From 9fb00f383dd7df97adf8bc603eeaa7be4e901bbd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mark H Weaver Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 18:18:40 -0400 Subject: gnu: wpa-supplicant: Fix WPS and P2P NFC NDEF record payload length validation. * gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-5-fix.patch: New file. * gnu-system.am (dist_patch_DATA): Add it. * gnu/packages/admin.scm (wpa-supplicant-light)[source]: Add patch. --- gnu/packages/admin.scm | 3 +- .../patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-5-fix.patch | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-5-fix.patch (limited to 'gnu/packages') diff --git a/gnu/packages/admin.scm b/gnu/packages/admin.scm index 58f9ce507d..c96e11635b 100644 --- a/gnu/packages/admin.scm +++ b/gnu/packages/admin.scm @@ -705,7 +705,8 @@ commands and their arguments.") "wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt2.patch" "wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt3.patch" "wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt4.patch" - "wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt5.patch"))))) + "wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt5.patch" + "wpa-supplicant-2015-5-fix.patch"))))) (build-system gnu-build-system) (arguments '(#:phases (alist-replace diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-5-fix.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-5-fix.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..496c68ff8e --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-5-fix.patch @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +Original patch copied from http://w1.fi/security/2015-5/ +and then backported to wpa-supplicant-2.4. + +From df9079e72760ceb7ebe7fb11538200c516bdd886 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 21:57:28 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] NFC: Fix payload length validation in NDEF record parser + +It was possible for the 32-bit record->total_length value to end up +wrapping around due to integer overflow if the longer form of payload +length field is used and record->payload_length gets a value close to +2^32. This could result in ndef_parse_record() accepting a too large +payload length value and the record type filter reading up to about 20 +bytes beyond the end of the buffer and potentially killing the process. +This could also result in an attempt to allocate close to 2^32 bytes of +heap memory and if that were to succeed, a buffer read overflow of the +same length which would most likely result in the process termination. +In case of record->total_length ending up getting the value 0, there +would be no buffer read overflow, but record parsing would result in an +infinite loop in ndef_parse_records(). + +Any of these error cases could potentially be used for denial of service +attacks over NFC by using a malformed NDEF record on an NFC Tag or +sending them during NFC connection handover if the application providing +the NDEF message to hostapd/wpa_supplicant did no validation of the +received records. While such validation is likely done in the NFC stack +that needs to parse the NFC messages before further processing, +hostapd/wpa_supplicant better be prepared for any data being included +here. + +Fix this by validating record->payload_length value in a way that +detects integer overflow. (CID 122668) + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + src/wps/ndef.c | 5 ++++- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/wps/ndef.c b/src/wps/ndef.c +index 5604b0a..50d018f 100644 +--- a/src/wps/ndef.c ++++ b/src/wps/ndef.c +@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@ static int ndef_parse_record(const u8 *data, u32 size, + if (size < 6) + return -1; + record->payload_length = ntohl(*(u32 *)pos); ++ if (record->payload_length > size - 6) ++ return -1; + pos += sizeof(u32); + } + +@@ -68,7 +70,8 @@ static int ndef_parse_record(const u8 *data, u32 size, + pos += record->payload_length; + + record->total_length = pos - data; +- if (record->total_length > size) ++ if (record->total_length > size || ++ record->total_length < record->payload_length) + return -1; + return 0; + } +-- +1.9.1 + -- cgit v1.2.3