diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'doc')
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/HACKING | 32 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/Makefile.am | 89 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/TODO | 11 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/TODO.021 | 386 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/TODO.022 | 92 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/TODO.external | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/TODO.future | 330 | ||||
| -rwxr-xr-x | doc/asciidoc-helper.sh | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/contrib/authority-policy.txt | 89 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/contrib/incentives.txt | 479 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/contrib/tor-rpm-creation.txt (renamed from doc/tor-rpm-creation.txt) | 0 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/contrib/torel-design.txt | 181 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/include.am | 89 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/spec/README | 11 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/tor-fw-helper.1.txt | 26 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/tor-gencert.1.txt | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/tor-resolve.1.txt | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/tor-win32-mingw-creation.txt | 119 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/tor.1.txt | 335 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/torify.1.txt | 26 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/translations.txt | 182 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/v3-authority-howto.txt | 84 |
22 files changed, 401 insertions, 2172 deletions
diff --git a/doc/HACKING b/doc/HACKING index bc409dc0d..b7cd8952d 100644 --- a/doc/HACKING +++ b/doc/HACKING @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/proposals/001-process For the latest version of the code, get a copy of git, and - git clone git://git.torproject.org/git/tor . + git clone https://git.torproject.org/git/tor We talk about Tor on the tor-talk mailing list. Design proposals and discussion belong on the tor-dev mailing list. We hang around on @@ -38,9 +38,9 @@ release. Occasionally, we'll merge an urgent bugfix into the release branch before it gets merged into maint, but that's rare. If you're working on a bugfix for a bug that occurs in a particular version, -base your bugfix branch on the "maint" branch for the first _actively -developed_ series that has that bug. (Right now, that's 0.2.1.) If you're -working on a new feature, base it on the master branch. +base your bugfix branch on the "maint" branch for the first supported series +that has that bug. (As of June 2013, we're supporting 0.2.3 and later.) If +you're working on a new feature, base it on the master branch. How we log changes @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ the "changes" toplevel subdirectory. It should have the format of a one-entry changelog section from the current ChangeLog file, as in o Major bugfixes: - - Fix a potential buffer overflow. Fixes bug 9999; bugfix on + - Fix a potential buffer overflow. Fixes bug 99999; bugfix on 0.3.1.4-beta. To write a changes file, first categorize the change. Some common categories @@ -90,10 +90,10 @@ Useful tools These aren't strictly necessary for hacking on Tor, but they can help track down bugs. -The buildbot -~~~~~~~~~~~~ +Jenkins +~~~~~~~ -https://buildbot.vidalia-project.net/one_line_per_build +http://jenkins.torproject.org Dmalloc ~~~~~~~ @@ -121,7 +121,8 @@ Running gcov for unit test coverage make clean make CFLAGS='-g -fprofile-arcs -ftest-coverage' ./src/test/test - cd src/common; gcov *.[ch] + gcov -o src/common src/common/*.[ch] + gcov -o src/or src/or/*.[ch] cd ../or; gcov *.[ch] ----- @@ -130,6 +131,13 @@ compiler generated no code for that line. '######' means that the line was never reached. Lines with numbers were called that number of times. +If that doesn't work: + * Try configuring Tor with --disable-gcc-hardening + * On recent OSX versions, you might need to add CC=clang to your + build line, as in: + make CFLAGS='-g -fprofile-arcs -ftest-coverage' CC=clang + Their llvm-gcc doesn't work so great for me. + Profiling Tor with oprofile ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ @@ -174,6 +182,8 @@ Did you remember... - To build your code while configured with --enable-gcc-warnings? - To run "make check-spaces" on your code? + - To run "make check-docs" to see whether all new options are on + the manpage? - To write unit tests, as possible? - To base your code on the appropriate branch? - To include a file in the "changes" directory as appropriate? @@ -304,7 +314,7 @@ do your own profiling to determine otherwise. Log conventions ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#LogLevels +https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorFAQ#loglevel No error or warning messages should be expected during normal OR or OP operation. @@ -467,7 +477,7 @@ a stable release, add it to the ReleaseNotes file too. If we're adding to a release-0.2.x branch, manually commit the changelogs to the later git branches too. -4) Bump the version number in configure.in and rebuild. +4) Bump the version number in configure.ac and rebuild. 5) Make dist, put the tarball up somewhere, and tell #tor about it. Wait a while to see if anybody has problems building it. Try to get Sebastian diff --git a/doc/Makefile.am b/doc/Makefile.am deleted file mode 100644 index 6cdd66d51..000000000 --- a/doc/Makefile.am +++ /dev/null @@ -1,89 +0,0 @@ -# We use a two-step process to generate documentation from asciidoc files. -# -# First, we use asciidoc/a2x to process the asciidoc files into .1.in and -# .html.in files (see the asciidoc-helper.sh script). These are the same as -# the regular .1 and .html files, except that they still have some autoconf -# variables set in them. -# -# Second, we use config.status to turn .1.in files into .1 files and -# .html.in files into .html files. -# -# We do the steps in this order so that we can ship the .*.in files as -# part of the source distribution, so that people without asciidoc can -# just use the .1 and .html files. - -regular_mans = tor tor-gencert tor-resolve torify -all_mans = $(regular_mans) tor-fw-helper - -if USE_ASCIIDOC -if USE_FW_HELPER -nodist_man_MANS = $(all_mans:=.1) -doc_DATA = $(all_mans:=.html) -else -nodist_man_MANS = $(regular_mans:=.1) -doc_DATA = $(regular_mans:=.html) -endif -html_in = $(all_mans:=.html.in) -man_in = $(all_mans:=.1.in) -txt_in = $(all_mans:=.1.txt) -else -html_in = -man_in = -txt_in = -nodist_man_MANS = -doc_DATA = -endif - -EXTRA_DIST = HACKING asciidoc-helper.sh \ - $(html_in) $(man_in) $(txt_in) \ - tor-rpm-creation.txt \ - tor-win32-mingw-creation.txt spec/README \ - state-contents.txt - -docdir = @docdir@ - -asciidoc_product = $(nodist_man_MANS) $(doc_DATA) - -# Generate the html documentation from asciidoc, but don't do -# machine-specific replacements yet -$(html_in) : - $(top_srcdir)/doc/asciidoc-helper.sh html @ASCIIDOC@ $(top_srcdir)/doc/$@ - -tor.html.in : tor.1.txt -torify.html.in : torify.1.txt -tor-gencert.html.in : tor-gencert.1.txt -tor-resolve.html.in : tor-resolve.1.txt -tor-fw-helper.html.in : tor-fw-helper.1.txt - -# Generate the manpage from asciidoc, but don't do -# machine-specific replacements yet -$(man_in) : - $(top_srcdir)/doc/asciidoc-helper.sh man @A2X@ $(top_srcdir)/doc/$@ - -tor.1.in : tor.1.txt -torify.1.in : torify.1.txt -tor-gencert.1.in : tor-gencert.1.txt -tor-resolve.1.in : tor-resolve.1.txt -tor-fw-helper.1.in : tor-fw-helper.1.txt - -# use ../config.status to swap all machine-specific magic strings -# in the asciidoc with their replacements. -$(asciidoc_product) : - if test -e $(top_srcdir)/doc/$@.in && ! test -e ./$@.in ; then \ - cp $(top_srcdir)/doc/$@.in .; \ - fi - ../config.status --file=$@; - -tor.1 : tor.1.in -torify.1 : torify.1.in -tor-gencert.1 : tor-gencert.1.in -tor-resolve.1 : tor-resolve.1.in -tor-fw-helper.1 : tor-fw-helper.1.in -tor.html : tor.html.in -torify.html : torify.html.in -tor-gencert.html : tor-gencert.html.in -tor-resolve.html : tor-resolve.html.in -tor-fw-helper.html : tor-fw-helper.html.in - -CLEANFILES = $(asciidoc_product) config.log -DISTCLEANFILES = $(html_in) $(man_in) diff --git a/doc/TODO b/doc/TODO deleted file mode 100644 index 194d6507b..000000000 --- a/doc/TODO +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ - -We've split out our TODO into three files: - -TODO.02x is the list of items we're planning to get done in the next -stable release. - -TODO.external lives in svn under /projects/todo/. It's the list of -external constraints and deliverables that we all need to keep in mind. - -TODO.future is the list of other items we plan to get to in later releases. - diff --git a/doc/TODO.021 b/doc/TODO.021 deleted file mode 100644 index 37c5b9845..000000000 --- a/doc/TODO.021 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,386 +0,0 @@ -Legend: -SPEC!! - Not specified -SPEC - Spec not finalized -N - nick claims -R - arma claims -P - phobos claims -S - Steven claims -E - Matt claims -M - Mike claims -J - Jeff claims -I - ioerror claims -W - weasel claims -K - Karsten claims - - Not done - * Top priority - . Partially done - o Done - d Deferrable - D Deferred - X Abandoned - -======================================================================= - -Things Roger would be excited to see: - -Nick - * Look at Roger's proposal 141 discussions on or-dev, and help us - decide how to proceed. - . Tors start believing the contents of NETINFO cells. - - respond to Steven's red-team TLS testing (a.k.a, look at a packet - dump and compare) - -Matt - - Fit Vidalia in 640x480 again. - - Vidalia should avoid stomping on your custom exit policy lines - just because you click on 'save' for a totally different config thing. - - How much space do we save in TBB by stripping symbols from Vidalia - first? Good idea or crazy idea? - (phobos adds you save about 12MB total across all exes by stripping - them) In fact, tbb-1.19 is stripped exes. - -ioerror - * weather.torproject.org should go live. - - Keep advocating new Tor servers and working with orgs like Mozilla - to let them like Tor. - - Find out what happened to the buildbot and get it back up: - http://tor-buildbot.freehaven.net:8010/ - - Learn about locking memory pages that have sensitive content. Get - that started in Tor. - - Translation portal - - Vidalia html help files - - should we i18nize polipo's error messages too? - - how to get our diagrams translated, and how to get our screenshots - from the right language? - - Some of our translated wml files are very old -- so old that they - are harmful to leave in place. We need some sort of way to notice - this and disable them. - -Steven - - Move proposal 131 or equivalent forward. - - Keep bugging us about exploits on the .exit notation. - - Mike's question #3 on https://www.torproject.org/volunteer#Research - - Worthwhile shipping TBB with some local html help files that come - as bookmarks? - -Andrew - -Weasel - - Figure out how to make Vidalia and Tor play nicely on Debian, make - the necessary modifications, and make some Vidalia debs that pass - muster. - - Fix bug 393. - - Get oftc to switch to Tor dns bulk exitlist. Or tell us why it's - not suitable yet. - - Move proposal 134 forward. - - putting port predictions in state file - - if tor hasn't been used in a while it stops fetching consensus - documents. Retain that state over restarts. - -Roger - - Finish tor-doc-bridge.wml - . Fix FAQ entry on setting up private Tor network - - Did we actually apply Steven's dkimproxy patch? - - Brainstorm about safe but effective ways for vidalia to - auto-update its user's bridges via Tor in the background. - - it doesn't count as successfully opening a circuit if it's not - an exit circuit. - -Mike: - - Roger wants to get an email every time there's a blog change, - e.g. a comment. That way spam doesn't go undetected for weeks. - - Or, maybe just disable linking from blog comments entirely? - (phobos mitigates this by checking it a few times a week) - -======================================================================= - -Bugs/issues for Tor 0.2.0.x: - . we should have an off-by-default way for relays to dump geoip data to - a file in their data directory, for measurement purposes. - o Basic implementation -N - Include probability-of-selection -R d let bridges set relaybandwidthrate as low as 5kb - -Documentation for Tor 0.2.0.x: - o Proposals: - o 111: Prioritize local traffic over relayed. - o 113: mark as closed close. - o document the "3/4 and 7/8" business in the clients fetching consensus - documents timeline. -R - then document the bridge user download timeline. - - HOWTO for DNSPort. See tup's wiki page. - . Document transport and natdport in a good HOWTO. - - Quietly document NT Service options: revise (or create) FAQ entry - -======================================================================= - -For 0.2.1.x-alpha: -R d bug: if we launch using bridges, and then stop using bridges, we - still have our bridges in our entryguards section, and may use them. - o add an event to report geoip summaries to vidalia for bridge relays, - so vidalia can say "recent activity (1-8 users) from sa". -R - investigate: it looks like if the bridge authority is unreachable, - we're not falling back on querying bridges directly? - o if "no running bridges known", an application request should make - us retry all our bridges. - -For 0.2.1.x: - - Proposals to do: - o 110: avoid infinite-length circuits - * Figure out the right value for max RELAY_EARLY cells (Bug 878) - - 117: IPv6 Exits - - Internal code support for ipv6: - o Clone ipv6 functions (inet_ntop, inet_pton) where they don't exist. - o Many address variables need to become tor_addr_t - o addr in connection_t - o n_addr in extend_info_t - - Teach resolving code how to handle ipv6. - . Teach exit policies about ipv6 (consider ipv4/ipv6 interaction!) - o Use IPv6 in connect/connected/failed-exitpolicy cells - o accept ipv6 from socks - o Generate END_REASON_EXITPOLICY cells right - . ... and parse them right - . Generate new BEGIN cell types and parse them right - - Detect availability of ipv6 - - Advertise availability of ipv6. - - Geoip support, if only to add a zone called "ipv6" - -K . 