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| -rw-r--r-- | doc/tor-design.tex | 13 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/doc/tor-design.tex b/doc/tor-design.tex index 34c6e830d..dac0621ad 100644 --- a/doc/tor-design.tex +++ b/doc/tor-design.tex @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ and addresses many limitations in the original Onion Routing design. Tor works in a real-world Internet environment, requires no special privileges such as root- or kernel-level access, requires little synchronization or coordination between nodes, and -provides a reasonable tradeoff between anonymity and usability/efficiency. +provides a reasonable tradeoff between anonymity, usability, and efficiency. We include a new practical design for rendezvous points, as well as a big list of open problems. \end{abstract} @@ -367,10 +367,10 @@ forward secrecy feasible. Circuit-based anonymity designs must choose which protocol layer to anonymize. They may choose to intercept IP packets directly, and relay them whole (stripping the source address) as the contents of -the circuit \cite{tarzan:ccs02,freedom2-arch}. Alternatively, like +the circuit \cite{freedom2-arch,tarzan:ccs02}. Alternatively, like Tor, they may accept TCP streams and relay the data in those streams along the circuit, ignoring the breakdown of that data into TCP frames -\cite{anonnet,morphmix:fc04}. Finally, they may accept application-level +\cite{morphmix:fc04,anonnet}. Finally, they may accept application-level protocols (such as HTTP) and relay the application requests themselves along the circuit. This protocol-layer decision represents a compromise between flexibility @@ -786,9 +786,9 @@ using TLS. Addressing the insider malleability attack, however, is more complex. We could do integrity checking of the relay cells at each hop, either -by including hashes or by using a cipher mode like EAX \cite{eax}. -But we don't want the added message-expansion overhead at each hop, and -we don't want to leak the path length (or pad to some max path length). +by including hashes or by using a cipher mode like EAX \cite{eax}, +but we don't want the added message-expansion overhead at each hop, and +we don't want to leak the path length or pad to some max path length. Because we've already accepted that our design is vulnerable to end-to-end timing attacks, we can perform integrity checking only at the edges of the circuit without introducing any new anonymity attacks. When Alice @@ -1894,6 +1894,7 @@ issues remaining to be ironed out. In particular: %\Section{Acknowledgments} % Peter Palfrader for editing % Bram Cohen for congestion control discussions +% Adam Back for suggesting telescoping circuits %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |