From b158f1d751b17acc1700fce9777d2b85ffa8e914 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Ludovic=20Court=C3=A8s?= Date: Sun, 12 Apr 2015 15:33:42 +0200 Subject: system: Allow users to PTRACE_ATTACH to their own processes. * gnu/build/activation.scm (activate-ptrace-attach): New procedure. * gnu/system.scm (operating-system-activation-script): Use it. --- gnu/build/activation.scm | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+) (limited to 'gnu/build/activation.scm') diff --git a/gnu/build/activation.scm b/gnu/build/activation.scm index 64c3410baf..0c60355a1c 100644 --- a/gnu/build/activation.scm +++ b/gnu/build/activation.scm @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ activate-/bin/sh activate-modprobe activate-firmware + activate-ptrace-attach activate-current-system)) ;;; Commentary: @@ -335,6 +336,18 @@ by itself, without having to resort to a \"user helper\"." (lambda (port) (display directory port)))) +(define (activate-ptrace-attach) + "Allow users to PTRACE_ATTACH their own processes. + +This works around a regression introduced in the default \"security\" policy +found in Linux 3.4 onward that prevents users from attaching to their own +processes--see Yama.txt in the Linux source tree for the rationale. This +sounds like an unacceptable restriction for little or no security +improvement." + (call-with-output-file "/proc/sys/kernel/yama/ptrace_scope" + (lambda (port) + (display 0 port)))) + (define %current-system ;; The system that is current (a symlink.) This is not necessarily the same -- cgit v1.2.3