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authorLeo Famulari <leo@famulari.name>2017-05-17 07:28:09 -0400
committerLeo Famulari <leo@famulari.name>2017-05-17 07:45:01 -0400
commite7620b649c2351a3f01b5201e6e9f0b0996e78f5 (patch)
tree9e592b843b7d490cc0ccff0e93c15b69ee66d8b0 /gnu
parent8d171471cff2dc16339f51cff6f124653af12069 (diff)
downloadpatches-e7620b649c2351a3f01b5201e6e9f0b0996e78f5.tar
patches-e7620b649c2351a3f01b5201e6e9f0b0996e78f5.tar.gz
gnu: qemu: Fix CVE-2017-7493.
* gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-7493.patch: New file. * gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Add it. * gnu/packages/qemu.scm (qemu)[source]: Use it.
Diffstat (limited to 'gnu')
-rw-r--r--gnu/local.mk1
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-7493.patch182
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/qemu.scm1
3 files changed, 184 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/local.mk b/gnu/local.mk
index d0c5b9daf8..daa67b1aa9 100644
--- a/gnu/local.mk
+++ b/gnu/local.mk
@@ -941,6 +941,7 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \
%D%/packages/patches/python2-pygobject-2-gi-info-type-error-domain.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/python-pygpgme-fix-pinentry-tests.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/python2-subprocess32-disable-input-test.patch \
+ %D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-7493.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/qt4-ldflags.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/quickswitch-fix-dmenu-check.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/rapicorn-isnan.patch \
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-7493.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-7493.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..67b26fad81
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-7493.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+Fix CVE-2017-7493:
+
+https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-7493
+
+Patch copied from upstream source repository:
+
+http://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=7a95434e0ca8a037fd8aa1a2e2461f92585eb77b
+
+From 7a95434e0ca8a037fd8aa1a2e2461f92585eb77b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+Date: Fri, 5 May 2017 14:48:08 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: local: forbid client access to metadata (CVE-2017-7493)
+
+When using the mapped-file security mode, we shouldn't let the client mess
+with the metadata. The current code already tries to hide the metadata dir
+from the client by skipping it in local_readdir(). But the client can still
+access or modify it through several other operations. This can be used to
+escalate privileges in the guest.
+
+Affected backend operations are:
+- local_mknod()
+- local_mkdir()
+- local_open2()
+- local_symlink()
+- local_link()
+- local_unlinkat()
+- local_renameat()
+- local_rename()
+- local_name_to_path()
+
+Other operations are safe because they are only passed a fid path, which
+is computed internally in local_name_to_path().
+
+This patch converts all the functions listed above to fail and return
+EINVAL when being passed the name of the metadata dir. This may look
+like a poor choice for errno, but there's no such thing as an illegal
+path name on Linux and I could not think of anything better.
+
+This fixes CVE-2017-7493.
+
+Reported-by: Leo Gaspard <leo@gaspard.io>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
+Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
+---
+ hw/9pfs/9p-local.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 56 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p-local.c b/hw/9pfs/9p-local.c
+index f3ebca4f7a..a2486566af 100644
+--- a/hw/9pfs/9p-local.c
++++ b/hw/9pfs/9p-local.c
+@@ -452,6 +452,11 @@ static off_t local_telldir(FsContext *ctx, V9fsFidOpenState *fs)
+ return telldir(fs->dir.stream);
+ }
+
++static bool local_is_mapped_file_metadata(FsContext *fs_ctx, const char *name)
++{
++ return !strcmp(name, VIRTFS_META_DIR);
++}
++