121: Hidden service authentication: - - missing: delayed descriptor publication for 'stealth' mode. - o 128: families of private bridges - o 135: simplify configuration of private tor networks. -K - 143: Improvements of Distributed Hidden Service Descriptor Storage: - only easy parts for 0.2.1.x, defer complex ones to 0.2.2.x. - o 148: Stream end reasons from the client side should be uniform. -K o 155: Four Improvements of Hidden Service Performance - - 145: Separate "suitable from a guard" from "suitable as a new guard" - - 146: Adding new flag to reflect long-term stability - - 149: Using data from NETINFO cells - o Don't extend a circuit over a noncanonical connection with - mismatched address. - o Apply rovv's bugfixes wrt preferring canonical connections. - o Make sure that having a non-canonical connection doesn't count - as _having_ a connection for the purpose of connecting to others, - and that when no canonical connection exists, we make one. - - Learn our outgoing IP address from netinfo cells? - - Learn skew from netinfo cells? - o 157: Make certificate downloads specific. - - - Proposals to write: - - Fix voting to handle bug 608 case when multiple servers get - Named. -N . Draft proposal for GeoIP aggregation (see external constraints *) - . Figure out how to make good use of the fallback consensus file. Right - now many of the addresses in the fallback consensus will be stale, - so it will take dozens of minutes to bootstrap from it. This is a - bad first Tor experience. But if we check the fallback consensus - file *after* we fail to connect to any authorities, then it may - still be valuable as a blocking-resistance step. - o Write the proposal. - - Patch our tor.spec rpm package so it knows where to put the fallback - consensus file. - . Put bandwidth weights in the networkstatus? So clients get weight - their choices even before they have the descriptors; and so - authorities can put in more accurate numbers in the future. - - - Spec compliance: - * Make sure that clients could do the new handshake without sending any - certs, if they wanted. - - - Tiny designs to write: - - If a relay publishes a new descriptor with a significantly lower - uptime or with a new IP address, then we should consider its current - "running" interval to have ended even if it hadn't yet failed its - third reachability test. the interval ended when the new descriptor - appeared, and a new interval began then too. - - - Authority improvements: -R - authorities should initiate a reachability test upon first - glimpsing a new descriptor. - - - Use less bandwidth - - Use if-modified-since to download consensuses - - - Testing - - Better unit test coverage - - Verify that write limits to linked connections work. - - - Security improvements - - make is-consensus-fresh-enough check tighter. - - If we haven't tried downloading a consensus for ages since we're tired, - try getting a new one before we use old descriptors for a circuit. - Related to bug 401. [What does "since we're tired" mean? -RD] - [I don't know. -NM] - - - Feature removals and deprecations: - - Get rid of the v1 directory stuff (making, serving, and caching) - . First verify that the caches won't flip out? - o If they will, just stop the caches from caching for now - . perhaps replace it with a "this is a tor server" stock webpage. - - Get the debs to set DirPortFrontPage in the default. - - Decide how to handle DirPortFrontPage files with image links. - - Can we deprecate controllers that don't use both features? - - Both TorK and Vidalia use VERBOSE_NAMES. - - TorK uses EXTENDED_EVENTS. Vidalia does not. (As of 9 Dec.) - - Matt is checking whether Vidalia would break if we started to use - EXTENDED_EVENTS by default. He says no. - -External tool improvements: - - Get IOCP patches into libevent - -Nice to have for 0.2.1.x: - - Proposals, time permitting - - 134: handle authority fragmentation. - - 140: Provide diffs betweeen consensuses - - - Handle multi-core cpus better - - Split circuit AES across cores - - Split cell_queue_t into a new structure with a processed subqueue, - an unprocessed subqueue, and a symmetric key. - - Write a function to pull cells from the unprocessed subqueue, - en/decrypt them, and place them on the processed subqueue. - - When a cell is added to a queue that previously had no - unprocessed cells, put that queue into a set of queues that - need to be processed. When the last cell is processed in a - queue, remove it from the set of queues that need to be - processed. - - Worker code to process queues in round-robin fashion. - - Think about how to be fair to differet circuits _and_ about to get - CPU-affinity, if that matters. - - When a cell is processed and placed onto a processed subqueue - that was previously empty, _and_ the or_conn output buffer - that the queue is targetting is empty, stick the buffer onto a - list of buffers that need attention and notify the main - thread if it was not already on the list. - - When the main thread gets notified, it pumps those buffers. - (i.e., it puts cells onto them from some of their circuits). - - To free a queue that is not currently processing, grab its lock - and free it. - - To free a queue that _is_ processing, .... ? - - - Documentation -P - Make documentation realize that location of system configuration file - will depend on location of system defaults, and isn't always /etc/torrc. - - - Small controller features - - A status event for when tor decides to stop fetching directory info - if the client hasn't clicked recently: then make the onion change too. - o Add a status event when new consensus arrives - - - Windows build -P - create a "make win32-bundle" for vidalia-privoxy-tor-torbutton bundle - - Is this obsolete with msi bundle coming soon asks phobos - - - Refactor bad code: - - connection_or_get_by_identity_digest() and connection_good_enough_for - _extend() could be merged into a smarter variant, perhaps. - - Refactor the HTTP logic so the functions aren't so large. - - Refactor buf_read and buf_write to have sensible ways to return - error codes after partial writes - - deprecate router_digest_is_trusted_dir() in favor of - router_get_trusteddirserver_by_digest() - - - Should be trivial - - Tor logs the libevent version on startup, for debugging purposes. - This is great. But it does this before configuring the logs, so - it only goes to stdout and is then lost. - (phobos asks, is this still the case? because it shows up in my - logs) - - - Deprecations - - Even clients run rep_hist_load_mtbf_data(). This doesn't waste memory - unless they had previously been non-clients collecting MTBF data. - Dump it anyway? - - Unless we start using ftime functions, dump them. - - can we deprecate the FastFirstHopPK config option? - - The v2dir flag isn't used for anything anymore, right? If so, dump it. - - can we deprecate 'getinfo network-status'? - - Dump most uint32_t addr functions. - - - do the part of the "abandon .exit" proposal that involves isolating - circuits which have used a .exit stream from those that haven't - -Defer: - - Proposals - - 118: Listen on and advertise multiple ports: - - Tor should be able to have a pool of outgoing IP addresses that it is - able to rotate through. (maybe. Possible overlap with proposal 118.) - - config option to publish what ports you listen on, beyond - ORPort/DirPort. It should support ranges and bit prefixes (?) too. - - Need to figure out the right format for routerinfo_t on this. - - 147: Eliminate the need for v2 directories in generating v3 directories - - - Proposals to write. - d Something for bug 469, to limit connections per IP. - d Do we want to maintain our own set of entryguards that we use as - next hop after the bridge? - d Possibly: revise link protocol to allow big circuit IDs, - variable-length cells, proposal-110 stuff, and versioned CREATES? - d Fetch an updated geoip file from the directory authorities. -R - bridge communities (revive proposal 128) - . spec - . deploy - - man page entries for Alternate*Authority config options - - - Tiny designs to write - - Better estimate of clock skew; has anonymity implications. Clients - should estimate their skew as median of skew from servers over last - N seconds, but for servers this is not so easy, since a server does - not choose who it connects to. - - Do TLS connection rotation more often than "once a week" in the - extra-stable case. - (One reason not to do it more often is because the old TLS conn - probably has a circuit on it, and we don't really want to build up - dozens of TCP connections to all the other extra-stable relays.) - - - - Use less RAM - - Optimize cell pool allocation. - - Support (or just always use) jemalloc (if it helps) - - mmap more files. - - Pull serverdescs off buffers as they arrive. - - Allocate routerstatus_t objects on a per-networkstatus memchunk. - - - Split TLS across multiple cores - - - "In the future, we should migrate to LOCAL_APPDATA entirely." - - - Use more mid-level and high-level libevent APIs - - For dns? - - For http? - - For buffers? - - - Proposals to write - - steven's plan for replacing check.torproject.org with a built-in - answer by tor itself. - - - Refactor bad code: - - Streamline how we pick entry nodes: Make choose_random_entry() have - less magic and less control logic. - - Move all status info out of routerinfo into local_routerstatus. Make - "who can change what" in local_routerstatus explicit. Make - local_routerstatus (or equivalent) subsume all places to go for "what - router is this?" - o Don't call time(NULL) so much; instead have a static time_t field - that gets updated only a handful of times per second. - - Refactor unit tests into multiple files - - - Make Tor able to chroot itself - o allow it to load an entire config file from control interface - - document LOADCONF - - log rotation (and FD passing) via control interface - - chroot yourself, including inhibit trying to read config file - and reopen logs, unless they are under datadir. - - - Should be trivial: - - Base relative control socket paths (and other stuff in torrc) on datadir. - o enforce a lower limit on MaxCircuitDirtiness and CircuitBuildTimeout. - - Make 'safelogging' extend to info-level logs too. - - don't do dns hijacking tests if we're reject *:* exit policy? - (deferred until 0.1.1.x is less common) - - More consistent error checking in router_parse_entry_from_string(). - I can say "banana" as my bandwidthcapacity, and it won't even squeak. - - d Interface for letting SOAT modify flags that authorities assign. - (How to keep the authority from clobbering them afterwards? - diff --git a/doc/TODO.022 b/doc/TODO.022 deleted file mode 100644 index d83ed6e67..000000000 --- a/doc/TODO.022 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,92 +0,0 @@ -Nick's initial priorities for Tor 0.2.2: - -NOTE 1: I'm not looking at fiddly little stuff from TODO.021 yet. We - can do a step where we triage the nice-to-have issues. - -NOTE 2: It's easy to list stuff like this with no time estimates and - no target dates. I think we should pick a target date for - 0.2.2, figure out how long the stuff we want will take, and - triage accordingly, or vice versa. - -- Performance, mostly protocol-neutral. - - o Revise how we do bandwidth limiting and round-robining between - circuits on a connection. - - . Revise how we do bandwidth limiting and round-robining between - connections. - - - Better flow-control to avoid filling buffers on routers. - - - Figure out good ways to instrument Tor internals so we can tell - how well our bandwidth and flow-control stuff is actually working. - - What ports eat the bandwidth? - - How full do queues get? - - How much latency do queues get? - - - Rate limit at clients: - - Give clients an upper bound on how much they're willing to use - the network if they're not relaying? - - ... or group client circuits by IP at the server and rate-limit - like that. - - - Use if-modified-since to download consensuses - - -- Other features - - Proposals to implement: - - 146: reflect long-term stability in consensuses - - 147: Stop using v2 directories to generate v3 votes. - - Start pinging as soon as we learn about a relay, not on a - 22-minute cycle. Prioritize new and volatile relays for - testing. - - - Proposals to improve and implement - - 158: microdescriptors - o Revise proposal - - Implement - - - Proposals to improve and implement if not broken - D IPv6 support. (Parts of 117, but figure out how to handle DNS - requests.) - - 140: Directory diffs - - Need a decent simple C diff implementation. - - Need a decent simple C ed patch implementation. - - 149: learn info from netinfo cells. - o Start discussion - - Revise proposal based on discussion. - X 134: handle authority fragmentation (Needs more analysis) - - 165: Easy migration for voting authority sets - - 163: Detect client-status better - o Write proposal - - Possibly implement, depending on discussion. - - 164: Have authorities report relay and voting status better: make it - easy to answer, "Why is my server not listed/not Guard/not - Running/etc" - o Write proposal - - Possibly implement, depending on discussion - - 162: Have consensuses come in multiple "flavours". - o Write proposal - - Possibly implement, depending on discussion. - - - Needs a proposal, or at least some design - - Weaken the requirements for being a Guard, based on K's - measurements. -K - Finish measurements -K? - Write proposal - - Adaptive timeouts for giving up on circuits and streams. -M - Revise proposal 151 - - Downweight guards more sensibly: be more forgiving about using - Guard nodes as non-first-hop. - - Write proposal. - - Lagged weight updates in consensuses: don't just move abruptly. -M? - Write proposal - d Don't kill a circuit on the first failed extend. - -- Installers - - Switch to MSI on win32 - - Use Thandy, perhaps? - -o Deprecations - o Make .exit safe, or make it off-by-default. - diff --git a/doc/TODO.external b/doc/TODO.external deleted file mode 100644 index 2e7e536ef..000000000 --- a/doc/TODO.external +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - -[This file moved to svn in /projects/todo/. More people can edit -it more easily there. -RD] - diff --git a/doc/TODO.future b/doc/TODO.future deleted file mode 100644 index 85e07aa92..000000000 --- a/doc/TODO.future +++ /dev/null @@ -1,330 +0,0 @@ -Legend: -SPEC!! - Not specified -SPEC - Spec not finalized -N - nick claims -R - arma claims -P - phobos claims -S - Steven claims -E - Matt claims -M - Mike claims -J - Jeff claims -I - ioerror claims -W - weasel claims -K - Karsten claims - - Not done - * Top priority - . Partially done - o Done - d Deferrable - D Deferred - X Abandoned - -======================================================================= - -Later, unless people want to implement them now: - - Actually use SSL_shutdown to close our TLS connections. - - Include "v" line in networkstatus getinfo values. - [Nick: bridge authorities output a networkstatus that is missing - version numbers. This is inconvenient if we want to make sure - bridgedb gives out bridges with certain characteristics. -RD] - [Okay. Is this a separate item, or is it the same issue as the lack of - a "v" line in response to the controller GETINFO command? -NM] - - MAYBE kill stalled circuits rather than stalled connections. This is - possible thanks to cell queues, but we need to consider the anonymity - implications. - - Make resolves no longer use edge_connection_t unless they are actually - _on_ a socks connection: have edge_connection_t and (say) - dns_request_t both extend an edge_stream_t, and have p_streams and - n_streams both be linked lists of edge_stream_t. - - Generate torrc.{complete|sample}.in, tor.1.in, the HTML manual, and the - online config documentation from a single source. - - It would be potentially helpful to respond to https requests on - the OR port by acting like an HTTPS server. - - - We should get smarter about handling address resolve failures, or - addresses that resolve to local IPs. It would be neat to retry - them, since right now we just close the stream. But we need to - make sure we don't retry them on the same exit as before. But if - we mark the circuit, then any user who types "localhost" will - cycle through circuits till they run out of retries. See bug 872. - -Can anybody remember why we wanted to do this and/or what it means? - - config option __ControllerLimit that hangs up if there are a limit - of controller connections already. - [This was mwenge's idea. The idea is that a Tor controller can - "fill" Tor's controller slot quota, so jerks can't do cross-protocol - attacks like the http form attack. -RD] - - Bridge issues - . Ask all directory questions to bridge via BEGIN_DIR. - - use the bridges for dir fetches even when our dirport is open. - - drop 'authority' queries if they're to our own identity key; accept - them otherwise. - - give extend_info_t a router_purpose again - - - -If somebody wants to do this in some version, they should: - - Create packages for Maemo/Nokia 800/810, requested by Chris Soghoian - - debian already makes ARM-arch debs, can maemo use these asks - phobos? - - More work on AvoidDiskWrites - - Make DNSPort support TCP DNS. - - -* * * * Roger, please sort these: * * * * - - - bridge communities with local bridge authorities: - - clients who have a password configured decide to ask their bridge - authority for a networkstatus - - be able to have bridges that aren't in your torrc. save them in - state file, etc. - - Consider if we can solve: the Tor client doesn't know what flags - its bridge has (since it only gets the descriptor), so it can't - make decisions based on Fast or Stable. - - Some mechanism for specifying that we want to stop using a cached - bridge. - -======================================================================= - -Future versions: - - - Protocol - - Our current approach to block attempts to use Tor as a single-hop proxy - is pretty lame; we should get a better one. - - Allow small cells and large cells on the same network? - - Cell buffering and resending. This will allow us to handle broken - circuits as long as the endpoints don't break, plus will allow - connection (tls session key) rotation. - - Implement Morphmix, so we can compare its behavior, complexity, - etc. But see paper breaking morphmix. - - Other transport. HTTP, udp, rdp, airhook, etc. May have to do our own - link crypto, unless we can bully DTLS into it. - - Need a relay teardown cell, separate from one-way ends. - (Pending a user who needs this) - - Handle half-open connections: right now we don't support all TCP - streams, at least according to the protocol. But we handle all that - we've seen in the wild. - (Pending a user who needs this) - - - Directory system - - BEGIN_DIR items - - handle connect-dir streams that don't have a chosen_exit_name set. - - Have a "Faster" status flag that means it. Fast2, Fast4, Fast8? - - Add an option (related to AvoidDiskWrites) to disable directory - caching. (Is this actually a good idea??) - X Add d64 and fp64 along-side d and fp so people can paste status - entries into a url. since + is a valid base64 char, only allow one - at a time. Consider adding to controller as well. - [abandoned for lack of demand] - - Some back-out mechanism for auto-approval on authorities - - a way of rolling back approvals to before a timestamp - - Consider minion-like fingerprint file/log combination. - X Have new people be in limbo and need to demonstrate usefulness - before we approve them. - - - Hidden services: - d Standby/hotswap/redundant hidden services: needs a proposal. - - you can insert a hidserv descriptor via the controller. - - auth mechanisms to let hidden service midpoint and responder filter - connection requests: proposal 121. - - Let each hidden service (or other thing) specify its own - OutboundBindAddress? - - - Server operation - - If the server is spewing complaints about raising your ulimit -n, - we should add a note about this to the server descriptor so other - people can notice too. - - When we hit a funny error from a dir request (eg 403 forbidden), - but tor is working and happy otherwise, and we haven't seen many - such errors recently, then don't warn about it. - - - Controller - - Implement missing status events and accompanying getinfos - - DIR_REACHABLE - - BAD_DIR_RESPONSE (Unexpected directory response; maybe we're behind - a firewall.) - - BAD_PROXY (Bad http or https proxy) - - UNRECOGNIZED_ROUTER (a nickname we asked for is unavailable) - - Status events related to hibernation - - something about failing to parse our address? - from resolve_my_address() in config.c - - sketchy OS, sketchy threading - - too many onions queued: threading problems or slow CPU? - - Implement missing status event fields: - - TIMEOUT on CHECKING_REACHABILITY - - GETINFO status/client, status/server, status/general: There should be - some way to learn which status events are currently "in effect." - We should specify which these are, what format they appear in, and so - on. - - More information in events: - - Include bandwidth breakdown by conn->type in BW events. - - Change circuit status events to give more details, like purpose, - whether they're internal, when they become dirty, when they become - too dirty for further circuits, etc. - - Change stream status events analogously. - - Expose more information via getinfo: - - import and export rendezvous descriptors - - Review all static fields for additional candidates - - Allow EXTENDCIRCUIT to unknown server. - - We need some way to adjust server status, and to tell tor not to - download directories/network-status, and a way to force a download. - - Make everything work with hidden services - - - Performance/resources - - per-conn write buckets - - separate config options for read vs write limiting - (It's hard to support read > write, since we need better - congestion control to avoid overfull buffers there. So, - defer the whole thing.) - - Rate limit exit connections to a given destination -- this helps - us play nice with websites when Tor users want to crawl them; it - also introduces DoS opportunities. - - Consider truncating rather than destroying failed circuits, - in order to save the effort of restarting. There are security - issues here that need thinking, though. - - Handle full buffers without totally borking - - Rate-limit OR and directory connections overall and per-IP and - maybe per subnet. - - - Misc - - Hold-open-until-flushed now works by accident; it should work by - design. - - Display the reasons in 'destroy' and 'truncated' cells under - some circumstances? - - Make router_is_general_exit() a bit smarter once we're sure what - it's for. - - Automatically determine what ports are reachable and start using - those, if circuits aren't working and it's a pattern we - recognize ("port 443 worked once and port 9001 keeps not - working"). - - - Security - - some better fix for bug #516? - - Directory guards - - Mini-SoaT: - - Servers might check certs for known-good ssl websites, and if - they come back self-signed, declare themselves to be - non-exits. Similar to how we test for broken/evil dns now. - - Authorities should try using exits for http to connect to some - URLS (specified in a configuration file, so as not to make the - List Of Things Not To Censor completely obvious) and ask them - for results. Exits that don't give good answers should have - the BadExit flag set. - - Alternatively, authorities should be able to import opinions - from Snakes on a Tor. - - Bind to random port when making outgoing connections to Tor servers, - to reduce remote sniping attacks. - - Audit everything to make sure rend and intro points are just as - likely to be us as not. - - Do something to prevent spurious EXTEND cells from making - middleman nodes connect all over. Rate-limit failed - connections, perhaps? - - DoS protection: TLS puzzles, public key ops, bandwidth exhaustion. - - - Needs thinking - - Now that we're avoiding exits when picking non-exit positions, - we need to consider how to pick nodes for internal circuits. If - we avoid exits for all positions, we skew the load balancing. If - we accept exits for all positions, we leak whether it's an - internal circuit at every step. If we accept exits only at the - last hop, we reintroduce Lasse's attacks from the Oakland paper. - - - Windows server usability - - Solve the ENOBUFS problem. - - make tor's use of openssl operate on buffers rather than sockets, - so we can make use of libevent's buffer paradigm once it has one. - - make tor's use of libevent tolerate either the socket or the - buffer paradigm; includes unifying the functions in connect.c. - - We need a getrlimit equivalent on Windows so we can reserve some - file descriptors for saving files, etc. Otherwise we'll trigger - asserts when we're out of file descriptors and crash. - - - Documentation - - a way to generate the website diagrams from source, so we can - translate them as utf-8 text rather than with gimp. (svg? or - imagemagick?) - . Flesh out options_description array in src/or/config.c - . multiple sample torrc files - - Refactor tor man page to divide generally useful options from - less useful ones? - - Add a doxygen style checker to make check-spaces so nick doesn't drift - too far from arma's undocumented styleguide. Also, document that - styleguide in HACKING. (See r9634 for example.) - - exactly one space at beginning and at end of comments, except i - guess when there's line-length pressure. - - if we refer to a function name, put a () after it. - - only write <b>foo</b> when foo is an argument to this function. - - doxygen comments must always end in some form of punctuation. - - capitalize the first sentence in the doxygen comment, except - when you shouldn't. - - avoid spelling errors and incorrect comments. ;) - - - Packaging - - The Debian package now uses --verify-config when (re)starting, - to distinguish configuration errors from other errors. Perhaps - the RPM and other startup scripts should too? - - add a "default.action" file to the tor/vidalia bundle so we can - fix the https thing in the default configuration: - https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#PrivoxyWeirdSSLPort - - -======================================================================= - -Documentation, non-version-specific. - - Specs - - Mark up spec; note unclear points about servers -NR - write a spec appendix for 'being nice with tor' - - Specify the keys and key rotation schedules and stuff - . Finish path-spec.txt - - Mention controller libs someplace. - - Remove need for HACKING file. - - document http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TransparentProxy on freebsd and osx -P - figure out rpm spec files for bundles of vidalia-tor-polipo -P - figure out polipo install scripts for bundles of vidalia-tor-polipo on osx, win32 - - figure out selinux policy for tor -P - change packaging system to more automated and specific for each - platform, suggested by Paul Wouter -P - Setup repos for redhat and suse rpms & start signing the rpms the - way package management apps prefer - -Website: -J . tor-in-the-media page -P - Figure out licenses for website material. - (Phobos reccomends the Open Publication License with Option A at - http://opencontent.org/openpub/) -P - put the logo on the website, in source form, so people can put it on - stickers directly, etc. -P - put the source image for the stickers on the website, so people can - print their own -P - figure out a license for the logos and docs we publish (trademark -figures into this) - (Phobos reccomends the Open Publication License with Option A at - http://opencontent.org/openpub/) -I - add a page for localizing all tor's components. - - It would be neat if we had a single place that described _all_ the - tor-related tools you can use, and what they give you, and how well they - work. Right now, we don't give a lot of guidance wrt - torbutton/foxproxy/privoxy/polipo in any consistent place. -P - create a 'blog badge' for tor fans to link to and feature on their - blogs. A sample is at http://interloper.org/tmp/tor/tor-button.png - - More prominently, we should have a recommended apps list. - - recommend pidgin (gaim is renamed) - - unrecommend IE because of ftp:// bug. - - Addenda to tor-design - - we should add a preamble to tor-design saying it's out of date. - - we should add an appendix or errata on what's changed. - - - Tor mirrors - - make a mailing list with the mirror operators - o make an automated tool to check /project/trace/ at mirrors to - learn which ones are lagging behind. - - auto (or manually) cull the mirrors that are broken; and - contact their operator? - - a set of instructions for mirror operators to make their apaches - serve our charsets correctly, and bonus points for language - negotiation. - - figure out how to load-balance the downloads across mirrors? - - ponder how to get users to learn that they should google for - "tor mirrors" if the main site is blocked. - - find a mirror volunteer to coordinate all of this - diff --git a/doc/asciidoc-helper.sh b/doc/asciidoc-helper.sh index dd420f7c4..c06b57026 100755 --- a/doc/asciidoc-helper.sh +++ b/doc/asciidoc-helper.sh @@ -52,8 +52,8 @@ elif [ "$1" = "man" ]; then You need a working asciidoc installed to be able to build the manpage. a2x is installed, but for some reason it isn't working. Sometimes -This happens because required docbook support files are missing. -Please install docbook-xsl, docbook-xml, and libxml2-utils (Debian) or +this happens because required docbook support files are missing. +Please install docbook-xsl, docbook-xml, and xmlto (Debian) or similar. If you use homebrew on Mac OS X, install the docbook formula and add "export XML_CATALOG_FILES=/usr/local/etc/xml/catalog" to your .bashrc diff --git a/doc/contrib/authority-policy.txt b/doc/contrib/authority-policy.txt deleted file mode 100644 index dd3dc1178..000000000 --- a/doc/contrib/authority-policy.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,89 +0,0 @@ - -0. Overview. - - This document contains various informal policies for how to operate - a directory authority, how to choose new ones, etc. - -1. How to pick a new directory authority. - - Here's our current guidelines for how to pick new directory - authorities. - - (These won't ever be formal criteria -- we need to keep this flexible - so we can adapt to new situations.) - - o Stability: - - Must be a low-downtime Tor server (computer as well as network). - - Must have a static IP. - - The operator must have been running a stable Tor server for at least - 3 months. - - Must intend for this server to stick around for the next 12 months - or more. - - Must not hibernate. - - Should not be an exit node (as this increases the risk both of - downtime and of key compromise). - - o Performance: - - Must have sufficient bandwidth: at least 300 kB/s symmetric, - though in practice the inbound traffic can be considerably less. - - o Availability: - - Must be available to upgrade within a few days in most cases. - (While we're still developing Tor, we periodically find bugs that - impact the whole network and require authority upgrades.) - - Should have a well-known way to contact the administrator - via PGP-encrypted message. - - o Integrity: - - Must promise not to censor or attack the network and users. - - Should be run by somebody that Tor (i.e. Roger) knows. - - Should be widely regarded as fair/trustworthy, or at least - known, by many people. - - If somebody asks you to backdoor or change your server, legally or - otherwise, you will fight it to the extent of your abilities. If - you fail to fight it, you must shut down the Tor server and notify - us that you have. - - o Diversity - - We should avoid situations that make it likelier for multiple - authority failures to happen at the same time. Therefore... - - It's good when authorities are not all in the same country. - - It's good when authorities are not all in the same jurisdictions. - - It's good when authorities are not all running the same OS. - - It's good when authorities are not all using the same ISP. - - It's good when authorities are not all running the same - version of Tor. - - No two authorities should have the same operator. - - Maximal diversity, however, is not always practical. Sometimes, - for example, there is only one version of Tor that provides a - given consensus generation algorithm. - - A small group of authorities with the same country/jurisdiction/OS is - not a problem, until that group's size approaches quorum (half the - authorities). - -2. How to choose the recommended versions - - The policy, in a nutshell, is to not remove versions without a good - reason. So this means we should recommend all versions except: - - - Versions that no longer conform to the spec. That is, if they wouldn't - actually interact correctly with the current Tor network. - - Versions that have known security problems. - - Versions that have frequent crash or assert problems. - - Versions that harm the performance or stability of the current Tor - network or the anonymity of other users. For example, a version - that load balances wrong, or a version that hammers the authorities - too much. - - -> some use the slight variant of requiring a *good* reason. -> excellent reasons include "there's a security flaw" -> good reasons include "that crashes every time you start it. you would think -+tor is dumb if you tried to use that version and think of it as tor." -> good reasons include "those old clients do their load balancing wrong, and -+they're screwing up the whole network" -> reasons include "the old one is really slow, clients should prefer the new -+one" -> i try to draw the line at 'good reasons and above' - - diff --git a/doc/contrib/incentives.txt b/doc/contrib/incentives.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 850a0d01e..000000000 --- a/doc/contrib/incentives.