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authorRoger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>2009-09-19 20:56:57 -0400
committerRoger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>2009-12-21 03:52:31 -0500
commit1a65bdd2327f671bb4bb4f5828de10d1f2042f10 (patch)
treeca1145fbd1d7c12e29b045d84e0d2d3a5243c1ff /src/or/or.h
parent580066f2f6fb9be141edab80396035f43895ac6f (diff)
downloadtor-1a65bdd2327f671bb4bb4f5828de10d1f2042f10.tar
tor-1a65bdd2327f671bb4bb4f5828de10d1f2042f10.tar.gz
Make EntryNodes config option much more aggressive.
Before it would prepend your requested entrynodes to your list of guard nodes, but feel free to use others after that. Now it chooses only from your EntryNodes if any of those are available, and only falls back to others if a) they're all down and b) StrictNodes is not set. Also, now we refresh your entry guards from EntryNode at each consensus fetch (rather than just at startup and then they slowly rot as the network changes). The goal here is to make users less likely to set StrictNodes, since it's doing closer to what they expect it should be doing.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/or/or.h')
-rw-r--r--src/or/or.h2
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h
index d30b53743..dabc40145 100644
--- a/src/or/or.h
+++ b/src/or/or.h
@@ -2989,7 +2989,7 @@ void entry_guards_compute_status(void);
int entry_guard_register_connect_status(const char *digest, int succeeded,
int mark_relay_status, time_t now);
void entry_nodes_should_be_added(void);
-int entry_list_can_grow(or_options_t *options);
+int entry_list_is_constrained(or_options_t *options);
routerinfo_t *choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state);
int entry_guards_parse_state(or_state_t *state, int set, char **msg);
void entry_guards_update_state(or_state_t *state);