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authorJeremy T. Bouse <jbouse@debian.org>2009-11-27 16:20:09 -0500
committerJeremy T. Bouse <jbouse@debian.org>2009-11-27 16:20:09 -0500
commit176c6caf4ea7918e1698438634b237fab8456471 (patch)
tree6e2a8e5be1af2a6ec324fdbf99589aa099f1ec2a /paramiko/transport.py
downloadpython-paramiko-upstream/1.5.2.tar
python-paramiko-upstream/1.5.2.tar.gz
Imported Upstream version 1.5.2upstream/1.5.2
Diffstat (limited to 'paramiko/transport.py')
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diff --git a/paramiko/transport.py b/paramiko/transport.py
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+++ b/paramiko/transport.py
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+# Copyright (C) 2003-2005 Robey Pointer <robey@lag.net>
+#
+# This file is part of paramiko.
+#
+# Paramiko is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the
+# terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by the Free
+# Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option)
+# any later version.
+#
+# Paramiko is distrubuted in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY
+# WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR
+# A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU Lesser General Public License for more
+# details.
+#
+# You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
+# along with Paramiko; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
+# 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA.
+
+"""
+L{Transport} handles the core SSH2 protocol.
+"""
+
+import os
+import socket
+import string
+import struct
+import sys
+import threading
+import time
+import weakref
+
+from paramiko import util
+from paramiko.common import *
+from paramiko.compress import ZlibCompressor, ZlibDecompressor
+from paramiko.ssh_exception import SSHException, BadAuthenticationType
+from paramiko.message import Message
+from paramiko.channel import Channel
+from paramiko.sftp_client import SFTPClient
+from paramiko.packet import Packetizer, NeedRekeyException
+from paramiko.rsakey import RSAKey
+from paramiko.dsskey import DSSKey
+from paramiko.kex_group1 import KexGroup1
+from paramiko.kex_gex import KexGex
+from paramiko.primes import ModulusPack
+from paramiko.auth_handler import AuthHandler
+
+# these come from PyCrypt
+# http://www.amk.ca/python/writing/pycrypt/
+# i believe this on the standards track.
+# PyCrypt compiled for Win32 can be downloaded from the HashTar homepage:
+# http://nitace.bsd.uchicago.edu:8080/hashtar
+from Crypto.Cipher import Blowfish, AES, DES3
+from Crypto.Hash import SHA, MD5, HMAC
+
+
+# for thread cleanup
+_active_threads = []
+def _join_lingering_threads():
+ for thr in _active_threads:
+ thr.stop_thread()
+import atexit
+atexit.register(_join_lingering_threads)
+
+
+class SecurityOptions (object):
+ """
+ Simple object containing the security preferences of an ssh transport.
+ These are tuples of acceptable ciphers, digests, key types, and key
+ exchange algorithms, listed in order of preference.
+
+ Changing the contents and/or order of these fields affects the underlying
+ L{Transport} (but only if you change them before starting the session).
+ If you try to add an algorithm that paramiko doesn't recognize,
+ C{ValueError} will be raised. If you try to assign something besides a
+ tuple to one of the fields, C{TypeError} will be raised.
+
+ @since: ivysaur
+ """
+ __slots__ = [ 'ciphers', 'digests', 'key_types', 'kex', 'compression', '_transport' ]
+
+ def __init__(self, transport):
+ self._transport = transport
+
+ def __repr__(self):
+ """
+ Returns a string representation of this object, for debugging.
+
+ @rtype: str
+ """
+ return '<paramiko.SecurityOptions for %s>' % repr(self._transport)
+
+ def _get_ciphers(self):
+ return self._transport._preferred_ciphers
+
+ def _get_digests(self):
+ return self._transport._preferred_macs
+
+ def _get_key_types(self):
+ return self._transport._preferred_keys
+
+ def _get_kex(self):
+ return self._transport._preferred_kex
+
+ def _get_compression(self):
+ return self._transport._preferred_compression
+
+ def _set(self, name, orig, x):
+ if type(x) is list:
+ x = tuple(x)
+ if type(x) is not tuple:
+ raise TypeError('expected tuple or list')
+ possible = getattr(self._transport, orig).keys()
+ if len(filter(lambda n: n not in possible, x)) > 0:
+ raise ValueError('unknown cipher')
+ setattr(self._transport, name, x)
+
+ def _set_ciphers(self, x):
+ self._set('_preferred_ciphers', '_cipher_info', x)
+
+ def _set_digests(self, x):
+ self._set('_preferred_macs', '_mac_info', x)
+
+ def _set_key_types(self, x):
+ self._set('_preferred_keys', '_key_info', x)
+
+ def _set_kex(self, x):
+ self._set('_preferred_kex', '_kex_info', x)
+
+ def _set_compression(self, x):
+ self._set('_preferred_compression', '_compression_info', x)
+
+ ciphers = property(_get_ciphers, _set_ciphers, None,
+ "Symmetric encryption ciphers")
+ digests = property(_get_digests, _set_digests, None,
+ "Digest (one-way hash) algorithms")
+ key_types = property(_get_key_types, _set_key_types, None,
+ "Public-key algorithms")
+ kex = property(_get_kex, _set_kex, None, "Key exchange algorithms")
+ compression = property(_get_compression, _set_compression, None,
+ "Compression algorithms")
+
+
+class Transport (threading.Thread):
+ """
+ An SSH Transport attaches to a stream (usually a socket), negotiates an
+ encrypted session, authenticates, and then creates stream tunnels, called
+ L{Channel}s, across the session. Multiple channels can be multiplexed
+ across a single session (and often are, in the case of port forwardings).
+ """
+
+ _PROTO_ID = '2.0'
+ _CLIENT_ID = 'paramiko_1.5.2'
+
+ _preferred_ciphers = ( 'aes128-cbc', 'blowfish-cbc', 'aes256-cbc', '3des-cbc' )
+ _preferred_macs = ( 'hmac-sha1', 'hmac-md5', 'hmac-sha1-96', 'hmac-md5-96' )
+ _preferred_keys = ( 'ssh-rsa', 'ssh-dss' )
+ _preferred_kex = ( 'diffie-hellman-group1-sha1', 'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1' )
+ _preferred_compression = ( 'none', )
+
+ _cipher_info = {
+ 'blowfish-cbc': { 'class': Blowfish, 'mode': Blowfish.MODE_CBC, 'block-size': 8, 'key-size': 16 },
+ 'aes128-cbc': { 'class': AES, 'mode': AES.MODE_CBC, 'block-size': 16, 'key-size': 16 },
+ 'aes256-cbc': { 'class': AES, 'mode': AES.MODE_CBC, 'block-size': 16, 'key-size': 32 },
+ '3des-cbc': { 'class': DES3, 'mode': DES3.MODE_CBC, 'block-size': 8, 'key-size': 24 },
+ }
+
+ _mac_info = {
+ 'hmac-sha1': { 'class': SHA, 'size': 20 },
+ 'hmac-sha1-96': { 'class': SHA, 'size': 12 },
+ 'hmac-md5': { 'class': MD5, 'size': 16 },
+ 'hmac-md5-96': { 'class': MD5, 'size': 12 },
+ }
+
+ _key_info = {
+ 'ssh-rsa': RSAKey,
+ 'ssh-dss': DSSKey,
+ }
+
+ _kex_info = {
+ 'diffie-hellman-group1-sha1': KexGroup1,
+ 'diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1': KexGex,
+ }
+
+ _compression_info = {
+ # zlib@openssh.com is just zlib, but only turned on after a successful
+ # authentication. openssh servers may only offer this type because
+ # they've had troubles with security holes in zlib in the past.
+ 'zlib@openssh.com': ( ZlibCompressor, ZlibDecompressor ),
+ 'zlib': ( ZlibCompressor, ZlibDecompressor ),
+ 'none': ( None, None ),
+ }
+
+
+ _modulus_pack = None
+
+ def __init__(self, sock):
+ """
+ Create a new SSH session over an existing socket, or socket-like
+ object. This only creates the Transport object; it doesn't begin the
+ SSH session yet. Use L{connect} or L{start_client} to begin a client
+ session, or L{start_server} to begin a server session.
+
+ If the object is not actually a socket, it must have the following
+ methods:
+ - C{send(str)}: Writes from 1 to C{len(str)} bytes, and
+ returns an int representing the number of bytes written. Returns
+ 0 or raises C{EOFError} if the stream has been closed.
+ - C{recv(int)}: Reads from 1 to C{int} bytes and returns them as a
+ string. Returns 0 or raises C{EOFError} if the stream has been
+ closed.