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,479 +0,0 @@ - - Tor Incentives Design Brainstorms - -1. Goals: what do we want to achieve with an incentive scheme? - -1.1. Encourage users to provide good relay service (throughput, latency). -1.2. Encourage users to allow traffic to exit the Tor network from - their node. - -2. Approaches to learning who should get priority. - -2.1. "Hard" or quantitative reputation tracking. - - In this design, we track the number of bytes and throughput in and - out of nodes we interact with. When a node asks to send or receive - bytes, we provide service proportional to our current record of the - node's value. One approach is to let each circuit be either a normal - circuit or a premium circuit, and nodes can "spend" their value by - sending and receiving bytes on premium circuits: see section 4.1 for - details of this design. Another approach (section 4.2) would treat - all traffic from the node with the same priority class, and so nodes - that provide resources will get and provide better service on average. - - This approach could be complemented with an anonymous e-cash - implementation to let people spend reputations gained from one context - in another context. - -2.2. "Soft" or qualitative reputation tracking. - - Rather than accounting for every byte (if I owe you a byte, I don't - owe it anymore once you've spent it), instead I keep a general opinion - about each server: my opinion increases when they do good work for me, - and it decays with time, but it does not decrease as they send traffic. - Therefore we reward servers who provide value to the system without - nickle and diming them at each step. We also let them benefit from - relaying traffic for others without having to "reserve" some of the - payment for their own use. See section 4.3 for a possible design. - -2.3. Centralized opinions from the reputation servers. - - The above approaches are complex and we don't have all the answers - for them yet. A simpler approach is just to let some central set - of trusted servers (say, the Tor directory servers) measure whether - people are contributing to the network, and provide a signal about - which servers should be rewarded. They can even do the measurements - via Tor so servers can't easily perform only when they're being - tested. See section 4.4. - -2.4. Reputation servers that aggregate opinions. - - The option above has the directory servers doing all of the - measurements. This doesn't scale. We can set it up so we have "deputy - testers" -- trusted other nodes that do performance testing and report - their results. - - If we want to be really adventurous, we could even - accept claims from every Tor user and build a complex weighting / - reputation system to decide which claims are "probably" right. - One possible way to implement the latter is something similar to - EigenTrust [http://www.stanford.edu/~sdkamvar/papers/eigentrust.pdf], - where the opinion of nodes with high reputation more is weighted - higher. - -3. Related issues we need to keep in mind. - -3.1. Relay and exit configuration needs to be easy and usable. - - Implicit in all of the above designs is the need to make it easy to - run a Tor server out of the box. We need to make it stable on all - common platforms (including XP), it needs to detect its available - bandwidth and not overreach that, and it needs to help the operator - through opening up ports on his firewall. Then we need a slick GUI - that lets people click a button or two rather than editing text files. - - Once we've done all this, we'll hit our first big question: is - most of the barrier to growth caused by the unusability of the current - software? If so, are the rest of these incentive schemes superfluous? - -3.2. The network effect: how many nodes will you interact with? - - One of the concerns with pairwise reputation systems is that as the - network gets thousands of servers, the chance that you're going to - interact with a given server decreases. So if 90% of interactions - don't have any prior information, the "local" incentive schemes above - are going to degrade. This doesn't mean they're pointless -- it just - means we need to be aware that this is a limitation, and plan in the - background for what step to take next. (It seems that e-cash solutions - would scale better, though they have issues of their own.) - -3.3. Guard nodes - - As of Tor 0.1.1.11, Tor users pick from a small set of semi-permanent - "guard nodes" for their first hop of each circuit. This seems like it - would have a big impact on pairwise reputation systems since you - will only be cashing in on your reputation to a few people, and it is - unlikely that a given pair of nodes will use each other as guard nodes. - - What does this imply? For one, it means that we don't care at all - about the opinions of most of the servers out there -- we should - focus on keeping our guard nodes happy with us. - - One conclusion from that is that our design needs to judge performance - not just through direct interaction (beginning of the circuit) but - also through indirect interaction (middle of the circuit). That way - you can never be sure when your guards are measuring you. - - Both 3.2 and 3.3 may be solved by having a global notion of reputation, - as in 2.3 and 2.4. However, computing the global reputation from local - views could be expensive (O(n^2)) when the network is really large. - -3.4. Restricted topology: benefits and roadmap. - - As the Tor network continues to grow, we will need to make design - changes to the network topology so that each node does not need - to maintain connections to an unbounded number of other nodes. For - anonymity's sake, we may partition the network such that all - the nodes have the same belief about the divisions and each node is - in only one partition. (The alternative is that every user fetches - his own random subset of the overall node list -- this is bad because - of intersection attacks.) - - Therefore the "network horizon" for each user will stay bounded, - which helps against the above issues in 3.2 and 3.3. - - It could be that the core of long-lived servers will all get to know - each other, and so the critical point that decides whether you get - good service is whether the core likes you. Or perhaps it will turn - out to work some other way. - - A special case here is the social network, where the network isn't - partitioned randomly but instead based on some external properties. - Social network topologies can provide incentives in other ways, because - people may be more inclined to help out their friends, and more willing - to relay traffic if most of the traffic they are relaying comes - from their friends. It also opens the door for out-of-band incentive - schemes because of the out-of-band links in the graph. - -3.5. Profit-maximizing vs. Altruism. - - There are some interesting game theory questions here. - - First, in a volunteer culture, success is measured in public utility - or in public esteem. If we add a reward mechanism, there's a risk that - reward-maximizing behavior will surpass utility- or esteem-maximizing - behavior. - - Specifically, if most of our servers right now are relaying traffic - for the good of the community, we may actually *lose* those volunteers - if we turn the act of relaying traffic into a selfish act. - - I am not too worried about this issue for now, since we're aiming - for an incentive scheme so effective that it produces tens of - thousands of new servers. - -3.6. What part of the node's performance do you measure? - - We keep referring to having a node measure how well the other nodes - receive bytes. But don't leeching clients receive bytes just as well - as servers? - - Further, many transactions in Tor involve fetching lots of - bytes and not sending very many. So it seems that we want to turn - things around: we need to measure how quickly a node is _sending_ - us bytes, and then only send it bytes in proportion to that. - - However, a sneaky user could simply connect to a node and send some - traffic through it, and voila, he has performed for the network. This - is no good. The first fix is that we only count if you're receiving - bytes "backwards" in the circuit. Now the sneaky user needs to - construct a circuit such that his node appears later in the circuit, - and then send some bytes back quickly. - - Maybe that complexity is sufficient to deter most lazy users. Or - maybe it's an argument in favor of a more penny-counting reputation - approach. - - Addendum: I was more thinking of measuring based on who is the service - provider and service receiver for the circuit. Say Alice builds a - circuit to Bob. Then Bob is providing service to Alice, since he - otherwise wouldn't need to spend his bandwidth. So traffic in either - direction should be charged to Alice. Of course, the same attack would - work, namely, Bob could cheat by sending bytes back quickly. So someone - close to the origin needs to detect this and close the circuit, if - necessary. -JN - -3.7. What is the appropriate resource balance for servers vs. clients? - - If we build a good incentive system, we'll still need to tune it - to provide the right bandwidth allocation -- if we reserve too much - bandwidth for fast servers, then we're wasting some potential, but - if we reserve too little, then fewer people will opt to become servers. - In fact, finding an optimum balance is especially hard because it's - a moving target: the better our incentive mechanism (and the lower - the barrier to setup), the more servers there will be. How do we find - the right balance? - - One answer is that it doesn't have to be perfect: we can err on the - side of providing extra resources to servers. Then we will achieve our - desired goal -- when people complain about speed, we can tell them to - run a server, and they will in fact get better performance. - -3.8. Anonymity attack: fast connections probably come from good servers. - - If only fast servers can consistently get good performance in the - network, they will stand out. "Oh, that connection probably came from - one of the top ten servers in the network." Intersection attacks over - time can improve the certainty of the attack. - - I'm not too worried about this. First, in periods of low activity, - many different people might be getting good performance. This dirties - the intersection attack. Second, with many of these schemes, we will - still be uncertain whether the fast node originated the traffic, or - was the entry node for some other lucky user -- and we already accept - this level of attack in other cases such as the Murdoch-Danezis attack - [http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#torta05]. - -3.9. How do we allocate bandwidth over the course of a second? - - This may be a simple matter of engineering, but it still needs to be - addressed. Our current token bucket design refills each bucket once a - second. If we have N tokens in our bucket, and we don't know ahead of - time how many connections are going to want to send out how many bytes, - how do we balance providing quick service to the traffic that is - already here compared to providing service to potential high-importance - future traffic? - - If we have only two classes of service, here is a simple design: - At each point, when we are 1/t through the second, the total number - of non-priority bytes we are willing to send out is N/t. Thus if N - priority bytes are waiting at the beginning of the second, we drain - our whole bucket then, and otherwise we provide some delayed service - to the non-priority bytes. - - Does this design expand to cover the case of three priority classes? - Ideally we'd give each remote server its own priority number. Or - hopefully there's an easy design in the literature to point to -- - this is clearly not my field. - - Is our current flow control mechanism (each circuit and each stream - start out with a certain window, and once they've exhausted it they - need to receive an ack before they can send more) going to have - problems with this new design now that we'll be queueing more bytes - for less preferred nodes? If it turns out we do, the first fix is - to have the windows start out at zero rather than start out full -- - it will slow down the startup phase but protect us better. - - While we have outgoing cells queued for a given server, we have the - option of reordering them based on the priority of the previous hop. - Is this going to turn out to be useful? If we're the exit node (that - is, there is no previous hop) what priority do those cells get? - - Should we do this prioritizing just for sending out bytes (as I've - described here) or would it help to do it also for receiving bytes? - See next section. - -3.10. Different-priority cells arriving on the same TCP connection. - - In some of the proposed designs, servers want to give specific circuits - priority rather than having all circuits from them get the same class - of service. - - Since Tor uses TCP's flow control for rate limiting, this constraints - our design choices -- it is easy to give different TCP connections - different priorities, but it is hard to give different cells on the - same connection priority, because you have to read them to know what - priority they're supposed to get. - - There are several possible solutions though. First is that we rely on - the sender to reorder them so the highest priority cells (circuits) are - more often first. Second is that if we open two TCP connections -- one - for the high-priority cells, and one for the low-priority cells. (But - this prevents us from changing the priority of a circuit because - we would need to migrate it from one connection to the other.) A - third approach is to remember which connections have recently sent - us high-priority cells, and preferentially read from those connections. - - Hopefully we can get away with not solving this section at all. But if - necessary, we can consult Ed Knightly, a Professor at Rice - [http://www.ece.rice.edu/~knightly/], for his extensive experience on - networking QoS. - -3.11. Global reputation system: Congestion on high reputation servers? - - If the notion of reputation is global (as in 2.3 or 2.4), circuits that - go through successive high reputation servers would be the fastest and - most reliable. This would incentivize everyone, regardless of their own - reputation, to choose only the highest reputation servers in its - circuits, causing an over-congestion on those servers. - - One could argue, though, that once those servers are over-congested, - their bandwidth per circuit drops, which would in turn lower their - reputation in the future. A question is whether this would overall - stabilize. - - Another possible way is to keep a cap on reputation. In this way, a - fraction of servers would have the same high reputation, thus balancing - such load. - -3.12. Another anonymity attack: learning from service levels. - - If reputation is local, it may be possible for an evil node to learn - the identity of the origin through provision of differential service. - For instance, the evil node provides crappy bandwidth to everyone, - until it finds a circuit that it wants to trace the origin, then it - provides good bandwidth. Now, as only those directly or indirectly - observing this circuit would like the evil node, it can test each node - by building a circuit via each node to another evil node. If the - bandwidth is high, it is (somewhat) likely that the node was a part of - the circuit. - - This problem does not exist if the reputation is global and nodes only - follow the global reputation, i.e., completely ignore their own view. - -3.13. DoS through high priority traffic. - - Assume there is an evil node with high reputation (or high value on - Alice) and this evil node wants to deny the service to Alice. What it - needs to do is to send a lot of traffic to Alice. To Alice, all traffic - from this evil node is of high priority. If the choice of circuits are - too based toward high priority circuits, Alice would spend most of her - available bandwidth on this circuit, thus providing poor bandwidth to - everyone else. Everyone else would start to dislike Alice, making it - even harder for her to forward other nodes' traffic. This could cause - Alice to have a low reputation, and the only high bandwidth circuit - Alice could use would be via the evil node. - -3.14. If you run a fast server, can you run your client elsewhere? - - A lot of people want to run a fast server at a colocation facility, - and then reap the rewards using their cablemodem or DSL Tor client. - - If we use anonymous micropayments, where reputation can literally - be transferred, this is trivial. - - If we pick a design where servers accrue reputation and can only - use it themselves, though, the clients can configure the servers as - their entry nodes and "inherit" their reputation. In this approach - we would let servers configure a set of IP addresses or keys that get - "like local" service. - -4. Sample designs. - -4.1. Two classes of service for circuits. - - Whenever a circuit is built, it is specified by the origin which class, - either "premium" or "normal", this circuit belongs. A premium circuit - gets preferred treatment at each node. A node "spends" its value, which - it earned a priori by providing service, to the next node by sending - and receiving bytes. Once a node has overspent its values, the circuit - cannot stay as premium. It either breaks or converts into a normal - circuit. Each node also reserves a small portion of bandwidth for - normal