gnu: openssl: Update to 1.0.2j.

* gnu/packages/tls.scm (openssl): Update to 1.0.2j.
[replacement]: Remove field
[source]: Remove 'openssl-CVE-2016-2177.patch' and
'openssl-CVE-2016-2178.patch'.
(openssl-1.0.2j): Remove variable.
(openssl-next)[replacement]: Remove field.
* gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2177.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2178.patch: Delete files.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Remove them.

3 files changed, 3 insertions, 423 deletions

diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2177.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2177.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index f6465aeaa7..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2177.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,286 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2016-2177.
-
-<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-2177>
-
-Source:
-<https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=a004e72b95835136d3f1ea90517f706c24c03da7>
-
-From a004e72b95835136d3f1ea90517f706c24c03da7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 11:10:26 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Avoid some undefined pointer arithmetic
-
-A common idiom in the codebase is:
-
-if (p + len > limit)
-{
-    return; /* Too long */
-}
-
-Where "p" points to some malloc'd data of SIZE bytes and
-limit == p + SIZE
-
-"len" here could be from some externally supplied data (e.g. from a TLS
-message).
-
-The rules of C pointer arithmetic are such that "p + len" is only well
-defined where len <= SIZE. Therefore the above idiom is actually
-undefined behaviour.
-
-For example this could cause problems if some malloc implementation
-provides an address for "p" such that "p + len" actually overflows for
-values of len that are too big and therefore p + len < limit!
-
-Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
-
-CVE-2016-2177
-
-Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
----
- ssl/s3_srvr.c  | 14 +++++++-------
- ssl/ssl_sess.c |  2 +-
- ssl/t1_lib.c   | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
- 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
-index ab28702..ab7f690 100644
---- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
-+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
-@@ -980,7 +980,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
- 
-         session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- 
--        if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
-+        if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= (d + n) - p) {
-             al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
-             goto f_err;
-@@ -998,7 +998,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
-     /* get the session-id */
-     j = *(p++);
- 
--    if (p + j > d + n) {
-+    if ((d + n) - p < j) {
-         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
-         goto f_err;
-@@ -1054,14 +1054,14 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
- 
-     if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
-         /* cookie stuff */
--        if (p + 1 > d + n) {
-+        if ((d + n) - p < 1) {
-             al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
-             goto f_err;
-         }
-         cookie_len = *(p++);
- 
--        if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
-+        if ((d + n ) - p < cookie_len) {
-             al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
-             goto f_err;
-@@ -1131,7 +1131,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
-         }
-     }
- 
--    if (p + 2 > d + n) {
-+    if ((d + n ) - p < 2) {
-         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
-         goto f_err;
-@@ -1145,7 +1145,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
-     }
- 
-     /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
--    if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
-+    if ((d + n) - p < i + 1) {
-         /* not enough data */
-         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-@@ -1211,7 +1211,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
- 
-     /* compression */
-     i = *(p++);
--    if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
-+    if ((d + n) - p < i) {
-         /* not enough data */
-         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
-index b182998..54ee783 100644
---- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c
-+++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
-@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
-     int r;
- #endif
- 
--    if (session_id + len > limit) {
-+    if (limit - session_id < len) {
-         fatal = 1;
-         goto err;
-     }
-diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
-index fb64607..cdac011 100644
---- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
-+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
-@@ -1867,11 +1867,11 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
-         0x02, 0x03,             /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
-     };
- 
--    if (data >= (limit - 2))
-+    if (limit - data <= 2)
-         return;
-     data += 2;
- 
--    if (data > (limit - 4))
-+    if (limit - data < 4)
-         return;
-     n2s(data, type);
-     n2s(data, size);
-@@ -1879,7 +1879,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