+ - C{close()}: Closes the socket.
+ - C{settimeout(n)}: Sets a (float) timeout on I/O operations.
+
+ For ease of use, you may also pass in an address (as a tuple) or a host
+ string as the C{sock} argument. (A host string is a hostname with an
+ optional port (separated by C{":"}) which will be converted into a
+ tuple of C{(hostname, port)}.) A socket will be connected to this
+ address and used for communication. Exceptions from the C{socket} call
+ may be thrown in this case.
+
+ @param sock: a socket or socket-like object to create the session over.
+ @type sock: socket
+ """
+ if type(sock) is str:
+ # convert "host:port" into (host, port)
+ hl = sock.split(':', 1)
+ if len(hl) == 1:
+ sock = (hl[0], 22)
+ else:
+ sock = (hl[0], int(hl[1]))
+ if type(sock) is tuple:
+ # connect to the given (host, port)
+ hostname, port = sock
+ sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+ sock.connect((hostname, port))
+ # okay, normal socket-ish flow here...
+ threading.Thread.__init__(self)
+ self.randpool = randpool
+ self.sock = sock
+ # Python < 2.3 doesn't have the settimeout method - RogerB
+ try:
+ # we set the timeout so we can check self.active periodically to
+ # see if we should bail. socket.timeout exception is never
+ # propagated.
+ self.sock.settimeout(0.1)
+ except AttributeError:
+ pass
+ # negotiated crypto parameters
+ self.packetizer = Packetizer(sock)
+ self.local_version = 'SSH-' + self._PROTO_ID + '-' + self._CLIENT_ID
+ self.remote_version = ''
+ self.local_cipher = self.remote_cipher = ''
+ self.local_kex_init = self.remote_kex_init = None
+ self.session_id = None
+ # /negotiated crypto parameters
+ self.expected_packet = 0
+ self.active = False
+ self.initial_kex_done = False
+ self.in_kex = False
+ self.lock = threading.Lock() # synchronization (always higher level than write_lock)
+ self.channels = weakref.WeakValueDictionary() # (id -> Channel)
+ self.channel_events = { } # (id -> Event)
+ self.channels_seen = { } # (id -> True)
+ self.channel_counter = 1
+ self.window_size = 65536
+ self.max_packet_size = 34816
+ self.saved_exception = None
+ self.clear_to_send = threading.Event()
+ self.clear_to_send_lock = threading.Lock()
+ self.log_name = 'paramiko.transport'
+ self.logger = util.get_logger(self.log_name)
+ self.packetizer.set_log(self.logger)
+ self.auth_handler = None
+ self.authenticated = False
+ # user-defined event callbacks:
+ self.completion_event = None
+ # server mode:
+ self.server_mode = False
+ self.server_object = None
+ self.server_key_dict = { }
+ self.server_accepts = [ ]
+ self.server_accept_cv = threading.Condition(self.lock)
+ self.subsystem_table = { }
+
+ def __del__(self):
+ self.close()
+
+ def __repr__(self):
+ """
+ Returns a string representation of this object, for debugging.
+
+ @rtype: str
+ """
+ out = '<paramiko.Transport at %s' % hex(long(id(self)) & 0xffffffffL)
+ if not self.active:
+ out += ' (unconnected)'
+ else:
+ if self.local_cipher != '':
+ out += ' (cipher %s, %d bits)' % (self.local_cipher,
+ self._cipher_info[self.local_cipher]['key-size'] * 8)
+ if self.is_authenticated():
+ if len(self.channels) == 1:
+ out += ' (active; 1 open channel)'
+ else:
+ out += ' (active; %d open channels)' % len(self.channels)
+ elif self.initial_kex_done:
+ out += ' (connected; awaiting auth)'
+ else:
+ out += ' (connecting)'
+ out += '>'
+ return out
+
+ def get_security_options(self):
+ """
+ Return a L{SecurityOptions} object which can be used to tweak the
+ encryption algorithms this transport will permit, and the order of
+ preference for them.
+
+ @return: an object that can be used to change the preferred algorithms
+ for encryption, digest (hash), public key, and key exchange.
+ @rtype: L{SecurityOptions}
+
+ @since: ivysaur
+ """
+ return SecurityOptions(self)
+
+ def start_client(self, event=None):
+ """
+ Negotiate a new SSH2 session as a client. This is the first step after
+ creating a new L{Transport}. A separate thread is created for protocol
+ negotiation.
+
+ If an event is passed in, this method returns immediately. When
+ negotiation is done (successful or not), the given C{Event} will
+ be triggered. On failure, L{is_active} will return C{False}.
+
+ (Since 1.4) If C{event} is C{None}, this method will not return until
+ negotation is done. On success, the method returns normally.
+ Otherwise an SSHException is raised.
+
+ After a successful negotiation, you will usually want to authenticate,
+ calling L{auth_password <Transport.auth_password>} or
+ L{auth_publickey <Transport.auth_publickey>}.
+
+ @note: L{connect} is a simpler method for connecting as a client.
+
+ @note: After calling this method (or L{start_server} or L{connect}),
+ you should no longer directly read from or write to the original
+ socket object.
+
+ @param event: an event to trigger when negotiation is complete
+ (optional)
+ @type event: threading.Event
+
+ @raise SSHException: if negotiation fails (and no C{event} was passed
+ in)
+ """
+ self.active = True
+ if event is not None:
+ # async, return immediately and let the app poll for completion
+ self.completion_event = event
+ self.start()
+ return
+
+ # synchronous, wait for a result
+ self.completion_event = event = threading.Event()
+ self.start()
+ while True:
+ event.wait(0.1)
+ if not self.active:
+ e = self.get_exception()
+ if e is not None:
+ raise e
+ raise SSHException('Negotiation failed.')
+ if event.isSet():
+ break
+
+ def start_server(self, event=None, server=None):
+ """
+ Negotiate a new SSH2 session as a server. This is the first step after
+ creating a new L{Transport} and setting up your server host key(s). A
+ separate thread is created for protocol negotiation.
+
+ If an event is passed in, this method returns immediately. When
+ negotiation is done (successful or not), the given C{Event} will
+ be triggered. On failure, L{is_active} will return C{False}.
+
+ (Since 1.4) If C{event} is C{None}, this method will not return until
+ negotation is done. On success, the method returns normally.
+ Otherwise an SSHException is raised.
+
+ After a successful negotiation, the client will need to authenticate.
+ Override the methods
+ L{get_allowed_auths <ServerInterface.get_allowed_auths>},
+ L{check_auth_none <ServerInterface.check_auth_none>},
+ L{check_auth_password <ServerInterface.check_auth_password>}, and
+ L{check_auth_publickey <ServerInterface.check_auth_publickey>} in the
+ given C{server} object to control the authentication process.
+
+ After a successful authentication, the client should request to open
+ a channel. Override
+ L{check_channel_request <ServerInterface.check_channel_request>} in the
+ given C{server} object to allow channels to be opened.
+
+ @note: After calling this method (or L{start_client} or L{connect}),
+ you should no longer directly read from or write to the original
+ socket object.
+
+ @param event: an event to trigger when negotiation is complete.
+ @type event: threading.Event
+ @param server: an object used to perform authentication and create
+ L{Channel}s.
+ @type server: L{server.ServerInterface}
+
+ @raise SSHException: if negotiation fails (and no C{event} was passed
+ in)
+ """
+ if server is None:
+ server = ServerInterface()
+ self.server_mode = True
+ self.server_object = server
+ self.active = True
+ if event is not None:
+ # async, return immediately and let the app poll for completion
+ self.completion_event = event
+ self.start()
+ return
+
+ # synchronous, wait for a result
+ self.completion_event = event = threading.Event()
+ self.start()
+ while True:
+ event.wait(0.1)
+ if not self.active:
+ e = self.get_exception()
+ if e is not None:
+ raise e
+ raise SSHException('Negotiation failed.')
+ if event.isSet():
+ break
+
+ def add_server_key(self, key):
+ """
+ Add a host key to the list of keys used for server mode. When behaving
+ as a server, the host key is used to sign certain packets during the
+ SSH2 negotiation, so that the client can trust that we are who we say
+ we are. Because this is used for signing, the key must contain private
+ key info, not just the public half. Only one key of each type (RSA or
+ DSS) is kept.
+
+ @param key: the host key to add, usually an L{RSAKey <rsakey.RSAKey>} or
+ L{DSSKey <dsskey.DSSKey>}.