circuits to prevent starvation. - - Pro: Even if a node has no value to spend, it can still use normal - circuits. This allow casual user to use Tor without forcing them to run - a server. - - Pro: Nodes have incentive to forward traffic as quick and as much as - possible to accumulate value. - - Con: There is no proactive method for a node to rebalance its debt. It - has to wait until there happens to be a circuit in the opposite - direction. - - Con: A node needs to build circuits in such a way that each node in the - circuit has to have good values to the next node. This requires - non-local knowledge and makes circuits less reliable as the values are - used up in the circuit. - - Con: May discourage nodes to forward traffic in some circuits, as they - worry about spending more useful values to get less useful values in - return. - -4.2. Treat all the traffic from the node with the same service; - hard reputation system. - - This design is similar to 4.1, except that instead of having two - classes of circuits, there is only one. All the circuits are - prioritized based on the value of the interacting node. - - Pro: It is simpler to design and give priority based on connections, - not circuits. - - Con: A node only needs to keep a few guard nodes happy to forward their - traffic. - - Con: Same as in 4.1, may discourage nodes to forward traffic in some - circuits, as they worry about spending more useful values to get less - useful values in return. - -4.3. Treat all the traffic from the node with the same service; - soft reputation system. - - Rather than a guaranteed system with accounting (as 4.1 and 4.2), - we instead try for a best-effort system. All bytes are in the same - class of service. You keep track of other Tors by key, and give them - service proportional to the service they have given you. That is, in - the past when you have tried to push bytes through them, you track the - number of bytes and the average bandwidth, and use that to weight the - priority of their connections if they try to push bytes through you. - - Now you're going to get minimum service if you don't ever push bytes - for other people, and you get increasingly improved service the more - active you are. We should have memories fade over time (we'll have - to tune that, which could be quite hard). - - Pro: Sybil attacks are pointless because new identities get lowest - priority. - - Pro: Smoothly handles periods of both low and high network load. Rather - than keeping track of the ratio/difference between what he's done for - you and what you've done for him, simply keep track of what he's done - for you, and give him priority based on that. - - Based on 3.3 above, it seems we should reward all the nodes in our - path, not just the first one -- otherwise the node can provide good - service only to its guards. On the other hand, there might be a - second-order effect where you want nodes to like you so that *when* - your guards choose you for a circuit, they'll be able to get good - performance. This tradeoff needs more simulation/analysis. - - This approach focuses on incenting people to relay traffic, but it - doesn't do much for incenting them to allow exits. It may help in - one way through: if there are few exits, then they will attract a - lot of use, so lots of people will like them, so when they try to - use the network they will find their first hop to be particularly - pleasant. After that they're like the rest of the world though. (An - alternative would be to reward exit nodes with higher values. At the - extreme, we could even ask the directory servers to suggest the extra - values, based on the current availability of exit nodes.) - - Pro: this is a pretty easy design to add; and it can be phased in - incrementally simply by having new nodes behave differently. - -4.4. Centralized opinions from the reputation servers. - - Have a set of official measurers who spot-check servers from the - directory to see if they really do offer roughly the bandwidth - they advertise. Include these observations in the directory. (For - simplicity, the directory servers could be the measurers.) Then Tor - servers give priority to other servers. We'd like to weight the - priority by advertised bandwidth to encourage people to donate more, - but it seems hard to distinguish between a slow server and a busy - server. - - The spot-checking can be done anonymously to prevent selectively - performing only for the measurers, because hey, we have an anonymity - network. - - We could also reward exit nodes by giving them better priority, but - like above this only will affect their first hop. Another problem - is that it's darn hard to spot-check whether a server allows exits - to all the pieces of the Internet that it claims to. If necessary, - perhaps this can be solved by a distributed reporting mechanism, - where clients that can reach a site from one exit but not another - anonymously submit that site to the measurers, who verify. - - A last problem is that since directory servers will be doing their - tests directly (easy to detect) or indirectly (through other Tor - servers), then we know that we can get away with poor performance for - people that aren't listed in the directory. Maybe we can turn this - around and call it a feature though -- another reason to get listed - in the directory. - -5. Recommendations and next steps. - -5.1. Simulation. - - For simulation trace, we can use two: one is what we obtained from Tor - and one from existing web traces. - - We want to simulate all the four cases in 4.1-4. For 4.4, we may want - to look at two variations: (1) the directory servers check the - bandwidth themselves through Tor; (2) each node reports their perceived - values on other nodes, while the directory servers use EigenTrust to - compute global reputation and broadcast those. - -5.2. Deploying into existing Tor network. - diff --git a/doc/tor-rpm-creation.txt b/doc/contrib/tor-rpm-creation.txt index a03891e2b..a03891e2b 100644 --- a/doc/tor-rpm-creation.txt +++ b/doc/contrib/tor-rpm-creation.txt diff --git a/doc/contrib/torel-design.txt b/doc/contrib/torel-design.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 610cbe21f..000000000 --- a/doc/contrib/torel-design.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,181 +0,0 @@ -Design For A Tor DNS-based Exit List - -Status: - - This is a suggested design for a DNS Exit List (DNSEL) for Tor exit nodes. - See http://exitlist.torproject.org/ for an implementation. - -Why? - - It's useful for third parties to be able to tell when a given connection - is coming from a Tor exit node. Potential applications range from - "anonymous user" cloaks on IRC networks like oftc, to networks like - Freenode that apply special authentication rules to users from these - IPs, to systems like Wikipedia that may want to make a priority of - _unblocking_ shared IPs more liberally than non-shared IPs, since shared - IPs presumably have non-abusive users as well as abusive ones. - - Since Tor provides exit policies, not every Tor server will connect to - every address:port combination on the Internet. Unless you're trying to - penalize hosts for supporting anonymity, it makes more sense to answer - the fine-grained question "which Tor servers will connect to _me_?" than - the coarse-grained question "which Tor servers exist?" The fine-grained - approach also helps Tor server ops who share an IP with their Tor - server: if they want to access a site that blocks Tor users, they - can exclude that site from their exit policy, and the site can learn - that they won't send it anonymous connections. - - Tor already ships with a tool (the "contrib/exitlist" script) to - identify which Tor nodes might open anonymous connections to any given - exit address. But this is a bit tricky to set up, so only sites like - Freenode and OFTC that are dedicated to privacy use it. - Conversely, providers of some DNSEL implementations are providing - coarse-grained lists of Tor hosts -- sometimes even listing servers that - permit no exit connections at all. This is rather a problem, since - support for DNSEL is pretty ubiquitous. - - -How? - - Keep a running Tor instance, and parse the cached-routers and - cached-routers.new files as new routers arrive. To tell whether a given - server allows connections to a certain address:port combo, look at the - definitions in dir-spec.txt or follow the logic of the current exitlist - script. If bug 405 is still open when you work on this - (https://bugs.torproject.org/flyspray/index.php?do=details&id=405), you'll - probably want to extend it to look at only the newest descriptor for - each server, so you don't use obsolete exit policy data. - - FetchUselessDescriptors would probably be a good torrc option to enable. - - If you're also running a directory cache, you get extra-fresh - information. - - -The DNS interface - - Standard DNSEL, if I understand right, looks like this: There's some - authoritative name server for foo.example.com. You want to know if - 1.2.3.4 is in the list, so you query for an A record for - 4.3.2.1.foo.example.com. If the record exists and has the value - 127.0.0.2[DNSBL-EMAIL], 1.2.3.4 is in the list. If you get an NXDOMAIN - error, 1.2.3.4 is not in the list. If you ask for a domain name outside - of the foo.example.com zone, you get a Server Failure error[RFC 1035]. - - Assume that the DNSEL answers queries authoritatively for some zone, - torhosts.example.com. Below are some queries that could be supported, - though some of them are possibly a bad idea. - - - Query type 1: "General IP:Port" - - Format: - {IP1}.{port}.{IP2}.ip-port.torhosts.example.com - - Rule: - Iff {IP1} is a Tor server that permits connections to {port} on - {IP2}, then there should be an A record with the value 127.0.0.2. - - Example: - "1.0.0.10.80.4.3.2.1.ip-port.torhosts.example.com" should have the - value 127.0.0.2 if and only if there is a Tor server at 10.0.0.1 - that allows connections to port 80 on 1.2.3.4. - - Example use: - I'm running an IRC server at w.x.y.z:9999, and I want to tell - whether an incoming connection is from a Tor server. I set - up my IRC server to give a special mask to any user coming from - an IP listed in 9999.z.y.x.w.ip-port.torhosts.example.com. - - Later, when I get a connection from a.b.c.d, my ircd looks up - "d.c.b.a.9999.z.y.x.w.ip-port.torhosts.example.com" to see - if it's a Tor server that allows connections to my ircd. - - - Query type 2: "IP-port group" - - Format: - {IP}.{listname}.list.torhosts.example.com - - Rule: - Iff this Tor server is configured with an IP:Port list named - {listname}, and {IP} is a Tor server that permits connections to - any member of {listname}, then there exists an A record. - - Example: - Suppose torhosts.example.com has a list of IP:Port called "foo". - There is an A record for 4.3.2.1.foo.list.torhosts.example.com - if and only if 1.2.3.4 is a Tor server that permits connections - to one of the addresses in list "foo". - - Example use: - Suppose torhosts.example.com has a list of hosts in "examplenet", - a popular IRC network. Rather than having them each set up to - query the appropriate "ip-port" list, they could instead all be - set to query a central examplenet.list.torhosts.example.com. - - Problems: - We'd be better off if each individual server queried about hosts - that allowed connections to itself. That way, if I wanted to - allow anonymous connections to foonet, but I wanted to be able to - connect to foonet from my own IP without being marked, I could add - just a few foonet addresses to my exit policy. - - - Query type 3: "My IP, with port" - - Format: - {IP}.{port}.me.torhosts.example.com - - Rule: - An A record exists iff there is a tor server at {IP} that permits - connections to {port} on the host that requested the lookup. - - Example: - "4.3.2.1.80.me.torhosts.example.com" should have an A record if - and only if there is a Tor server at 1.2.3.4 that allows - connections to port 80 of the querying host. - - Example use: - Somebody wants to set up a quick-and-dirty Tor detector for a - single webserver: just point them at 80.me.torhosts.example.com. - - Problem: - This would be easiest to use, but DNS gets in the way. If you - create DNS records that give different results depending on who is - asking, you mess up caching. There could be a fix here, but might - not. - - - RECOMMENDATION: Just build ip-port for now, and see what demand is - like. There's no point in building mechanisms nobody wants. - -Web interface: - - Should provide the same data as the dns interface. - -Other issues: - - After a Tor server op turns off their server, it stops publishing server - descriptors. We should consider that server's IP address to still - represent a Tor node until 48 hours after its last descriptor was - published. - - 30-60 minutes is not an unreasonable TTL. - - There could be some demand for address masks and port lists. Address - masks wider than /8 make me nervous here, as do port ranges. - - We need an answer for what to do about hosts which exit from different - IPs than their advertised IP. One approach would be for the DNSEL - to launch periodic requests to itself through all exit servers whose - policies allow it -- and then see where the requests actually come from. - -References: - - [DNSBL-EMAIL] Levine, J., "DNS Based Blacklists and Whitelists for - E-Mail", http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-asrg-dnsbl-02, November - 2005. - - [RFC 1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain Names - Implementation and - Specification", RFC 1035, November 1987. diff --git a/doc/include.am b/doc/include.am new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9695292bd --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/include.am @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +# We use a two-step process to generate documentation from asciidoc files. +# +# First, we use asciidoc/a2x to process the asciidoc files into .1.in and +# .html.in files (see the asciidoc-helper.sh script). These are the same as +# the regular .1 and .html files, except that they still have some autoconf +# variables set in them. +# +# Second, we use config.status to turn .1.in files into .1 files and +# .html.in files into .html files. +# +# We do the steps in this order so that we can ship the .*.in files as +# part of the source distribution, so that people without asciidoc can +# just use the .1 and .html files. + +regular_mans = doc/tor doc/tor-gencert doc/tor-resolve doc/torify +all_mans = $(regular_mans) doc/tor-fw-helper + +if USE_ASCIIDOC +if USE_FW_HELPER +nodist_man1_MANS = $(all_mans:=.1) +doc_DATA = $(all_mans:=.html) +else +nodist_man1_MANS = $(regular_mans:=.1) +doc_DATA = $(regular_mans:=.html) +endif +html_in = $(all_mans:=.html.in) +man_in = $(all_mans:=.1.in) +txt_in = $(all_mans:=.1.txt) +else +html_in = +man_in = +txt_in = +nodist_man1_MANS = +doc_DATA = +endif + +EXTRA_DIST+= doc/HACKING doc/asciidoc-helper.sh \ + $(html_in) $(man_in) $(txt_in) \ + doc/state-contents.txt + +docdir = @docdir@ + +asciidoc_product = $(nodist_man1_MANS) $(doc_DATA) + +# Generate the html documentation from asciidoc, but don't do +# machine-specific replacements yet +$(html_in) : + $(AM_V_GEN)$(top_srcdir)/doc/asciidoc-helper.sh html @ASCIIDOC@ $(top_srcdir)/$@ + +# Generate the manpage from asciidoc, but don't do +# machine-specific replacements yet +$(man_in) : + $(AM_V_GEN)$(top_srcdir)/doc/asciidoc-helper.sh man @A2X@ $(top_srcdir)/$@ + +doc/tor.1.in: doc/tor.1.txt +doc/tor-gencert.1.in: doc/tor-gencert.1.txt +doc/tor-resolve.1.in: doc/tor-resolve.1.txt +doc/torify.1.in: doc/torify.1.txt +doc/tor-fw-helper.1.in: doc/tor-fw-helper.1.txt + +doc/tor.html.in: doc/tor.1.txt +doc/tor-gencert.html.in: doc/tor-gencert.1.txt +doc/tor-resolve.html.in: doc/tor-resolve.1.txt +doc/torify.html.in: doc/torify.1.txt +doc/tor-fw-helper.html.in: doc/tor-fw-helper.1.txt + +# use ../config.status to swap all machine-specific magic strings +# in the asciidoc with their replacements. +$(asciidoc_product) : + $(AM_V_GEN)$(MKDIR_P) $(@D) + $(AM_V_at)if test -e $(top_srcdir)/$@.in && ! test -e $@.in ; then \ + cp $(top_srcdir)/$@.in $@; \ + fi + $(AM_V_at)./config.status -q --file=$@; + +doc/tor.html: doc/tor.html.in +doc/tor-gencert.html: doc/tor-gencert.html.in +doc/tor-resolve.html: doc/tor-resolve.html.in +doc/torify.html: doc/torify.html.in +doc/tor-fw-helper.html: doc/tor-fw-helper.html.in + +doc/tor.1: doc/tor.1.in +doc/tor-gencert.1: doc/tor-gencert.1.in +doc/tor-resolve.1: doc/tor-resolve.1.in +doc/torify.1: doc/torify.1.in +doc/tor-fw-helper.1: doc/tor-fw-helper.1.in + +CLEANFILES+= $(asciidoc_product) config.log +DISTCLEANFILES+= $(html_in) $(man_in) diff --git a/doc/spec/README b/doc/spec/README deleted file mode 100644 index ccd33a421..000000000 --- a/doc/spec/README +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ -The Tor specifications and proposals have moved to a new repository. - -To browse the specifications, go to - https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree - -To check out the specification repository, run - git clone git://git.torproject.org/torspec.git - -For other information on the repository, see - https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git - diff --git a/doc/tor-fw-helper.1.txt b/doc/tor-fw-helper.1.txt index 49b091038..1c103d925 100644 --- a/doc/tor-fw-helper.