-     if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
-         return;
- 
--    if (data + size > limit)
-+    if (limit - data < size)
-         return;
-     data += size;
- 
-@@ -1887,7 +1887,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
-         const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
-         const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
- 
--        if (data + len1 + len2 != limit)
-+        if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2))
-             return;
-         if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
-             return;
-@@ -1896,7 +1896,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
-     } else {
-         const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
- 
--        if (data + len != limit)
-+        if (limit - data != (int)(len))
-             return;
-         if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
-             return;
-@@ -2053,19 +2053,19 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
-     if (data == limit)
-         goto ri_check;
- 
--    if (data > (limit - 2))
-+    if (limit - data < 2)
-         goto err;
- 
-     n2s(data, len);
- 
--    if (data + len != limit)
-+    if (limit - data != len)
-         goto err;
- 
--    while (data <= (limit - 4)) {
-+    while (limit - data >= 4) {
-         n2s(data, type);
-         n2s(data, size);
- 
--        if (data + size > (limit))
-+        if (limit - data < size)
-             goto err;
- # if 0
-         fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
-@@ -2472,18 +2472,18 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s,
-     if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0)
-         return 1;
- 
--    if (data >= limit - 2)
-+    if (limit - data <= 2)
-         return 1;
-     n2s(data, len);
- 
--    if (data > limit - len)
-+    if (limit - data < len)
-         return 1;
- 
--    while (data <= limit - 4) {
-+    while (limit - data >= 4) {
-         n2s(data, type);
-         n2s(data, size);
- 
--        if (data + size > limit)
-+        if (limit - data < size)
-             return 1;
-         if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0)
-             return 0;
-@@ -2569,20 +2569,20 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
-                              SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
- # endif
- 
--    if (data >= (d + n - 2))
-+    if ((d + n) - data <= 2)
-         goto ri_check;
- 
-     n2s(data, length);
--    if (data + length != d + n) {
-+    if ((d + n) - data != length) {
-         *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-         return 0;
-     }
- 
--    while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
-+    while ((d + n) - data >= 4) {
-         n2s(data, type);
-         n2s(data, size);
- 
--        if (data + size > (d + n))
-+        if ((d + n) - data < size)
-             goto ri_check;
- 
-         if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
-@@ -3307,29 +3307,33 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
-     /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
-     if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
-         i = *(p++);
--        p += i;
--        if (p >= limit)
-+
-+        if (limit - p <= i)
-             return -1;
-+
-+        p += i;
-     }
-     /* Skip past cipher list */
-     n2s(p, i);
--    p += i;
--    if (p >= limit)
-+    if (limit - p <= i)
-         return -1;
-+    p += i;
-+
-     /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
-     i = *(p++);
--    p += i;
--    if (p > limit)
-+    if (limit - p < i)
-         return -1;
-+    p += i;
-+
-     /* Now at start of extensions */
--    if ((p + 2) >= limit)
-+    if (limit - p <= 2)
-         return 0;
-     n2s(p, i);
--    while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
-+    while (limit - p >= 4) {
-         unsigned short type, size;
-         n2s(p, type);
-         n2s(p, size);
--        if (p + size > limit)
-+        if (limit - p < size)
-             return 0;
-         if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
-             int r;
--- 
-2.8.4
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2178.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2178.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 37cf2763af..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2178.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2016-2178.
-
-<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-2178>
-
-Source:
-<https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=621eaf49a289bfac26d4cbcdb7396e796784c534>
-<https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=b7d0f2834e139a20560d64c73e2565e93715ce2b>
-
-From 621eaf49a289bfac26d4cbcdb7396e796784c534 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Cesar Pereida <cesar.pereida@aalto.fi>
-Date: Mon, 23 May 2016 12:45:25 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Fix DSA, preserve BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
-
-Operations in the DSA signing algorithm should run in constant time in
-order to avoid side channel attacks. A flaw in the OpenSSL DSA
-implementation means that a non-constant time codepath is followed for
-certain operations. This has been demonstrated through a cache-timing
-attack to be sufficient for an attacker to recover the private DSA key.
