diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'doc')
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/HACKING | 12 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/Makefile.am | 89 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/TODO | 12 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/TODO.021 | 386 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/TODO.022 | 92 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/TODO.external | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/TODO.future | 330 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/include.am | 91 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/tor-fw-helper.1.txt | 16 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/tor-gencert.1.txt | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/tor-resolve.1.txt | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/tor.1.txt | 252 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/torify.1.txt | 8 |
13 files changed, 327 insertions, 969 deletions
diff --git a/doc/HACKING b/doc/HACKING index bc409dc0d..c06a68268 100644 --- a/doc/HACKING +++ b/doc/HACKING @@ -121,7 +121,8 @@ Running gcov for unit test coverage make clean make CFLAGS='-g -fprofile-arcs -ftest-coverage' ./src/test/test - cd src/common; gcov *.[ch] + gcov -o src/common src/common/*.[ch] + gcov -o src/or src/or/*.[ch] cd ../or; gcov *.[ch] ----- @@ -130,6 +131,13 @@ compiler generated no code for that line. '######' means that the line was never reached. Lines with numbers were called that number of times. +If that doesn't work: + * Try configuring Tor with --disable-gcc-hardening + * On recent OSX versions, you might need to add CC=clang to your + build line, as in: + make CFLAGS='-g -fprofile-arcs -ftest-coverage' CC=clang + Their llvm-gcc doesn't work so great for me. + Profiling Tor with oprofile ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ @@ -467,7 +475,7 @@ a stable release, add it to the ReleaseNotes file too. If we're adding to a release-0.2.x branch, manually commit the changelogs to the later git branches too. -4) Bump the version number in configure.in and rebuild. +4) Bump the version number in configure.ac and rebuild. 5) Make dist, put the tarball up somewhere, and tell #tor about it. Wait a while to see if anybody has problems building it. Try to get Sebastian diff --git a/doc/Makefile.am b/doc/Makefile.am deleted file mode 100644 index 6cdd66d51..000000000 --- a/doc/Makefile.am +++ /dev/null @@ -1,89 +0,0 @@ -# We use a two-step process to generate documentation from asciidoc files. -# -# First, we use asciidoc/a2x to process the asciidoc files into .1.in and -# .html.in files (see the asciidoc-helper.sh script). These are the same as -# the regular .1 and .html files, except that they still have some autoconf -# variables set in them. -# -# Second, we use config.status to turn .1.in files into .1 files and -# .html.in files into .html files. -# -# We do the steps in this order so that we can ship the .*.in files as -# part of the source distribution, so that people without asciidoc can -# just use the .1 and .html files. - -regular_mans = tor tor-gencert tor-resolve torify -all_mans = $(regular_mans) tor-fw-helper - -if USE_ASCIIDOC -if USE_FW_HELPER -nodist_man_MANS = $(all_mans:=.1) -doc_DATA = $(all_mans:=.html) -else -nodist_man_MANS = $(regular_mans:=.1) -doc_DATA = $(regular_mans:=.html) -endif -html_in = $(all_mans:=.html.in) -man_in = $(all_mans:=.1.in) -txt_in = $(all_mans:=.1.txt) -else -html_in = -man_in = -txt_in = -nodist_man_MANS = -doc_DATA = -endif - -EXTRA_DIST = HACKING asciidoc-helper.sh \ - $(html_in) $(man_in) $(txt_in) \ - tor-rpm-creation.txt \ - tor-win32-mingw-creation.txt spec/README \ - state-contents.txt - -docdir = @docdir@ - -asciidoc_product = $(nodist_man_MANS) $(doc_DATA) - -# Generate the html documentation from asciidoc, but don't do -# machine-specific replacements yet -$(html_in) : - $(top_srcdir)/doc/asciidoc-helper.sh html @ASCIIDOC@ $(top_srcdir)/doc/$@ - -tor.html.in : tor.1.txt -torify.html.in : torify.1.txt -tor-gencert.html.in : tor-gencert.1.txt -tor-resolve.html.in : tor-resolve.1.txt -tor-fw-helper.html.in : tor-fw-helper.1.txt - -# Generate the manpage from asciidoc, but don't do -# machine-specific replacements yet -$(man_in) : - $(top_srcdir)/doc/asciidoc-helper.sh man @A2X@ $(top_srcdir)/doc/$@ - -tor.1.in : tor.1.txt -torify.1.in : torify.1.txt -tor-gencert.1.in : tor-gencert.1.txt -tor-resolve.1.in : tor-resolve.1.txt -tor-fw-helper.1.in : tor-fw-helper.1.txt - -# use ../config.status to swap all machine-specific magic strings -# in the asciidoc with their replacements. -$(asciidoc_product) : - if test -e $(top_srcdir)/doc/$@.in && ! test -e ./$@.in ; then \ - cp $(top_srcdir)/doc/$@.in .; \ - fi - ../config.status --file=$@; - -tor.1 : tor.1.in -torify.1 : torify.1.in -tor-gencert.1 : tor-gencert.1.in -tor-resolve.1 : tor-resolve.1.in -tor-fw-helper.1 : tor-fw-helper.1.in -tor.html : tor.html.in -torify.html : torify.html.in -tor-gencert.html : tor-gencert.html.in -tor-resolve.html : tor-resolve.html.in -tor-fw-helper.html : tor-fw-helper.html.in - -CLEANFILES = $(asciidoc_product) config.log -DISTCLEANFILES = $(html_in) $(man_in) @@ -1,11 +1,3 @@ -We've split out our TODO into three files: - -TODO.02x is the list of items we're planning to get done in the next -stable release. - -TODO.external lives in svn under /projects/todo/. It's the list of -external constraints and deliverables that we all need to keep in mind. - -TODO.future is the list of other items we plan to get to in later releases. - +We no longer track our TODO lists in git. To see open Tor tasks, visit +our bugtracker and wiki at trac.torproject.org. diff --git a/doc/TODO.021 b/doc/TODO.021 deleted file mode 100644 index 37c5b9845..000000000 --- a/doc/TODO.021 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,386 +0,0 @@ -Legend: -SPEC!! - Not specified -SPEC - Spec not finalized -N - nick claims -R - arma claims -P - phobos claims -S - Steven claims -E - Matt claims -M - Mike claims -J - Jeff claims -I - ioerror claims -W - weasel claims -K - Karsten claims - - Not done - * Top priority - . Partially done - o Done - d Deferrable - D Deferred - X Abandoned - -======================================================================= - -Things Roger would be excited to see: - -Nick - * Look at Roger's proposal 141 discussions on or-dev, and help us - decide how to proceed. - . Tors start believing the contents of NETINFO cells. - - respond to Steven's red-team TLS testing (a.k.a, look at a packet - dump and compare) - -Matt - - Fit Vidalia in 640x480 again. - - Vidalia should avoid stomping on your custom exit policy lines - just because you click on 'save' for a totally different config thing. - - How much space do we save in TBB by stripping symbols from Vidalia - first? Good idea or crazy idea? - (phobos adds you save about 12MB total across all exes by stripping - them) In fact, tbb-1.19 is stripped exes. - -ioerror - * weather.torproject.org should go live. - - Keep advocating new Tor servers and working with orgs like Mozilla - to let them like Tor. - - Find out what happened to the buildbot and get it back up: - http://tor-buildbot.freehaven.net:8010/ - - Learn about locking memory pages that have sensitive content. Get - that started in Tor. - - Translation portal - - Vidalia html help files - - should we i18nize polipo's error messages too? - - how to get our diagrams translated, and how to get our screenshots - from the right language? - - Some of our translated wml files are very old -- so old that they - are harmful to leave in place. We need some sort of way to notice - this and disable them. - -Steven - - Move proposal 131 or equivalent forward. - - Keep bugging us about exploits on the .exit notation. - - Mike's question #3 on https://www.torproject.org/volunteer#Research - - Worthwhile shipping TBB with some local html help files that come - as bookmarks? - -Andrew - -Weasel - - Figure out how to make Vidalia and Tor play nicely on Debian, make - the necessary modifications, and make some Vidalia debs that pass - muster. - - Fix bug 393. - - Get oftc to switch to Tor dns bulk exitlist. Or tell us why it's - not suitable yet. - - Move proposal 134 forward. - - putting port predictions in state file - - if tor hasn't been used in a while it stops fetching consensus - documents. Retain that state over restarts. - -Roger - - Finish tor-doc-bridge.wml - . Fix FAQ entry on setting up private Tor network - - Did we actually apply Steven's dkimproxy patch? - - Brainstorm about safe but effective ways for vidalia to - auto-update its user's bridges via Tor in the background. - - it doesn't count as successfully opening a circuit if it's not - an exit circuit. - -Mike: - - Roger wants to get an email every time there's a blog change, - e.g. a comment. That way spam doesn't go undetected for weeks. - - Or, maybe just disable linking from blog comments entirely? - (phobos mitigates this by checking it a few times a week) - -======================================================================= - -Bugs/issues for Tor 0.2.0.x: - . we should have an off-by-default way for relays to dump geoip data to - a file in their data directory, for measurement purposes. - o Basic implementation -N - Include probability-of-selection -R d let bridges set relaybandwidthrate as low as 5kb - -Documentation for Tor 0.2.0.x: - o Proposals: - o 111: Prioritize local traffic over relayed. - o 113: mark as closed close. - o document the "3/4 and 7/8" business in the clients fetching consensus - documents timeline. -R - then document the bridge user download timeline. - - HOWTO for DNSPort. See tup's wiki page. - . Document transport and natdport in a good HOWTO. - - Quietly document NT Service options: revise (or create) FAQ entry - -======================================================================= - -For 0.2.1.x-alpha: -R d bug: if we launch using bridges, and then stop using bridges, we - still have our bridges in our entryguards section, and may use them. - o add an event to report geoip summaries to vidalia for bridge relays, - so vidalia can say "recent activity (1-8 users) from sa". -R - investigate: it looks like if the bridge authority is unreachable, - we're not falling back on querying bridges directly? - o if "no running bridges known", an application request should make - us retry all our bridges. - -For 0.2.1.x: - - Proposals to do: - o 110: avoid infinite-length circuits - * Figure out the right value for max RELAY_EARLY cells (Bug 878) - - 117: IPv6 Exits - - Internal code support for ipv6: - o Clone ipv6 functions (inet_ntop, inet_pton) where they don't exist. - o Many address variables need to become tor_addr_t - o addr in connection_t - o n_addr in extend_info_t - - Teach resolving code how to handle ipv6. - . Teach exit policies about ipv6 (consider ipv4/ipv6 interaction!) - o Use IPv6 in connect/connected/failed-exitpolicy cells - o accept ipv6 from socks - o Generate END_REASON_EXITPOLICY cells right - . ... and parse them right - . Generate new BEGIN cell types and parse them right - - Detect availability of ipv6 - - Advertise availability of ipv6. - - Geoip support, if only to add a zone called "ipv6" - -K . 121: Hidden service authentication: - - missing: delayed descriptor publication for 'stealth' mode. - o 128: families of private bridges - o 135: simplify configuration of private tor networks. -K - 143: Improvements of Distributed Hidden Service Descriptor Storage: - only easy parts for 0.2.1.x, defer complex ones to 0.2.2.x. - o 148: Stream end reasons from the client side should be uniform. -K o 155: Four Improvements of Hidden Service Performance - - 145: Separate "suitable from a guard" from "suitable as a new guard" - - 146: Adding new flag to reflect long-term stability - - 149: Using data from NETINFO cells - o Don't extend a circuit over a noncanonical connection with - mismatched address. - o Apply rovv's bugfixes wrt preferring canonical connections. - o Make sure that having a non-canonical connection doesn't count - as _having_ a connection for the purpose of connecting to others, - and that when no canonical connection exists, we make one. - - Learn our outgoing IP address from netinfo cells? - - Learn skew from netinfo cells? - o 157: Make certificate downloads specific. - - - Proposals to write: - - Fix voting to handle bug 608 case when multiple servers get - Named. -N . Draft proposal for GeoIP aggregation (see external constraints *) - . Figure out how to make good use of the fallback consensus file. Right - now many of the addresses in the fallback consensus will be stale, - so it will take dozens of minutes to bootstrap from it. This is a - bad first Tor experience. But if we check the fallback consensus - file *after* we fail to connect to any authorities, then it may - still be valuable as a blocking-resistance step. - o Write the proposal. - - Patch our tor.spec rpm package so it knows where to put the fallback - consensus file. - . Put bandwidth weights in the networkstatus? So clients get weight - their choices even before they have the descriptors; and so - authorities can put in more accurate numbers in the future. - - - Spec compliance: - * Make sure that clients could do the new handshake without sending any - certs, if they wanted. - - - Tiny designs to write: - - If a relay publishes a new descriptor with a significantly lower - uptime or with a new IP address, then we should consider its current - "running" interval to have ended even if it hadn't yet failed its - third reachability test. the interval ended when the new descriptor - appeared, and a new interval began then too. - - - Authority improvements: -R - authorities should initiate a reachability test upon first - glimpsing a new descriptor. - - - Use less bandwidth - - Use if-modified-since to download consensuses - - - Testing - - Better unit test coverage - - Verify that write limits to linked connections work. - - - Security improvements - - make is-consensus-fresh-enough check tighter. - - If we haven't tried downloading a consensus for ages since we're tired, - try getting a new one before we use old descriptors for a circuit. - Related to bug 401. [What does "since we're tired" mean? -RD] - [I don't know. -NM] - - - Feature removals and deprecations: - - Get rid of the v1 directory stuff (making, serving, and caching) - . First verify that the caches won't flip out? - o If they will, just stop the caches from caching for now - . perhaps replace it with a "this is a tor server" stock webpage. - - Get the debs to set DirPortFrontPage in the default. - - Decide how to handle DirPortFrontPage files with image links. - - Can we deprecate controllers that don't use both features? - - Both TorK and Vidalia use VERBOSE_NAMES. - - TorK uses EXTENDED_EVENTS. Vidalia does not. (As of 9 Dec.) - - Matt is checking whether Vidalia would break if we started to use - EXTENDED_EVENTS by default. He says no. - -External tool improvements: - - Get IOCP patches into libevent - -Nice to have for 0.2.1.x: - - Proposals, time permitting - - 134: handle authority fragmentation. - - 140: Provide diffs betweeen consensuses - - - Handle multi-core cpus better - - Split circuit AES across cores - - Split cell_queue_t into a new structure with a processed subqueue, - an unprocessed subqueue, and a symmetric key. - - Write a function to pull cells from the unprocessed subqueue, - en/decrypt them, and place them on the processed subqueue. - - When a cell is added to a queue that previously had no - unprocessed cells, put that queue into a set of queues that - need to be processed. When the last cell is processed in a - queue, remove it from the set of queues that need to be - processed. - - Worker code to process queues in round-robin fashion. - - Think about how to be fair to differet circuits _and_ about to get - CPU-affinity, if that matters. - - When a cell is processed and placed onto a processed subqueue - that was previously empty, _and_ the or_conn output buffer - that the queue is targetting is empty, stick the buffer onto a - list of buffers that need attention and notify the main - thread if it was not already on the list. - - When the main thread gets notified, it pumps those buffers. - (i.e., it puts cells onto them from some of their circuits). - - To free a queue that is not currently processing, grab its lock - and free it. - - To free a queue that _is_ processing, .... ? - - - Documentation -P - Make documentation realize that location of system configuration file - will depend on location of system defaults, and isn't always /etc/torrc. - - - Small controller features - - A status event for when tor decides to stop fetching directory info - if the client hasn't clicked recently: then make the onion change too. - o Add a status event when new consensus arrives - - - Windows build -P - create a "make win32-bundle" for vidalia-privoxy-tor-torbutton bundle - - Is this obsolete with msi bundle coming soon asks phobos - - - Refactor bad code: - - connection_or_get_by_identity_digest() and connection_good_enough_for - _extend() could be merged into a smarter variant, perhaps. - - Refactor the HTTP logic so the functions aren't so large. - - Refactor buf_read and buf_write to have sensible ways to return - error codes after partial writes - - deprecate router_digest_is_trusted_dir() in favor of - router_get_trusteddirserver_by_digest() - - - Should be trivial - - Tor logs the libevent version on startup, for debugging purposes. - This is great. But it does this before configuring the logs, so - it only goes to stdout and is then lost. - (phobos asks, is this still the case? because it shows up in my - logs) - - - Deprecations - - Even clients run rep_hist_load_mtbf_data(). This doesn't waste memory - unless they had previously been non-clients collecting MTBF data. - Dump it anyway? - - Unless we start using ftime functions, dump them. - - can we deprecate the FastFirstHopPK config option? - - The v2dir flag isn't used for anything anymore, right? If so, dump it. - - can we deprecate 'getinfo network-status'? - - Dump most uint32_t addr functions. - - - do the part of the "abandon .exit" proposal that involves isolating - circuits which have used a .exit stream from those that haven't - -Defer: - - Proposals - - 118: Listen on and advertise multiple ports: - - Tor should be able to have a pool of outgoing IP addresses that it is - able to rotate through. (maybe. Possible overlap with proposal 118.) - - config option to publish what ports you listen on, beyond - ORPort/DirPort. It should support ranges and bit prefixes (?) too. - - Need to figure out the right format for routerinfo_t on this. - - 147: Eliminate the need for v2 directories in generating v3 directories - - - Proposals to write. - d Something for bug 469, to limit connections per IP. - d Do we want to maintain our own set of entryguards that we use as - next hop after the bridge? - d Possibly: revise link protocol to allow big circuit IDs, - variable-length cells, proposal-110 stuff, and versioned CREATES? - d Fetch an updated geoip file from the directory authorities. -R - bridge communities (revive proposal 128) - . spec - . deploy - - man page entries for Alternate*Authority config options - - - Tiny designs to write - - Better estimate of clock skew; has anonymity implications. Clients - should estimate their skew as median of skew from servers over last - N seconds, but for servers this is not so easy, since a server does - not choose who it connects to. - - Do TLS connection rotation more often than "once a week" in the - extra-stable case. - (One reason not to do it more often is because the old TLS conn - probably has a circuit on it, and we don't really want to build up - dozens of TCP connections to all the other extra-stable relays.) - - - - Use less RAM - - Optimize cell pool allocation. - - Support (or just always use) jemalloc (if it helps) - - mmap more files. - - Pull serverdescs off buffers as they arrive. - - Allocate routerstatus_t objects on a per-networkstatus memchunk. - - - Split TLS across multiple cores - - - "In the future, we should migrate to LOCAL_APPDATA entirely." - - - Use more mid-level and high-level libevent APIs - - For dns? - - For http? - - For buffers? - - - Proposals to write - - steven's plan for replacing check.torproject.org with a built-in - answer by tor itself. - - - Refactor bad code: - - Streamline how we pick entry nodes: Make choose_random_entry() have - less magic and less control logic. - - Move all status info out of routerinfo into local_routerstatus. Make - "who can change what" in local_routerstatus explicit. Make - local_routerstatus (or equivalent) subsume all places to go for "what - router is this?" - o Don't call time(NULL) so much; instead have a static time_t field - that gets updated only a handful of times per second. - - Refactor unit tests into multiple files - - - Make Tor able to chroot itself - o allow it to load an entire config file from control interface - - document LOADCONF - - log rotation (and FD passing) via control interface - - chroot yourself, including inhibit trying to read config file - and reopen logs, unless they are under datadir. - - - Should be trivial: - - Base relative control socket paths (and other stuff in torrc) on datadir. - o enforce a lower limit on MaxCircuitDirtiness and CircuitBuildTimeout. - - Make 'safelogging' extend to info-level logs too. - - don't do dns hijacking tests if we're reject *:* exit policy? - (deferred until 0.1.1.x is less common) - - More consistent error checking in router_parse_entry_from_string(). - I can say "banana" as my bandwidthcapacity, and it won't even squeak. - - d Interface for letting SOAT modify flags that authorities assign. - (How to keep the authority from clobbering them afterwards? - diff --git a/doc/TODO.022 b/doc/TODO.022 deleted file mode 100644 index d83ed6e67..000000000 --- a/doc/TODO.022 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,92 +0,0 @@ -Nick's initial priorities for Tor 0.2.2: - -NOTE 1: I'm not looking at fiddly little stuff from TODO.021 yet. We - can do a step where we triage the nice-to-have issues. - -NOTE 2: It's easy to list stuff like this with no time estimates and - no target dates. I think we should pick a target date for - 0.2.2, figure out how long the stuff we want will take, and - triage accordingly, or vice versa. - -- Performance, mostly protocol-neutral. - - o Revise how we do bandwidth limiting and round-robining between - circuits on a connection. - - . Revise how we do bandwidth limiting and round-robining between - connections. - - - Better flow-control to avoid filling buffers on routers. - - - Figure out good ways to instrument Tor internals so we can tell - how well our bandwidth and flow-control stuff is actually working. - - What ports eat the bandwidth? - - How full do queues get? - - How much latency do queues get? - - - Rate limit at clients: - - Give clients an upper bound on how much they're willing to use - the network if they're not relaying? - - ... or group client circuits by IP at the server and rate-limit - like that. - - - Use if-modified-since to download consensuses - - -- Other features - - Proposals to implement: - - 146: reflect long-term stability in consensuses - - 147: Stop using v2 directories to generate v3 votes. - - Start pinging as soon as we learn about a relay, not on a - 22-minute cycle. Prioritize new and volatile relays for - testing. - - - Proposals to improve and implement - - 158: microdescriptors - o Revise proposal - - Implement - - - Proposals to improve and implement if not broken - D IPv6 support. (Parts of 117, but figure out how to handle DNS - requests.) - - 140: Directory diffs - - Need a decent simple C diff implementation. - - Need a decent simple C ed patch implementation. - - 149: learn info from netinfo cells. - o Start discussion - - Revise proposal based on discussion. - X 134: handle authority fragmentation (Needs more analysis) - - 165: Easy migration for voting authority sets - - 163: Detect client-status better - o Write proposal - - Possibly implement, depending on discussion. - - 164: Have authorities report relay and voting status better: make it - easy to answer, "Why is my server not listed/not Guard/not - Running/etc" - o Write proposal - - Possibly implement, depending on discussion - - 162: Have consensuses come in multiple "flavours". - o Write proposal - - Possibly implement, depending on discussion. - - - Needs a proposal, or at least some design - - Weaken the requirements for being a Guard, based on K's - measurements. -K - Finish measurements -K? - Write proposal - - Adaptive timeouts for giving up on circuits and streams. -M - Revise proposal 151 - - Downweight guards more sensibly: be more forgiving about using - Guard nodes as non-first-hop. - - Write proposal. - - Lagged weight updates in consensuses: don't