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-rw-r--r--changes/bug6252_again11
-rw-r--r--changes/bug65305
-rw-r--r--changes/pathsel-BUGGY-a14
3 files changed, 30 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/changes/bug6252_again b/changes/bug6252_again
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+++ b/changes/bug6252_again
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+ o Security fixes:
+ - Tear down the circuit if we get an unexpected SENDME cell. Clients
+ could use this trick to make their circuits receive cells faster
+ than our flow control would have allowed, or to gum up the network,
+ or possibly to do targeted memory denial-of-service attacks on
+ entry nodes. Fixes bug 6252. Bugfix on the 54th commit on Tor --
+ from July 2002, before the release of Tor 0.0.0. We had committed
+ this patch previously, but we had to revert it because of bug 6271.
+ Now that 6271 is fixed, this appears to work.
+
+
diff --git a/changes/bug6530 b/changes/bug6530
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+++ b/changes/bug6530
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+ o Major security fixes:
+ - Avoid a read of uninitializd RAM when reading a vote or consensus
+ document with an unrecognized flavor name. This could lead to a
+ remote crash bug. Fixes bug 6530; bugfix on 0.2.2.6-alpha.
+
diff --git a/changes/pathsel-BUGGY-a b/changes/pathsel-BUGGY-a
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+++ b/changes/pathsel-BUGGY-a
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+ o Security fixes:
+
+ - Try to leak less information about what relays a client is
+ choosing to a side-channel attacker. Previously, a Tor client
+ would stop iterating through the list of available relays as
+ soon as it had chosen one, thus finishing a little earlier
+ when it picked a router earlier in the list. If an attacker
+ can recover this timing information (nontrivial but not
+ proven to be impossible), they could learn some coarse-
+ grained information about which relays a client was picking
+ (middle nodes in particular are likelier to be affected than
+ exits). The timing attack might be mitigated by other factors
+ (see bug #6537 for some discussion), but it's best not to
+ take chances. Fixes bug 6537; bugfix on 0.0.8rc1.