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor-fw-helper.1.txt @@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ // See LICENSE for licensing information // This is an asciidoc file used to generate the manpage/html reference. // Learn asciidoc on http://www.methods.co.nz/asciidoc/userguide.html +:man source: Tor +:man manual: Tor Manual tor-fw-helper(1) ================ Jacob Appelbaum @@ -12,9 +14,8 @@ tor-fw-helper - Manage upstream firewall/NAT devices SYNOPSIS -------- -**tor-fw-helper** [-h|--help] [-T|--test] [-v|--verbose] [-g|--fetch-public-ip] - -i|--internal-or-port __TCP port__ [-e|--external-or-port _TCP port_] - [-d|--internal-dir-port _TCP port_] [-p|--external-dir-port _TCP port_] +**tor-fw-helper** [-h|--help] [-T|--test-commandline] [-v|--verbose] [-g|--fetch-public-ip] + [-p __external port__:__internal_port__] DESCRIPTION ----------- @@ -29,28 +30,19 @@ OPTIONS **-h** or **--help**:: Display help text and exit. -**-v**:: +**-v** or **--verbose**:: Display verbose output. -**-T** or **--test**:: +**-T** or **--test-commandline**:: Display test information and print the test information in tor-fw-helper.log **-g** or **--fetch-public-ip**:: Fetch the the public ip address for each supported NAT helper method. -**-i** or **--internal-or-port** __port__:: - Inform **tor-fw-helper** of your internal OR port. This is the only - required argument. - -**-e** or **--external-or-port** __port__:: - Inform **tor-fw-helper** of your external OR port. - -**-d** or **--internal-dir-port** __port__:: - Inform **tor-fw-helper** of your internal Dir port. - -**-p** or **--external-dir-port** __port__:: - Inform **tor-fw-helper** of your external Dir port. +**-p** or **--port** __external_port__:__internal_port__:: + Forward external_port to internal_port. This option can appear + more than once. BUGS ---- diff --git a/doc/tor-gencert.1.txt b/doc/tor-gencert.1.txt index 2a2d1179c..aa61ec3ec 100644 --- a/doc/tor-gencert.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor-gencert.1.txt @@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ // See LICENSE for licensing information // This is an asciidoc file used to generate the manpage/html reference. // Learn asciidoc on http://www.methods.co.nz/asciidoc/userguide.html +:man source: Tor +:man manual: Tor Manual tor-gencert(1) ============== Nick Mathewson diff --git a/doc/tor-resolve.1.txt b/doc/tor-resolve.1.txt index bdc636b08..341d30224 100644 --- a/doc/tor-resolve.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor-resolve.1.txt @@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ // See LICENSE for licensing information // This is an asciidoc file used to generate the manpage/html reference. // Learn asciidoc on http://www.methods.co.nz/asciidoc/userguide.html +:man source: Tor +:man manual: Tor Manual tor-resolve(1) ============== Peter Palfrader diff --git a/doc/tor-win32-mingw-creation.txt b/doc/tor-win32-mingw-creation.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 4a25e47a8..000000000 --- a/doc/tor-win32-mingw-creation.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,119 +0,0 @@ -## -## Instructions for building Tor with MinGW (http://www.mingw.org/) -## - -Stage One: Download and Install MinGW. ---------------------------------------- - -Download mingw: -http://prdownloads.sf.net/mingw/MinGW-5.1.6.exe?download - -Download msys: -http://prdownloads.sf.net/ming/MSYS-1.0.11.exe?download - -Download msysDTK: -http://sourceforge.net/projects/mingw/files/MSYS%20Supplementary%20Tools/msysDTK-1.0.1/msysDTK-1.0.1.exe/download - -Install MinGW, msysDTK, and MSYS in that order. - -Make sure your PATH includes C:\MinGW\bin. You can verify this by right -clicking on "My Computer", choose "Properties", choose "Advanced", -choose "Environment Variables", select PATH. - -Start MSYS(rxvt). - -Create a directory called "tor-mingw". - -Stage Two: Download, extract, compile openssl ----------------------------------------------- - -Download openssl: -http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-0.9.8l.tar.gz - -Extract openssl: -Copy the openssl tarball into the "tor-mingw" directory. -Type "cd tor-mingw/" -Type "tar zxf openssl-0.9.8l.tar.gz" -(Note: There are many symlink errors because Windows doesn't support -symlinks. You can ignore these errors.) - -Make openssl libraries: -Type "cd tor-mingw/openssl-0.9.8l/" -Type "./Configure -no-idea -no-rc5 -no-mdc2 mingw" -Edit Makefile and remove the "test:" and "tests:" sections. -Type "rm -rf ./test" -Type "cd crypto/" -Type "find ./ -name "*.h" -exec cp {} ../include/openssl/ \;" -Type "cd ../ssl/" -Type "find ./ -name "*.h" -exec cp {} ../include/openssl/ \;" -Type "cd .." -Type "cp *.h include/openssl/" -Type "find ./fips -type f -name "*.h" -exec cp {} include/openssl/ \;" -# The next steps can take up to 30 minutes to complete. -Type "make" -Type "make install" - - -Stage Three: Download, extract, compile zlib ---------------------------------------------- - -Download zlib source: -http://www.zlib.net/zlib-1.2.3.tar.gz - -Extract zlib: -Copy the zlib tarball into the "tor-mingw" directory -Type "cd tor-mingw/" -Type "tar zxf zlib-1.2.3.tar.gz" - -CHOICE: - -Make zlib.a: -Type "cd tor-mingw/zlib-1.2.3/" -Type "./configure" -Type "make" -Type "make install" - -Done. - - -Stage Four: Download, extract, and compile libevent ------------------------------------------------------- - -Download the latest libevent release: -http://www.monkey.org/~provos/libevent/ - -Copy the libevent tarball into the "tor-mingw" directory. -Type "cd tor-mingw" - -Extract libevent. - -Type "./configure --enable-static --disable-shared" -Type "make" -Type "make install" - -Stage Five: Build Tor ----------------------- - -Download the current Tor alpha release source code from https://torproject.org/download.html. -Copy the Tor tarball into the "tor-mingw" directory. -Extract Tor: -Type "tar zxf latest-tor-alpha.tar.gz" - -cd tor-<version> -Type "./configure" -Type "make" - -You now have a tor.exe in src/or/. This is Tor. -You now have a tor-resolve.exe in src/tools/. - -Stage Six: Build the installer -------------------------------- - -Install the latest NSIS: -http://nsis.sourceforge.net/Download - -Run the package script in contrib: -From the Tor build directory above, run: -"./contrib/package_nsis-mingw.sh" - -The resulting Tor installer executable is in ./win_tmp/. diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index 1f3afef2a..cd67d829f 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ // See LICENSE for licensing information // This is an asciidoc file used to generate the manpage/html reference. // Learn asciidoc on http://www.methods.co.nz/asciidoc/userguide.html +:man source: Tor +:man manual: Tor Manual TOR(1) ====== @@ -122,42 +124,42 @@ option name with a forward slash. GENERAL OPTIONS --------------- -**BandwidthRate** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**:: +**BandwidthRate** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**:: A token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth usage on this node to the specified number of bytes per second, and the average outgoing bandwidth usage to that same value. If you want to run a relay in the - public network, this needs to be _at the very least_ 30 KB (that is, - 30720 bytes). (Default: 5 MB) + public network, this needs to be _at the very least_ 30 KBytes (that is, + 30720 bytes). (Default: 1 GByte) -**BandwidthBurst** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**:: +**BandwidthBurst** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**:: Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) to the given - number of bytes in each direction. (Default: 10 MB) + number of bytes in each direction. (Default: 1 GByte) -**MaxAdvertisedBandwidth** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**:: +**MaxAdvertisedBandwidth** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**:: If set, we will not advertise more than this amount of bandwidth for our BandwidthRate. Server operators who want to reduce the number of clients who ask to build circuits through them (since this is proportional to advertised bandwidth rate) can thus reduce the CPU demands on their server without impacting network performance. -**RelayBandwidthRate** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**:: +**RelayBandwidthRate** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**:: If not 0, a separate token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth usage for \_relayed traffic_ on this node to the specified number of bytes per second, and the average outgoing bandwidth usage to that same value. Relayed traffic currently is calculated to include answers to directory requests, but that may change in future versions. (Default: 0) -**RelayBandwidthBurst** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**:: +**RelayBandwidthBurst** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**:: If not 0, limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) for \_relayed traffic_ to the given number of bytes in each direction. (Default: 0) -**PerConnBWRate** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**:: +**PerConnBWRate** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**:: If set, do separate rate limiting for each connection from a non-relay. You should never need to change this value, since a network-wide value is published in the consensus and your relay will use that value. (Default: 0) -**PerConnBWBurst** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**:: +**PerConnBWBurst** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**:: If set, do separate rate limiting for each connection from a non-relay. You should never need to change this value, since a network-wide value is published in the consensus and your relay will use that value. (Default: 0) @@ -179,6 +181,11 @@ GENERAL OPTIONS using __options__ as its command-line options, and expects to receive proxied client traffic from it. +**ServerTransportListenAddr** __transport__ __IP__:__PORT__:: + When this option is set, Tor will suggest __IP__:__PORT__ as the + listening address of any pluggable transport proxy that tries to + launch __transport__. + **ConnLimit** __NUM__:: The minimum number of file descriptors that must be available to the Tor process before it will start. Tor will ask the OS for as many file @@ -215,7 +222,7 @@ GENERAL OPTIONS the TCP stream and will reduce throughput in proportion to round trip time on long paths. (Default: 0) -**ConstrainedSockSize** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**:: +**ConstrainedSockSize** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**:: When **ConstrainedSockets** is enabled the receive and transmit buffers for all sockets will be set to this limit. Must be a value between 2048 and 262144, in 1024 byte increments. Default of 8192 is recommended. @@ -285,7 +292,12 @@ GENERAL OPTIONS **DataDirectory** __DIR__:: Store working data in DIR (Default: @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor) -**DirServer** [__nickname__] [**flags**] __address__:__port__ __fingerprint__:: +**FallbackDir** __address__:__port__ orport=__port__ id=__fingerprint__ [weight=__num__]:: + When we're unable to connect to any directory cache for directory info + (usually because we don't know about any yet) we try a FallbackDir. + By default, the directory authorities are also FallbackDirs. + +**DirAuthority** [__nickname__] [**flags**] __address__:__port__ __fingerprint__:: Use a nonstandard authoritative directory server at the provided address and port, with the specified key fingerprint. This option can be repeated many times, for multiple authoritative directory servers. Flags are @@ -298,16 +310,24 @@ GENERAL OPTIONS flag is set, or if the "v1" flag is set and the "no-hs" flag is **not** set. Tor will use this authority as a bridge authoritative directory if the "bridge" flag is set. If a flag "orport=**port**" is given, Tor will use the - given port when opening encrypted tunnels to the dirserver. Lastly, if a + given port when opening encrypted tunnels to the dirserver. If a flag + "weight=**num**" is given, then the directory server is chosen randomly + with probability proportional to that weight (default 1.0). Lastly, if a flag "v3ident=**fp**" is given, the dirserver is a v3 directory authority whose v3 long-term signing key has the fingerprint **fp**. + + - If no **dirserver** line is given, Tor will use the default directory - servers. NOTE: this option is intended for setting up a private Tor + If no **DirAuthority** line is given, Tor will use the default directory + authorities. NOTE: this option is intended for setting up a private Tor network with its own directory authorities. If you use it, you will be distinguishable from other users, because you won't believe the same authorities they do. +**DirAuthorityFallbackRate** __NUM__:: + When configured to use both directory authorities and fallback + directories, the directory authorities also work as fallbacks. They are + chosen with their regular weights, multiplied by this number, which + should be 1.0 or less. (Default: 1.0) + **DynamicDHGroups** **0**|**1**:: If this option is set to 1, when running as a server, generate our own Diffie-Hellman group instead of using the one from Apache's mod_ssl. @@ -319,7 +339,7 @@ GENERAL OPTIONS **AlternateHSAuthority** [__nickname__] [**flags**] __address__:__port__ __fingerprint__ + **AlternateBridgeAuthority** [__nickname__] [**flags**] __address__:__port__ __ fingerprint__:: - These options behave as DirServer, but they replace fewer of the + These options behave as DirAuthority, but they replace fewer of the default directory authorities. Using AlternateDirAuthority replaces the default Tor directory authorities, but leaves the default hidden service authorities and bridge authorities in @@ -470,8 +490,10 @@ GENERAL OPTIONS **OutboundBindAddress** __IP__:: Make all outbound connections originate from the IP address specified. This is only useful when you have multiple network interfaces, and you want all - of Tor's outgoing connections to use a single one. This setting will be - ignored for connections to the loopback addresses (127.0.0.0/8 and ::1). + of Tor's outgoing connections to use a single one. This option may + be used twice, once with an IPv4 address and once with an IPv6 address. + This setting will be ignored for connections to the loopback addresses + (127.0.0.0/8 and ::1). **PidFile** __FILE__:: On startup, write our PID to FILE. On clean shutdown, remove @@ -657,7 +679,11 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if Note also that if you are a relay, this (and the other node selection options below) only affects your own circuits that Tor builds for you. Clients can still build circuits through you to any node. Controllers - can tell Tor to build circuits through any node. + can tell Tor to build circuits through any node. + + + + Country codes are case-insensitive. The code "\{??}" refers to nodes whose + country can't be identified. No country code, including \{??}, works if + no GeoIPFile can be loaded. See also the GeoIPExcludeUnknown option below. **ExcludeExitNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__:: @@ -667,6 +693,14 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if node listed in ExcludeNodes is automatically considered to be part of this list too. See also the caveats on the "ExitNodes" option below. +**GeoIPExcludeUnknown** **0**|**1**|**auto**:: + If this option is set to 'auto', then whenever any country code is set in + ExcludeNodes or ExcludeExitNodes, all nodes with unknown country (\{??