just move abruptly. -M? - Write proposal - d Don't kill a circuit on the first failed extend. - -- Installers - - Switch to MSI on win32 - - Use Thandy, perhaps? - -o Deprecations - o Make .exit safe, or make it off-by-default. - diff --git a/doc/TODO.external b/doc/TODO.external deleted file mode 100644 index 2e7e536ef..000000000 --- a/doc/TODO.external +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - -[This file moved to svn in /projects/todo/. More people can edit -it more easily there. -RD] - diff --git a/doc/TODO.future b/doc/TODO.future deleted file mode 100644 index 85e07aa92..000000000 --- a/doc/TODO.future +++ /dev/null @@ -1,330 +0,0 @@ -Legend: -SPEC!! - Not specified -SPEC - Spec not finalized -N - nick claims -R - arma claims -P - phobos claims -S - Steven claims -E - Matt claims -M - Mike claims -J - Jeff claims -I - ioerror claims -W - weasel claims -K - Karsten claims - - Not done - * Top priority - . Partially done - o Done - d Deferrable - D Deferred - X Abandoned - -======================================================================= - -Later, unless people want to implement them now: - - Actually use SSL_shutdown to close our TLS connections. - - Include "v" line in networkstatus getinfo values. - [Nick: bridge authorities output a networkstatus that is missing - version numbers. This is inconvenient if we want to make sure - bridgedb gives out bridges with certain characteristics. -RD] - [Okay. Is this a separate item, or is it the same issue as the lack of - a "v" line in response to the controller GETINFO command? -NM] - - MAYBE kill stalled circuits rather than stalled connections. This is - possible thanks to cell queues, but we need to consider the anonymity - implications. - - Make resolves no longer use edge_connection_t unless they are actually - _on_ a socks connection: have edge_connection_t and (say) - dns_request_t both extend an edge_stream_t, and have p_streams and - n_streams both be linked lists of edge_stream_t. - - Generate torrc.{complete|sample}.in, tor.1.in, the HTML manual, and the - online config documentation from a single source. - - It would be potentially helpful to respond to https requests on - the OR port by acting like an HTTPS server. - - - We should get smarter about handling address resolve failures, or - addresses that resolve to local IPs. It would be neat to retry - them, since right now we just close the stream. But we need to - make sure we don't retry them on the same exit as before. But if - we mark the circuit, then any user who types "localhost" will - cycle through circuits till they run out of retries. See bug 872. - -Can anybody remember why we wanted to do this and/or what it means? - - config option __ControllerLimit that hangs up if there are a limit - of controller connections already. - [This was mwenge's idea. The idea is that a Tor controller can - "fill" Tor's controller slot quota, so jerks can't do cross-protocol - attacks like the http form attack. -RD] - - Bridge issues - . Ask all directory questions to bridge via BEGIN_DIR. - - use the bridges for dir fetches even when our dirport is open. - - drop 'authority' queries if they're to our own identity key; accept - them otherwise. - - give extend_info_t a router_purpose again - - - -If somebody wants to do this in some version, they should: - - Create packages for Maemo/Nokia 800/810, requested by Chris Soghoian - - debian already makes ARM-arch debs, can maemo use these asks - phobos? - - More work on AvoidDiskWrites - - Make DNSPort support TCP DNS. - - -* * * * Roger, please sort these: * * * * - - - bridge communities with local bridge authorities: - - clients who have a password configured decide to ask their bridge - authority for a networkstatus - - be able to have bridges that aren't in your torrc. save them in - state file, etc. - - Consider if we can solve: the Tor client doesn't know what flags - its bridge has (since it only gets the descriptor), so it can't - make decisions based on Fast or Stable. - - Some mechanism for specifying that we want to stop using a cached - bridge. - -======================================================================= - -Future versions: - - - Protocol - - Our current approach to block attempts to use Tor as a single-hop proxy - is pretty lame; we should get a better one. - - Allow small cells and large cells on the same network? - - Cell buffering and resending. This will allow us to handle broken - circuits as long as the endpoints don't break, plus will allow - connection (tls session key) rotation. - - Implement Morphmix, so we can compare its behavior, complexity, - etc. But see paper breaking morphmix. - - Other transport. HTTP, udp, rdp, airhook, etc. May have to do our own - link crypto, unless we can bully DTLS into it. - - Need a relay teardown cell, separate from one-way ends. - (Pending a user who needs this) - - Handle half-open connections: right now we don't support all TCP - streams, at least according to the protocol. But we handle all that - we've seen in the wild. - (Pending a user who needs this) - - - Directory system - - BEGIN_DIR items - - handle connect-dir streams that don't have a chosen_exit_name set. - - Have a "Faster" status flag that means it. Fast2, Fast4, Fast8? - - Add an option (related to AvoidDiskWrites) to disable directory - caching. (Is this actually a good idea??) - X Add d64 and fp64 along-side d and fp so people can paste status - entries into a url. since + is a valid base64 char, only allow one - at a time. Consider adding to controller as well. - [abandoned for lack of demand] - - Some back-out mechanism for auto-approval on authorities - - a way of rolling back approvals to before a timestamp - - Consider minion-like fingerprint file/log combination. - X Have new people be in limbo and need to demonstrate usefulness - before we approve them. - - - Hidden services: - d Standby/hotswap/redundant hidden services: needs a proposal. - - you can insert a hidserv descriptor via the controller. - - auth mechanisms to let hidden service midpoint and responder filter - connection requests: proposal 121. - - Let each hidden service (or other thing) specify its own - OutboundBindAddress? - - - Server operation - - If the server is spewing complaints about raising your ulimit -n, - we should add a note about this to the server descriptor so other - people can notice too. - - When we hit a funny error from a dir request (eg 403 forbidden), - but tor is working and happy otherwise, and we haven't seen many - such errors recently, then don't warn about it. - - - Controller - - Implement missing status events and accompanying getinfos - - DIR_REACHABLE - - BAD_DIR_RESPONSE (Unexpected directory response; maybe we're behind - a firewall.) - - BAD_PROXY (Bad http or https proxy) - - UNRECOGNIZED_ROUTER (a nickname we asked for is unavailable) - - Status events related to hibernation - - something about failing to parse our address? - from resolve_my_address() in config.c - - sketchy OS, sketchy threading - - too many onions queued: threading problems or slow CPU? - - Implement missing status event fields: - - TIMEOUT on CHECKING_REACHABILITY - - GETINFO status/client, status/server, status/general: There should be - some way to learn which status events are currently "in effect." - We should specify which these are, what format they appear in, and so - on. - - More information in events: - - Include bandwidth breakdown by conn->type in BW events. - - Change circuit status events to give more details, like purpose, - whether they're internal, when they become dirty, when they become - too dirty for further circuits, etc. - - Change stream status events analogously. - - Expose more information via getinfo: - - import and export rendezvous descriptors - - Review all static fields for additional candidates - - Allow EXTENDCIRCUIT to unknown server. - - We need some way to adjust server status, and to tell tor not to - download directories/network-status, and a way to force a download. - - Make everything work with hidden services - - - Performance/resources - - per-conn write buckets - - separate config options for read vs write limiting - (It's hard to support read > write, since we need better - congestion control to avoid overfull buffers there. So, - defer the whole thing.) - - Rate limit exit