From 3575f939d8c836ac7d2b28f334bab6747cec5ec4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joey Hess Date: Wed, 13 May 2015 14:22:08 -0400 Subject: update --- doc/todo/emailauth.mdwn | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'doc/todo') diff --git a/doc/todo/emailauth.mdwn b/doc/todo/emailauth.mdwn index bd9428756..05b7f1177 100644 --- a/doc/todo/emailauth.mdwn +++ b/doc/todo/emailauth.mdwn @@ -31,13 +31,14 @@ A few points to make this more secure: Still, this could be attacked: * If an attacker can access a user's inbox, they can generate a new login - link, and log in as them. + link, and log in as them. They are probably busy draining their bank + account by this method and not logging into some wiki though. * If TLS is not used for the email transport, a MITM can snoop login links - and use them. + and use them. Again probably more lucrative ways to exploit such a MITM. * If https is not used for the login link, a MITM can intercept and proxy web traffic and either steal a copy of the cookie, or use the login link themselves without letting the user log in. This attack seems no - worse then using password authentication w/o https, and the solution is + worse than using password authentication w/o https, and the solution is of course https. * If an attacker wants to DOS a wiki, they can try to get its domain, IP, whatever blacklisted as a spam source. -- cgit v1.2.3