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authorRoger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>2002-06-27 02:54:16 +0000
committerRoger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>2002-06-27 02:54:16 +0000
commitf00ef2098aa73a605ad99f3ef0c73ebe68ee46f8 (patch)
tree86a38043d2b5361fc678b54ceaf0d240b3dca66d /TODO
parent9a928eeb1215f0d7c9b6d0bb9e4571d0a16ed79a (diff)
downloadtor-f00ef2098aa73a605ad99f3ef0c73ebe68ee46f8.tar
tor-f00ef2098aa73a605ad99f3ef0c73ebe68ee46f8.tar.gz
made it clearer that the ORs currently don't support padding at all
(it should be straightforward to add in -- but only once we decide how we want to do it.) svn:r7
Diffstat (limited to 'TODO')
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1 files changed, 16 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/TODO b/TODO
index e21f2134b..5cf1f4e02 100644
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@@ -63,22 +63,27 @@ Obvious things I'd like to do that won't break anything:
* The parts of the code that say 'FIXME'
+
+
+
+
+
Non-obvious things I'd like to do:
(Many of these topics are inter-related. It's clear that we need more
analysis before we can guess which approaches are good.)
-* Padding between ORs, and correct padding between OPs. Currently
- the OP seems to send padding at a steady rate, but data cells can
- come more quickly than that. This doesn't provide much protection
- at all. I'd like to investigate a synchronous mixing approach, where
- cells are sent at fixed intervals. We need to investigate the effects
- of this on DoS resistance -- what do we do when we have too many
- packets? One approach is to do traffic shaping rather than traffic
- padding -- we gain a bit more resistance to DoS at the expense of some
- anonymity. Can we compare this analysis to that of the Cottrell Mix,
- and learn something new? We'll need to decide on exactly how the
- traffic shaping algorithm works.
+* Padding between ORs, and correct padding between OPs. The ORs currently
+ send no padding cells between each other. Currently the OP seems to
+ send padding at a steady rate, but data cells can come more quickly
+ than that. This doesn't provide much protection at all. I'd like to
+ investigate a synchronous mixing approach, where cells are sent at fixed
+ intervals. We need to investigate the effects of this on DoS resistance
+ -- what do we do when we have too many packets? One approach is to
+ do traffic shaping rather than traffic padding -- we gain a bit more
+ resistance to DoS at the expense of some anonymity. Can we compare this
+ analysis to that of the Cottrell Mix, and learn something new? We'll
+ need to decide on exactly how the traffic shaping algorithm works.
* Make the connection buf's grow dynamically as needed. This won't
really solve the fundamental problem above, though, that a buffer