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author | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2003-11-04 07:35:58 +0000 |
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committer | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2003-11-04 07:35:58 +0000 |
commit | c72d57c92e3fecd1ede89c76cdac7e3dfec0b977 (patch) | |
tree | e89e8d37d9be0a9841104cc01cd92d780f166250 | |
parent | 256ee49a2dceb80b6cd3704dcff0963f3d9e88d3 (diff) | |
download | tor-c72d57c92e3fecd1ede89c76cdac7e3dfec0b977.tar tor-c72d57c92e3fecd1ede89c76cdac7e3dfec0b977.tar.gz |
Fixes to last checkin
svn:r750
-rw-r--r-- | doc/tor-design.tex | 7 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/doc/tor-design.tex b/doc/tor-design.tex index 67be8bffb..b2dcd28e4 100644 --- a/doc/tor-design.tex +++ b/doc/tor-design.tex @@ -1135,8 +1135,8 @@ We also worry about attacks to deceive a client about the router membership list, topology, or current network state. Such \emph{partitioning attacks} on client knowledge help an adversary to efficiently deploy resources -when attacking a target. -% XXX Cite for partitioning attacks? +when attacking a target \cite{minion-design}. + Tor uses a small group of redundant, well-known onion routers to track changes in network topology and node state, including keys and @@ -1896,8 +1896,7 @@ retrieval presents a scaling problem, since clients currently download a description of the entire network state every 15 minutes. As the state grows larger and clients more numerous, we may need to move to a solution in which clients only receive -incremental updates to directory state, or where directories are -cached at the ORs to avoid high loads on the directory servers. +incremental updates to directory state. \emph{Implementing location-hidden servers:} While Section~\ref{sec:rendezvous} describes a design for rendezvous |