+ static struct dirent *local_readdir(FsContext *ctx, V9fsFidOpenState *fs)
+ {
+ struct dirent *entry;
+@@ -465,8 +470,8 @@ again:
+ if (ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED) {
+ entry->d_type = DT_UNKNOWN;
+ } else if (ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED_FILE) {
+- if (!strcmp(entry->d_name, VIRTFS_META_DIR)) {
+- /* skp the meta data directory */
++ if (local_is_mapped_file_metadata(ctx, entry->d_name)) {
++ /* skip the meta data directory */
+ goto again;
+ }
+ entry->d_type = DT_UNKNOWN;
+@@ -559,6 +564,12 @@ static int local_mknod(FsContext *fs_ctx, V9fsPath *dir_path,
+ int err = -1;
+ int dirfd;
+
++ if (fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED_FILE &&
++ local_is_mapped_file_metadata(fs_ctx, name)) {
++ errno = EINVAL;
++ return -1;
++ }
++
+ dirfd = local_opendir_nofollow(fs_ctx, dir_path->data);
+ if (dirfd == -1) {
+ return -1;
+@@ -605,6 +616,12 @@ static int local_mkdir(FsContext *fs_ctx, V9fsPath *dir_path,
+ int err = -1;
+ int dirfd;
+
++ if (fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED_FILE &&
++ local_is_mapped_file_metadata(fs_ctx, name)) {
++ errno = EINVAL;
++ return -1;
++ }
++
+ dirfd = local_opendir_nofollow(fs_ctx, dir_path->data);
+ if (dirfd == -1) {
+ return -1;
+@@ -694,6 +711,12 @@ static int local_open2(FsContext *fs_ctx, V9fsPath *dir_path, const char *name,
+ int err = -1;
+ int dirfd;
+
++ if (fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED_FILE &&
++ local_is_mapped_file_metadata(fs_ctx, name)) {
++ errno = EINVAL;
++ return -1;
++ }
++
+ /*
+ * Mark all the open to not follow symlinks
+ */
+@@ -752,6 +775,12 @@ static int local_symlink(FsContext *fs_ctx, const char *oldpath,
+ int err = -1;
+ int dirfd;
+
++ if (fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED_FILE &&
++ local_is_mapped_file_metadata(fs_ctx, name)) {
++ errno = EINVAL;
++ return -1;
++ }
++
+ dirfd = local_opendir_nofollow(fs_ctx, dir_path->data);
+ if (dirfd == -1) {
+ return -1;
+@@ -826,6 +855,12 @@ static int local_link(FsContext *ctx, V9fsPath *oldpath,
+ int ret = -1;
+ int odirfd, ndirfd;
+
++ if (ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED_FILE &&
++ local_is_mapped_file_metadata(ctx, name)) {
++ errno = EINVAL;
++ return -1;
++ }
++
+ odirfd = local_opendir_nofollow(ctx, odirpath);
+ if (odirfd == -1) {
+ goto out;
+@@ -1096,6 +1131,12 @@ static int local_lremovexattr(FsContext *ctx, V9fsPath *fs_path,
+ static int local_name_to_path(FsContext *ctx, V9fsPath *dir_path,
+ const char *name, V9fsPath *target)
+ {
++ if (ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED_FILE &&
++ local_is_mapped_file_metadata(ctx, name)) {
++ errno = EINVAL;
++ return -1;
++ }
++
+ if (dir_path) {
+ v9fs_path_sprintf(target, "%s/%s", dir_path->data, name);
+ } else if (strcmp(name, "/")) {
+@@ -1116,6 +1157,13 @@ static int local_renameat(FsContext *ctx, V9fsPath *olddir,
+ int ret;
+ int odirfd, ndirfd;
+
++ if (ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED_FILE &&
++ (local_is_mapped_file_metadata(ctx, old_name) ||
++ local_is_mapped_file_metadata(ctx, new_name))) {
++ errno = EINVAL;
++ return -1;
++ }
++
+ odirfd = local_opendir_nofollow(ctx, olddir->data);
+ if (odirfd == -1) {
+ return -1;
+@@ -1206,6 +1254,12 @@ static int local_unlinkat(FsContext *ctx, V9fsPath *dir,
+ int ret;
+ int dirfd;
+
++ if (ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED_FILE &&
++ local_is_mapped_file_metadata(ctx, name)) {
++ errno = EINVAL;
++ return -1;
++ }
++
+ dirfd = local_opendir_nofollow(ctx, dir->data);
+ if (dirfd == -1) {
+ return -1;
+--
+2.13.0
+
diff --git a/gnu/packages/qemu.scm b/gnu/packages/qemu.scm
index 30b9908aa0..0734b6d0f7 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/qemu.scm
+++ b/gnu/packages/qemu.scm
@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@
(method url-fetch)
(uri (string-append "http://wiki.qemu-project.org/download/qemu-"
version ".tar.xz"))
+ (patches (search-patches "qemu-CVE-2017-7493.patch"))
(sha256
(base32
"08mhfs0ndbkyqgw7fjaa9vjxf4dinrly656f6hjzvmaz7hzc677h"))))