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| author | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2007-08-27 15:33:58 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2007-08-27 15:33:58 +0000 |
| commit | d3224bad42957bf2e1751c7a1731c8956e003530 (patch) | |
| tree | 02b92176af96af5ce487d47adfffe5d3fefba5f3 /src/or/or.h | |
| parent | 0608ec71fdbd25da4195fd0e40ccd1bec7f3a0a5 (diff) | |
| download | tor-d3224bad42957bf2e1751c7a1731c8956e003530.tar tor-d3224bad42957bf2e1751c7a1731c8956e003530.tar.gz | |
r14227@Kushana: nickm | 2007-08-27 11:33:28 -0400
Add a new ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses option (default: on) to refuse to believe that any address can map to or from an internal address. This blocks some kinds of potential browser-based attacks, especially on hosts using DNSPort. Also clarify behavior in some comments. Backport candiate?
svn:r11287
Diffstat (limited to 'src/or/or.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/or.h | 8 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 3c8842541..aded80613 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -191,7 +191,8 @@ #define DEFAULT_DNS_TTL (30*60) /** How long can a TTL be before we stop believing it? */ #define MAX_DNS_TTL (3*60*60) -/** How small can a TTL be before we stop believing it? */ +/** How small can a TTL be before we stop believing it? Provides rudimentary + * pinning. */ #define MIN_DNS_TTL (60) /** How often do we rotate onion keys? */ @@ -2093,6 +2094,11 @@ typedef struct { * if we are a cache). For authorities, this is always true. */ int DownloadExtraInfo; + /** If true, do not believe anybody who tells us that a domain resolves + * to an internal address, or that an internal address has a PTR mapping. + * Helps avoid some cross-site attacks. */ + int ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses; + /** The length of time that we think a consensus should be fresh. */ int V3AuthVotingInterval; /** The length of time we think it will take to distribute votes */ |