+ @type key: L{PKey <pkey.PKey>}
+ """
+ self.server_key_dict[key.get_name()] = key
+
+ def get_server_key(self):
+ """
+ Return the active host key, in server mode. After negotiating with the
+ client, this method will return the negotiated host key. If only one
+ type of host key was set with L{add_server_key}, that's the only key
+ that will ever be returned. But in cases where you have set more than
+ one type of host key (for example, an RSA key and a DSS key), the key
+ type will be negotiated by the client, and this method will return the
+ key of the type agreed on. If the host key has not been negotiated
+ yet, C{None} is returned. In client mode, the behavior is undefined.
+
+ @return: host key of the type negotiated by the client, or C{None}.
+ @rtype: L{PKey <pkey.PKey>}
+ """
+ try:
+ return self.server_key_dict[self.host_key_type]
+ except KeyError:
+ return None
+
+ def load_server_moduli(filename=None):
+ """
+ I{(optional)}
+ Load a file of prime moduli for use in doing group-exchange key
+ negotiation in server mode. It's a rather obscure option and can be
+ safely ignored.
+
+ In server mode, the remote client may request "group-exchange" key
+ negotiation, which asks the server to send a random prime number that
+ fits certain criteria. These primes are pretty difficult to compute,
+ so they can't be generated on demand. But many systems contain a file
+ of suitable primes (usually named something like C{/etc/ssh/moduli}).
+ If you call C{load_server_moduli} and it returns C{True}, then this
+ file of primes has been loaded and we will support "group-exchange" in
+ server mode. Otherwise server mode will just claim that it doesn't
+ support that method of key negotiation.
+
+ @param filename: optional path to the moduli file, if you happen to
+ know that it's not in a standard location.
+ @type filename: str
+ @return: True if a moduli file was successfully loaded; False
+ otherwise.
+ @rtype: bool
+
+ @since: doduo
+
+ @note: This has no effect when used in client mode.
+ """
+ Transport._modulus_pack = ModulusPack(randpool)
+ # places to look for the openssh "moduli" file
+ file_list = [ '/etc/ssh/moduli', '/usr/local/etc/moduli' ]
+ if filename is not None:
+ file_list.insert(0, filename)
+ for fn in file_list:
+ try:
+ Transport._modulus_pack.read_file(fn)
+ return True
+ except IOError:
+ pass
+ # none succeeded
+ Transport._modulus_pack = None
+ return False
+ load_server_moduli = staticmethod(load_server_moduli)
+
+ def close(self):
+ """
+ Close this session, and any open channels that are tied to it.
+ """
+ self.active = False
+ # since this may be called from __del__, can't assume any attributes exist
+ try:
+ self.packetizer.close()
+ for chan in self.channels.values():
+ chan._unlink()
+ except AttributeError:
+ pass
+
+ def get_remote_server_key(self):
+ """
+ Return the host key of the server (in client mode).
+
+ @note: Previously this call returned a tuple of (key type, key string).
+ You can get the same effect by calling
+ L{PKey.get_name <pkey.PKey.get_name>} for the key type, and
+ C{str(key)} for the key string.
+
+ @raise SSHException: if no session is currently active.
+
+ @return: public key of the remote server.
+ @rtype: L{PKey <pkey.PKey>}
+ """
+ if (not self.active) or (not self.initial_kex_done):
+ raise SSHException('No existing session')
+ return self.host_key
+
+ def is_active(self):
+ """
+ Return true if this session is active (open).
+
+ @return: True if the session is still active (open); False if the
+ session is closed.
+ @rtype: bool
+ """
+ return self.active
+
+ def open_session(self):
+ """
+ Request a new channel to the server, of type C{"session"}. This
+ is just an alias for C{open_channel('session')}.
+
+ @return: a new L{Channel} on success, or C{None} if the request is
+ rejected or the session ends prematurely.
+ @rtype: L{Channel}
+ """
+ return self.open_channel('session')
+
+ def open_channel(self, kind, dest_addr=None, src_addr=None):
+ """
+ Request a new channel to the server. L{Channel}s are socket-like
+ objects used for the actual transfer of data across the session.
+ You may only request a channel after negotiating encryption (using
+ L{connect} or L{start_client}) and authenticating.
+
+ @param kind: the kind of channel requested (usually C{"session"},
+ C{"forwarded-tcpip"} or C{"direct-tcpip"}).
+ @type kind: str
+ @param dest_addr: the destination address of this port forwarding,
+ if C{kind} is C{"forwarded-tcpip"} or C{"direct-tcpip"} (ignored
+ for other channel types).
+ @type dest_addr: (str, int)
+ @param src_addr: the source address of this port forwarding, if
+ C{kind} is C{"forwarded-tcpip"} or C{"direct-tcpip"}.
+ @type src_addr: (str, int)
+ @return: a new L{Channel} on success, or C{None} if the request is
+ rejected or the session ends prematurely.
+ @rtype: L{Channel}
+ """
+ chan = None
+ if not self.active:
+ # don't bother trying to allocate a channel
+ return None
+ self.lock.acquire()
+ try:
+ chanid = self.channel_counter
+ while self.channels.has_key(chanid):
+ self.channel_counter = (self.channel_counter + 1) & 0xffffff
+ chanid = self.channel_counter
+ self.channel_counter = (self.channel_counter + 1) & 0xffffff
+ m = Message()
+ m.add_byte(chr(MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN))
+ m.add_string(kind)
+ m.add_int(chanid)
+ m.add_int(self.window_size)
+ m.add_int(self.max_packet_size)
+ if (kind == 'forwarded-tcpip') or (kind == 'direct-tcpip'):
+ m.add_string(dest_addr[0])
+ m.add_int(dest_addr[1])
+ m.add_string(src_addr[0])
+ m.add_int(src_addr[1])
+ self.channels[chanid] = chan = Channel(chanid)
+ self.channel_events[chanid] = event = threading.Event()
+ self.channels_seen[chanid] = True
+ chan._set_transport(self)
+ chan._set_window(self.window_size, self.max_packet_size)
+ finally:
+ self.lock.release()
+ self._send_user_message(m)
+ while 1:
+ event.wait(0.1);
+ if not self.active:
+ return None
+ if event.isSet():
+ break
+ try:
+ self.lock.acquire()
+ if not self.channels.has_key(chanid):
+ chan = None
+ finally:
+ self.lock.release()
+ return chan
+
+ def open_sftp_client(self):
+ """
+ Create an SFTP client channel from an open transport. On success,
+ an SFTP session will be opened with the remote host, and a new
+ SFTPClient object will be returned.
+
+ @return: a new L{SFTPClient} object, referring to an sftp session
+ (channel) across this transport
+ @rtype: L{SFTPClient}
+ """
+ return SFTPClient.from_transport(self)
+
+ def send_ignore(self, bytes=None):
+ """
+ Send a junk packet across the encrypted link. This is sometimes used
+ to add "noise" to a connection to confuse would-be attackers. It can
+ also be used as a keep-alive for long lived connections traversing
+ firewalls.
+
+ @param bytes: the number of random bytes to send in the payload of the
+ ignored packet -- defaults to a random number from 10 to 41.
+ @type bytes: int
+
+ @since: fearow
+ """
+ m = Message()
+ m.add_byte(chr(MSG_IGNORE))
+ randpool.stir()
+ if bytes is None:
+ bytes = (ord(randpool.get_bytes(1)) % 32) + 10
+ m.add_bytes(randpool.get_bytes(bytes))
+ self._send_user_message(m)
+
+ def renegotiate_keys(self):
+ """
+ Force this session to switch to new keys. Normally this is done
+ automatically after the session hits a certain number of packets or
+ bytes sent or received, but this method gives you the option of forcing
+ new keys whenever you want. Negotiating new keys causes a pause in
+ traffic both ways as the two sides swap keys and do computations. This
+ method returns when the session has switched to new keys, or the
+ session has died mid-negotiation.
+
+ @return: True if the renegotiation was successful, and the link is
+ using new keys; False if the session dropped during renegotiation.
+ @rtype: bool
+ """
+ self.completion_event = threading.Event()
+ self._send_kex_init()
+ while 1:
+ self.completion_event.wait(0.1);
+ if not self.active:
+ return False
+ if self.completion_event.isSet():
+ break
+ return True
+
+ def set_keepalive(self, interval):
+ """
+ Turn on/off keepalive packets (default is off). If this is set, after
+ C{interval} seconds without sending any data over the connection, a
+ "keepalive" packet will be sent (and ignored by the remote host). This
+ can be useful to keep connections alive over a NAT, for example.
+
+ @param interval: seconds to wait before sending a keepalive packet (or
+ 0 to disable keepalives).
+ @type interval: int
+
+ @since: fearow
+ """
+ self.packetizer.set_keepalive(interval,
+ lambda x=self: x.global_request('keepalive@lag.net', wait=False))
+
+ def global_request(self, kind, data=None, wait=True):
+ """
+ Make a global request to the remote host. These are normally
+ extensions to the SSH2 protocol.
+
+ @param kind: name of the request.
+ @type kind: str
+ @param data: an optional tuple containing additional data to attach
+ to the request.
+ @type data: tuple
+ @param wait: C{True} if this method should not return until a response
+ is received; C{False} otherwise.
+ @type wait: bool
+ @return: a L{Message} containing possible additional data if the
+ request was successful (or an empty L{Message} if C{wait} was
+ C{False}); C{None} if the request was denied.
+ @rtype: L{Message}
+
+ @since: fearow
+ """
+ if wait:
+ self.completion_event = threading.Event()
+ m = Message()
+ m.add_byte(chr(MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST))
+ m.add_string(kind)
+ m.add_boolean(wait)
+ if data is not None:
+ m.add(*data)
+ self._log(DEBUG, 'Sending global request "%s"' % kind)
+ self._send_user_message(m)
+ if not wait:
+ return None
+ while True:
+ self.completion_event.wait(0.1)
+ if not self.active:
+ return None
+ if self.completion_event.isSet():
+ break
+ return self.global_response
+
+ def accept(self, timeout=None):
+ """
+ Return the next channel opened by the client over this transport, in
+ server mode. If no channel is opened before the given timeout, C{None}
+ is returned.
+
+ @param timeout: seconds to wait for a channel, or C{None} to wait
+ forever
+ @type timeout: int
+ @return: a new Channel opened by the client
+ @rtype: L{Channel}
+ """
+ self.lock.acquire()
+ try:
+ if len(self.server_accepts) > 0:
+ chan = self.server_accepts.pop(0)
+ else:
+ self.server_accept_cv.wait(timeout)
+ if len(self.server_accepts) > 0:
+ chan = self.server_accepts.pop(0)
+ else:
+ # timeout
+ chan = None
+ finally:
+ self.lock.release()
+ return chan
+
+ def connect(self, hostkey=None, username='', password=None, pkey=None):
+ """
+ Negotiate an SSH2 session, and optionally verify the server's host key
+ and authenticate using a password or private key. This is a shortcut
+ for L{start_client}, L{get_remote_server_key}, and
+ L{Transport.auth_password} or L{Transport.auth_publickey}. Use those
+ methods if you want more control.
+
+ You can use this method immediately after creating a Transport to
+ negotiate encryption with a server. If it fails, an exception will be
+ thrown. On success, the method will return cleanly, and an encrypted
+ session exists. You may immediately call L{open_channel} or
+ L{open_session} to get a L{Channel} object, which is used for data
+ transfer.
+
+ @note: If you fail to supply a password or private key, this method may
+ succeed, but a subsequent L{open_channel} or L{open_session} call may
+ fail because you haven't authenticated yet.
+
+ @param hostkey: the host key expected from the server, or C{None} if
+ you don't want to do host key verification.
+ @type hostkey: L{PKey<pkey.PKey>}
+ @param username: the username to authenticate as.
+ @type username: str
+ @param password: a password to use for authentication, if you want to
+ use password authentication; otherwise C{None}.
+ @type password: str
+ @param pkey: a private key to use for authentication, if you want to
+ use private key authentication; otherwise C{None}.
+ @type pkey: L{PKey<pkey.PKey>}
+
+ @raise SSHException: if the SSH2 negotiation fails, the host key
+ supplied by the server is incorrect, or authentication fails.
+
+ @since: doduo
+ """
+ if hostkey is not None:
+ self._preferred_keys = [ hostkey.get_name() ]
+
+ self.start_client()
+
+ # check host key if we were given one
+ if (hostkey is not None):
+ key = self.get_remote_server_key()
+ if (key.get_name() != hostkey.get_name()) or (str(key) != str(hostkey)):
+ self._log(DEBUG, 'Bad host key from server')
+ self._log(DEBUG, 'Expected: %s: %s' % (hostkey.get_name(), repr(str(hostkey))))
+ self._log(DEBUG, 'Got : %s: %s' % (key.get_name(), repr(str(key))))
+ raise SSHException('Bad host key from server')
+ self._log(DEBUG, 'Host key verified (%s)' % hostkey.get_name())
+
+ if (pkey is not None) or (password is not None):
+ if password is not None:
+ self._log(DEBUG, 'Attempting password auth...')
+ self.auth_password(username, password)
+ else:
+ self._log(DEBUG, 'Attempting public-key auth...')
+ self.auth_publickey(username, pkey)
+
+ return
+
+ def get_exception(self):
+ """
+ Return any exception that happened during the last server request.
+ This can be used to fetch more specific error information after using
+ calls like L{start_client}. The exception (if any) is cleared after
+ this call.
+
+ @return: an exception, or C{None} if there is no stored exception.
+ @rtype: Exception
+
+ @since: 1.1
+ """
+ self.lock.acquire()
+ try:
+ e = self.saved_exception
+ self.saved_exception = None
+ return e
+ finally:
+ self.lock.release()
+
+ def set_subsystem_handler(self, name, handler, *larg, **kwarg):
+ """
+ Set the handler class for a subsystem in server mode. If a request
+ for this subsystem is made on an open ssh channel later, this handler
+ will be constructed and called -- see L{SubsystemHandler} for more
+ detailed documentation.
+
+ Any extra parameters (including keyword arguments) are saved and
+ passed to the L{SubsystemHandler} constructor later.
+
+ @param name: name of the subsystem.
+ @type name: str
+ @param handler: subclass of L{SubsystemHandler} that handles this
+ subsystem.
+ @type handler: class
+ """
+ try:
+ self.lock.acquire()
+ self.subsystem_table[name] = (handler, larg, kwarg)
+ finally:
+ self.lock.release()
+
+ def is_authenticated(self):
+ """
+ Return true if this session is active and authenticated.
+
+ @return: True if the session is still open and has been authenticated
+ successfully; False if authentication failed and/or the session is
+ closed.
+ @rtype: bool
+ """
+ return self.active and (self.auth_handler is not None) and self.auth_handler.is_authenticated()
+
+ def get_username(self):
+ """
+ Return the username this connection is authenticated for. If the
+ session is not authenticated (or authentication failed), this method
+ returns C{None}.
+
+ @return: username that was authenticated, or C{None}.
+ @rtype: string
+
+ @since: fearow
+ """
+ if not self.active or (self.auth_handler is None):
+ return None
+ return self.auth_handler.get_username()
+
+ def auth_none(self, username):
+ """
+ Try to authenticate to the server using no authentication at all.
+ This will almost always fail. It may be useful for determining the
+ list of authentication types supported by the server, by catching the
+ L{BadAuthenticationType} exception raised.
+
+ @param username: the username to authenticate as
+ @type username: string
+ @return: list of auth types permissible for the next stage of
+ authentication (normally empty)
+ @rtype: list
+
+ @raise BadAuthenticationType: if "none" authentication isn't allowed
+ by the server for this user
+ @raise SSHException: if the authentication failed due to a network
+ error
+
+ @since: 1.5
+ """
+ if (not self.active) or (not self.initial_kex_done):
+ raise SSHException('No existing session')
+ my_event = threading.Event()
+ self.auth_handler = AuthHandler(self)
+ self.auth_handler.auth_none(username, my_event)
+ return self.auth_handler.wait_for_response(my_event)
+
+ def auth_password(self, username, password, event=None, fallback=True):
+ """
+ Authenticate to the server using a password. The username and password
+ are sent over an encrypted link.
+
+ If an C{event} is passed in, this method will return immediately, and
+ the event will be triggered once authentication succeeds or fails. On
+ success, L{is_authenticated} will return C{True}. On failure, you may
+ use L{get_exception} to get more detailed error information.
+
+ Since 1.1, if no event is passed, this method will block until the
+ authentication succeeds or fails. On failure, an exception is raised.
+ Otherwise, the method simply returns.
+
+ Since 1.5, if no event is passed and C{fallback} is C{True} (the
+ default), if the server doesn't support plain password authentication
+ but does support so-called "keyboard-interactive" mode, an attempt
+ will be made to authenticate using this interactive mode. If it fails,
+ the normal exception will be thrown as if the attempt had never been
+ made. This is useful for some recent Gentoo and Debian distributions,
+ which turn off plain password authentication in a misguided belief
+ that interactive authentication is "more secure". (It's not.)
+
+ If the server requires multi-step authentication (which is very rare),
+ this method will return a list of auth types permissible for the next
+ step. Otherwise, in the normal case, an empty list is returned.
+
+ @param username: the username to authenticate as
+ @type username: string
+ @param password: the password to authenticate with
+ @type password: string
+ @param event: an event to trigger when the authentication attempt is
+ complete (whether it was successful or not)
+ @type event: threading.Event
+ @param fallback: C{True} if an attempt at an automated "interactive"
+ password auth should be made if the server doesn't support normal
+ password auth
+ @type fallback: bool
+ @return: list of auth types permissible for the next stage of
+ authentication (normally empty)
+ @rtype: list
+
+ @raise BadAuthenticationType: if password authentication isn't
+ allowed by the server for this user (and no event was passed in)
+ @raise SSHException: if the authentication failed (and no event was
+ passed in)
+ """
+ if (not self.active) or (not self.initial_kex_done):
+ # we should never try to send the password unless we're on a secure link
+ raise SSHException('No existing session')
+ if event is None:
+ my_event = threading.Event()
+ else:
+ my_event = event
+ self.auth_handler = AuthHandler(self)
+ self.auth_handler.auth_password(username, password, my_event)
+ if event is not None:
+ # caller wants to wait for event themselves
+ return []
+ try:
+ return self.auth_handler.wait_for_response(my_event)
+ except BadAuthenticationType, x:
+ # if password auth isn't allowed, but keyboard-interactive *is*, try to fudge it
+ if not fallback or not 'keyboard-interactive' in x.allowed_types:
+ raise
+ try:
+ def handler(title, instructions, fields):
+ if len(fields) > 1:
+ raise SSHException('Fallback authentication failed.')
+ if len(fields) == 0:
+ # for some reason, at least on os x, a 2nd request will
+ # be made with zero fields requested. maybe it's just
+ # to try to fake out automated scripting of the exact
+ # type we're doing here. *shrug* :)
+ return []
+ return [ password ]
+ return self.auth_interactive(username, handler)
+ except SSHException, ignored:
+ # attempt failed; just raise the original exception
+ raise x
+
+ def auth_publickey(self, username, key, event=None):
+ """
+ Authenticate to the server using a private key. The key is used to
+ sign data from the server, so it must include the private part.
+
+ If an C{event} is passed in, this method will return immediately, and
+ the event will be triggered once authentication succeeds or fails. On
+ success, L{is_authenticated} will return C{True}. On failure, you may
+ use L{get_exception} to get more detailed error information.
+
+ Since 1.1, if no event is passed, this method will block until the
+ authentication succeeds or fails. On failure, an exception is raised.
+ Otherwise, the method simply returns.
+
+ If the server requires multi-step authentication (which is very rare),
+ this method will return a list of auth types permissible for the next
+ step. Otherwise, in the normal case, an empty list is returned.
+
+ @param username: the username to authenticate as
+ @type username: string
+ @param key: the private key to authenticate with
+ @type key: L{PKey <pkey.PKey>}
+ @param event: an event to trigger when the authentication attempt is
+ complete (whether it was successful or not)
+ @type event: threading.Event
+ @return: list of auth types permissible for the next stage of
+ authentication (normally empty).
+ @rtype: list
+
+ @raise BadAuthenticationType: if public-key authentication isn't
+ allowed by the server for this user (and no event was passed in).
+ @raise SSHException: if the authentication failed (and no event was
+ passed in).
+ """
+ if (not self.active) or (not self.initial_kex_done):
+ # we should never try to authenticate unless we're on a secure link
+ raise SSHException('No existing session')
+ if event is None:
+ my_event = threading.Event()
+ else:
+ my_event = event
+ self.auth_handler = AuthHandler(self)
+ self.auth_handler.auth_publickey(username, key, my_event)
+ if event is not None:
+ # caller wants to wait for event themselves
+ return []
+ return self.auth_handler.wait_for_response(my_event)
+
+ def auth_interactive(self, username, handler, submethods=''):
+ """
+ Authenticate to the server interactively. A handler is used to answer
+ arbitrary questions from the server. On many servers, this is just a
+ dumb wrapper around PAM.
+
+ This method will block until the authentication succeeds or fails,
+ peroidically calling the handler asynchronously to get answers to
+ authentication questions. The handler may be called more than once
+ if the server continues to ask questions.
+
+ The handler is expected to be a callable that will handle calls of the
+ form: C{handler(title, instructions, prompt_list)}. The C{title} is
+ meant to be a dialog-window title, and the C{instructions} are user
+ instructions (both are strings). C{prompt_list} will be a list of
+ prompts, each prompt being a tuple of C{(str, bool)}. The string is
+ the prompt and the boolean indicates whether the user text should be
+ echoed.
+
+ A sample call would thus be:
+ C{handler('title', 'instructions', [('Password:', False)])}.
+
+ The handler should return a list or tuple of answers to the server's
+ questions.
+
+ If the server requires multi-step authentication (which is very rare),
+ this method will return a list of auth types permissible for the next
+ step. Otherwise, in the normal case, an empty list is returned.
+
+ @param username: the username to authenticate as
+ @type username: string
+ @param handler: a handler for responding to server questions
+ @type handler: callable
+ @param submethods: a string list of desired submethods (optional)
+ @type submethods: str
+ @return: list of auth types permissible for the next stage of
+ authentication (normally empty).
+ @rtype: list
+
+ @raise BadAuthenticationType: if public-key authentication isn't
+ allowed by the server for this user
+ @raise SSHException: if the authentication failed
+
+ @since: 1.5
+ """
+ if (not self.active) or (not self.initial_kex_done):
+ # we should never try to authenticate unless we're on a secure link
+ raise SSHException('No existing session')
+ my_event = threading.Event()
+ self.auth_handler = AuthHandler(self)
+ self.auth_handler.auth_interactive(username, handler, my_event, submethods)
+ return self.auth_handler.wait_for_response(my_event)
+
+ def set_log_channel(self, name):
+ """
+ Set the channel for this transport's logging. The default is
+ C{"paramiko.transport"} but it can be set to anything you want.
+ (See the C{logging} module for more info.) SSH Channels will log
+ to a sub-channel of the one specified.
+
+ @param name: new channel name for logging.
+ @type name: str
+
+ @since: 1.1
+ """
+ self.log_name = name
+ self.logger = util.get_logger(name)
+
+ def get_log_channel(self):
+ """
+ Return the channel name used for this transport's logging.
+
+ @return: channel name.
+ @rtype: str
+
+ @since: 1.2
+ """
+ return self.log_name
+
+ def set_hexdump(self, hexdump):
+ """
+ Turn on/off logging a hex dump of protocol traffic at DEBUG level in
+ the logs. Normally you would want this off (which is the default),
+ but if you are debugging something, it may be useful.
+
+ @param hexdump: C{True} to log protocol traffix (in hex) to the log;
+ C{False} otherwise.
+ @type hexdump: bool
+ """
+ self.packetizer.set_hexdump(hexdump)
+
+ def get_hexdump(self):
+ """
+ Return C{True} if the transport is currently logging hex dumps of
+ protocol traffic.
+
+ @return: C{True} if hex dumps are being logged
+ @rtype: bool
+
+ @since: 1.4
+ """
+ return self.packetizer.get_hexdump()
+
+ def use_compression(self, compress=True):
+ """
+ Turn on/off compression. This will only have an affect before starting
+ the transport (ie before calling L{connect}, etc). By default,
+ compression is off since it negatively affects interactive sessions
+ and is not fully tested.
+
+ @param compress: C{True} to ask the remote client/server to compress
+ traffic; C{False} to refuse compression
+ @type compress: bool
+
+ @since: 1.5.2
+ """
+ if compress:
+ self._preferred_compression = ( 'zlib@openssh.com', 'zlib', 'none' )
+ else:
+ self._preferred_compression = ( 'none', )
+
+ def stop_thread(self):
+ self.active = False
+ self.packetizer.close()
+
+
+ ### internals...
+
+
+ def _log(self, level, msg):
+ if issubclass(type(msg), list):
+ for m in msg:
+ self.logger.log(level, m)
+ else:
+ self.logger.log(level, msg)
+
+ def _get_modulus_pack(self):
+ "used by KexGex to find primes for group exchange"
+ return self._modulus_pack
+
+ def _unlink_channel(self, chanid):
+ "used by a Channel to remove itself from the active channel list"
+ try:
+ self.lock.acquire()
+ if self.channels.has_key(chanid):
+ del self.channels[chanid]
+ finally:
+ self.lock.release()
+
+ def _send_message(self, data):
+ self.packetizer.send_message(data)
+
+ def _send_user_message(self, data):
+ """
+ send a message, but block if we're in key negotiation. this is used
+ for user-initiated requests.
