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author | Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org> | 2002-06-27 02:54:16 +0000 |
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committer | Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org> | 2002-06-27 02:54:16 +0000 |
commit | f00ef2098aa73a605ad99f3ef0c73ebe68ee46f8 (patch) | |
tree | 86a38043d2b5361fc678b54ceaf0d240b3dca66d /TODO | |
parent | 9a928eeb1215f0d7c9b6d0bb9e4571d0a16ed79a (diff) | |
download | tor-f00ef2098aa73a605ad99f3ef0c73ebe68ee46f8.tar tor-f00ef2098aa73a605ad99f3ef0c73ebe68ee46f8.tar.gz |
made it clearer that the ORs currently don't support padding at all
(it should be straightforward to add in -- but only once we decide how we
want to do it.)
svn:r7
Diffstat (limited to 'TODO')
-rw-r--r-- | TODO | 27 |
1 files changed, 16 insertions, 11 deletions
@@ -63,22 +63,27 @@ Obvious things I'd like to do that won't break anything: * The parts of the code that say 'FIXME' + + + + + Non-obvious things I'd like to do: (Many of these topics are inter-related. It's clear that we need more analysis before we can guess which approaches are good.) -* Padding between ORs, and correct padding between OPs. Currently - the OP seems to send padding at a steady rate, but data cells can - come more quickly than that. This doesn't provide much protection - at all. I'd like to investigate a synchronous mixing approach, where - cells are sent at fixed intervals. We need to investigate the effects - of this on DoS resistance -- what do we do when we have too many - packets? One approach is to do traffic shaping rather than traffic - padding -- we gain a bit more resistance to DoS at the expense of some - anonymity. Can we compare this analysis to that of the Cottrell Mix, - and learn something new? We'll need to decide on exactly how the - traffic shaping algorithm works. +* Padding between ORs, and correct padding between OPs. The ORs currently + send no padding cells between each other. Currently the OP seems to + send padding at a steady rate, but data cells can come more quickly + than that. This doesn't provide much protection at all. I'd like to + investigate a synchronous mixing approach, where cells are sent at fixed + intervals. We need to investigate the effects of this on DoS resistance + -- what do we do when we have too many packets? One approach is to + do traffic shaping rather than traffic padding -- we gain a bit more + resistance to DoS at the expense of some anonymity. Can we compare this + analysis to that of the Cottrell Mix, and learn something new? We'll + need to decide on exactly how the traffic shaping algorithm works. * Make the connection buf's grow dynamically as needed. This won't really solve the fundamental problem above, though, that a buffer |