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-rw-r--r--doc/TODO9
-rw-r--r--doc/spec/tor-spec.txt7
2 files changed, 10 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/doc/TODO b/doc/TODO
index f089e5823..0e591e836 100644
--- a/doc/TODO
+++ b/doc/TODO
@@ -23,9 +23,10 @@ Things we'd like to do in 0.2.0.x:
- Support for preconfigured mirror lists
- Use a pre-shipped fallback consensus.
- Download consensuses (et al) via if-modified-since
- - Saner TLS rotation
- - Bump up the "connection timeout" value to be 1.5
+ o Saner TLS rotation
+ o Bump up OR the "connection timeout" value to be 1.5
circuit dirtiness interval.
+ o Document this in tor-spec
- base Guard flag on WFU rather than or in addition to MTBF
D 118 if feasible and obvious
D Maintain a skew estimate and use ftime consistently.
@@ -103,8 +104,8 @@ Things we'd like to do in 0.2.0.x:
- Handle rate-limiting on directory writes to linked directory
connections in a more sensible manner.
- Find more ways to test this.
- - Have clients do TLS connection rotation less often than "every 10
- minutes" in the thrashy case, and more often than "once a week" in the
+ o Do TLS rotation less often than "every 10 minutes" in the thrashy case.
+ D Do TLS connection rotation more often than "once a week" in the
extra-stable case.
- Streamline how we pick entry nodes: Make choose_random_entry() have
less magic and less control logic.
diff --git a/doc/spec/tor-spec.txt b/doc/spec/tor-spec.txt
index de614207f..b31e7bf62 100644
--- a/doc/spec/tor-spec.txt
+++ b/doc/spec/tor-spec.txt
@@ -194,9 +194,12 @@ see tor-design.pdf.
of TLS records MUST NOT leak information about the type or contents
of the cells.
- TLS connections are not permanent. Either side may close a connection
+ TLS connections are not permanent. Either side MAY close a connection
if there are no circuits running over it and an amount of time
- (KeepalivePeriod, defaults to 5 minutes) has passed.
+ (KeepalivePeriod, defaults to 5 minutes) has passed since the last time
+ any traffic was transmitted over the TLS connection. Clients SHOULD
+ also hold a TLS connection with no circuits open, if it is likely that a
+ circuit will be built soon using that connection.
(As an exception, directory servers may try to stay connected to all of
the ORs -- though this will be phased out for the Tor 0.1.2.x release.)