+ """
+ while True:
+ self.clear_to_send.wait(0.1)
+ if not self.active:
+ self._log(DEBUG, 'Dropping user packet because connection is dead.')
+ return
+ self.clear_to_send_lock.acquire()
+ if self.clear_to_send.isSet():
+ break
+ self.clear_to_send_lock.release()
+ try:
+ self._send_message(data)
+ finally:
+ self.clear_to_send_lock.release()
+
+ def _set_K_H(self, k, h):
+ "used by a kex object to set the K (root key) and H (exchange hash)"
+ self.K = k
+ self.H = h
+ if self.session_id == None:
+ self.session_id = h
+
+ def _expect_packet(self, type):
+ "used by a kex object to register the next packet type it expects to see"
+ self.expected_packet = type
+
+ def _verify_key(self, host_key, sig):
+ key = self._key_info[self.host_key_type](Message(host_key))
+ if key is None:
+ raise SSHException('Unknown host key type')
+ if not key.verify_ssh_sig(self.H, Message(sig)):
+ raise SSHException('Signature verification (%s) failed. Boo. Robey should debug this.' % self.host_key_type)
+ self.host_key = key
+
+ def _compute_key(self, id, nbytes):
+ "id is 'A' - 'F' for the various keys used by ssh"
+ m = Message()
+ m.add_mpint(self.K)
+ m.add_bytes(self.H)
+ m.add_byte(id)
+ m.add_bytes(self.session_id)
+ out = sofar = SHA.new(str(m)).digest()
+ while len(out) < nbytes:
+ m = Message()
+ m.add_mpint(self.K)
+ m.add_bytes(self.H)
+ m.add_bytes(sofar)
+ hash = SHA.new(str(m)).digest()
+ out += hash
+ sofar += hash
+ return out[:nbytes]
+
+ def _get_cipher(self, name, key, iv):
+ if not self._cipher_info.has_key(name):
+ raise SSHException('Unknown client cipher ' + name)
+ return self._cipher_info[name]['class'].new(key, self._cipher_info[name]['mode'], iv)
+
+ def run(self):
+ # (use the exposed "run" method, because if we specify a thread target
+ # of a private method, threading.Thread will keep a reference to it
+ # indefinitely, creating a GC cycle and not letting Transport ever be
+ # GC'd. it's a bug in Thread.)
+
+ # active=True occurs before the thread is launched, to avoid a race
+ _active_threads.append(self)
+ if self.server_mode:
+ self._log(DEBUG, 'starting thread (server mode): %s' % hex(long(id(self)) & 0xffffffffL))
+ else:
+ self._log(DEBUG, 'starting thread (client mode): %s' % hex(long(id(self)) & 0xffffffffL))
+ try:
+ self.packetizer.write_all(self.local_version + '\r\n')
+ self._check_banner()
+ self._send_kex_init()
+ self.expected_packet = MSG_KEXINIT
+
+ while self.active:
+ if self.packetizer.need_rekey() and not self.in_kex:
+ self._send_kex_init()
+ try:
+ ptype, m = self.packetizer.read_message()
+ except NeedRekeyException:
+ continue
+ if ptype == MSG_IGNORE:
+ continue
+ elif ptype == MSG_DISCONNECT:
+ self._parse_disconnect(m)
+ self.active = False
+ self.packetizer.close()
+ break
+ elif ptype == MSG_DEBUG:
+ self._parse_debug(m)
+ continue
+ if self.expected_packet != 0:
+ if ptype != self.expected_packet:
+ raise SSHException('Expecting packet %d, got %d' % (self.expected_packet, ptype))
+ self.expected_packet = 0
+ if (ptype >= 30) and (ptype <= 39):
+ self.kex_engine.parse_next(ptype, m)
+ continue
+
+ if self._handler_table.has_key(ptype):
+ self._handler_table[ptype](self, m)
+ elif self._channel_handler_table.has_key(ptype):
+ chanid = m.get_int()
+ if self.channels.has_key(chanid):
+ self._channel_handler_table[ptype](self.channels[chanid], m)
+ elif self.channels_seen.has_key(chanid):
+ self._log(DEBUG, 'Ignoring message for dead channel %d' % chanid)
+ else:
+ self._log(ERROR, 'Channel request for unknown channel %d' % chanid)
+ self.active = False
+ self.packetizer.close()
+ elif (self.auth_handler is not None) and self.auth_handler._handler_table.has_key(ptype):
+ self.auth_handler._handler_table[ptype](self.auth_handler, m)
+ else:
+ self._log(WARNING, 'Oops, unhandled type %d' % ptype)
+ msg = Message()
+ msg.add_byte(chr(MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED))
+ msg.add_int(m.seqno)
+ self._send_message(msg)
+ except SSHException, e:
+ self._log(ERROR, 'Exception: ' + str(e))
+ self._log(ERROR, util.tb_strings())
+ self.saved_exception = e
+ except EOFError, e:
+ self._log(DEBUG, 'EOF in transport thread')
+ #self._log(DEBUG, util.tb_strings())
+ self.saved_exception = e
+ except socket.error, e:
+ if type(e.args) is tuple:
+ emsg = '%s (%d)' % (e.args[1], e.args[0])
+ else:
+ emsg = e.args
+ self._log(ERROR, 'Socket exception: ' + emsg)
+ self.saved_exception = e
+ except Exception, e:
+ self._log(ERROR, 'Unknown exception: ' + str(e))
+ self._log(ERROR, util.tb_strings())
+ self.saved_exception = e
+ _active_threads.remove(self)
+ for chan in self.channels.values():
+ chan._unlink()
+ if self.active:
+ self.active = False
+ self.packetizer.close()
+ if self.completion_event != None:
+ self.completion_event.set()
+ if self.auth_handler is not None:
+ self.auth_handler.abort()
+ for event in self.channel_events.values():
+ event.set()
+ self.sock.close()
+
+
+ ### protocol stages
+
+
+ def _negotiate_keys(self, m):
+ # throws SSHException on anything unusual
+ self.clear_to_send_lock.acquire()
+ try:
+ self.clear_to_send.clear()
+ finally:
+ self.clear_to_send_lock.release()
+ if self.local_kex_init == None:
+ # remote side wants to renegotiate
+ self._send_kex_init()
+ self._parse_kex_init(m)
+ self.kex_engine.start_kex()
+
+ def _check_banner(self):
+ # this is slow, but we only have to do it once
+ for i in range(5):
+ # give them 5 seconds for the first line, then just 2 seconds each additional line
+ if i == 0:
+ timeout = 5
+ else:
+ timeout = 2
+ try:
+ buffer = self.packetizer.readline(timeout)
+ except Exception, x:
+ raise SSHException('Error reading SSH protocol banner' + str(x))
+ if buffer[:4] == 'SSH-':
+ break
+ self._log(DEBUG, 'Banner: ' + buffer)
+ if buffer[:4] != 'SSH-':
+ raise SSHException('Indecipherable protocol version "' + buffer + '"')
+ # save this server version string for later
+ self.remote_version = buffer
+ # pull off any attached comment
+ comment = ''
+ i = string.find(buffer, ' ')
+ if i >= 0:
+ comment = buffer[i+1:]
+ buffer = buffer[:i]
+ # parse out version string and make sure it matches
+ segs = buffer.split('-', 2)
+ if len(segs) < 3:
+ raise SSHException('Invalid SSH banner')
+ version = segs[1]
+ client = segs[2]
+ if version != '1.99' and version != '2.0':
+ raise SSHException('Incompatible version (%s instead of 2.0)' % (version,))
+ self._log(INFO, 'Connected (version %s, client %s)' % (version, client))
+
+ def _send_kex_init(self):
+ """
+ announce to the other side that we'd like to negotiate keys, and what
+ kind of key negotiation we support.