connections to a given destination -- this helps - us play nice with websites when Tor users want to crawl them; it - also introduces DoS opportunities. - - Consider truncating rather than destroying failed circuits, - in order to save the effort of restarting. There are security - issues here that need thinking, though. - - Handle full buffers without totally borking - - Rate-limit OR and directory connections overall and per-IP and - maybe per subnet. - - - Misc - - Hold-open-until-flushed now works by accident; it should work by - design. - - Display the reasons in 'destroy' and 'truncated' cells under - some circumstances? - - Make router_is_general_exit() a bit smarter once we're sure what - it's for. - - Automatically determine what ports are reachable and start using - those, if circuits aren't working and it's a pattern we - recognize ("port 443 worked once and port 9001 keeps not - working"). - - - Security - - some better fix for bug #516? - - Directory guards - - Mini-SoaT: - - Servers might check certs for known-good ssl websites, and if - they come back self-signed, declare themselves to be - non-exits. Similar to how we test for broken/evil dns now. - - Authorities should try using exits for http to connect to some - URLS (specified in a configuration file, so as not to make the - List Of Things Not To Censor completely obvious) and ask them - for results. Exits that don't give good answers should have - the BadExit flag set. - - Alternatively, authorities should be able to import opinions - from Snakes on a Tor. - - Bind to random port when making outgoing connections to Tor servers, - to reduce remote sniping attacks. - - Audit everything to make sure rend and intro points are just as - likely to be us as not. - - Do something to prevent spurious EXTEND cells from making - middleman nodes connect all over. Rate-limit failed - connections, perhaps? - - DoS protection: TLS puzzles, public key ops, bandwidth exhaustion. - - - Needs thinking - - Now that we're avoiding exits when picking non-exit positions, - we need to consider how to pick nodes for internal circuits. If - we avoid exits for all positions, we skew the load balancing. If - we accept exits for all positions, we leak whether it's an - internal circuit at every step. If we accept exits only at the - last hop, we reintroduce Lasse's attacks from the Oakland paper. - - - Windows server usability - - Solve the ENOBUFS problem. - - make tor's use of openssl operate on buffers rather than sockets, - so we can make use of libevent's buffer paradigm once it has one. - - make tor's use of libevent tolerate either the socket or the - buffer paradigm; includes unifying the functions in connect.c. - - We need a getrlimit equivalent on Windows so we can reserve some - file descriptors for saving files, etc. Otherwise we'll trigger - asserts when we're out of file descriptors and crash. - - - Documentation - - a way to generate the website diagrams from source, so we can - translate them as utf-8 text rather than with gimp. (svg? or - imagemagick?) - . Flesh out options_description array in src/or/config.c - . multiple sample torrc files - - Refactor tor man page to divide generally useful options from - less useful ones? - - Add a doxygen style checker to make check-spaces so nick doesn't drift - too far from arma's undocumented styleguide. Also, document that - styleguide in HACKING. (See r9634 for example.) - - exactly one space at beginning and at end of comments, except i - guess when there's line-length pressure. - - if we refer to a function name, put a () after it. - - only write <b>foo</b> when foo is an argument to this function. - - doxygen comments must always end in some form of punctuation. - - capitalize the first sentence in the doxygen comment, except - when you shouldn't. - - avoid spelling errors and incorrect comments. ;) - - - Packaging - - The Debian package now uses --verify-config when (re)starting, - to distinguish configuration errors from other errors. Perhaps - the RPM and other startup scripts should too? - - add a "default.action" file to the tor/vidalia bundle so we can - fix the https thing in the default configuration: - https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#PrivoxyWeirdSSLPort - - -======================================================================= - -Documentation, non-version-specific. - - Specs - - Mark up spec; note unclear points about servers -NR - write a spec appendix for 'being nice with tor' - - Specify the keys and key rotation schedules and stuff - . Finish path-spec.txt - - Mention controller libs someplace. - - Remove need for HACKING file. - - document http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TransparentProxy on freebsd and osx -P - figure out rpm spec files for bundles of vidalia-tor-polipo -P - figure out polipo install scripts for bundles of vidalia-tor-polipo on osx, win32 - - figure out selinux policy for tor -P - change packaging system to more automated and specific for each - platform, suggested by Paul Wouter -P - Setup repos for redhat and suse rpms & start signing the rpms the - way package management apps prefer - -Website: -J . tor-in-the-media page -P - Figure out licenses for website material. - (Phobos reccomends the Open Publication License with Option A at - http://opencontent.org/openpub/) -P - put the logo on the website, in source form, so people can put it on - stickers directly, etc. -P - put the source image for the stickers on the website, so people can - print their own -P - figure out a license for the logos and docs we publish (trademark -figures into this) - (Phobos reccomends the Open Publication License with Option A at - http://opencontent.org/openpub/) -I - add a page for localizing all tor's components. - - It would be neat if we had a single place that described _all_ the - tor-related tools you can use, and what they give you, and how well they - work. Right now, we don't give a lot of guidance wrt - torbutton/foxproxy/privoxy/polipo in any consistent place. -P - create a 'blog badge' for tor fans to link to and feature on their - blogs. A sample is at http://interloper.org/tmp/tor/tor-button.png - - More prominently, we should have a recommended apps list. - - recommend pidgin (gaim is renamed) - - unrecommend IE because of ftp:// bug. - - Addenda to tor-design - - we should add a preamble to tor-design saying it's out of date. - - we should add an appendix or errata on what's changed. - - - Tor mirrors - - make a mailing list with the mirror operators - o make an automated tool to check /project/trace/ at mirrors to - learn which ones are lagging behind. - - auto (or manually) cull the mirrors that are broken; and - contact their operator? - - a set of instructions for mirror operators to make their apaches - serve our charsets correctly, and bonus points for language - negotiation. - - figure out how to load-balance the downloads across mirrors? - - ponder how to get users to learn that they should google for - "tor mirrors" if the main site is blocked. - - find a mirror volunteer to coordinate all of this - diff --git a/doc/include.am b/doc/include.am new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9eb919b9e --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/include.am @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +# We use a two-step process to generate documentation from asciidoc files. +# +# First, we use asciidoc/a2x to process the asciidoc files into .1.in and +# .html.in files (see the asciidoc-helper.sh script). These are the same as +# the regular .1 and .html files, except that they still have some autoconf +# variables set in them. +# +# Second, we use config.status to turn .1.in files into .1 files and +# .html.in files into .html files. +# +# We do the steps in this order so that we can ship the .*.in files as +# part of the source distribution, so that people without asciidoc can +# just use the .1 and .html files. + +regular_mans = doc/tor doc/tor-gencert doc/tor-resolve doc/torify +all_mans = $(regular_mans) doc/tor-fw-helper + +if USE_ASCIIDOC +if USE_FW_HELPER +nodist_man1_MANS = $(all_mans:=.1) +doc_DATA = $(all_mans:=.html) +else +nodist_man1_MANS = $(regular_mans:=.1) +doc_DATA = $(regular_mans:=.html) +endif +html_in = $(all_mans:=.html.in) +man_in = $(all_mans:=.1.in) +txt_in = $(all_mans:=.1.txt) +else +html_in = +man_in = +txt_in = +nodist_man1_MANS = +doc_DATA = +endif + +EXTRA_DIST+= doc/HACKING doc/asciidoc-helper.sh \ + $(html_in) $(man_in) $(txt_in) \ + doc/tor-rpm-creation.txt \ + doc/tor-win32-mingw-creation.txt doc/spec/README \ + doc/state-contents.txt + +docdir = @docdir@ + +asciidoc_product = $(nodist_man1_MANS) $(doc_DATA) + +# Generate the html documentation from asciidoc, but don't do +# machine-specific replacements yet +$(html_in) : + $(AM_V_GEN)$(top_srcdir)/doc/asciidoc-helper.sh html @ASCIIDOC@ $(top_srcdir)/$@ + +# Generate the manpage from asciidoc, but don't do +# machine-specific replacements yet +$(man_in) : + $(AM_V_GEN)$(top_srcdir)/doc/asciidoc-helper.sh man @A2X@ $(top_srcdir)/$@ + +doc/tor.1.in: doc/tor.1.txt +doc/tor-gencert.1.in: doc/tor-gencert.1.txt +doc/tor-resolve.1.in: doc/tor-resolve.1.txt +doc/torify.1.in: doc/torify.1.txt +doc/tor-fw-helper.1.in: doc/tor-fw-helper.1.txt + +doc/tor.html.in: doc/tor.1.txt +doc/tor-gencert.html.in: doc/tor-gencert.1.txt +doc/tor-resolve.html.in: doc/tor-resolve.1.txt +doc/torify.html.in: doc/torify.1.txt +doc/tor-fw-helper.html.in: doc/tor-fw-helper.1.txt + +# use ../config.status to swap all machine-specific magic strings +# in the asciidoc with their replacements. +$(asciidoc_product) : + $(AM_V_GEN)$(MKDIR_P) $(@D) + $(AM_V_at)if test -e $(top_srcdir)/$@.in && ! test -e $@.in ; then \ + cp $(top_srcdir)/$@.in $@; \ + fi + $(AM_V_at)./config.status -q --file=$@; + +doc/tor.html: doc/tor.html.in +doc/tor-gencert.html: doc/tor-gencert.html.in +doc/tor-resolve.html: doc/tor-resolve.html.in +doc/torify.html: doc/torify.html.in +doc/tor-fw-helper.html: doc/tor-fw-helper.html.in + +doc/tor.1: doc/tor.1.in +doc/tor-gencert.1: doc/tor-gencert.1.in +doc/tor-resolve.1: doc/tor-resolve.1.in +doc/torify.1: doc/torify.1.in +doc/tor-fw-helper.1: doc/tor-fw-helper.1.in + +CLEANFILES+= $(asciidoc_product) config.log +DISTCLEANFILES+= $(html_in) $(man_in) diff --git a/doc/tor-fw-helper.1.txt b/doc/tor-fw-helper.1.txt index 49b091038..cf769d965 100644 --- a/doc/tor-fw-helper.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor-fw-helper.1.txt @@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ // See LICENSE for licensing information // This is an asciidoc file used to generate the manpage/html reference. // Learn asciidoc on http://www.methods.co.nz/asciidoc/userguide.html +:man source: Tor +:man manual: Tor Manual tor-fw-helper(1) ================ Jacob Appelbaum @@ -39,18 +41,8 @@ OPTIONS **-g** or **--fetch-public-ip**:: Fetch the the public ip address for each supported NAT helper method. -**-i** or **--internal-or-port** __port__:: - Inform **tor-fw-helper** of your internal OR port. This is the only - required argument. - -**-e** or **--external-or-port** __port__:: - Inform **tor-fw-helper** of your external OR port. - -**-d** or **--internal-dir-port** __port__:: - Inform **tor-fw-helper** of your internal Dir port. - -**-p** or **--external-dir-port** __port__:: - Inform **tor-fw-helper** of your external Dir port. +**-p** or **--forward-port** __external_port__:__internal_port__:: + Forward external_port to internal_port. BUGS ---- diff --git a/doc/tor-gencert.1.txt b/doc/tor-gencert.1.txt index 2a2d1179c..aa61ec3ec 100644 --- a/doc/tor-gencert.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor-gencert.1.txt @@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ // See LICENSE for licensing information // This is an asciidoc file used to generate the manpage/html reference. // Learn asciidoc on http://www.methods.co.nz/asciidoc/userguide.html +:man source: Tor +:man manual: Tor Manual tor-gencert(1) ============== Nick Mathewson diff --git a/doc/tor-resolve.1.txt b/doc/tor-resolve.1.txt index bdc636b08..341d30224 100644 --- a/doc/tor-resolve.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor-resolve.1.txt @@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ // See LICENSE for licensing information // This is an asciidoc file used to generate the manpage/html reference. // Learn asciidoc on http://www.methods.co.nz/asciidoc/userguide.html +:man source: Tor +:man manual: Tor Manual tor-resolve(1) ============== Peter Palfrader diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index 773fccf53..b95de32b3 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ // See LICENSE for licensing information // This is an asciidoc file used to generate the manpage/html reference. // Learn asciidoc on http://www.methods.co.nz/asciidoc/userguide.html +:man source: Tor +:man manual: Tor Manual TOR(1) ====== @@ -127,11 +129,11 @@ GENERAL OPTIONS the specified number of bytes per second, and the average outgoing bandwidth usage to that same value. If you want to run a relay in the public network, this needs to be _at the very least_ 30 KB (that is, - 30720 bytes). (Default: 5 MB) + 30720 bytes). (Default: 1 GB) **BandwidthBurst** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**:: Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) to the given - number of bytes in each direction. (Default: 10 MB) + number of bytes in each direction. (Default: 1 GB) **MaxAdvertisedBandwidth** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**:: If set, we will not advertise more than this amount of bandwidth for our @@ -179,6 +181,11 @@ GENERAL OPTIONS using __options__ as its command-line options, and expects to receive proxied client traffic from it. +**ServerTransportListenAddr** __transport__ __IP__:__PORT__:: + When this option is set, Tor will suggest __IP__:__PORT__ as the + listening address of any pluggable transport proxy that tries to + launch __transport__. + **ConnLimit** __NUM__:: The minimum number of file descriptors that must be available to the Tor process before it will start. Tor will ask the OS for as many file @@ -285,7 +292,12 @@ GENERAL OPTIONS **DataDirectory** __DIR__:: Store working data in DIR (Default: @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor) -**DirServer** [__nickname__] [**flags**] __address__:__port__ __fingerprint__:: +**FallbackDir** __address__:__port__ orport=__port__ id=__fingerprint__ [weight=__num__]:: + When we're unable to connect to any directory cache for directory info + (usually because we don't know about any yet) we try a FallbackDir. + By default, the directory authorities are also FallbackDirs. + +**DirAuthority** [__nickname__] [**flags**] __address__:__port__ __fingerprint__:: Use a nonstandard authoritative directory server at the provided address and port, with the specified key fingerprint. This option can be repeated many times, for multiple authoritative directory servers. Flags are @@ -298,16 +310,24 @@ GENERAL OPTIONS flag is set, or if the "v1" flag is set and the "no-hs" flag is **not** set. Tor will use this authority as a bridge authoritative directory if the "bridge" flag is set. If a flag "orport=**port**" is given, Tor will use the - given port when opening encrypted tunnels to the dirserver. Lastly, if a + given port when opening encrypted tunnels to the dirserver. If a flag + "weight=**num**" is given, then the directory server is chosen randomly + with probability proportional to that weight (default 1.0). Lastly, if a flag "v3ident=**fp**" is given, the dirserver is a v3 directory authority whose v3 long-term signing key has the fingerprint **fp**. + + - If no **dirserver** line is given, Tor will use the default directory - servers. NOTE: this option is intended for setting up a private Tor + If no **DirAuthority** line is given, Tor will use the default directory + authorities. NOTE: this option is intended for setting up a private Tor network with its own directory authorities. If you use it, you will be distinguishable from other users, because you won't believe the same authorities they do. +**DirAuthorityFallbackRate** __NUM__:: + When configured to use both directory authorities and fallback + directories, the directory authorities also work as fallbacks. They are + chosen with their regular weights, multiplied by this number, which + should be 1.0 or less. (Default: 1.0) + **DynamicDHGroups** **0**|**1**:: If this option is set to 1, when running as a server, generate our own Diffie-Hellman group instead of using the one from Apache's mod_ssl. @@ -319,7 +339,7 @@ GENERAL OPTIONS **AlternateHSAuthority** [__nickname__] [**flags**] __address__:__port__ __fingerprint__ + **AlternateBridgeAuthority** [__nickname__] [**flags**] __address__:__port__ __ fingerprint__:: - These options behave as DirServer, but they replace fewer of the + These options behave as DirAuthority, but they replace fewer of the default directory authorities. Using AlternateDirAuthority replaces the default Tor directory authorities, but leaves the default hidden service authorities and bridge authorities in @@ -470,8 +490,10 @@ GENERAL OPTIONS **OutboundBindAddress** __IP__:: Make all outbound connections originate from the IP address specified. This is only useful when you have multiple network interfaces, and you want all - of Tor's outgoing connections to use a single one. This setting will be - ignored for connections to the loopback addresses (127.0.0.0/8 and ::1). + of Tor's outgoing connections to use a single one. This option may + be used twice, once with an IPv4 address and once with an IPv6 address. + This setting will be ignored for connections to the loopback addresses + (127.0.0.0/8 and ::1). **PidFile** __FILE__:: On startup, write our PID to FILE. On clean shutdown, remove @@ -657,7 +679,11 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if Note also that if you are a relay, this (and the other node selection options below) only affects your own circuits that Tor builds for you. Clients can still build circuits through you to any node. Controllers - can tell Tor to build circuits through any node. + can tell Tor to build circuits through any node. + + + + Country codes are case-insensitive. The code "\{??}" refers to nodes whose + country can't be identified. No country code, including \{??}, works if + no GeoIPFile can be loaded. See also the GeoIPExcludeUnknown option below. **ExcludeExitNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__:: @@ -667,6 +693,14 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if node listed in ExcludeNodes is automatically considered to be part of this list too. See also the caveats on the "ExitNodes" option below. +**GeoIPExcludeUnknown** **0**|**1**|**auto**:: + If this option is set to 'auto', then whenever any country code is set in + ExcludeNodes or ExcludeEntryNodes, all nodes with unknown country (\{??} and + possibly \{A1}) are treated as excluded as well. If this option is set to + '1', then all unknown countries are treated as excluded in ExcludeNodes + and ExcludeEntryNodes. This option has no effect when a GeoIP file isn't + configured or can't be found. (Default: auto) + **ExitNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__:: A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address patterns of nodes to use as exit node---that is, a @@ -860,7 +894,7 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if the same circuit. Currently, two addresses are "too close" if they lie in the same /16 range. (Default: 1) -**SOCKSPort** \['address':]__port__|**auto** [_isolation flags_]:: +**SOCKSPort** \['address':]__port__|**auto** [_flags_] [_isolation flags_]:: Open this port to listen for connections from SOCKS-speaking applications. Set this to 0 if you don't want to allow application connections via SOCKS. Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for @@ -893,7 +927,51 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if on this port to share circuits with streams from every other port with the same session group. (By default, streams received on different SOCKSPorts, TransPorts, etc are always isolated from one - another. This option overrides that behavior.) + another. This option overrides that behavior.) + ++ + Other recognized _flags_ for a SOCKSPort are: + **NoIPv4Traffic**;; + Tell exits to not connect to IPv4 addresses in response to SOCKS + requests on this connection. + **IPv6Traffic**;; + Tell exits to allow IPv6 addresses in response to SOCKS requests on + this connection, so long as SOCKS5 is in use. (SOCKS4 can't handle + IPv6.) + **PreferIPv6**;; + Tells exits that, if a host has both an IPv4 and an IPv6 address, + we would prefer to connect to it via IPv6. (IPv4 is the default.) + ++ + NOTE: Although this option allows you to specify an IP address + other than localhost, you should do so only with extreme caution. + The SOCKS protocol is unencrypted and (as we use it) + unauthenticated, so exposing it in this way could leak your + information to anybody watching your network, and allow anybody + to use your computer as an open proxy. + **CacheIPv4DNS**;; + Tells the client to remember IPv4 DNS answers we receive from exit + nodes via this connection. (On by default.) + **CacheIPv6DNS**;; + Tells the client to remember IPv6 DNS answers we receive from exit + nodes via this connection. + **CacheDNS**;; + Tells the client to remember all DNS answers we receive from exit + nodes via this connection. + **UseIPv4Cache**;; + Tells the client to use any cached IPv4 DNS answers we have when making + requests via this connection. (NOTE: This option, along UseIPv6Cache + and UseDNSCache, can harm your anonymity, and probably + won't help performance as much as you might expect. Use with care!) + **UseIPv6Cache**;; + Tells the client to use any cached IPv6 DNS answers we have when making + requests via this connection. + **UseDNSCache**;; + Tells the client to use any cached DNS answers we have when making + requests via this connection. + **PreferIPv6Automap**;; + When serving a hostname lookup request on this port that + should get automapped (according to AutomapHostsOnResove), + if we could return either an IPv4 or an IPv6 answer, prefer + an IPv6 answer. (On by default.) **SOCKSListenAddress** __IP__[:__PORT__]:: Bind to this address to listen for connections from Socks-speaking @@ -955,10 +1033,22 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if increases the odds that an adversary who owns some servers will observe a fraction of your paths. (Default: 1) +**UseEntryGuardsAsDirectoryGuards** **0**|**1**:: + If this option is set to 1, we try to use our entry guards as directory + guards, and failing that, pick more nodes to act as our directory guards. + This helps prevent an adversary from enumerating clients. It's only + available for clients (non-relay, non-bridge) that aren't configured to + download any non-default directory material. It doesn't currently + do anything when we lack a live consensus. (Default: 1) + **NumEntryGuards** __NUM__:: If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we will try to pick a total of NUM routers as long-term entries for our circuits. (Default: 3) +**NumDirectoryGuards** __NUM__:: + If UseEntryGuardsAsDirectoryGuards is enabled, we try to make sure we + have at least NUM routers to use as directory guards. (Default: 3) + **SafeSocks** **0**|**1**:: When this option is enabled, Tor will reject application connections that use unsafe variants of the socks protocol -- ones that only provide an IP @@ -979,16 +1069,20 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if applications to do DNS resolves themselves is usually a bad idea and can leak your location to attackers. (Default: 1) -**VirtualAddrNetwork** __Address__/__bits__:: +**VirtualAddrNetworkIPv4** __Address__/__bits__ + + +**VirtualAddrNetworkIPv6** [__Address__]/__bits__:: When Tor needs to assign a virtual (unused) address because of a MAPADDRESS command from the controller or the AutomapHostsOnResolve feature, Tor - picks an unassigned address from this range. (Default: - 127.192.0.0/10) + + picks an unassigned address from this range. (Defaults: + 127.192.0.0/10 and [FE80::]/10 respectively.) + + When providing proxy server service to a network of computers using a tool - like dns-proxy-tor, change this address to "10.192.0.0/10" or - "172.16.0.0/12". The default **VirtualAddrNetwork** address range on a - properly configured machine will route to the loopback interface. For + like dns-proxy-tor, change the IPv4 network to "10.192.0.0/10" or + "172.16.0.0/12" and change the IPv6 network to "[FC00]/7". + The default **VirtualAddrNetwork** address ranges on a + properly configured machine will route to the loopback or link-local + interface. For local use, no change to the default VirtualAddrNetwork setting is needed. **AllowNonRFC953Hostnames** **0**|**1**:: @@ -1095,12 +1189,6 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if regular router descriptors. Tor does not use this information for anything itself; to save bandwidth, leave this option turned off. (Default: 0) -**FallbackNetworkstatusFile** __FILENAME__:: - If Tor doesn't have a cached networkstatus file, it starts out using this - one instead. Even if this file is out of date, Tor can still use it to - learn about directory mirrors, so it doesn't need to put load on the - authorities. (Default: None) - **WarnPlaintextPorts** __port__,__port__,__...