diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'doc')
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/TODO | 18 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/rend-spec.txt | 10 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/tor-spec.txt | 30 |
3 files changed, 25 insertions, 33 deletions
@@ -11,21 +11,6 @@ ARMA - arma claims D Deferred X Abandoned -Flag-day changes: (things which are backward incompatible) - o remove link key from directories, from connection_t. - (just get it from the tls cert) - o Generate link keys on startup; don't store them to disk. - o make onion keys include oaep padding, so you can tell - if you decrypted it correctly - o Rotate onion keys as needed - D Rotate TLS connections [arma] - o Set expiration times on X509 certs [nickm] - o add bandwidthrate and bandwidthburst to server descriptor [nickm] - o directories need to say who signed them. [nickm] - - remove assumption that 0.0.5 doesn't do rendezvous? - D what other pieces of the descriptors need to change? - maybe add a section for who's connected to a given router? - add a flexible section for reputation info? For September: - Windows port @@ -69,6 +54,9 @@ For September: - allow non-clique topology Other details and small things: + - hidserv offerers shouldn't need to define a SocksPort + - when the client fails to pick an intro point for a hidserv, + it should refetch the hidserv desc. . should maybe make clients exit(1) when bad things happen? e.g. clock skew. - should retry exitpolicy end streams even if the end cell didn't diff --git a/doc/rend-spec.txt b/doc/rend-spec.txt index c428864d8..ac2b0aca8 100644 --- a/doc/rend-spec.txt +++ b/doc/rend-spec.txt @@ -255,12 +255,10 @@ Tor Rendezvous Spec PK_ID is the hash of Bob's public key. RP is NUL-padded. - The data is encrypted to Bob's PK as follows: Suppose Bob's PK is L octets - long. If the data to be encrypted is shorter than L-42, then it is - encrypted directly (with OAEP padding). If the data is at least as long - as L-42, then a randomly generated 16-byte symmetric key is prepended to - the data, after which the first L-16-42 bytes of the data are encrypted with - Bob's PK; and the rest of the data is encrypted with the symmetric key. + The hybrid encryption to Bob's PK works just like the hybrid + encryption in CREATE cells (see main spec). Thus the payload of the + RELAY_INTRODUCE1 cell on the wire will contain 20+42+16+20+20+128=246 + bytes. 1.9. Introduction: From the Introduction Point to Bob's OP diff --git a/doc/tor-spec.txt b/doc/tor-spec.txt index 7c0297429..5536ef000 100644 --- a/doc/tor-spec.txt +++ b/doc/tor-spec.txt @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ TODO: (very soon) proxies is a fixed-width "cell". Each cell contains the following fields: - CircID [2 bytes] + CircID [2 bytes] Command [1 byte] Payload (padded with 0 bytes) [509 bytes] [Total size: 512 bytes] @@ -146,23 +146,29 @@ TODO: (very soon) which instructs the last node in the circuit to send a CREATE cell to extend the circuit. - The payload for a CREATE cell is an 'onion skin', consisting of: - RSA-encrypted data [128 bytes] - Symmetrically-encrypted data [16 bytes] + The payload for a CREATE cell is an 'onion skin', which consists + of the first step of the DH handshake data (also known as g^x). - The RSA-encrypted portion contains: - Symmetric key [16 bytes] - First part of DH data (g^x) [112 bytes] - The symmetrically encrypted portion contains: - Second part of DH data (g^x) [16 bytes] + The data is encrypted to Bob's PK as follows: Suppose Bob's PK is + L octets long. If the data to be encrypted is shorter than L-42, + then it is encrypted directly (with OAEP padding). If the data is at + least as long as L-42, then a randomly generated 16-byte symmetric + key is prepended to the data, after which the first L-16-42 bytes + of the data are encrypted with Bob's PK; and the rest of the data is + encrypted with the symmetric key. - The two parts of DH data, once decrypted and concatenated, form - g^x as calculated by the client. + So in this case, the onion skin on the wire looks like: + RSA-encrypted: + OAEP padding [42 bytes] + Symmetric key [16 bytes] + First part of g^x [70 bytes] + Symmetrically encrypted: + Second part of g^x [58 bytes] The relay payload for an EXTEND relay cell consists of: Address [4 bytes] Port [2 bytes] - Onion skin [144 bytes] + Onion skin [186 bytes] The port and address field denote the IPV4 address and port of the next onion router in the circuit. |