+ """
+ self.clear_to_send_lock.acquire()
+ try:
+ self.clear_to_send.clear()
+ finally:
+ self.clear_to_send_lock.release()
+ self.in_kex = True
+ if self.server_mode:
+ if (self._modulus_pack is None) and ('diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1' in self._preferred_kex):
+ # can't do group-exchange if we don't have a pack of potential primes
+ pkex = list(self.get_security_options().kex)
+ pkex.remove('diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1')
+ self.get_security_options().kex = pkex
+ available_server_keys = filter(self.server_key_dict.keys().__contains__,
+ self._preferred_keys)
+ else:
+ available_server_keys = self._preferred_keys
+
+ randpool.stir()
+ m = Message()
+ m.add_byte(chr(MSG_KEXINIT))
+ m.add_bytes(randpool.get_bytes(16))
+ m.add_list(self._preferred_kex)
+ m.add_list(available_server_keys)
+ m.add_list(self._preferred_ciphers)
+ m.add_list(self._preferred_ciphers)
+ m.add_list(self._preferred_macs)
+ m.add_list(self._preferred_macs)
+ m.add_list(self._preferred_compression)
+ m.add_list(self._preferred_compression)
+ m.add_string('')
+ m.add_string('')
+ m.add_boolean(False)
+ m.add_int(0)
+ # save a copy for later (needed to compute a hash)
+ self.local_kex_init = str(m)
+ self._send_message(m)
+
+ def _parse_kex_init(self, m):
+ cookie = m.get_bytes(16)
+ kex_algo_list = m.get_list()
+ server_key_algo_list = m.get_list()
+ client_encrypt_algo_list = m.get_list()
+ server_encrypt_algo_list = m.get_list()
+ client_mac_algo_list = m.get_list()
+ server_mac_algo_list = m.get_list()
+ client_compress_algo_list = m.get_list()
+ server_compress_algo_list = m.get_list()
+ client_lang_list = m.get_list()
+ server_lang_list = m.get_list()
+ kex_follows = m.get_boolean()
+ unused = m.get_int()
+
+ self._log(DEBUG, 'kex algos:' + str(kex_algo_list) + ' server key:' + str(server_key_algo_list) + \
+ ' client encrypt:' + str(client_encrypt_algo_list) + \
+ ' server encrypt:' + str(server_encrypt_algo_list) + \
+ ' client mac:' + str(client_mac_algo_list) + \
+ ' server mac:' + str(server_mac_algo_list) + \
+ ' client compress:' + str(client_compress_algo_list) + \
+ ' server compress:' + str(server_compress_algo_list) + \
+ ' client lang:' + str(client_lang_list) + \
+ ' server lang:' + str(server_lang_list) + \
+ ' kex follows?' + str(kex_follows))
+
+ # as a server, we pick the first item in the client's list that we support.
+ # as a client, we pick the first item in our list that the server supports.
+ if self.server_mode:
+ agreed_kex = filter(self._preferred_kex.__contains__, kex_algo_list)
+ else:
+ agreed_kex = filter(kex_algo_list.__contains__, self._preferred_kex)
+ if len(agreed_kex) == 0:
+ raise SSHException('Incompatible ssh peer (no acceptable kex algorithm)')
+ self.kex_engine = self._kex_info[agreed_kex[0]](self)
+
+ if self.server_mode:
+ available_server_keys = filter(self.server_key_dict.keys().__contains__,
+ self._preferred_keys)
+ agreed_keys = filter(available_server_keys.__contains__, server_key_algo_list)
+ else:
+ agreed_keys = filter(server_key_algo_list.__contains__, self._preferred_keys)
+ if len(agreed_keys) == 0:
+ raise SSHException('Incompatible ssh peer (no acceptable host key)')
+ self.host_key_type = agreed_keys[0]
+ if self.server_mode and (self.get_server_key() is None):
+ raise SSHException('Incompatible ssh peer (can\'t match requested host key type)')
+
+ if self.server_mode:
+ agreed_local_ciphers = filter(self._preferred_ciphers.__contains__,
+ server_encrypt_algo_list)
+ agreed_remote_ciphers = filter(self._preferred_ciphers.__contains__,
+ client_encrypt_algo_list)
+ else:
+ agreed_local_ciphers = filter(client_encrypt_algo_list.__contains__,
+ self._preferred_ciphers)
+ agreed_remote_ciphers = filter(server_encrypt_algo_list.__contains__,
+ self._preferred_ciphers)
+ if (len(agreed_local_ciphers) == 0) or (len(agreed_remote_ciphers) == 0):
+ raise SSHException('Incompatible ssh server (no acceptable ciphers)')
+ self.local_cipher = agreed_local_ciphers[0]
+ self.remote_cipher = agreed_remote_ciphers[0]
+ self._log(DEBUG, 'Ciphers agreed: local=%s, remote=%s' % (self.local_cipher, self.remote_cipher))
+
+ if self.server_mode:
+ agreed_remote_macs = filter(self._preferred_macs.__contains__, client_mac_algo_list)
+ agreed_local_macs = filter(self._preferred_macs.__contains__, server_mac_algo_list)
+ else:
+ agreed_local_macs = filter(client_mac_algo_list.__contains__, self._preferred_macs)
+ agreed_remote_macs = filter(server_mac_algo_list.__contains__, self._preferred_macs)
+ if (len(agreed_local_macs) == 0) or (len(agreed_remote_macs) == 0):
+ raise SSHException('Incompatible ssh server (no acceptable macs)')
+ self.local_mac = agreed_local_macs[0]
+ self.remote_mac = agreed_remote_macs[0]
+
+ if self.server_mode:
+ agreed_remote_compression = filter(self._preferred_compression.__contains__, client_compress_algo_list)
+ agreed_local_compression = filter(self._preferred_compression.__contains__, server_compress_algo_list)
+ else:
+ agreed_local_compression = filter(client_compress_algo_list.__contains__, self._preferred_compression)
+ agreed_remote_compression = filter(server_compress_algo_list.__contains__, self._preferred_compression)
+ if (len(agreed_local_compression) == 0) or (len(agreed_remote_compression) == 0):
+ raise SSHException('Incompatible ssh server (no acceptable compression) %r %r %r' % (agreed_local_compression, agreed_remote_compression, self._preferred_compression))
+ self.local_compression = agreed_local_compression[0]
+ self.remote_compression = agreed_remote_compression[0]
+
+ self._log(DEBUG, 'using kex %s; server key type %s; cipher: local %s, remote %s; mac: local %s, remote %s; compression: local %s, remote %s' %
+ (agreed_kex[0], self.host_key_type, self.local_cipher, self.remote_cipher, self.local_mac,
+ self.remote_mac, self.local_compression, self.remote_compression))
+
+ # save for computing hash later...
+ # now wait! openssh has a bug (and others might too) where there are
+ # actually some extra bytes (one NUL byte in openssh's case) added to
+ # the end of the packet but not parsed. turns out we need to throw
+ # away those bytes because they aren't part of the hash.
+ self.remote_kex_init = chr(MSG_KEXINIT) + m.get_so_far()
+
+ def _activate_inbound(self):
+ "switch on newly negotiated encryption parameters for inbound traffic"
+ block_size = self._cipher_info[self.remote_cipher]['block-size']
+ if self.server_mode:
+ IV_in = self._compute_key('A', block_size)
+ key_in = self._compute_key('C', self._cipher_info[self.remote_cipher]['key-size'])
+ else:
+ IV_in = self._compute_key('B', block_size)
+ key_in = self._compute_key('D', self._cipher_info[self.remote_cipher]['key-size'])
+ engine = self._get_cipher(self.remote_cipher, key_in, IV_in)
+ mac_size = self._mac_info[self.remote_mac]['size']
+ mac_engine = self._mac_info[self.remote_mac]['class']
+ # initial mac keys are done in the hash's natural size (not the potentially truncated
+ # transmission size)
+ if self.server_mode:
+ mac_key = self._compute_key('E', mac_engine.digest_size)
+ else:
+ mac_key = self._compute_key('F', mac_engine.digest_size)
+ self.packetizer.set_inbound_cipher(engine, block_size, mac_engine, mac_size, mac_key)
+ compress_in = self._compression_info[self.remote_compression][1]
+ if (compress_in is not None) and ((self.remote_compression != 'zlib@openssh.com') or self.authenticated):
+ self._log(DEBUG, 'Switching on inbound compression ...')
