gnu: dropbear: Update to 2019.77.

* gnu/packages/ssh.scm (dropbear): Update to 2019.77.
[source]: Remove patch.
* gnu/packages/patches/dropbear-CVE-2018-15599.patch: Delete file.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Remove it.

2 files changed, 10 insertions, 251 deletions

diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/dropbear-CVE-2018-15599.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/dropbear-CVE-2018-15599.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a474552cd2..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/dropbear-CVE-2018-15599.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,240 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2018-15599:
-
-http://lists.ucc.gu.uwa.edu.au/pipermail/dropbear/2018q3/002108.html
-https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-15599
-
-Patch copied from upstream source repository:
-
-https://github.com/mkj/dropbear/commit/52adbb34c32d3e2e1bcdb941e20a6f81138b8248
-
-From 52adbb34c32d3e2e1bcdb941e20a6f81138b8248 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au>
-Date: Thu, 23 Aug 2018 23:43:12 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] Wait to fail invalid usernames
-
----
- auth.h           |  6 +++---
- svr-auth.c       | 19 +++++--------------
- svr-authpam.c    | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++----
- svr-authpasswd.c | 27 ++++++++++++++-------------
- svr-authpubkey.c | 11 ++++++++++-
- 5 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
-index da498f5b..98f54683 100644
---- a/auth.h
-+++ b/auth.h
-@@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ void recv_msg_userauth_request(void);
- void send_msg_userauth_failure(int partial, int incrfail);
- void send_msg_userauth_success(void);
- void send_msg_userauth_banner(const buffer *msg);
--void svr_auth_password(void);
--void svr_auth_pubkey(void);
--void svr_auth_pam(void);
-+void svr_auth_password(int valid_user);
-+void svr_auth_pubkey(int valid_user);
-+void svr_auth_pam(int valid_user);
- 
- #if DROPBEAR_SVR_PUBKEY_OPTIONS_BUILT
- int svr_pubkey_allows_agentfwd(void);
-diff --git a/svr-auth.c b/svr-auth.c
-index c19c0901..edde86bc 100644
---- a/svr-auth.c
-+++ b/svr-auth.c
-@@ -149,10 +149,8 @@ void recv_msg_userauth_request() {
- 		if (methodlen == AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD_LEN &&
- 				strncmp(methodname, AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD,
- 					AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD_LEN) == 0) {
--			if (valid_user) {
--				svr_auth_password();
--				goto out;
--			}
-+			svr_auth_password(valid_user);
-+			goto out;
- 		}
- 	}
- #endif
-@@ -164,10 +162,8 @@ void recv_msg_userauth_request() {
- 		if (methodlen == AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD_LEN &&
- 				strncmp(methodname, AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD,
- 					AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD_LEN) == 0) {
--			if (valid_user) {
--				svr_auth_pam();
--				goto out;
--			}
-+			svr_auth_pam(valid_user);
-+			goto out;
- 		}
- 	}
- #endif
-@@ -177,12 +173,7 @@ void recv_msg_userauth_request() {
- 	if (methodlen == AUTH_METHOD_PUBKEY_LEN &&
- 			strncmp(methodname, AUTH_METHOD_PUBKEY,
- 				AUTH_METHOD_PUBKEY_LEN) == 0) {
--		if (valid_user) {
--			svr_auth_pubkey();
--		} else {
--			/* pubkey has no failure delay */
--			send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 0);
--		}
-+		svr_auth_pubkey(valid_user);
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- #endif
-diff --git a/svr-authpam.c b/svr-authpam.c
-index 05e4f3e5..d201bc96 100644
---- a/svr-authpam.c
-+++ b/svr-authpam.c
-@@ -178,13 +178,14 @@ pamConvFunc(int num_msg,
-  * Keyboard interactive would be a lot nicer, but since PAM is synchronous, it
-  * gets very messy trying to send the interactive challenges, and read the
-  * interactive responses, over the network. */
--void svr_auth_pam() {
-+void svr_auth_pam(int valid_user) {
- 
- 	struct UserDataS userData = {NULL, NULL};
- 	struct pam_conv pamConv = {
- 		pamConvFunc,
- 		&userData /* submitted to pamvConvFunc as appdata_ptr */ 
- 	};
-+	const char* printable_user = NULL;
- 
- 	pam_handle_t* pamHandlep = NULL;
- 
-@@ -204,12 +205,23 @@ void svr_auth_pam() {
- 
- 	password = buf_getstring(ses.payload, &passwordlen);
- 
-+	/* We run the PAM conversation regardless of whether the username is valid
-+	in case the conversation function has an inherent delay.
-+	Use ses.authstate.username rather than ses.authstate.pw_name.
-+	After PAM succeeds we then check the valid_user flag too */
-+
- 	/* used to pass data to the PAM conversation function - don't bother with
- 	 * strdup() etc since these are touched only by our own conversation
- 	 * function (above) which takes care of it */
--	userData.user = ses.authstate.pw_name;
-+	userData.user = ses.authstate.username;
- 	userData.passwd = password;
- 
-+	if (ses.authstate.pw_name) {
-+		printable_user = ses.authstate.pw_name;
-+	} else {
-+		printable_user = "<invalid username>";
-+	}
-+
- 	/* Init pam */
- 	if ((rc = pam_start("sshd", NULL, &pamConv, &pamHandlep)) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
- 		dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING, "pam_start() failed, rc=%d, %s", 
-@@ -242,7 +254,7 @@ void svr_auth_pam() {
- 				rc, pam_strerror(pamHandlep, rc));
- 		dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING,