} and + possibly \{A1}) are treated as excluded as well. If this option is set to + '1', then all unknown countries are treated as excluded in ExcludeNodes + and ExcludeExitNodes. This option has no effect when a GeoIP file isn't + configured or can't be found. (Default: auto) + **ExitNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__:: A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address patterns of nodes to use as exit node---that is, a @@ -860,7 +894,7 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if the same circuit. Currently, two addresses are "too close" if they lie in the same /16 range. (Default: 1) -**SOCKSPort** \['address':]__port__|**auto** [_isolation flags_]:: +**SOCKSPort** \['address':]__port__|**auto** [_flags_] [_isolation flags_]:: Open this port to listen for connections from SOCKS-speaking applications. Set this to 0 if you don't want to allow application connections via SOCKS. Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for @@ -893,7 +927,60 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if on this port to share circuits with streams from every other port with the same session group. (By default, streams received on different SOCKSPorts, TransPorts, etc are always isolated from one - another. This option overrides that behavior.) + another. This option overrides that behavior.) + ++ + Other recognized _flags_ for a SOCKSPort are: + **NoIPv4Traffic**;; + Tell exits to not connect to IPv4 addresses in response to SOCKS + requests on this connection. + **IPv6Traffic**;; + Tell exits to allow IPv6 addresses in response to SOCKS requests on + this connection, so long as SOCKS5 is in use. (SOCKS4 can't handle + IPv6.) + **PreferIPv6**;; + Tells exits that, if a host has both an IPv4 and an IPv6 address, + we would prefer to connect to it via IPv6. (IPv4 is the default.) + ++ + NOTE: Although this option allows you to specify an IP address + other than localhost, you should do so only with extreme caution. + The SOCKS protocol is unencrypted and (as we use it) + unauthenticated, so exposing it in this way could leak your + information to anybody watching your network, and allow anybody + to use your computer as an open proxy. + **CacheIPv4DNS**;; + Tells the client to remember IPv4 DNS answers we receive from exit + nodes via this connection. (On by default.) + **CacheIPv6DNS**;; + Tells the client to remember IPv6 DNS answers we receive from exit + nodes via this connection. + **CacheDNS**;; + Tells the client to remember all DNS answers we receive from exit + nodes via this connection. + **UseIPv4Cache**;; + Tells the client to use any cached IPv4 DNS answers we have when making + requests via this connection. (NOTE: This option, along UseIPv6Cache + and UseDNSCache, can harm your anonymity, and probably + won't help performance as much as you might expect. Use with care!) + **UseIPv6Cache**;; + Tells the client to use any cached IPv6 DNS answers we have when making + requests via this connection. + **UseDNSCache**;; + Tells the client to use any cached DNS answers we have when making + requests via this connection. + **PreferIPv6Automap**;; + When serving a hostname lookup request on this port that + should get automapped (according to AutomapHostsOnResove), + if we could return either an IPv4 or an IPv6 answer, prefer + an IPv6 answer. (On by default.) + **PreferSOCKSNoAuth**;; + Ordinarily, when an application offers both "username/password + authentication" and "no authentication" to Tor via SOCKS5, Tor + selects username/password authentication so that IsolateSOCKSAuth can + work. This can confuse some applications, if they offer a + username/password combination then get confused when asked for + one. You can disable this behavior, so that Tor will select "No + authentication" when IsolateSOCKSAuth is disabled, or when this + option is set. **SOCKSListenAddress** __IP__[:__PORT__]:: Bind to this address to listen for connections from Socks-speaking @@ -955,10 +1042,28 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if increases the odds that an adversary who owns some servers will observe a fraction of your paths. (Default: 1) +**UseEntryGuardsAsDirectoryGuards** **0**|**1**:: + If this option is set to 1, we try to use our entry guards as directory + guards, and failing that, pick more nodes to act as our directory guards. + This helps prevent an adversary from enumerating clients. It's only + available for clients (non-relay, non-bridge) that aren't configured to + download any non-default directory material. It doesn't currently + do anything when we lack a live consensus. (Default: 1) + **NumEntryGuards** __NUM__:: If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we will try to pick a total of NUM routers as long-term entries for our circuits. (Default: 3) +**NumDirectoryGuards** __NUM__:: + If UseEntryGuardsAsDirectoryGuards is enabled, we try to make sure we + have at least NUM routers to use as directory guards. (Default: 3) + +**GuardLifetime** __N__ **days**|**weeks**|**months**:: + If nonzero, and UseEntryGuards is set, minimum time to keep a guard before + picking a new one. If zero, we use the GuardLifetime parameter from the + consensus directory. No value here may be less than 1 month or greater + than 5 years; out-of-range values are clamped. (Default: 0) + **SafeSocks** **0**|**1**:: When this option is enabled, Tor will reject application connections that use unsafe variants of the socks protocol -- ones that only provide an IP @@ -979,16 +1084,20 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if applications to do DNS resolves themselves is usually a bad idea and can leak your location to attackers. (Default: 1) -**VirtualAddrNetwork** __Address__/__bits__:: +**VirtualAddrNetworkIPv4** __Address__/__bits__ + + +**VirtualAddrNetworkIPv6** [__Address__]/__bits__:: When Tor needs to assign a virtual (unused) address because of a MAPADDRESS command from the controller or the AutomapHostsOnResolve feature, Tor - picks an unassigned address from this range. (Default: - 127.192.0.0/10) + + picks an unassigned address from this range. (Defaults: + 127.192.0.0/10 and [FE80::]/10 respectively.) + + When providing proxy server service to a network of computers using a tool - like dns-proxy-tor, change this address to "10.192.0.0/10" or - "172.16.0.0/12". The default **VirtualAddrNetwork** address range on a - properly configured machine will route to the loopback interface. For + like dns-proxy-tor, change the IPv4 network to "10.192.0.0/10" or + "172.16.0.0/12" and change the IPv6 network to "[FC00]/7". + The default **VirtualAddrNetwork** address ranges on a + properly configured machine will route to the loopback or link-local + interface. For local use, no change to the default VirtualAddrNetwork setting is needed. **AllowNonRFC953Hostnames** **0**|**1**:: @@ -1065,7 +1174,9 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if **DNSPort** \['address':]__port__|**auto** [_isolation flags_]:: If non-zero, open this port to listen for UDP DNS requests, and resolve - them anonymously. Set the port to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for + them anonymously. This port only handles A, AAAA, and PTR requests---it + doesn't handle arbitrary DNS request types. Set the port to "auto" to + have Tor pick a port for you. This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. See SOCKSPort for an explanation of isolation flags. (Default: 0) @@ -1095,12 +1206,6 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if regular router descriptors. Tor does not use this information for anything itself; to save bandwidth, leave this option turned off. (Default: 0) -**FallbackNetworkstatusFile** __FILENAME__:: - If Tor doesn't have a cached networkstatus file, it starts out using this - one instead. Even if this file is out of date, Tor can still use it to - learn about directory mirrors, so it doesn't need to put load on the - authorities. (Default: None) - **WarnPlaintextPorts** __port__,__port__,__...__:: Tells Tor to issue a warnings whenever the user tries to make an anonymous connection to one of these ports. This option is designed to alert users @@ -1142,32 +1247,93 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if "auto" (recommended) then it is on for all clients that do not set FetchUselessDescriptors. (Default: auto) +**UseNTorHandshake** **0**|**1**|**auto**:: + The "ntor" circuit-creation handshake is faster and (we think) more + secure than the original ("TAP") circuit handshake, but starting to use + it too early might make your client stand out. If this option is 0, your + Tor client won't use the ntor handshake. If it's 1, your Tor client + will use the ntor handshake to extend circuits through servers that + support it. If this option is "auto" (recommended), then your client + will use the ntor handshake once enough directory authorities recommend + it. (Default: auto) + **PathBiasCircThreshold** __NUM__ + **PathBiasNoticeRate** __NUM__ + -**PathBiasDisableRate** __NUM__ + +**PathBiasWarnRate** __NUM__ + + +**PathBiasExtremeRate** __NUM__ + -**PathBiasScaleThreshold** __NUM__ + +**PathBiasDropGuards** __NUM__ + -**PathBiasScaleFactor** __NUM__:: +**PathBiasScaleThreshold** __NUM__:: These options override the default behavior of Tor's (**currently experimental**) path bias detection algorithm. To try to find broken or misbehaving guard nodes, Tor looks for nodes where more than a certain - fraction of circuits through that node fail after the first hop. The - PathBiasCircThreshold option controls how many circuits we need to build - through a guard before we make these checks. The PathBiasNoticeRate and - PathBiasDisableRate options control what fraction of circuits must - succeed through a guard so we won't warn about it or disable it, - respectively. When we have seen more than PathBiasScaleThreshold - circuits through a guard, we divide our observations by - PathBiasScaleFactor, so that new observations don't get swamped by old - ones. + + fraction of circuits through that guard fail to get built. + + + The PathBiasCircThreshold option controls how many circuits we need to build + through a guard before we make these checks. The PathBiasNoticeRate, + PathBiasWarnRate and PathBiasExtremeRate options control what fraction of + circuits must succeed through a guard so we won't write log messages. + If less than PathBiasExtremeRate circuits succeed *and* PathBiasDropGuards + is set to 1, we disable use of that guard. + + + + When we have seen more than PathBiasScaleThreshold + circuits through a guard, we scale our observations by 0.5 (governed by + the consensus) so that new observations don't get swamped by old ones. + + By default, or if a negative value is provided for one of these options, Tor uses reasonable defaults from the networkstatus consensus document. - If no defaults are available there, these options default to 20, .70, - 0.0, 200, and 4 respectively. + If no defaults are available there, these options default to 150, .70, + .50, .30, 0, and 300 respectively. + +**PathBiasUseThreshold** __NUM__ + + +**PathBiasNoticeUseRate** __NUM__ + + +**PathBiasExtremeUseRate** __NUM__ + + +**PathBiasScaleUseThreshold** __NUM__:: + Similar to the above options, these options override the default behavior + of Tor's (**currently experimental**) path use bias detection algorithm. + + + Where as the path bias parameters govern thresholds for successfully + building circuits, these four path use bias parameters govern thresholds + only for circuit usage. Circuits which receive no stream usage + are not counted by this detection algorithm. A used circuit is considered + successful if it is capable of carrying streams or otherwise receiving + well-formed responses to RELAY cells. + + + By default, or if a negative value is provided for one of these options, + Tor uses reasonable defaults from the networkstatus consensus document. + If no defaults are available there, these options default to 20, .80, + .60, and 100, respectively. + +**ClientUseIPv6** **0**|**1**:: + If this option is set to 1, Tor might connect to entry nodes over + IPv6. Note that clients configured with an IPv6 address in a + **Bridge** line will try connecting over IPv6 even if + **ClientUseIPv6** is set to 0. (Default: 0) + +**ClientPreferIPv6ORPort** **0**|**1**:: + If this option is set to 1, Tor prefers an OR port with an IPv6 + address over one with IPv4 if a given entry node has both. Other + things may influence the choice. This option breaks a tie to the + favor of IPv6. (Default: 0) + +**PathsNeededToBuildCircuits** __NUM__:: + Tor clients don't build circuits for user traffic until they know + about enough of the network so that they could potentially construct + enough of the possible paths through the network. If this option + is set to a fraction between 0.25 and 0.95, Tor won't build circuits + until it has enough descriptors or microdescriptors to construct + that fraction of possible paths. Note that setting this option too low + can make your Tor client less anonymous, and setting it too high can + prevent your Tor client from bootstrapping. If this option is negative, + Tor will use a default value chosen by the directory + authorities. (Default: -1.) SERVER OPTIONS @@ -1259,9 +1425,13 @@ is non-zero): at the beginning of your exit policy. See above entry on ExitPolicy. (Default: 1) -**MaxOnionsPending** __NUM__:: - If you have more than this number of onionskins queued for decrypt, reject - new ones. (Default: 100) +**IPv6Exit** **0**|**1**:: + If set, and we are an exit node, allow clients to use us for IPv6 + traffic. (Default: 0) + +**MaxOnionQueueDelay** __NUM__ [**msec**|**second**]:: + If we have more onionskins queued for processing than we can process in + this amount of time, reject new ones. (Default: 1750 msec) **MyFamily** __node__,__node__,__...__:: Declare that this Tor server is controlled or administered by a group or @@ -1271,6 +1441,9 @@ is non-zero): same circuit. (Each server only needs to list the other servers in its family; it doesn't need to list itself, but it won't hurt.) Do not list any bridge relay as it would compromise its concealment. + + + When listing a node, it's better to list it by fingerprint than by + nickname: fingerprints are more reliable. **Nickname** __name__:: Set the server's nickname to \'name'. Nicknames must be between 1 and 19 @@ -1345,8 +1518,13 @@ is non-zero): **ShutdownWaitLength** __NUM__:: When we get a SIGINT and we're a server, we begin shutting down: we close listeners and start refusing new circuits. After **NUM** - seconds, we exit. If we get a second SIGINT, we exit immedi- - ately. (Default: 30 seconds) + seconds, we exit. If we get a second SIGINT, we exit immediately. + (Default: 30 seconds) + +**SSLKeyLifetime** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**:: + When creating a link certificate for our outermost SSL handshake, + set its lifetime to this amount of time. If set to 0, Tor will choose + some reasonable random defaults. (Default: 0) **HeartbeatPeriod** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**:: Log a heartbeat message every **HeartbeatPeriod** seconds. This is @@ -1354,14 +1532,14 @@ is non-zero): server is still alive and doing useful things. Settings this to 0 will disable the heartbeat. (Default: 6 hours) -**AccountingMax** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**|**TB**:: +**AccountingMax** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**:: Never send more than the specified number of bytes in a given accounting period, or receive more than that number in the period. For example, with - AccountingMax set to 1 GB, a server could send 900 MB and receive 800 MB - and continue running. It will only hibernate once one of the two reaches 1 - GB. When the number of bytes gets low, Tor will stop accepting new - connections and circuits. When the number of bytes - is exhausted, Tor will hibernate until some + AccountingMax set to 1 GByte, a server could send 900 MBytes and + receive 800 MBytes and continue running. It will only hibernate once + one of the two reaches 1 GByte. When the number of bytes gets low, + Tor will stop accepting new connections and circuits. When the + number of bytes is exhausted, Tor will hibernate until some time in the next accounting period. To prevent all servers from waking at the same time, Tor will also wait until a random point in each period before waking up. If you have bandwidth cost issues, enabling