diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/or/circuitbuild.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/circuitbuild.c | 61 |
1 files changed, 33 insertions, 28 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index e934acc86..12b58e1ee 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -1437,7 +1437,7 @@ pathbias_count_build_success(origin_circuit_t *circ) } /* Don't count cannibalized/reused circs for path bias - * build success.. They get counted under use success */ + * "build" success, since they get counted under "use" success. */ if (!circ->has_opened) { if (circ->cpath && circ->cpath->extend_info) { guard = entry_guard_get_by_id_digest( @@ -1515,7 +1515,7 @@ pathbias_count_build_success(origin_circuit_t *circ) * are not possible to differentiate from unresponsive servers. * * The probe is sent at the end of the circuit lifetime for two - * reasons: to prevent cyptographic taggers from being able to + * reasons: to prevent cryptographic taggers from being able to * drop cells to cause timeouts, and to prevent easy recognition * of probes before any real client traffic happens. * @@ -1556,7 +1556,7 @@ pathbias_send_usable_probe(circuit_t *circ) circuit_change_purpose(circ, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING); - /* Update timestamp for circuit_expire_building to kill us */ + /* Update timestamp for when circuit_expire_building() should kill us */ tor_gettimeofday(&circ->timestamp_began); /* Generate a random address for the nonce */ @@ -1596,8 +1596,8 @@ pathbias_send_usable_probe(circuit_t *circ) RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN, payload, payload_len, cpath_layer) < 0) { log_notice(LD_CIRC, - "Failed to send pathbias probe cell on circuit %d.", - ocirc->global_identifier); + "Failed to send pathbias probe cell on circuit %d.", + ocirc->global_identifier); return -1; } @@ -1710,7 +1710,7 @@ pathbias_check_close(origin_circuit_t *ocirc, int reason) } else { if (reason & END_CIRC_REASON_FLAG_REMOTE) { - /* Unused remote circ close reasons all could be bias */ + /* Remote circ close reasons on an unused circuit all could be bias */ log_info(LD_CIRC, "Circuit %d remote-closed without successful use for reason %d. " "Circuit purpose %d currently %d,%s. Len %d.", @@ -1836,6 +1836,8 @@ pathbias_count_unusable(origin_circuit_t *circ) /* In rare cases, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING can get converted to * CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT and have no guards here. * No need to log that case. */ + /* XXX note cut-and-paste code in this function compared to nearby + * functions. Would be nice to refactor. -RD */ log_info(LD_CIRC, "Stream-failing circuit has no known guard. " "Circuit is a %s currently %s", @@ -1886,11 +1888,11 @@ pathbias_count_timeout(origin_circuit_t *circ) double pathbias_get_closed_count(entry_guard_t *guard) { - circuit_t *circ = global_circuitlist; + circuit_t *circ; int open_circuits = 0; - /* Count currently open circuits. Give them the benefit of the doubt */ - for ( ; circ; circ = circ->next) { + /* Count currently open circuits. Give them the benefit of the doubt. */ + for (circ = global_circuitlist; circ; circ = circ->next) { origin_circuit_t *ocirc = NULL; if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) || /* didn't originate here */ circ->marked_for_close) /* already counted */ @@ -1903,8 +1905,8 @@ pathbias_get_closed_count(entry_guard_t *guard) if (ocirc->path_state >= PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED && fast_memeq(guard->identity, - ocirc->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest, - DIGEST_LEN)) { + ocirc->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest, + DIGEST_LEN)) { open_circuits++; } } @@ -1928,9 +1930,10 @@ pathbias_get_success_count(entry_guard_t *guard) } /** Increment the number of times we successfully extended a circuit to - * 'guard', first checking if the failure rate is high enough that we should - * eliminate the guard. Return -1 if the guard looks no good; return 0 if the - * guard looks fine. */ + * <b>guard</b>, first checking if the failure rate is high enough that + * we should eliminate the guard. Return -1 if the guard looks no good; + * return 0 if the guard looks fine. + */ static int entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(entry_guard_t *guard) { @@ -1949,7 +1952,7 @@ entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(entry_guard_t *guard) if (!guard->path_bias_disabled) { log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Your Guard %s=%s is failing an extremely large amount of " - "circuits. To avoid potential route manipluation attacks, " + "circuits. To avoid potential route manipulation attacks, " "Tor has disabled use of this guard. " "Success counts are %ld/%ld. %ld circuits completed, %ld " "were unusable, %ld collapsed, and %ld timed out. For " @@ -1992,7 +1995,7 @@ entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(entry_guard_t *guard) "Your Guard %s=%s is failing a very large amount of " "circuits. Most likely this means the Tor network is " "overloaded, but it could also mean an attack against " - "you or the potentially the guard itself. " + "you or potentially the guard itself. " "Success counts are %ld/%ld. %ld circuits completed, %ld " "were unusable, %ld collapsed, and %ld timed out. For " "reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.", @@ -2058,10 +2061,9 @@ entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(entry_guard_t *guard) return 0; } -/** A created or extended cell came back to us on the circuit, and it included - * reply_cell as its body. (If <b>reply_type</b> is CELL_CREATED, the body - * contains (the second DH key, plus KH). If <b>reply_type</b> is - * CELL_CREATED_FAST, the body contains a secret y and a hash H(x|y).) +/** A "created" cell <b>reply</b> came back to us on circuit <b>circ</b>. + * (The body of <b>reply</b> varies depending on what sort of handshake + * this is.) * * Calculate the appropriate keys and digests, make sure KH is * correct, and initialize this hop of the cpath. @@ -2117,9 +2119,9 @@ circuit_finish_handshake(origin_circuit_t *circ, /** We received a relay truncated cell on circ. * - * Since we don't ask for truncates currently, getting a truncated + * Since we don't send truncates currently, getting a truncated * means that a connection broke or an extend failed. For now, - * just give up: for circ to close, and return 0. + * just give up: force circ to close, and return 0. */ int circuit_truncated(origin_circuit_t *circ, crypt_path_t *layer, int reason) @@ -2130,7 +2132,7 @@ circuit_truncated(origin_circuit_t *circ, crypt_path_t *layer, int reason) tor_assert(circ); tor_assert(layer); - /* XXX Since we don't ask for truncates currently, getting a truncated + /* XXX Since we don't send truncates currently, getting a truncated * means that a connection broke or an extend failed. For now, * just give up. */ @@ -2223,15 +2225,18 @@ onionskin_answer(or_circuit_t *circ, return 0; } -/** Choose a length for a circuit of purpose <b>purpose</b>. - * Default length is 3 + the number of endpoints that would give something - * away. If the routerlist <b>routers</b> doesn't have enough routers +/** Choose a length for a circuit of purpose <b>purpose</b>: three + the + * number of endpoints that would give something away about our destination. + * + * If the routerlist <b>nodes</b> doesn't have enough routers * to handle the desired path length, return as large a path length as * is feasible, except if it's less than 2, in which case return -1. + * XXX ^^ I think this behavior is a hold-over from back when we had only a + * few relays in the network, and certainly back before guards existed. + * We should very likely get rid of it. -RD */ static int -new_route_len(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit, - smartlist_t *nodes) +new_route_len(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit, smartlist_t *nodes) { int num_acceptable_routers; int routelen; |