diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'contrib/operator-tools')
| -rw-r--r-- | contrib/operator-tools/linux-tor-prio.sh | 192 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | contrib/operator-tools/tor-exit-notice.html | 144 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | contrib/operator-tools/tor.logrotate.in | 14 |
3 files changed, 350 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/contrib/operator-tools/linux-tor-prio.sh b/contrib/operator-tools/linux-tor-prio.sh new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ea9e0ddaa --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/operator-tools/linux-tor-prio.sh @@ -0,0 +1,192 @@ +#!/bin/bash +# Written by Marco Bonetti & Mike Perry +# Based on instructions from Dan Singletary's ADSL BW Management HOWTO: +# http://www.faqs.org/docs/Linux-HOWTO/ADSL-Bandwidth-Management-HOWTO.html +# This script is Public Domain. + +############################### README ################################# + +# This script provides prioritization of Tor traffic below other +# traffic on a Linux server. It has two modes of operation: UID based +# and IP based. + +# UID BASED PRIORITIZATION +# +# The UID based method requires that Tor be launched from +# a specific user ID. The "User" Tor config setting is +# insufficient, as it sets the UID after the socket is created. +# Here is a C wrapper you can use to execute Tor and drop privs before +# it creates any sockets. +# +# Compile with: +# gcc -DUID=`id -u tor` -DGID=`id -g tor` tor_wrap.c -o tor_wrap +# +# #include <unistd.h> +# int main(int argc, char **argv) { +# if(initgroups("tor", GID) == -1) { perror("initgroups"); return 1; } +# if(setresgid(GID, GID, GID) == -1) { perror("setresgid"); return 1; } +# if(setresuid(UID, UID, UID) == -1) { perror("setresuid"); return 1; } +# execl("/bin/tor", "/bin/tor", "-f", "/etc/tor/torrc", NULL); +# perror("execl"); return 1; +# } + +# IP BASED PRIORITIZATION +# +# The IP setting requires that a separate IP address be dedicated to Tor. +# Your Torrc should be set to bind to this IP for "OutboundBindAddress", +# "ListenAddress", and "Address". + +# GENERAL USAGE +# +# You should also tune the individual connection rate parameters below +# to your individual connection. In particular, you should leave *some* +# minimum amount of bandwidth for Tor, so that Tor users are not +# completely choked out when you use your server's bandwidth. 30% is +# probably a reasonable choice. More is better of course. +# +# To start the shaping, run it as: +# ./linux-tor-prio.sh +# +# To get status information (useful to verify packets are getting marked +# and prioritized), run: +# ./linux-tor-prio.sh status +# +# And to stop prioritization: +# ./linux-tor-prio.sh stop +# +######################################################################## + +# BEGIN USER TUNABLE PARAMETERS + +DEV=eth0 + +# NOTE! You must START Tor under this UID. Using the Tor User +# config setting is NOT sufficient. See above. +TOR_UID=$(id -u tor) + +# If the UID mechanism doesn't work for you, you can set this parameter +# instead. If set, it will take precedence over the UID setting. Note that +# you need multiple IPs with one specifically devoted to Tor for this to +# work. +#TOR_IP="42.42.42.42" + +# Average ping to most places on the net, milliseconds +RTT_LATENCY=40 + +# RATE_UP must be less than your connection's upload capacity in +# kbits/sec. If it is larger, then the bottleneck will be at your +# router's queue, which you do not control. This will cause congestion +# and a revert to normal TCP fairness no matter what the queing +# priority is. +RATE_UP=5000 + +# RATE_UP_TOR is the minimum speed your Tor connections will have in +# kbits/sec. They will have at least this much bandwidth for upload. +# In general, you probably shouldn't set this too low, or else Tor +# users who use your node will be completely choked out whenever your +# machine does any other network activity. That is not very fun. +RATE_UP_TOR=1500 + +# RATE_UP_TOR_CEIL is the maximum rate allowed for all Tor trafic in +# kbits/sec. +RATE_UP_TOR_CEIL=5000 + +CHAIN=OUTPUT +#CHAIN=PREROUTING +#CHAIN=POSTROUTING + +MTU=1500 +AVG_PKT=900 # should be more like 600 for non-exit nodes + +# END USER TUNABLE PARAMETERS + + + +# The queue size should be no larger than your bandwidth-delay +# product. This is RT latency*bandwidth/MTU/2 + +BDP=$(expr $RTT_LATENCY \* $RATE_UP / $AVG_PKT) + +# Further research indicates that the BDP calculations should use +# RTT/sqrt(n) where n is the expected number of active connections.. + +BDP=$(expr $BDP / 4) + +if [ "$1" = "status" ] +then + echo "[qdisc]" + tc -s qdisc show dev $DEV + tc -s qdisc show dev imq0 + echo "[class]" + tc -s class show dev $DEV + tc -s class show dev imq0 + echo "[filter]" + tc -s filter show dev $DEV + tc -s filter show dev imq0 + echo "[iptables]" + iptables -t mangle -L TORSHAPER-OUT -v -x 2> /dev/null + exit +fi + + +# Reset everything to a known state (cleared) +tc