__:: Tells Tor to issue a warnings whenever the user tries to make an anonymous connection to one of these ports. This option is designed to alert users @@ -1142,32 +1230,93 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if "auto" (recommended) then it is on for all clients that do not set FetchUselessDescriptors. (Default: auto) +**UseNTorHandshake** **0**|**1**|**auto**:: + The "ntor" circuit-creation handshake is faster and (we think) more + secure than the original ("TAP") circuit handshake, but starting to use + it too early might make your client stand out. If this option is 0, your + Tor client won't use the ntor handshake. If it's 1, your Tor client + will use the ntor handshake to extend circuits through servers that + support it. If this option is "auto" (recommended), then your client + will use the ntor handshake once enough directory authorities recommend + it. (Default: auto) + **PathBiasCircThreshold** __NUM__ + **PathBiasNoticeRate** __NUM__ + -**PathBiasDisableRate** __NUM__ + +**PathBiasWarnRate** __NUM__ + + +**PathBiasExtremeRate** __NUM__ + -**PathBiasScaleThreshold** __NUM__ + +**PathBiasDropGuards** __NUM__ + -**PathBiasScaleFactor** __NUM__:: +**PathBiasScaleThreshold** __NUM__:: These options override the default behavior of Tor's (**currently experimental**) path bias detection algorithm. To try to find broken or misbehaving guard nodes, Tor looks for nodes where more than a certain - fraction of circuits through that node fail after the first hop. The - PathBiasCircThreshold option controls how many circuits we need to build - through a guard before we make these checks. The PathBiasNoticeRate and - PathBiasDisableRate options control what fraction of circuits must - succeed through a guard so we won't warn about it or disable it, - respectively. When we have seen more than PathBiasScaleThreshold - circuits through a guard, we divide our observations by - PathBiasScaleFactor, so that new observations don't get swamped by old - ones. + + fraction of circuits through that guard fail to get built. + + + The PathBiasCircThreshold option controls how many circuits we need to build + through a guard before we make these checks. The PathBiasNoticeRate, + PathBiasWarnRate and PathBiasExtremeRate options control what fraction of + circuits must succeed through a guard so we won't write log messages. + If less than PathBiasExtremeRate circuits succeed *and* PathBiasDropGuards + is set to 1, we disable use of that guard. + + + + When we have seen more than PathBiasScaleThreshold + circuits through a guard, we scale our observations by 0.5 (governed by + the consensus) so that new observations don't get swamped by old ones. + + By default, or if a negative value is provided for one of these options, Tor uses reasonable defaults from the networkstatus consensus document. - If no defaults are available there, these options default to 20, .70, - 0.0, 200, and 4 respectively. + If no defaults are available there, these options default to 150, .70, + .50, .30, 0, and 300 respectively. + +**PathBiasUseThreshold** __NUM__ + + +**PathBiasNoticeUseRate** __NUM__ + + +**PathBiasExtremeUseRate** __NUM__ + + +**PathBiasScaleUseThreshold** __NUM__:: + Similar to the above options, these options override the default behavior + of Tor's (**currently experimental**) path use bias detection algorithm. + + + Where as the path bias parameters govern thresholds for successfully + building circuits, these four path use bias parameters govern thresholds + only for circuit usage. Circuits which receive no stream usage + are not counted by this detection algorithm. A used circuit is considered + successful if it is capable of carrying streams or otherwise receiving + well-formed responses to RELAY cells. + + + By default, or if a negative value is provided for one of these options, + Tor uses reasonable defaults from the networkstatus consensus document. + If no defaults are available there, these options default to 20, .80, + .60, and 100, respectively. + +**ClientUseIPv6** **0**|**1**:: + If this option is set to 1, Tor might connect to entry nodes over + IPv6. Note that clients configured with an IPv6 address in a + **Bridge** line will try connecting over IPv6 even if + **ClientUseIPv6** is set to 0. (Default: 0) + +**ClientPreferIPv6ORPort** **0**|**1**:: + If this option is set to 1, Tor prefers an OR port with an IPv6 + address over one with IPv4 if a given entry node has both. Other + things may influence the choice. This option breaks a tie to the + favor of IPv6. (Default: 0) + +**PathsNeededToBuildCircuits** __NUM__:: + Tor clients don't build circuits for user traffic until they know + about enough of the network so that they could potentially construct + enough of the possible paths through the network. If this option + is set to a fraction between 0.25 and 0.95, Tor won't build circuits + until it has enough descriptors or microdescriptors to construct + that fraction of possible paths. Note that setting this option too low + can make your Tor client less anonymous, and setting it too high can + prevent your Tor client from bootstrapping. If this option is negative, + Tor will use a default value chosen by the directory + authorities. (Default: -1.) SERVER OPTIONS @@ -1259,9 +1408,13 @@ is non-zero): at the beginning of your exit policy. See above entry on ExitPolicy. (Default: 1) -**MaxOnionsPending** __NUM__:: - If you have more than this number of onionskins queued for decrypt, reject - new ones. (Default: 100) +**IPv6Exit** **0**|**1**:: + If set, and we are an exit node, allow clients to use us for IPv6 + traffic. (Default: 0) + +**MaxOnionQueueDelay** __NUM__ [**msec**|**second**]:: + If we have more onionskins queued for processing than we can process in + this amount of time, reject new ones. (Default: 1750 msec) **MyFamily** __node__,__node__,__...__:: Declare that this Tor server is controlled or administered by a group or @@ -1442,7 +1595,16 @@ is non-zero): does on behalf of clients. (Default: 1) **GeoIPFile** __filename__:: - A filename containing GeoIP data, for use with BridgeRecordUsageByCountry. + A filename containing IPv4 GeoIP data, for use with by-country statistics. + +**GeoIPv6File** __filename__:: + A filename containing IPv6 GeoIP data, for use with by-country statistics. + +**TLSECGroup** **P224**|**P256**:: + What EC group should we try to use for incoming TLS connections? + P224 is faster, but makes us stand out more. Has no effect if + we're a client, or if our OpenSSL version lacks support for ECDHE. + (Default: P224 for public servers; P256 for bridges.) **CellStatistics** **0**|**1**:: When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the mean time that @@ -1733,6 +1895,12 @@ DIRECTORY AUTHORITY SERVER OPTIONS votes on whether to accept relays as hidden service directories. (Default: 1) +**AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity** **0**|**1**:: + Authoritative directories only. When set to 0, OR ports with an + IPv6 address are being accepted without reachability testing. + When set to 1, IPv6 OR ports are being tested just like IPv4 OR + ports. (Default: 0) + HIDDEN SERVICE OPTIONS ---------------------- diff --git a/doc/torify.1.txt b/doc/torify.1.txt index 4a4be1250..22b3fe537 100644 --- a/doc/torify.1.txt +++ b/doc/torify.1.txt @@ -2,10 +2,10 @@ // See LICENSE for licensing information // This is an asciidoc file used to generate the manpage/html reference. // Learn asciidoc on http://www.methods.co.nz/asciidoc/userguide.html +:man source: Tor +:man manual: Tor Manual torify(1) ========= -Peter Palfrader -Jacob Appelbaum NAME ---- @@ -48,3 +48,7 @@ SEE ALSO -------- **tor**(1), **tor-resolve**(1), **torsocks**(1), **tsocks**(1), **tsocks.conf**(5). + +AUTHORS +------- +Peter Palfrader and Jacob Appelbaum wrote this manual. |