- 				"Bad PAM password attempt for '%s' from %s",
--				ses.authstate.pw_name,
-+				printable_user,
- 				svr_ses.addrstring);
- 		send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 1);
- 		goto cleanup;
-@@ -253,12 +265,18 @@ void svr_auth_pam() {
- 				rc, pam_strerror(pamHandlep, rc));
- 		dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING,
- 				"Bad PAM password attempt for '%s' from %s",
--				ses.authstate.pw_name,
-+				printable_user,
- 				svr_ses.addrstring);
- 		send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 1);
- 		goto cleanup;
- 	}
- 
-+	if (!valid_user) {
-+		/* PAM auth succeeded but the username isn't allowed in for another reason
-+		(checkusername() failed) */
-+		send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 1);
-+	}
-+
- 	/* successful authentication */
- 	dropbear_log(LOG_NOTICE, "PAM password auth succeeded for '%s' from %s",
- 			ses.authstate.pw_name,
-diff --git a/svr-authpasswd.c b/svr-authpasswd.c
-index bdee2aa1..69c7d8af 100644
---- a/svr-authpasswd.c
-+++ b/svr-authpasswd.c
-@@ -48,22 +48,14 @@ static int constant_time_strcmp(const char* a, const char* b) {
- 
- /* Process a password auth request, sending success or failure messages as
-  * appropriate */
--void svr_auth_password() {
-+void svr_auth_password(int valid_user) {
- 	
- 	char * passwdcrypt = NULL; /* the crypt from /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow */
- 	char * testcrypt = NULL; /* crypt generated from the user's password sent */
--	char * password;
-+	char * password = NULL;
- 	unsigned int passwordlen;
--
- 	unsigned int changepw;
- 
--	passwdcrypt = ses.authstate.pw_passwd;
--
--#ifdef DEBUG_HACKCRYPT
--	/* debugging crypt for non-root testing with shadows */
--	passwdcrypt = DEBUG_HACKCRYPT;
--#endif
--
- 	/* check if client wants to change password */
- 	changepw = buf_getbool(ses.payload);
- 	if (changepw) {
-@@ -73,12 +65,21 @@ void svr_auth_password() {
- 	}
- 
- 	password = buf_getstring(ses.payload, &passwordlen);
--
--	/* the first bytes of passwdcrypt are the salt */
--	testcrypt = crypt(password, passwdcrypt);
-+	if (valid_user) {
-+		/* the first bytes of passwdcrypt are the salt */
-+		passwdcrypt = ses.authstate.pw_passwd;
-+		testcrypt = crypt(password, passwdcrypt);
-+	}
- 	m_burn(password, passwordlen);
- 	m_free(password);
- 
-+	/* After we have got the payload contents we can exit if the username
-+	is invalid. Invalid users have already been logged. */
-+	if (!valid_user) {
-+		send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 1);
-+		return;
-+	}
-+
- 	if (testcrypt == NULL) {
- 		/* crypt() with an invalid salt like "!!" */
- 		dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING, "User account '%s' is locked",
-diff --git a/svr-authpubkey.c b/svr-authpubkey.c
-index aa6087c9..ff481c87 100644
---- a/svr-authpubkey.c
-+++ b/svr-authpubkey.c
-@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static int checkfileperm(char * filename);
- 
- /* process a pubkey auth request, sending success or failure message as
-  * appropriate */
--void svr_auth_pubkey() {
-+void svr_auth_pubkey(int valid_user) {
- 
- 	unsigned char testkey; /* whether we're just checking if a key is usable */
- 	char* algo = NULL; /* pubkey algo */
-@@ -102,6 +102,15 @@ void svr_auth_pubkey() {
- 	keybloblen = buf_getint(ses.payload);
- 	keyblob = buf_getptr(ses.payload, keybloblen);
- 
-+	if (!valid_user) {
-+		/* Return failure once we have read the contents of the packet
-+		required to validate a public key. 
-+		Avoids blind user enumeration though it isn't possible to prevent
-+		testing for user existence if the public key is known */
-+		send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 0);
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
- 	/* check if the key is valid */
- 	if (checkpubkey(algo, algolen, keyblob, keybloblen) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) {
- 		send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 0);
diff --git a/gnu/packages/ssh.scm b/gnu/packages/ssh.scm
index f5e069ff05..bd26149872 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/ssh.scm
+++ b/gnu/packages/ssh.scm
@@ -451,18 +451,17 @@ TCP, not the SSH protocol.")
 (define-public dropbear
   (package
     (name "dropbear")
-    (version "2018.76")
-    (source (origin
-              (method url-fetch)
-              (uri (string-append
-                    "https://matt.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/releases/"
-                    "dropbear-" version ".tar.bz2"))
-              (patches (search-patches "dropbear-CVE-2018-15599.patch"))
-              (sha256
-               (base32
-                "0rgavbzw7jrs5wslxm0dnwx2m409yzxd9hazd92r7kx8xikr3yzj"))))
+    (version "2019.77")
+    (source
+     (origin
+       (method url-fetch)
+       (uri (string-append
+             "https://matt.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/releases/"
+             "dropbear-" version ".tar.bz2"))
+       (sha256
+        (base32 "13a55fcy2mx2pvsfj6dh9107k4wnbd9ybdyi3w3ivgikwvmph7yr"))))
     (build-system gnu-build-system)
-    (arguments `(#:tests? #f)) ; there is no "make check" or anything similar
+    (arguments `(#:tests? #f))  ; there is no "make check" or anything similar
     ;; TODO: Investigate unbundling libtommath and libtomcrypt or at least
     ;; cherry-picking important bug fixes from them. See <bugs.gnu.org/24674>
     ;; for more information.