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author | Leo Famulari <leo@famulari.name> | 2017-01-06 13:43:38 -0500 |
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committer | Leo Famulari <leo@famulari.name> | 2017-01-06 13:50:18 -0500 |
commit | aa21c764d65068783ae31febee2a92eb3d138a24 (patch) | |
tree | 16ce9d75b61b80fc1a42635eb7aa22e4b6ddbacb /gnu/packages | |
parent | 707c65aad74f185d1463da174473a2364aa40133 (diff) | |
download | patches-aa21c764d65068783ae31febee2a92eb3d138a24.tar patches-aa21c764d65068783ae31febee2a92eb3d138a24.tar.gz |
gnu: python-pycrypto: Fix CVE-2013-7459.
* gnu/packages/patches/python-pycrypto-CVE-2013-7459.patch: New file.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Add it.
* gnu/packages/python.scm (python-pycrypto, python2-pycrypto)[source]: Use the
patch. Use pypi-uri.
Diffstat (limited to 'gnu/packages')
-rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/python-pycrypto-CVE-2013-7459.patch | 97 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/python.scm | 12 |
2 files changed, 102 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/python-pycrypto-CVE-2013-7459.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/python-pycrypto-CVE-2013-7459.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3570b94e9b --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/python-pycrypto-CVE-2013-7459.patch @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +Fix CVE-2013-7459: + +https://github.com/dlitz/pycrypto/issues/176 +https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-7459 + +Copied from Debian: + +https://anonscm.debian.org/cgit/collab-maint/python-crypto.git/commit/?id=0de2243837ed369a086f15c50cca2be85bdfab9d + +Debian adapts this upstream commit: + +https://github.com/dlitz/pycrypto/commit/8dbe0dc3eea5c689d4f76b37b93fe216cf1f00d4 + +From 8dbe0dc3eea5c689d4f76b37b93fe216cf1f00d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Legrandin <helderijs@gmail.com> +Date: Sun, 22 Dec 2013 22:24:46 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Throw exception when IV is used with ECB or CTR + +The IV parameter is currently ignored when initializing +a cipher in ECB or CTR mode. + +For CTR mode, it is confusing: it takes some time to see +that a different parameter is needed (the counter). + +For ECB mode, it is outright dangerous. + +This patch forces an exception to be raised. +--- + lib/Crypto/SelfTest/Cipher/common.py | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------- + src/block_template.c | 11 +++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +--- a/lib/Crypto/SelfTest/Cipher/common.py ++++ b/lib/Crypto/SelfTest/Cipher/common.py +@@ -239,19 +239,34 @@ class RoundtripTest(unittest.TestCase): + return """%s .decrypt() output of .encrypt() should not be garbled""" % (self.module_name,) + + def runTest(self): +- for mode in (self.module.MODE_ECB, self.module.MODE_CBC, self.module.MODE_CFB, self.module.MODE_OFB, self.module.MODE_OPENPGP): ++ ++ ## ECB mode ++ mode = self.module.MODE_ECB ++ encryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode) ++ ciphertext = encryption_cipher.encrypt(self.plaintext) ++ decryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode) ++ decrypted_plaintext = decryption_cipher.decrypt(ciphertext) ++ self.assertEqual(self.plaintext, decrypted_plaintext) ++ ++ ## OPENPGP mode ++ mode = self.module.MODE_OPENPGP ++ encryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode, self.iv) ++ eiv_ciphertext = encryption_cipher.encrypt(self.plaintext) ++ eiv = eiv_ciphertext[:self.module.block_size+2] ++ ciphertext = eiv_ciphertext[self.module.block_size+2:] ++ decryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode, eiv) ++ decrypted_plaintext = decryption_cipher.decrypt(ciphertext) ++ self.assertEqual(self.plaintext, decrypted_plaintext) ++ ++ ## All other non-AEAD modes (but CTR) ++ for mode in (self.module.MODE_CBC, self.module.MODE_CFB, self.module.MODE_OFB): + encryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode, self.iv) + ciphertext = encryption_cipher.encrypt(self.plaintext) +- +- if mode != self.module.MODE_OPENPGP: +- decryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode, self.iv) +- else: +- eiv = ciphertext[:self.module.block_size+2] +- ciphertext = ciphertext[self.module.block_size+2:] +- decryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode, eiv) ++ decryption_cipher = self.module.new(a2b_hex(self.key), mode, self.iv) + decrypted_plaintext = decryption_cipher.decrypt(ciphertext) + self.assertEqual(self.plaintext, decrypted_plaintext) + ++ + class PGPTest(unittest.TestCase): + def __init__(self, module, params): + unittest.TestCase.__init__(self) +--- a/src/block_template.c ++++ b/src/block_template.c +@@ -170,6 +170,17 @@ ALGnew(PyObject *self, PyObject *args, P + "Key cannot be the null string"); + return NULL; + } ++ if (IVlen != 0 && mode == MODE_ECB) ++ { ++ PyErr_Format(PyExc_ValueError, "ECB mode does not use IV"); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ if (IVlen != 0 && mode == MODE_CTR) ++ { ++ PyErr_Format(PyExc_ValueError, ++ "CTR mode needs counter parameter, not IV"); ++ return NULL; ++ } + if (IVlen != BLOCK_SIZE && mode != MODE_ECB && mode != MODE_CTR) + { + PyErr_Format(PyExc_ValueError, diff --git a/gnu/packages/python.scm b/gnu/packages/python.scm index 5faebae3d9..d8ca83d810 100644 --- a/gnu/packages/python.scm +++ b/gnu/packages/python.scm @@ -958,13 +958,11 @@ Python 3 support.") (define-public python2-setuptools (package-with-python2 python-setuptools)) -;;; Pycrypto is abandoned upstream [0] and contains at least one bug that can be -;;; exploited to achieve arbitrary code execution [1]. +;;; Pycrypto is abandoned upstream: ;;; -;;; TODO Remove this package from GNU Guix. +;;; https://github.com/dlitz/pycrypto/issues/173 ;;; -;;; [0] https://github.com/dlitz/pycrypto/issues/173 -;;; [1] https://github.com/dlitz/pycrypto/issues/176 +;;; TODO Remove this package from GNU Guix. (define-public python-pycrypto (package (name "python-pycrypto") @@ -972,8 +970,8 @@ Python 3 support.") (source (origin (method url-fetch) - (uri (string-append "https://pypi.python.org/packages/source/p/" - "pycrypto/pycrypto-" version ".tar.gz")) + (uri (pypi-uri "pycrypto" version)) + (patches (search-patches "python-pycrypto-CVE-2013-7459.patch")) (sha256 (base32 "0g0ayql5b9mkjam8hym6zyg6bv77lbh66rv1fyvgqb17kfc1xkpj")))) |