diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/local.mk | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/dropbear-CVE-2018-15599.patch | 240 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/ssh.scm | 21 |
3 files changed, 10 insertions, 252 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/local.mk b/gnu/local.mk index d85679b2a8..594755f693 100644 --- a/gnu/local.mk +++ b/gnu/local.mk @@ -728,7 +728,6 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \ %D%/packages/patches/docker-fix-tests.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/dovecot-trees-support-dovecot-2.3.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/doxygen-test.patch \ - %D%/packages/patches/dropbear-CVE-2018-15599.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/dvd+rw-tools-add-include.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/efl-mesa-compat.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/elfutils-tests-ptrace.patch \ diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/dropbear-CVE-2018-15599.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/dropbear-CVE-2018-15599.patch deleted file mode 100644 index a474552cd2..0000000000 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/dropbear-CVE-2018-15599.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,240 +0,0 @@ -Fix CVE-2018-15599: - -http://lists.ucc.gu.uwa.edu.au/pipermail/dropbear/2018q3/002108.html -https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-15599 - -Patch copied from upstream source repository: - -https://github.com/mkj/dropbear/commit/52adbb34c32d3e2e1bcdb941e20a6f81138b8248 - -From 52adbb34c32d3e2e1bcdb941e20a6f81138b8248 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au> -Date: Thu, 23 Aug 2018 23:43:12 +0800 -Subject: [PATCH] Wait to fail invalid usernames - ---- - auth.h | 6 +++--- - svr-auth.c | 19 +++++-------------- - svr-authpam.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++---- - svr-authpasswd.c | 27 ++++++++++++++------------- - svr-authpubkey.c | 11 ++++++++++- - 5 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h -index da498f5b..98f54683 100644 ---- a/auth.h -+++ b/auth.h -@@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ void recv_msg_userauth_request(void); - void send_msg_userauth_failure(int partial, int incrfail); - void send_msg_userauth_success(void); - void send_msg_userauth_banner(const buffer *msg); --void svr_auth_password(void); --void svr_auth_pubkey(void); --void svr_auth_pam(void); -+void svr_auth_password(int valid_user); -+void svr_auth_pubkey(int valid_user); -+void svr_auth_pam(int valid_user); - - #if DROPBEAR_SVR_PUBKEY_OPTIONS_BUILT - int svr_pubkey_allows_agentfwd(void); -diff --git a/svr-auth.c b/svr-auth.c -index c19c0901..edde86bc 100644 ---- a/svr-auth.c -+++ b/svr-auth.c -@@ -149,10 +149,8 @@ void recv_msg_userauth_request() { - if (methodlen == AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD_LEN && - strncmp(methodname, AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD, - AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD_LEN) == 0) { -- if (valid_user) { -- svr_auth_password(); -- goto out; -- } -+ svr_auth_password(valid_user); -+ goto out; - } - } - #endif -@@ -164,10 +162,8 @@ void recv_msg_userauth_request() { - if (methodlen == AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD_LEN && - strncmp(methodname, AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD, - AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD_LEN) == 0) { -- if (valid_user) { -- svr_auth_pam(); -- goto out; -- } -+ svr_auth_pam(valid_user); -+ goto out; - } - } - #endif -@@ -177,12 +173,7 @@ void recv_msg_userauth_request() { - if (methodlen == AUTH_METHOD_PUBKEY_LEN && - strncmp(methodname, AUTH_METHOD_PUBKEY, - AUTH_METHOD_PUBKEY_LEN) == 0) { -- if (valid_user) { -- svr_auth_pubkey(); -- } else { -- /* pubkey has no failure delay */ -- send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 0); -- } -+ svr_auth_pubkey(valid_user); - goto out; - } - #endif -diff --git a/svr-authpam.c b/svr-authpam.c -index 05e4f3e5..d201bc96 100644 ---- a/svr-authpam.c -+++ b/svr-authpam.c -@@ -178,13 +178,14 @@ pamConvFunc(int num_msg, - * Keyboard interactive would be a lot nicer, but since PAM is synchronous, it - * gets very messy trying to send the interactive challenges, and read the - * interactive responses, over the network. */ --void svr_auth_pam() { -+void svr_auth_pam(int valid_user) { - - struct UserDataS userData = {NULL, NULL}; - struct pam_conv pamConv = { - pamConvFunc, - &userData /* submitted to pamvConvFunc as appdata_ptr */ - }; -+ const char* printable_user = NULL; - - pam_handle_t* pamHandlep = NULL; - -@@ -204,12 +205,23 @@ void svr_auth_pam() { - - password = buf_getstring(ses.payload, &passwordlen); - -+ /* We run the PAM conversation regardless of whether the username is valid -+ in case the conversation function has an inherent delay. -+ Use ses.authstate.username rather than ses.authstate.pw_name. -+ After PAM succeeds we then check the valid_user flag too */ -+ - /* used to pass data to the PAM conversation function - don't bother with - * strdup() etc since these are touched only by our own conversation - * function (above) which takes care of it */ -- userData.user = ses.authstate.pw_name; -+ userData.user = ses.authstate.username; - userData.passwd = password; - -+ if (ses.authstate.pw_name) { -+ printable_user = ses.authstate.pw_name; -+ } else { -+ printable_user = "<invalid username>"; -+ } -+ - /* Init pam */ - if ((rc = pam_start("sshd", NULL, &pamConv, &pamHandlep)) != PAM_SUCCESS) { - dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING, "pam_start() failed, rc=%d, %s", -@@ -242,7 +254,7 @@ void svr_auth_pam() { - rc, pam_strerror(pamHandlep, rc)); - dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING, - "Bad PAM password attempt for '%s' from %s", -- ses.authstate.pw_name, -+ printable_user, - svr_ses.addrstring); - send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 1); - goto cleanup; -@@ -253,12 +265,18 @@ void svr_auth_pam() { - rc, pam_strerror(pamHandlep, rc)); - dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING, - "Bad PAM password attempt for '%s' from %s", -- ses.authstate.pw_name, -+ printable_user, - svr_ses.addrstring); - send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 1); - goto cleanup; - } - -+ if (!valid_user) { -+ /* PAM auth succeeded but the username isn't allowed in for another reason -+ (checkusername() failed) */ -+ send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 1); -+ } -+ - /* successful authentication */ - dropbear_log(LOG_NOTICE, "PAM password auth succeeded for '%s' from %s", - ses.authstate.pw_name, -diff --git a/svr-authpasswd.c b/svr-authpasswd.c -index bdee2aa1..69c7d8af 100644 ---- a/svr-authpasswd.c -+++ b/svr-authpasswd.c -@@ -48,22 +48,14 @@ static int constant_time_strcmp(const char* a, const char* b) { - - /* Process a password auth request, sending success or failure messages as - * appropriate */ --void svr_auth_password() { -+void svr_auth_password(int valid_user) { - - char * passwdcrypt = NULL; /* the crypt from /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow */ - char * testcrypt = NULL; /* crypt generated from the user's password sent */ -- char * password; -+ char * password = NULL; - unsigned int passwordlen; -- - unsigned int changepw; - -- passwdcrypt = ses.authstate.pw_passwd; -- --#ifdef DEBUG_HACKCRYPT -- /* debugging crypt for non-root testing with shadows */ -- passwdcrypt = DEBUG_HACKCRYPT; --#endif -- - /* check if client wants to change password */ - changepw = buf_getbool(ses.payload); - if (changepw) { -@@ -73,12 +65,21 @@ void svr_auth_password() { - } - - password = buf_getstring(ses.payload, &passwordlen); -- -- /* the first bytes of passwdcrypt are the salt */ -- testcrypt = crypt(password, passwdcrypt); -+ if (valid_user) { -+ /* the first bytes of passwdcrypt are the salt */ -+ passwdcrypt = ses.authstate.pw_passwd; -+ testcrypt = crypt(password, passwdcrypt); -+ } - m_burn(password, passwordlen); - m_free(password); - -+ /* After we have got the payload contents we can exit if the username -+ is invalid. Invalid users have already been logged. */ -+ if (!valid_user) { -+ send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 1); -+ return; -+ } -+ - if (testcrypt == NULL) { - /* crypt() with an invalid salt like "!!" */ - dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING, "User account '%s' is locked", -diff --git a/svr-authpubkey.c b/svr-authpubkey.c -index aa6087c9..ff481c87 100644 ---- a/svr-authpubkey.c -+++ b/svr-authpubkey.c -@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static int checkfileperm(char * filename); - - /* process a pubkey auth request, sending success or failure message as - * appropriate */ --void svr_auth_pubkey() { -+void svr_auth_pubkey(int valid_user) { - - unsigned char testkey; /* whether we're just checking if a key is usable */ - char* algo = NULL; /* pubkey algo */ -@@ -102,6 +102,15 @@ void svr_auth_pubkey() { - keybloblen = buf_getint(ses.payload); - keyblob = buf_getptr(ses.payload, keybloblen); - -+ if (!valid_user) { -+ /* Return failure once we have read the contents of the packet -+ required to validate a public key. -+ Avoids blind user enumeration though it isn't possible to prevent -+ testing for user existence if the public key is known */ -+ send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 0); -+ goto out; -+ } -+ - /* check if the key is valid */ - if (checkpubkey(algo, algolen, keyblob, keybloblen) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) { - send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 0); diff --git a/gnu/packages/ssh.scm b/gnu/packages/ssh.scm index f5e069ff05..bd26149872 100644 --- a/gnu/packages/ssh.scm +++ b/gnu/packages/ssh.scm @@ -451,18 +451,17 @@ TCP, not the SSH protocol.") (define-public dropbear (package (name "dropbear") - (version "2018.76") - (source (origin - (method url-fetch) - (uri (string-append - "https://matt.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/releases/" - "dropbear-" version ".tar.bz2")) - (patches (search-patches "dropbear-CVE-2018-15599.patch")) - (sha256 - (base32 - "0rgavbzw7jrs5wslxm0dnwx2m409yzxd9hazd92r7kx8xikr3yzj")))) + (version "2019.77") + (source + (origin + (method url-fetch) + (uri (string-append + "https://matt.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/releases/" + "dropbear-" version ".tar.bz2")) + (sha256 + (base32 "13a55fcy2mx2pvsfj6dh9107k4wnbd9ybdyi3w3ivgikwvmph7yr")))) (build-system gnu-build-system) - (arguments `(#:tests? #f)) ; there is no "make check" or anything similar + (arguments `(#:tests? #f)) ; there is no "make check" or anything similar ;; TODO: Investigate unbundling libtommath and libtomcrypt or at least ;; cherry-picking important bug fixes from them. See <bugs.gnu.org/24674> ;; for more information. |