diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/tor-design.bib | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/tor-design.tex | 8 |
2 files changed, 11 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/doc/tor-design.bib b/doc/tor-design.bib index ba42711e3..99f365a75 100644 --- a/doc/tor-design.bib +++ b/doc/tor-design.bib @@ -7,7 +7,13 @@ @Misc{anonymizer, key = {anonymizer}, title = {The {Anonymizer}}, - note = {\url{http://www.anonymizer.com}} + note = {\url{http://www.anonymizer.com/}} +} + +@Misc{privoxy, + key = {privoxy}, + title = {{Privoxy}}, + note = {\url{http://www.privoxy.org/}} } @Misc{anonnet, diff --git a/doc/tor-design.tex b/doc/tor-design.tex index 144538cb0..5172849ec 100644 --- a/doc/tor-design.tex +++ b/doc/tor-design.tex @@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ Tor uses the standard and near-ubiquitous SOCKS \cite{socks4,socks5} proxy interface, allowing us to support most TCP-based programs without modification. This design change allows Tor to use the filtering features of privacy-enhancing -application-level proxies such as Privoxy without having to +application-level proxies such as Privoxy \cite{privoxy} without having to incorporate those features itself. \item \textbf{Many TCP streams can share one circuit:} The original @@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ internet chat, or SSH connections. Tor belongs to the second category: \emph{low-latency} designs that attempt to anonymize interactive network traffic. Because these protocols typically -involve a large number of packets that much be delivered quickly, it is +involve a large number of packets that must be delivered quickly, it is difficult for them to prevent an attacker who can eavesdrop both ends of the interactive communication from points from correlating the timing and volume of traffic entering the anonymity network with traffic leaving it. These @@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ Some systems, such as Crowds \cite{crowds-tissec}, do not rely changing the appearance of packets to hide the path; rather they try to prevent an intermediary from knowing when whether it is talking to an ultimate initiator, or just another intermediary. Crowds uses no public-key -encryption encryption, but the responder and all data are visible to all +encryption, but the responder and all data are visible to all nodes on the path so that anonymity of connection initiator depends on filtering all identifying information from the data stream. Crowds only supports HTTP traffic. @@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ research lacking a generally accepted solution. % the enclave-firewall model? -RD % I don't think we should. -NM \item[No protocol normalization:] Tor does not provide \emph{protocol - normalization} Privoxy or the Anonymizer. In order to make clients + normalization} like Privoxy or the Anonymizer. In order to make clients indistinguishable when they complex and variable protocols such as HTTP, Tor must be layered with a filtering proxy such as Privoxy to hide differences between clients, expunge protocol features that leak identity, |