hibernation @@ -1384,7 +1562,8 @@ is non-zero): Prevent nodes that don't appear in the consensus from exiting using this relay. If the option is 1, we always block exit attempts from such nodes; if it's 0, we never do, and if the option is "auto", then we do - whatever the authorities suggest in the consensus. (Default: auto) + whatever the authorities suggest in the consensus (and block if the consensus + is quiet on the issue). (Default: auto) **ServerDNSResolvConfFile** __filename__:: Overrides the default DNS configuration with the configuration in @@ -1442,7 +1621,16 @@ is non-zero): does on behalf of clients. (Default: 1) **GeoIPFile** __filename__:: - A filename containing GeoIP data, for use with BridgeRecordUsageByCountry. + A filename containing IPv4 GeoIP data, for use with by-country statistics. + +**GeoIPv6File** __filename__:: + A filename containing IPv6 GeoIP data, for use with by-country statistics. + +**TLSECGroup** **P224**|**P256**:: + What EC group should we try to use for incoming TLS connections? + P224 is faster, but makes us stand out more. Has no effect if + we're a client, or if our OpenSSL version lacks support for ECDHE. + (Default: P224 for public servers; P256 for bridges.) **CellStatistics** **0**|**1**:: When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the mean time that @@ -1676,15 +1864,15 @@ DIRECTORY AUTHORITY SERVER OPTIONS Authoritative directories only. Like AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr, but applies to addresses shared with directory authorities. (Default: 5) -**AuthDirFastGuarantee** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**:: +**AuthDirFastGuarantee** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**:: Authoritative directories only. If non-zero, always vote the Fast flag for any relay advertising this amount of capacity or - more. (Default: 100 KB) + more. (Default: 100 KBytes) -**AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**:: +**AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**:: Authoritative directories only. If non-zero, this advertised capacity or more is always sufficient to satisfy the bandwidth requirement - for the Guard flag. (Default: 250 KB) + for the Guard flag. (Default: 250 KBytes) **BridgePassword** __Password__:: If set, contains an HTTP authenticator that tells a bridge authority to @@ -1742,6 +1930,12 @@ DIRECTORY AUTHORITY SERVER OPTIONS votes on whether to accept relays as hidden service directories. (Default: 1) +**AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity** **0**|**1**:: + Authoritative directories only. When set to 0, OR ports with an + IPv6 address are being accepted without reachability testing. + When set to 1, IPv6 OR ports are being tested just like IPv4 OR + ports. (Default: 0) + HIDDEN SERVICE OPTIONS ---------------------- @@ -1827,12 +2021,12 @@ The following options are used for running a testing Tor network. **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 30 minutes) **TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**:: - Like TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay, but for initial voting interval before + Like V3AuthVoteDelay, but for initial voting interval before the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 5 minutes) **TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**:: - Like TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay, but for initial voting interval before + Like V3AuthDistDelay, but for initial voting interval before the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 5 minutes) @@ -1846,6 +2040,11 @@ The following options are used for running a testing Tor network. time. Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 10 minutes) +**TestingMinFastFlagThreshold** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**:: + Minimum value for the Fast flag. Overrides the ordinary minimum taken + from the consensus when TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 0.) + + SIGNALS ------- @@ -1972,7 +2171,7 @@ __HiddenServiceDirectory__**/client_keys**:: SEE ALSO -------- -**privoxy**(1), **tsocks**(1), **torify**(1) + +**privoxy**(1), **torsocks**(1), **torify**(1) + **https://www.torproject.org/** diff --git a/doc/torify.1.txt b/doc/torify.1.txt index 4a4be1250..8dca90131 100644 --- a/doc/torify.1.txt +++ b/doc/torify.1.txt @@ -2,14 +2,14 @@ // See LICENSE for licensing information // This is an asciidoc file used to generate the manpage/html reference. // Learn asciidoc on http://www.methods.co.nz/asciidoc/userguide.html +:man source: Tor +:man manual: Tor Manual torify(1) ========= -Peter Palfrader -Jacob Appelbaum NAME ---- -torify - wrapper for torsocks or tsocks and tor +torify - wrapper for torsocks and tor SYNOPSIS -------- @@ -18,33 +18,25 @@ SYNOPSIS DESCRIPTION ----------- **torify** is a simple wrapper that attempts to find the best underlying Tor -wrapper available on a system. It calls torsocks or tsocks with a tor specific +wrapper available on a system. It calls torsocks with a tor specific configuration file. + torsocks is an improved wrapper that explicitly rejects UDP, safely resolves DNS lookups and properly socksifies your TCP connections. + -tsocks itself is a wrapper between the tsocks library and the application that -you would like to run socksified. + - Please note that since both method use LD_PRELOAD, torify cannot be applied to suid binaries. WARNING ------- -You should also be aware that the way tsocks currently works only TCP -connections are socksified. Be aware that this will in most circumstances not -include hostname lookups which would still be routed through your normal system -resolver to your usual resolving nameservers. The **tor-resolve**(1) tool can be -useful as a workaround in some cases. The Tor FAQ at -https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ might have further -information on this subject. + - When used with torsocks, torify should not leak DNS requests or UDP data. + Both will leak ICMP data. SEE ALSO -------- -**tor**(1), **tor-resolve**(1), **torsocks**(1), **tsocks**(1), -**tsocks.conf**(5). +**tor**(1), **tor-resolve**(1), **torsocks**(1) + +AUTHORS +------- +Peter Palfrader and Jacob Appelbaum wrote this manual. diff --git a/doc/translations.txt b/doc/translations.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 06d16f446..000000000 --- a/doc/translations.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,182 +0,0 @@ -## Instructions for helping translate text for Vidalia, TorButton -## and TorCheck -## ( More translation information for Tor related apps will accumulate here ) - -Our translations are handled in one of two places. The Tor Translation Portal -handles all of the translations for Vidalia, Torbutton and TorCheck. The Tor -website itself is currently handled by hand translations using subversion. - -------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -For the Tor website, you'll need a Tor SVN account. -If you do not have one and you need one, please run this command with your -desired username in place of 'USERNAME': - htdigest -c passwd.tmp "Tor subversion repository" USERNAME -and send us the contents of passwd.tmp. - -------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -For the Portal-based projects, all three check in their respective .po -files into the following subversion urls: - - https://tor-svn.freehaven.net/svn/translation/trunk/projects/torbutton - https://tor-svn.freehaven.net/svn/translation/trunk/projects/torcheck - https://svn.vidalia-project.net/svn/vidalia/trunk/src/vidalia/i18n/ - -The current pootle configuration is checked into subversion as well: - - https://tor-svn.freehaven.net/svn/translation/trunk/pootle - ----------------------------- TorCheck ------------------------------- - -TorCheck uses our translation portal to accept translations. Users use -the portal to check in their changes. To make use of the translations -that users have committed to the translations/ subversion module, you'll -need to ensure that you have a current checked out copy of TorCheck: - - cd check/trunk/i18n/ - check/trunk/i18n$ svn up - -You should see something like the following: - - Fetching external item into 'pootle' - External at revision 15300. - - At revision 15300. - -Now if you had changes, you'd simply want to move the newly updated .po files -into the current stable directory. Moving the .po files from -'check/trunk/i18n/pootle/' into 'check/trunk/i18n' properly naming the files -for their respective locale. - -Here's an example of how to move all of the current pootle translations into -the svn trunk area of TorCheck: - - cd check/trunk/i18n/ - for locale in `ls -1 pootle/|grep -v template`; - do - mv -v pootle/$locale/TorCheck_$locale.po TorCheck_$locale.po; - done - -Now check the differences (ensure the output looks reasonable): - - svn diff - -Ensure that msgfmt has no errors: - - msgfmt -C *.po - -And finally check in the changes: - - svn commit - ----------------------------- Torbutton ------------------------------- - -Torbutton uses our translation portal to accept translations. Users use -the portal to check in their changes. - -To make use of the translations that users have committed to the translations/ -subversion module, you'll need to ensure that you have a current checked out -copy of them in your torbutton git checkout: - - cd torbutton.git/trans_tools - torbutton.git/trans_tools$ svn co https://tor-svn.freehaven.net/svn/translation/trunk/projects/torbutton pootle - -You should see something like the following: - - Checked out revision 21092. - -If you made changes to strings in Torbutton, you need to rebuild the -templates in torbutton.git/trans_tools/pootle/templates. This is done with -the following command from within the torbutton.git checkout directory: - - moz2po -P -i src/chrome/locale/en/ -o trans_tools/pootle/templates/ - -You now have two options: - -Option 1 (The [shitty] Pootle Web UI Way): - -View then commit the changes to the template with: - - cd trans_tools/pootle - svn diff templates - svn commit templates - -Then poke Jake to 'svn up' on the Pootle side. If you do this enough -times, he may give you a button to click to update templates in Pootle, -or maybe even an account on the Pootle server. Persistence is a virtue. - -You then need to go to the Pootle website and click the checkbox next to -every language on: -https://translation.torproject.org/projects/torbutton/admin.html -and then click "Update Languages" at the bottom. - -You then need to go to each language and go to "Editing Options" and click -"Commit" for each one. - -You then need to 'svn up' locally, and follow the procedure above for -rebuilding your .dtd and .properties files. - -Yes, this sucks. :/ - -Option 2 (Use your own msgmerge: YMMV, may change .po flags and formatting): - -Run msgmerge yourself for each language: - - cd trans_tools - for i in `ls -1 pootle` - do - msgmerge -U ./pootle/$i/torbutton.dtd.po ./pootle/templates/torbutton.dtd.pot - msgmerge -U ./pootle/$i/torbutton.properties.po ./pootle/templates/torbutton.properties.pot - done - svn diff pootle - svn commit pootle - -Then poke Jake to 'svn up' on the Pootle side. If you do this enough times, -he may give you a button on Pootle, or maybe even an account on the Pootle -server. Persistence is a virtue. - -You may notice that some .po file flags and string formatting have changed -with this method, depending on your gettext version. It is unclear if this -is a problem. Please update this doc if you hit a landmine and everything -breaks :) - -After this process is done, you then need to regenerate the mozilla -.dtd and .properties files as specified above. - - -Regardless of whether or not you had changes in the torbutton strings, if there -were updated strings in pootle that you checked out from svn you now need to -convert from .po and move the newly updated mozilla files into the current -stable locale directory. First convert them with the 'mkmoz.sh' script and -then move the proper mozilla files from 'torbutton.git/trans_tools/moz/' into -'torbutton.git/src/chrome/locale/' directory while properly naming the files -for their respective locale. - -Here's an example of how to move all of the current pootle translations into -the svn trunk area of Torbutton: - - cd trans_tools - ./mkmoz.sh - for locale in `ls -1 moz/`; - do - mv -v moz/$locale/*.{dtd,properties} ../src/chrome/locale/$locale/ - done - -Now check the differences to your git branch to ensure the output looks -reasonable: - - cd .. - git diff - -And finally check in the changes: - - cd src/chrome/locale - git commit . - ----------------------------- Vidalia ------------------------------- - -Vidalia uses our translation portal to accept translations. Users use the -portal to check in their changes. No conversion or moving is required other -than normal pootle usage. - diff --git a/doc/v3-authority-howto.txt b/doc/v3-authority-howto.txt deleted file mode 100644 index e4470e8c8..000000000 --- a/doc/v3-authority-howto.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,84 +0,0 @@ - - How to add a v3 directory authority. - -What we'll be doing: - - We'll be configuring your Tor server as a v3 directory authority, - generating a v3 identity key plus certificates, and adding your v3 - identity fingerprint to the list of default directory authorities. - -The steps: - -0) Make sure you're running ntp, and that your time is correct. - - Make sure you have Tor version at least r12724. In the short term, - running a working authority may mean running the latest version of - Tor from SVN trunk. Later on, we hope that it will become easier - and you can just run a recent development release (and later still, - a recent stable release). - -1) First, you'll need a certificate. Run ./src/tools/tor-gencert to - generate one. - - Run tor-gencert in a separate, very secure directory. Maybe even on - a more secure computer. The first time you run it, you will need to - run it with the --create-identity-key option to make a v3 authority - identity key. Subsequent times, you can just run it as-is. - - tor-gencert will make 3 files: - - authority_identity_key -- THIS IS VERY SECRET AND VERY SENSITIVE. - DO NOT LEAK IT. DO NOT LOSE IT. - - authority_signing_key -- A key for signing votes and v3 conensuses. - - authority_certificate -- A document authenticating your signing key - with your identity-key. - - You will need to rotate your signing key periodically. The current - default lifetime is 1 year. We'll probably take this down to a month or - two some time soon. To rotate your key, run tor-gencert as before, - but without the --create-identity-key option. - -2) Copy authority_signing_key and authority_certificate to your Tor keys - directory. - - For example if your data directory is /var/lib/tor/, you should run - cp authority_signing_key authority_certificate /var/lib/tor/keys/ - - You will need to repeat this every time you rotate your certificate. - -3) Tell your Tor to be a v3 authority by adding these lines to your torrc: - - AuthoritativeDirectory 1 - V3AuthoritativeDirectory 1 - -4) Now your authority is generating a networkstatus opinion (called a - "vote") every period, but none of the other authorities care yet. The - next step is to get a Tor developer (likely Roger or Nick) to add - your v3 identity fingerprint to the default list of dirservers. - - First, you need to learn your authority's v3 identity fingerprint. - It should be in your authority_certificate file in a line like: - - fingerprint 3041632465FA8847A98B2C5742108C72325532D9 - - One of the Tor developers then needs to add this fingerprint to - the add_default_trusted_dirservers() function in config.c, using - the syntax "v3ident=<fingerprint>". For example, if moria1's new v3 - identity fingerprint is FOO, the moria1 dirserver line should now be: - - DirServer moria1 v1 orport=9001 v3ident=FOO 128.31.0.34:9031 FFCB 46DB 1339 DA84 674C 70D7 CB58 6434 C437 0441 - - The v3ident item must appear after the nickname and before the IP. - -5) Once your fingerprint has been added to config.c, we will try to - get a majority of v3 authorities to upgrade, so they know about you - too. At that point your vote will automatically be included in the - networkstatus consensus, and you'll be a fully-functioning contributing - v3 authority. - - Note also that a majority of the configured v3 authorities need to - agree in order to generate a consensus: so this is also the point - where extended downtime on your server means missing votes. - |