qdisc del dev $DEV root 2> /dev/null > /dev/null +tc qdisc del dev imq0 root 2> /dev/null > /dev/null +iptables -t mangle -D POSTROUTING -o $DEV -j TORSHAPER-OUT 2> /dev/null > /dev/null +iptables -t mangle -D PREROUTING -o $DEV -j TORSHAPER-OUT 2> /dev/null > /dev/null +iptables -t mangle -D OUTPUT -o $DEV -j TORSHAPER-OUT 2> /dev/null > /dev/null +iptables -t mangle -F TORSHAPER-OUT 2> /dev/null > /dev/null +iptables -t mangle -X TORSHAPER-OUT 2> /dev/null > /dev/null +ip link set imq0 down 2> /dev/null > /dev/null +rmmod imq 2> /dev/null > /dev/null + +if [ "$1" = "stop" ] +then + echo "Shaping removed on $DEV." + exit +fi + +# Outbound Shaping (limits total bandwidth to RATE_UP) + +ip link set dev $DEV qlen $BDP + +# Add HTB root qdisc, default is high prio +tc qdisc add dev $DEV root handle 1: htb default 20 + +# Add main rate limit class +tc class add dev $DEV parent 1: classid 1:1 htb rate ${RATE_UP}kbit + +# Create the two classes, giving Tor at least RATE_UP_TOR kbit and capping +# total upstream at RATE_UP so the queue is under our control. +tc class add dev $DEV parent 1:1 classid 1:20 htb rate $(expr $RATE_UP - $RATE_UP_TOR)kbit ceil ${RATE_UP}kbit prio 0 +tc class add dev $DEV parent 1:1 classid 1:21 htb rate $[$RATE_UP_TOR]kbit ceil ${RATE_UP_TOR_CEIL}kbit prio 10 + +# Start up pfifo +tc qdisc add dev $DEV parent 1:20 handle 20: pfifo limit $BDP +tc qdisc add dev $DEV parent 1:21 handle 21: pfifo limit $BDP + +# filter traffic into classes by fwmark +tc filter add dev $DEV parent 1:0 prio 0 protocol ip handle 20 fw flowid 1:20 +tc filter add dev $DEV parent 1:0 prio 0 protocol ip handle 21 fw flowid 1:21 + +# add TORSHAPER-OUT chain to the mangle table in iptables +iptables -t mangle -N TORSHAPER-OUT +iptables -t mangle -I $CHAIN -o $DEV -j TORSHAPER-OUT + + +# Set firewall marks +# Low priority to Tor +if [ ""$TOR_IP == "" ] +then + echo "Using UID-based QoS. UID $TOR_UID marked as low priority." + iptables -t mangle -A TORSHAPER-OUT -m owner --uid-owner $TOR_UID -j MARK --set-mark 21 +else + echo "Using IP-based QoS. $TOR_IP marked as low priority." + iptables -t mangle -A TORSHAPER-OUT -s $TOR_IP -j MARK --set-mark 21 +fi + +# High prio for everything else +iptables -t mangle -A TORSHAPER-OUT -m mark --mark 0 -j MARK --set-mark 20 + +echo "Outbound shaping added to $DEV. Rate for Tor upload at least: ${RATE_UP_TOR}Kbyte/sec." + diff --git a/contrib/operator-tools/tor-exit-notice.html b/contrib/operator-tools/tor-exit-notice.html new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8cf5c294f --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/operator-tools/tor-exit-notice.html @@ -0,0 +1,144 @@ +<?xml version="1.0"?> +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> +<head> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=utf-8" /> +<title>This is a Tor Exit Router</title> + +<!-- + +This notice is intended to be placed on a virtual host for a domain that +your Tor exit node IP reverse resolves to so that people who may be about +to file an abuse complaint would check it first before bothering you or +your ISP. Ex: +http://tor-exit.yourdomain.org or http://tor-readme.yourdomain.org. + +This type of setup has proven very effective at reducing abuse complaints +for exit node operators. + +There are a few places in this document that you may want to customize. +They are marked with FIXME. + +--> + +</head> +<body> + +<p style="text-align:center; font-size:xx-large; font-weight:bold">This is a +Tor Exit Router</p> + +<p> +Most likely you are accessing this website because you had some issue with +the traffic coming from this IP. This router is part of the <a +href="https://www.torproject.org/">Tor Anonymity Network</a>, which is +dedicated to <a href="https://www.torproject.org/about/overview">providing +privacy</a> to people who need it most: average computer users. This +router IP should be generating no other traffic, unless it has been +compromised.</p> + + +<!-- FIXME: you should probably grab your own copy of how_tor_works_thumb.png + and serve it locally --> + +<p style="text-align:center"> +<a href="https://www.torproject.org/about/overview"> +<img src="https://www.torproject.org/images/how_tor_works_thumb.png" alt="How Tor works" style="border-style:none"/> +</a></p> + +<p> +Tor sees use by <a href="https://www.torproject.org/about/torusers">many +important segments of the population</a>, including whistle blowers, +journalists, Chinese dissidents skirting the Great Firewall and oppressive +censorship, abuse victims, stalker targets, the US military, and law +enforcement, just to name a few. While Tor is not designed for malicious +computer users, it is true that they can use the network for malicious ends. +In reality however, the actual amount of <a +href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq-abuse">abuse</a> is quite low. This +is largely because criminals and hackers have significantly better access to +privacy and anonymity than do the regular users whom they prey upon. Criminals +can and do <a +href="http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2008/08/web_fraud_20_tools.html">build, +sell, and trade</a> far larger and <a +href="http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2008/08/web_fraud_20_distributing_your.html">more +powerful networks</a> than Tor on a daily basis. Thus, in the mind of this +operator, the social need for easily accessible censorship-resistant private, +anonymous communication trumps the risk of unskilled bad actors, who are +almost always more easily uncovered by traditional police work than by +extensive monitoring and surveillance anyway.