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author | Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org> | 2003-11-01 07:52:51 +0000 |
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committer | Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org> | 2003-11-01 07:52:51 +0000 |
commit | 6a909560be4419dd8bc4b8d21c1f2ea4a9b2293f (patch) | |
tree | 03462f4934f01e802bc0b2a8efcb0f8226f368d3 | |
parent | c826c5a95c2ac45d0d75b17448a94f88e4cafd1b (diff) | |
download | tor-6a909560be4419dd8bc4b8d21c1f2ea4a9b2293f.tar tor-6a909560be4419dd8bc4b8d21c1f2ea4a9b2293f.tar.gz |
mess with the formatting in sec9
svn:r703
-rw-r--r-- | doc/tor-design.tex | 26 |
1 files changed, 12 insertions, 14 deletions
diff --git a/doc/tor-design.tex b/doc/tor-design.tex index 6a4607585..7e39dec71 100644 --- a/doc/tor-design.tex +++ b/doc/tor-design.tex @@ -1704,9 +1704,8 @@ presence of unreliable nodes. Below we summarize a variety of attacks and how well our design withstands them. -\begin{enumerate} -\item \textbf{Passive attacks} -\begin{itemize} +\subsubsection*{Passive attacks} +\begin{tightlist} \item \emph{Observing user behavior.} \item \emph{End-to-end Timing correlation.} \item \emph{End-to-end Size correlation.} @@ -1733,10 +1732,10 @@ DOS three of the 4 who would allow a certain exit. anonymization of data stream. -\end{itemize} +\end{tightlist} -\item \textbf{Active attacks} -\begin{itemize} +\subsubsection*{Active attacks} +\begin{tightlist} \item \emph{Key compromise.} Talk about all three keys. 3 bullets \item \emph{Iterated subpoena.} Legal roving adversary. Works bad against this because of ephemeral keys. Criticize pets paper in section 2 for @@ -1756,7 +1755,6 @@ Subcase of running a hostile node: the exit node can change the content you're getting to try to trick you. similarly, when it rejects you due to exit policy, it could give you a bad IP that sends you somewhere else. -\end{itemize} \item \emph{replaying traffic} Can't in Tor. NonSSL anonymizer. \item Do bad things with the Tor network, so we are hated and @@ -1771,23 +1769,23 @@ Exit policy's are a start. we rely on DNS being globally consistent. if people in africa resolve IPs differently, then asking to extend a circuit to a certain IP can give away your origin. +\end{tightlist} -\item \textbf{Directory attacks} -\begin{itemize} +\subsubsection*{Directory attacks} +\begin{tightlist} \item knock out a dirserver \item knock out half the dirservers \item trick user into using different software (with different dirserver keys) \item OR connects to the dirservers but nowhere else \item foo -\end{itemize} +\end{tightlist} -\item \textbf{Attacks against rendezvous points} -\begin{itemize} +\subsubsection*{Attacks against rendezvous points} +\begin{tightlist} \item foo -\end{itemize} +\end{tightlist} -\end{enumerate} %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |