diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/or/connection_or.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/or/connection_or.c | 33 |
1 files changed, 18 insertions, 15 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c index d5dd4470e..3d16e1453 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@ -1160,6 +1160,16 @@ connection_or_connect(const tor_addr_t *_addr, uint16_t port, /** Mark orconn for close and transition the associated channel, if any, to * the closing state. + * + * It's safe to call this and connection_or_close_for_error() any time, and + * channel layer will treat it as a connection closing for reasons outside + * its control, like the remote end closing it. It can also be a local + * reason that's specific to connection_t/or_connection_t rather than + * the channel mechanism, such as expiration of old connections in + * run_connection_housekeeping(). If you want to close a channel_t + * from somewhere that logically works in terms of generic channels + * rather than connections, use channel_mark_for_close(); see also + * the comment on that function in channel.c. */ void @@ -2051,8 +2061,9 @@ connection_or_send_netinfo(or_connection_t *conn) memset(&cell, 0, sizeof(cell_t)); cell.command = CELL_NETINFO; - /* Timestamp. */ - set_uint32(cell.payload, htonl((uint32_t)now)); + /* Timestamp, if we're a relay. */ + if (public_server_mode(get_options()) || ! conn->is_outgoing) + set_uint32(cell.payload, htonl((uint32_t)now)); /* Their address. */ out = cell.payload + 4; @@ -2286,19 +2297,11 @@ connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn, if (server) return V3_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN; // ptr-out - /* Time: 8 octets. */ - { - uint64_t now = time(NULL); - if ((time_t)now < 0) - return -1; - set_uint32(ptr, htonl((uint32_t)(now>>32))); - set_uint32(ptr+4, htonl((uint32_t)now)); - ptr += 8; - } - - /* Nonce: 16 octets. */ - crypto_rand((char*)ptr, 16); - ptr += 16; + /* 8 octets were reserved for the current time, but we're trying to get out + * of the habit of sending time around willynilly. Fortunately, nothing + * checks it. That's followed by 16 bytes of nonce. */ + crypto_rand((char*)ptr, 24); + ptr += 24; tor_assert(ptr - out == V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN); |