</p> + +<p> +In terms of applicable law, the best way to understand Tor is to consider it a +network of routers operating as common carriers, much like the Internet +backbone. However, unlike the Internet backbone routers, Tor routers +explicitly do not contain identifiable routing information about the source of +a packet, and no single Tor node can determine both the origin and destination +of a given transmission.</p> + +<p> +As such, there is little the operator of this router can do to help you track +the connection further. This router maintains no logs of any of the Tor +traffic, so there is little that can be done to trace either legitimate or +illegitimate traffic (or to filter one from the other). Attempts to +seize this router will accomplish nothing.</p> + +<!-- FIXME: US-Only section. Remove if you are a non-US operator --> + +<p> +Furthermore, this machine also serves as a carrier of email, which means that +its contents are further protected under the ECPA. <a +href="http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2707">18 +USC 2707</a> explicitly allows for civil remedies ($1000/account +<i><b>plus</b></i> legal fees) +in the event of a seizure executed without good faith or probable cause (it +should be clear at this point that traffic with an originating IP address of +FIXME_DNS_NAME should not constitute probable cause to seize the +machine). Similar considerations exist for 1st amendment content on this +machine.</p> + +<!-- FIXME: May or may not be US-only. Some non-US tor nodes have in + fact reported DMCA harassment... --> + +<p> +If you are a representative of a company who feels that this router is being +used to violate the DMCA, please be aware that this machine does not host or +contain any illegal content. Also be aware that network infrastructure +maintainers are not liable for the type of content that passes over their +equipment, in accordance with <a +href="http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/17/512">DMCA +"safe harbor" provisions</a>. In other words, you will have just as much luck +sending a takedown notice to the Internet backbone providers. Please consult +<a href="https://www.torproject.org/eff/tor-dmca-response">EFF's prepared +response</a> for more information on this matter.</p> + +<p>For more information, please consult the following documentation:</p> + +<ol> +<li><a href="https://www.torproject.org/about/overview">Tor Overview</a></li> +<li><a href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq-abuse">Tor Abuse FAQ</a></li> +<li><a href="https://www.torproject.org/eff/tor-legal-faq">Tor Legal FAQ</a></li> +</ol> + +<p> +That being said, if you still have a complaint about the router, you may +email the <a href="mailto:FIXME_YOUR_EMAIL_ADDRESS">maintainer</a>. If +complaints are related to a particular service that is being abused, I will +consider removing that service from my exit policy, which would prevent my +router from allowing that traffic to exit through it. I can only do this on an +IP+destination port basis, however. Common P2P ports are +already blocked.</p> + +<p> +You also have the option of blocking this IP address and others on +the Tor network if you so desire. The Tor project provides a <a +href="https://check.torproject.org/cgi-bin/TorBulkExitList.py">web service</a> +to fetch a list of all IP addresses of Tor exit nodes that allow exiting to a +specified IP:port combination, and an official <a +href="https://www.torproject.org/tordnsel/dist/">DNSRBL</a> is also available to +determine if a given IP address is actually a Tor exit server. Please +be considerate +when using these options. It would be unfortunate to deny all Tor users access +to your site indefinitely simply because of a few bad apples.</p> + +</body> +</html> diff --git a/contrib/operator-tools/tor.logrotate.in b/contrib/operator-tools/tor.logrotate.in new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6e75f80bf --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/operator-tools/tor.logrotate.in @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +@LOCALSTATEDIR@/log/tor/*log { + daily + rotate 5 + compress + delaycompress + missingok + notifempty + # you may need to change the username/groupname below + create 0640 _tor _tor + sharedscripts + postrotate + /etc/init.d/tor reload > /dev/null + endscript +} |