+ self.packetizer.set_inbound_compressor(compress_in())
+
+ def _activate_outbound(self):
+ "switch on newly negotiated encryption parameters for outbound traffic"
+ m = Message()
+ m.add_byte(chr(MSG_NEWKEYS))
+ self._send_message(m)
+ block_size = self._cipher_info[self.local_cipher]['block-size']
+ if self.server_mode:
+ IV_out = self._compute_key('B', block_size)
+ key_out = self._compute_key('D', self._cipher_info[self.local_cipher]['key-size'])
+ else:
+ IV_out = self._compute_key('A', block_size)
+ key_out = self._compute_key('C', self._cipher_info[self.local_cipher]['key-size'])
+ engine = self._get_cipher(self.local_cipher, key_out, IV_out)
+ mac_size = self._mac_info[self.local_mac]['size']
+ mac_engine = self._mac_info[self.local_mac]['class']
+ # initial mac keys are done in the hash's natural size (not the potentially truncated
+ # transmission size)
+ if self.server_mode:
+ mac_key = self._compute_key('F', mac_engine.digest_size)
+ else:
+ mac_key = self._compute_key('E', mac_engine.digest_size)
+ self.packetizer.set_outbound_cipher(engine, block_size, mac_engine, mac_size, mac_key)
+ compress_out = self._compression_info[self.local_compression][0]
+ if (compress_out is not None) and ((self.local_compression != 'zlib@openssh.com') or self.authenticated):
+ self._log(DEBUG, 'Switching on outbound compression ...')
+ self.packetizer.set_outbound_compressor(compress_out())
+ if not self.packetizer.need_rekey():
+ self.in_kex = False
+ # we always expect to receive NEWKEYS now
+ self.expected_packet = MSG_NEWKEYS
+
+ def _auth_trigger(self):
+ self.authenticated = True
+ # delayed initiation of compression
+ if self.local_compression == 'zlib@openssh.com':
+ compress_out = self._compression_info[self.local_compression][0]
+ self._log(DEBUG, 'Switching on outbound compression ...')
+ self.packetizer.set_outbound_compressor(compress_out())
+ if self.remote_compression == 'zlib@openssh.com':
+ compress_in = self._compression_info[self.remote_compression][1]
+ self._log(DEBUG, 'Switching on inbound compression ...')
+ self.packetizer.set_inbound_compressor(compress_in())
+
+ def _parse_newkeys(self, m):
+ self._log(DEBUG, 'Switch to new keys ...')
+ self._activate_inbound()
+ # can also free a bunch of stuff here
+ self.local_kex_init = self.remote_kex_init = None
+ self.K = None
+ self.kex_engine = None
+ if self.server_mode and (self.auth_handler is None):
+ # create auth handler for server mode
+ self.auth_handler = AuthHandler(self)
+ if not self.initial_kex_done:
+ # this was the first key exchange
+ self.initial_kex_done = True
+ # send an event?
+ if self.completion_event != None:
+ self.completion_event.set()
+ # it's now okay to send data again (if this was a re-key)
+ if not self.packetizer.need_rekey():
+ self.in_kex = False
+ self.clear_to_send_lock.acquire()
+ try:
+ self.clear_to_send.set()
+ finally:
+ self.clear_to_send_lock.release()
+ return
+
+ def _parse_disconnect(self, m):
+ code = m.get_int()
+ desc = m.get_string()
+ self._log(INFO, 'Disconnect (code %d): %s' % (code, desc))
+
+ def _parse_global_request(self, m):
+ kind = m.get_string()
+ self._log(DEBUG, 'Received global request "%s"' % kind)
+ want_reply = m.get_boolean()
+ ok = self.server_object.check_global_request(kind, m)
+ extra = ()
+ if type(ok) is tuple:
+ extra = ok
+ ok = True
+ if want_reply:
+ msg = Message()
+ if ok:
+ msg.add_byte(chr(MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS))
+ msg.add(*extra)
+ else:
+ msg.add_byte(chr(MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE))
+ self._send_message(msg)
+
+ def _parse_request_success(self, m):
+ self._log(DEBUG, 'Global request successful.')
+ self.global_response = m
+ if self.completion_event is not None:
+ self.completion_event.set()
+
+ def _parse_request_failure(self, m):
+ self._log(DEBUG, 'Global request denied.')
+ self.global_response = None
+ if self.completion_event is not None:
+ self.completion_event.set()
+
+ def _parse_channel_open_success(self, m):
+ chanid = m.get_int()
+ server_chanid = m.get_int()
+ server_window_size = m.get_int()
+ server_max_packet_size = m.get_int()
+ if not self.channels.has_key(chanid):
+ self._log(WARNING, 'Success for unrequested channel! [??]')
+ return
+ self.lock.acquire()
+ try:
+ chan = self.channels[chanid]
+ chan._set_remote_channel(server_chanid, server_window_size, server_max_packet_size)
+ self._log(INFO, 'Secsh channel %d opened.' % chanid)
+ if self.channel_events.has_key(chanid):
+ self.channel_events[chanid].set()
+ del self.channel_events[chanid]
+ finally:
+ self.lock.release()
+ return
+
+ def _parse_channel_open_failure(self, m):
+ chanid = m.get_int()
+ reason = m.get_int()
+ reason_str = m.get_string()
+ lang = m.get_string()
+ if CONNECTION_FAILED_CODE.has_key(reason):
+ reason_text = CONNECTION_FAILED_CODE[reason]
+ else:
+ reason_text = '(unknown code)'
+ self._log(INFO, 'Secsh channel %d open FAILED: %s: %s' % (chanid, reason_str, reason_text))
+ try:
+ self.lock.aquire()
+ if self.channels.has_key(chanid):
+ del self.channels[chanid]
+ if self.channel_events.has_key(chanid):
+ self.channel_events[chanid].set()
+ del self.channel_events[chanid]
+ finally:
+ self.lock.release()
+ return
+
+ def _parse_channel_open(self, m):
+ kind = m.get_string()
+ chanid = m.get_int()
+ initial_window_size = m.get_int()
+ max_packet_size = m.get_int()
+ reject = False
+ if not self.server_mode:
+ self._log(DEBUG, 'Rejecting "%s" channel request from server.' % kind)
+ reject = True
+ reason = OPEN_FAILED_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED
+ else:
+ self.lock.acquire()
+ try:
+ my_chanid = self.channel_counter
+ while self.channels.has_key(my_chanid):
+ self.channel_counter = (self.channel_counter + 1) & 0xffffff
+ my_chanid = self.channel_counter
+ self.channel_counter = (self.channel_counter + 1) & 0xffffff
+ finally:
+ self.lock.release()
+ reason = self.server_object.check_channel_request(kind, my_chanid)
+ if reason != OPEN_SUCCEEDED:
+ self._log(DEBUG, 'Rejecting "%s" channel request from client.' % kind)
+ reject = True
+ if reject:
+ msg = Message()
+ msg.add_byte(chr(MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE))
+ msg.add_int(chanid)
+ msg.add_int(reason)
+ msg.add_string('')
+ msg.add_string('en')
+ self._send_message(msg)
+ return
+ chan = Channel(my_chanid)
+ try:
+ self.lock.acquire()
+ self.channels[my_chanid] = chan
+ self.channels_seen[my_chanid] = True
+ chan._set_transport(self)
+ chan._set_window(self.window_size, self.max_packet_size)
+ chan._set_remote_channel(chanid, initial_window_size, max_packet_size)
+ finally:
+ self.lock.release()
+ m = Message()
+ m.add_byte(chr(MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_SUCCESS))
+ m.add_int(chanid)
+ m.add_int(my_chanid)
+ m.add_int(self.window_size)
+ m.add_int(self.max_packet_size)
+ self._send_message(m)
+ self._log(INFO, 'Secsh channel %d opened.' % my_chanid)
+ try:
+ self.lock.acquire()
+ self.server_accepts.append(chan)
+ self.server_accept_cv.notify()
+ finally:
+ self.lock.release()
+
+ def _parse_debug(self, m):
+ always_display = m.get_boolean()
+ msg = m.get_string()
+ lang = m.get_string()
+ self._log(DEBUG, 'Debug msg: ' + util.safe_string(msg))
+
+ def _get_subsystem_handler(self, name):
+ try:
+ self.lock.acquire()
+ if not self.subsystem_table.has_key(name):
+ return (None, [], {})
+ return self.subsystem_table[name]
+ finally:
+ self.lock.release()
+
+ _handler_table = {
+ MSG_NEWKEYS: _parse_newkeys,
+ MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST: _parse_global_request,
+ MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS: _parse_request_success,
+ MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE: _parse_request_failure,
+ MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_SUCCESS: _parse_channel_open_success,
+ MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE: _parse_channel_open_failure,
+ MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN: _parse_channel_open,
+ MSG_KEXINIT: _negotiate_keys,
+ }
+
+ _channel_handler_table = {
+ MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS: Channel._request_success,
+ MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE: Channel._request_failed,
+ MSG_CHANNEL_DATA: Channel._feed,
+ MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA: Channel._feed_extended,
+ MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST: Channel._window_adjust,
+ MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST: Channel._handle_request,
+ MSG_CHANNEL_EOF: Channel._handle_eof,
+ MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE: Channel._handle_close,
+ }