-
-CVE-2016-2178
-
-Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
----
- crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c | 6 +++---
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
-index efc4f1b..b29eb4b 100644
---- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
-+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
-@@ -248,9 +248,6 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
-         if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q))
-             goto err;
-     while (BN_is_zero(&k)) ;
--    if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
--        BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
--    }
- 
-     if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
-         if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
-@@ -279,9 +276,12 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
-         }
- 
-         K = &kq;
-+
-+        BN_set_flags(K, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-     } else {
-         K = &k;
-     }
-+
-     DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(goto err, dsa, r, dsa->g, K, dsa->p, ctx,
-                    dsa->method_mont_p);
-     if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx))
--- 
-2.8.4
-
-From b7d0f2834e139a20560d64c73e2565e93715ce2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2016 09:12:51 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] More fix DSA, preserve BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
-
-The previous "fix" still left "k" exposed to constant time problems in
-the later BN_mod_inverse() call. Ensure both k and kq have the
-BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag set at the earliest opportunity after creation.
-
-CVE-2016-2178
-
-Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
----
- crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c | 11 ++++++++---
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
-index b29eb4b..58013a4 100644
---- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
-+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
-@@ -247,7 +247,12 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
-     do
-         if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q))
-             goto err;
--    while (BN_is_zero(&k)) ;
-+    while (BN_is_zero(&k));
-+
-+    if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
-+        BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-+    }
-+
- 
-     if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
-         if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
-@@ -261,6 +266,8 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
-         if (!BN_copy(&kq, &k))
-             goto err;
- 
-+        BN_set_flags(&kq, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-+
-         /*
-          * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we
-          * compute g^k using an equivalent exponent of fixed length. (This
-@@ -276,8 +283,6 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
-         }
- 
-         K = &kq;
--
--        BN_set_flags(K, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-     } else {
-         K = &k;
-     }
--- 
-2.8.4
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/tls.scm b/gnu/packages/tls.scm
index 8e9c9287fa..2e3a11b51b 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/tls.scm
+++ b/gnu/packages/tls.scm
@@ -214,8 +214,7 @@ required structures.")
 (define-public openssl
   (package
    (name "openssl")
-   (replacement openssl-1.0.2j)
-   (version "1.0.2h")
+   (version "1.0.2j")
    (source (origin
              (method url-fetch)
              (uri (list (string-append "ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/"
@@ -225,11 +224,9 @@ required structures.")
                                        "/" name "-" version ".tar.gz")))
              (sha256
               (base32
-               "06996ds1rk8xhnyb5y273a7xkcxhggp4bq1g02rab55d7bjhfh0x"))
+               "0cf4ar97ijfc7mg35zdgpad6x8ivkdx9qii6mz35khi1ps9g5bz7"))
              (patches (search-patches "openssl-runpath.patch"
-                                      "openssl-c-rehash-in.patch"
-                                      "openssl-CVE-2016-2177.patch"
-                                      "openssl-CVE-2016-2178.patch"))))
+                                      "openssl-c-rehash-in.patch"))))
    (build-system gnu-build-system)
    (outputs '("out"
               "doc"                               ;1.5MiB of man3 pages
@@ -354,29 +351,10 @@ required structures.")
    (license license:openssl)
    (home-page "http://www.openssl.org/")))
 
-(define openssl-1.0.2j
-  (package
-    (inherit openssl)
-    (name "openssl")
-    (version "1.0.2j")
-    (source (origin
-              (method url-fetch)
-              (uri (list (string-append "ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/"
-                                        name "-" version ".tar.gz")
-                         (string-append "ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/old/"
-                                        (string-trim-right version char-set:letter)
-                                        "/" name "-" version ".tar.gz")))
-              (sha256
-               (base32
-                "0cf4ar97ijfc7mg35zdgpad6x8ivkdx9qii6mz35khi1ps9g5bz7"))
-              (patches (search-patches "openssl-runpath.patch"
-                                       "openssl-c-rehash-in.patch"))))))
-
 (define-public openssl-next
   (package
     (inherit openssl)
     (name "openssl")
-    (replacement #f)
     (version "1.1.0b")
     (source (origin
              (method url-fetch)