line_t *bridge_line) +{ + bridge_info_t *b; + + { /* Log the bridge we are about to register: */ + log_debug(LD_GENERAL, "Registering bridge at %s (transport: %s) (%s)", + fmt_addrport(&bridge_line->addr, bridge_line->port), + bridge_line->transport_name ? + bridge_line->transport_name : "no transport", + tor_digest_is_zero(bridge_line->digest) ? + "no key listed" : hex_str(bridge_line->digest, DIGEST_LEN)); + + if (bridge_line->socks_args) { /* print socks arguments */ + int i = 0; + + tor_assert(smartlist_len(bridge_line->socks_args) > 0); + + log_debug(LD_GENERAL, "Bridge uses %d SOCKS arguments:", + smartlist_len(bridge_line->socks_args)); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(bridge_line->socks_args, const char *, arg, + log_debug(LD_CONFIG, "%d: %s", ++i, arg)); + } + } + + bridge_resolve_conflicts(&bridge_line->addr, + bridge_line->port, + bridge_line->digest, + bridge_line->transport_name); + + b = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(bridge_info_t)); + tor_addr_copy(&b->addr, &bridge_line->addr); + b->port = bridge_line->port; + memcpy(b->identity, bridge_line->digest, DIGEST_LEN); + if (bridge_line->transport_name) + b->transport_name = bridge_line->transport_name; + b->fetch_status.schedule = DL_SCHED_BRIDGE; + b->socks_args = bridge_line->socks_args; + if (!bridge_list) + bridge_list = smartlist_new(); + + tor_free(bridge_line); /* Deallocate bridge_line now. */ + + smartlist_add(bridge_list, b); +} + +/** Return true iff <b>routerset</b> contains the bridge <b>bridge</b>. */ +static int +routerset_contains_bridge(const routerset_t *routerset, + const bridge_info_t *bridge) +{ + int result; + extend_info_t *extinfo; + tor_assert(bridge); + if (!routerset) + return 0; + + extinfo = extend_info_new( + NULL, bridge->identity, NULL, NULL, &bridge->addr, bridge->port); + result = routerset_contains_extendinfo(routerset, extinfo); + extend_info_free(extinfo); + return result; +} + +/** If <b>digest</b> is one of our known bridges, return it. */ +static bridge_info_t * +find_bridge_by_digest(const char *digest) +{ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, bridge, + { + if (tor_memeq(bridge->identity, digest, DIGEST_LEN)) + return bridge; + }); + return NULL; +} + +/** Given the <b>addr</b> and <b>port</b> of a bridge, if that bridge + * supports a pluggable transport, return its name. Otherwise, return + * NULL. */ +const char * +find_transport_name_by_bridge_addrport(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port) +{ + if (!bridge_list) + return NULL; + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridge_list, const bridge_info_t *, bridge) { + if (tor_addr_eq(&bridge->addr, addr) && + (bridge->port == port)) + return bridge->transport_name; + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(bridge); + + return NULL; +} + +/** If <b>addr</b> and <b>port</b> match the address and port of a + * bridge of ours that uses pluggable transports, place its transport + * in <b>transport</b>. + * + * Return 0 on success (found a transport, or found a bridge with no + * transport, or found no bridge); return -1 if we should be using a + * transport, but the transport could not be found. + */ +int +get_transport_by_bridge_addrport(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, + const transport_t **transport) +{ + *transport = NULL; + if (!bridge_list) + return 0; + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridge_list, const bridge_info_t *, bridge) { + if (tor_addr_eq(&bridge->addr, addr) && + (bridge->port == port)) { /* bridge matched */ + if (bridge->transport_name) { /* it also uses pluggable transports */ + *transport = transport_get_by_name(bridge->transport_name); + if (*transport == NULL) { /* it uses pluggable transports, but + the transport could not be found! */ + return -1; + } + return 0; + } else { /* bridge matched, but it doesn't use transports. */ + break; + } + } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(bridge); + + *transport = NULL; + return 0; +} + +/** Return a smartlist containing all the SOCKS arguments that we + * should pass to the SOCKS proxy. */ +const smartlist_t * +get_socks_args_by_bridge_addrport(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port) +{ + bridge_info_t *bridge = get_configured_bridge_by_addr_port_digest(addr, + port, + NULL); + return bridge ? bridge->socks_args : NULL; +} + +/** We need to ask <b>bridge</b> for its server descriptor. */ +static void +launch_direct_bridge_descriptor_fetch(bridge_info_t *bridge) +{ + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + + if (connection_get_by_type_addr_port_purpose( + CONN_TYPE_DIR, &bridge->addr, bridge->port, + DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_SERVERDESC)) + return; /* it's already on the way */ + + if (routerset_contains_bridge(options->ExcludeNodes, bridge)) { + download_status_mark_impossible(&bridge->fetch_status); + log_warn(LD_APP, "Not using bridge at %s: it is in ExcludeNodes.", + safe_str_client(fmt_and_decorate_addr(&bridge->addr))); + return; + } + + directory_initiate_command(&bridge->addr, + bridge->port, 0/*no dirport*/, + bridge->identity, + DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_SERVERDESC, + ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE, + DIRIND_ONEHOP, "authority.z", NULL, 0, 0); +} + +/** Fetching the bridge descriptor from the bridge authority returned a + * "not found". Fall back to trying a direct fetch. */ +void +retry_bridge_descriptor_fetch_directly(const char *digest) +{ + bridge_info_t *bridge = find_bridge_by_digest(digest); + if (!bridge) + return; /* not found? oh well. */ + + launch_direct_bridge_descriptor_fetch(bridge); +} + +/** For each bridge in our list for which we don't currently have a + * descriptor, fetch a new copy of its descriptor -- either directly + * from the bridge or via a bridge authority. */ +void +fetch_bridge_descriptors(const or_options_t *options, time_t now) +{ + int num_bridge_auths = get_n_authorities(BRIDGE_DIRINFO); + int ask_bridge_directly; + int can_use_bridge_authority; + + if (!bridge_list) + return; + + /* If we still have unconfigured managed proxies, don't go and + connect to a bridge. */ + if (pt_proxies_configuration_pending()) + return; + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, bridge) + { + if (!download_status_is_ready(&bridge->fetch_status, now, + IMPOSSIBLE_TO_DOWNLOAD)) + continue; /* don't bother, no need to retry yet */ + if (routerset_contains_bridge(options->ExcludeNodes, bridge)) { + download_status_mark_impossible(&bridge->fetch_status); + log_warn(LD_APP, "Not using bridge at %s: it is in ExcludeNodes.", + safe_str_client(fmt_and_decorate_addr(&bridge->addr))); + continue; + } + + /* schedule another fetch as if this one will fail, in case it does */ + download_status_failed(&bridge->fetch_status, 0); + + can_use_bridge_authority = !tor_digest_is_zero(bridge->identity) && + num_bridge_auths; + ask_bridge_directly = !can_use_bridge_authority || + !options->UpdateBridgesFromAuthority; + log_debug(LD_DIR, "ask_bridge_directly=%d (%d, %d, %d)", + ask_bridge_directly, tor_digest_is_zero(bridge->identity), + !options->UpdateBridgesFromAuthority, !num_bridge_auths); + + if (ask_bridge_directly && + !fascist_firewall_allows_address_or(&bridge->addr, bridge->port)) { + log_notice(LD_DIR, "Bridge at '%s' isn't reachable by our " + "firewall policy. %s.", + fmt_addrport(&bridge->addr, bridge->port), + can_use_bridge_authority ? + "Asking bridge authority instead" : "Skipping"); + if (can_use_bridge_authority) + ask_bridge_directly = 0; + else + continue; + } + + if (ask_bridge_directly) { + /* we need to ask the bridge itself for its descriptor. */ + launch_direct_bridge_descriptor_fetch(bridge); + } else { + /* We have a digest and we want to ask an authority. We could + * combine all the requests into one, but that may give more + * hints to the bridge authority than we want to give. */ + char resource[10 + HEX_DIGEST_LEN]; + memcpy(resource, "fp/", 3); + base16_encode(resource+3, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1, + bridge->identity, DIGEST_LEN); + memcpy(resource+3+HEX_DIGEST_LEN, ".z", 3); + log_info(LD_DIR, "Fetching bridge info '%s' from bridge authority.", + resource); + directory_get_from_dirserver(DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_SERVERDESC, + ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE, resource, 0); + } + } + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(bridge); +} + +/** If our <b>bridge</b> is configured to be a different address than + * the bridge gives in <b>node</b>, rewrite the routerinfo + * we received to use the address we meant to use. Now we handle + * multihomed bridges better. + */ +static void +rewrite_node_address_for_bridge(const bridge_info_t *bridge, node_t *node) +{ + /* XXXX move this function. */ + /* XXXX overridden addresses should really live in the node_t, so that the + * routerinfo_t and the microdesc_t can be immutable. But we can only + * do that safely if we know that no function that connects to an OR + * does so through an address from any source other than node_get_addr(). + */ + tor_addr_t addr; + + if (node->ri) { + routerinfo_t *ri = node->ri; + tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, ri->addr); + + if ((!tor_addr_compare(&bridge->addr, &addr, CMP_EXACT) && + bridge->port == ri->or_port) || + (!tor_addr_compare(&bridge->addr, &ri->ipv6_addr, CMP_EXACT) && + bridge->port == ri->ipv6_orport)) { + /* they match, so no need to do anything */ + } else { + if (tor_addr_family(&bridge->addr) == AF_INET) { + ri->addr = tor_addr_to_ipv4h(&bridge->addr); + ri->or_port = bridge->port; + log_info(LD_DIR, + "Adjusted bridge routerinfo for '%s' to match configured " + "address %s:%d.", + ri->nickname, fmt_addr32(ri->addr), ri->or_port); + } else if (tor_addr_family(&bridge->addr) == AF_INET6) { + tor_addr_copy(&ri->ipv6_addr, &bridge->addr); + ri->ipv6_orport = bridge->port; + log_info(LD_DIR, + "Adjusted bridge routerinfo for '%s' to match configured " + "address %s.", + ri->nickname, fmt_addrport(&ri->ipv6_addr, ri->ipv6_orport)); + } else { + log_err(LD_BUG, "Address family not supported: %d.", + tor_addr_family(&bridge->addr)); + return; + } + } + + /* Mark which address to use based on which bridge_t we got. */ + node->ipv6_preferred = (tor_addr_family(&bridge->addr) == AF_INET6 && + !tor_addr_is_null(&node->ri->ipv6_addr)); + + /* XXXipv6 we lack support for falling back to another address for + the same relay, warn the user */ + if (!tor_addr_is_null(&ri->ipv6_addr)) { + tor_addr_port_t ap; + node_get_pref_orport(node, &ap); + log_notice(LD_CONFIG, + "Bridge '%s' has both an IPv4 and an IPv6 address. " + "Will prefer using its %s address (%s).", + ri->nickname, + tor_addr_family(&ap.addr) == AF_INET6 ? "IPv6" : "IPv4", + fmt_addrport(&ap.addr, ap.port)); + } + } + if (node->rs) { + routerstatus_t *rs = node->rs; + tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, rs->addr); + + if (!tor_addr_compare(&bridge->addr, &addr, CMP_EXACT) && + bridge->port == rs->or_port) { + /* they match, so no need to do anything */ + } else { + rs->addr = tor_addr_to_ipv4h(&bridge->addr); + rs->or_port = bridge->port; + log_info(LD_DIR, + "Adjusted bridge routerstatus for '%s' to match " + "configured address %s.", + rs->nickname, fmt_addrport(&bridge->addr, rs->or_port)); + } + } +} + +/** We just learned a descriptor for a bridge. See if that + * digest is in our entry guard list, and add it if not. */ +void +learned_bridge_descriptor(routerinfo_t *ri, int from_cache) +{ + tor_assert(ri); + tor_assert(ri->purpose == ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE); + if (get_options()->UseBridges) { + int first = num_bridges_usable() <= 1; + bridge_info_t *bridge = get_configured_bridge_by_routerinfo(ri); + time_t now = time(NULL); + router_set_status(ri->cache_info.identity_digest, 1); + + if (bridge) { /* if we actually want to use this one */ + node_t *node; + /* it's here; schedule its re-fetch for a long time from now. */ + if (!from_cache) + download_status_reset(&bridge->fetch_status); + + node = node_get_mutable_by_id(ri->cache_info.identity_digest); + tor_assert(node); + rewrite_node_address_for_bridge(bridge, node); + add_an_entry_guard(node, 1, 1, 0, 0); + + log_notice(LD_DIR, "new bridge descriptor '%s' (%s): %s", ri->nickname, + from_cache ? "cached" : "fresh", router_describe(ri)); + /* set entry->made_contact so if it goes down we don't drop it from + * our entry node list */ + entry_guard_register_connect_status(ri->cache_info.identity_digest, + 1, 0, now); + if (first) { + routerlist_retry_directory_downloads(now); + } + } + } +} + +/** Return the number of bridges that have descriptors that + * are marked with purpose 'bridge' and are running. + * + * We use this function to decide if we're ready to start building + * circuits through our bridges, or if we need to wait until the + * directory "server/authority" requests finish. */ +int +any_bridge_descriptors_known(void) +{ + tor_assert(get_options()->UseBridges); + return choose_random_entry(NULL) != NULL; +} + +/** Return the number of bridges that have descriptors that are marked with + * purpose 'bridge' and are running. + */ +static int +num_bridges_usable(void) +{ + int n_options = 0; + tor_assert(get_options()->UseBridges); + (void) choose_random_entry_impl(NULL, 0, 0, &n_options); + return n_options; +} + +/** Return 1 if we have at least one descriptor for an entry guard + * (bridge or member of EntryNodes) and all descriptors we know are + * down. Else return 0. If <b>act</b> is 1, then mark the down guards + * up; else just observe and report. */ +static int +entries_retry_helper(const or_options_t *options, int act) +{ + const node_t *node; + int any_known = 0; + int any_running = 0; + int need_bridges = options->UseBridges != 0; + if (!entry_guards) + entry_guards = smartlist_new(); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e) { + node = node_get_by_id(e->identity); + if (node && node_has_descriptor(node) && + node_is_bridge(node) == need_bridges) { + any_known = 1; + if (node->is_running) + any_running = 1; /* some entry is both known and running */ + else if (act) { + /* Mark all current connections to this OR as unhealthy, since + * otherwise there could be one that started 30 seconds + * ago, and in 30 seconds it will time out, causing us to mark + * the node down and undermine the retry attempt. We mark even + * the established conns, since if the network just came back + * we'll want to attach circuits to fresh conns. */ + connection_or_set_bad_connections(node->identity, 1); + + /* mark this entry node for retry */ + router_set_status(node->identity, 1); + e->can_retry = 1; + e->bad_since = 0; + } + } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(e); + log_debug(LD_DIR, "%d: any_known %d, any_running %d", + act, any_known, any_running); + return any_known && !any_running; +} + +/** Do we know any descriptors for our bridges / entrynodes, and are + * all the ones we have descriptors for down? */ +int +entries_known_but_down(const or_options_t *options) +{ + tor_assert(entry_list_is_constrained(options)); + return entries_retry_helper(options, 0); +} + +/** Mark all down known bridges / entrynodes up. */ +void +entries_retry_all(const or_options_t *options) +{ + tor_assert(entry_list_is_constrained(options)); + entries_retry_helper(options, 1); +} + +/** Return true if at least one of our bridges runs a Tor version that can + * provide microdescriptors to us. If not, we'll fall back to asking for + * full descriptors. */ +int +any_bridge_supports_microdescriptors(void) +{ + const node_t *node; + if (!get_options()->UseBridges || !entry_guards) + return 0; + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e) { + node = node_get_by_id(e->identity); + if (node && node->is_running && + node_is_bridge(node) && node_is_a_configured_bridge(node) && + node_understands_microdescriptors(node)) { + /* This is one of our current bridges, and we know enough about + * it to know that it will be able to answer our microdescriptor + * questions. */ + return 1; + } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(e); + return 0; +} + +/** Release all storage held by the list of entry guards and related + * memory structs. */ +void +entry_guards_free_all(void) +{ + if (entry_guards) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e, + entry_guard_free(e)); + smartlist_free(entry_guards); + entry_guards = NULL; + } + clear_bridge_list(); + smartlist_free(bridge_list); + bridge_list = NULL; + circuit_build_times_free_timeouts(get_circuit_build_times_mutable()); +} + |