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authorRoger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>2003-11-02 11:43:39 +0000
committerRoger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>2003-11-02 11:43:39 +0000
commit30ba3520a2e1ac2465896590b64e0991f34d0acb (patch)
tree5542b89a1657fdc32934297d54bec401fb730587 /doc
parentb6d5a56e84c9e028e6d152c2907915af07792ef3 (diff)
downloadtor-30ba3520a2e1ac2465896590b64e0991f34d0acb.tar
tor-30ba3520a2e1ac2465896590b64e0991f34d0acb.tar.gz
some minor tweaks, for the first draft.
svn:r715
Diffstat (limited to 'doc')
-rw-r--r--doc/tor-design.tex13
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/doc/tor-design.tex b/doc/tor-design.tex
index 34c6e830d..dac0621ad 100644
--- a/doc/tor-design.tex
+++ b/doc/tor-design.tex
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ and addresses many limitations in the original Onion Routing design.
Tor works in a real-world Internet environment, requires no special
privileges such as root- or kernel-level access,
requires little synchronization or coordination between nodes, and
-provides a reasonable tradeoff between anonymity and usability/efficiency.
+provides a reasonable tradeoff between anonymity, usability, and efficiency.
We include a new practical design for rendezvous points, as well
as a big list of open problems.
\end{abstract}
@@ -367,10 +367,10 @@ forward secrecy feasible.
Circuit-based anonymity designs must choose which protocol layer
to anonymize. They may choose to intercept IP packets directly, and
relay them whole (stripping the source address) as the contents of
-the circuit \cite{tarzan:ccs02,freedom2-arch}. Alternatively, like
+the circuit \cite{freedom2-arch,tarzan:ccs02}. Alternatively, like
Tor, they may accept TCP streams and relay the data in those streams
along the circuit, ignoring the breakdown of that data into TCP frames
-\cite{anonnet,morphmix:fc04}. Finally, they may accept application-level
+\cite{morphmix:fc04,anonnet}. Finally, they may accept application-level
protocols (such as HTTP) and relay the application requests themselves
along the circuit.
This protocol-layer decision represents a compromise between flexibility
@@ -786,9 +786,9 @@ using TLS. Addressing the insider malleability attack, however, is
more complex.
We could do integrity checking of the relay cells at each hop, either
-by including hashes or by using a cipher mode like EAX \cite{eax}.
-But we don't want the added message-expansion overhead at each hop, and
-we don't want to leak the path length (or pad to some max path length).
+by including hashes or by using a cipher mode like EAX \cite{eax},
+but we don't want the added message-expansion overhead at each hop, and
+we don't want to leak the path length or pad to some max path length.
Because we've already accepted that our design is vulnerable to end-to-end
timing attacks, we can perform integrity checking only at the edges of
the circuit without introducing any new anonymity attacks. When Alice
@@ -1894,6 +1894,7 @@ issues remaining to be ironed out. In particular:
%\Section{Acknowledgments}
% Peter Palfrader for editing
% Bram Cohen for congestion control discussions
+% Adam Back for suggesting telescoping circuits
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%