gnu: wpa-supplicant: Update to 2.6.

* gnu/packages/admin.scm (wpa-supplicant-minimal)[source]: Update to
  2.6. Remove 'patches' field.
* gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5310.patch,
  gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5314.patch,
  gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5315.patch,
  gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5316.patch,
  gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4476.patch,
  gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt1.patch,
  gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt2.patch,
  gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt3.patch,
  gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt4.patch: Delete
  files.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Remove them.

Signed-off-by: Leo Famulari <leo@famulari.name>

11 files changed, 2 insertions, 519 deletions

diff --git a/gnu/local.mk b/gnu/local.mk
index 292f5ff45d..526756f08e 100644
--- a/gnu/local.mk
+++ b/gnu/local.mk
@@ -896,15 +896,6 @@ dist_patch_DATA =						\
   %D%/packages/patches/wordnet-CVE-2008-2149.patch			\
   %D%/packages/patches/wordnet-CVE-2008-3908-pt1.patch			\
   %D%/packages/patches/wordnet-CVE-2008-3908-pt2.patch			\
-  %D%/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5310.patch	\
-  %D%/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5314.patch	\
-  %D%/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5315.patch	\
-  %D%/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5316.patch	\
-  %D%/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4476.patch	\
-  %D%/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt1.patch	\
-  %D%/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt2.patch	\
-  %D%/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt3.patch	\
-  %D%/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt4.patch	\
   %D%/packages/patches/xdotool-fix-makefile.patch               \
   %D%/packages/patches/xf86-video-ark-remove-mibstore.patch	\
   %D%/packages/patches/xf86-video-ast-remove-mibstore.patch	\
diff --git a/gnu/packages/admin.scm b/gnu/packages/admin.scm
index cfb33c40c3..d9b08efc4c 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/admin.scm
+++ b/gnu/packages/admin.scm
@@ -862,7 +862,7 @@ commands and their arguments.")
 (define-public wpa-supplicant-minimal
   (package
     (name "wpa-supplicant-minimal")
-    (version "2.5")
+    (version "2.6")
     (source (origin
               (method url-fetch)
               (uri (string-append
@@ -871,17 +871,7 @@ commands and their arguments.")
                     ".tar.gz"))
               (sha256
                (base32
-                "05mkp5bx1c3z7h5biddsv0p49gkrq9ksany3anp4wdiv92p5prfc"))
-              (patches
-               (search-patches "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5310.patch"
-                               "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5314.patch"
-                               "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5315.patch"
-                               "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5316.patch"
-                               "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4476.patch"
-                               "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt1.patch"
-                               "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt2.patch"
-                               "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt3.patch"
-                               "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt4.patch"))))
+                "0l0l5gz3d5j9bqjsbjlfcv4w4jwndllp9fmyai4x9kg6qhs6v4xl"))))
     (build-system gnu-build-system)
     (arguments
      '(#:phases (alist-replace
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5310.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5310.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 00e5b7c771..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5310.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-From 6b12d93d2c7428a34bfd4b3813ba339ed57b698a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Sun, 25 Oct 2015 15:45:50 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] WNM: Ignore Key Data in WNM Sleep Mode Response frame if no
- PMF in use
-
-WNM Sleep Mode Response frame is used to update GTK/IGTK only if PMF is
-enabled. Verify that PMF is in use before using this field on station
-side to avoid accepting unauthenticated key updates. (CVE-2015-5310)
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c | 6 ++++++
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
-index 954de67..7d79499 100644
---- a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
-+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
-@@ -187,6 +187,12 @@ static void wnm_sleep_mode_exit_success(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
- 	end = ptr + key_len_total;
- 	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: Key Data", ptr, key_len_total);
- 
-+	if (key_len_total && !wpa_sm_pmf_enabled(wpa_s->wpa)) {
-+		wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_INFO,
-+			"WNM: Ignore Key Data in WNM-Sleep Mode Response - PMF not enabled");
-+		return;
-+	}
-+
- 	while (ptr + 1 < end) {
- 		if (ptr + 2 + ptr[1] > end) {
- 			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: Invalid Key Data element "
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5314.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5314.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index bfc4c74e95..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5314.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-From bef802ece03f9ae9d52a21f0cf4f1bc2c5a1f8aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 18:24:16 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd server: Fix last fragment length validation
-
-All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining
-room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last
-fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer.
-The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual
-buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process
-termination. (CVE-2015-5314)
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 6 +++---
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-index cb83ff7..9f787ab 100644
---- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-@@ -970,7 +970,7 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
- 	/*
- 	 * the first and all intermediate fragments have the M bit set
- 	 */
--	if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
-+	if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) {
- 		if ((data->in_frag_pos + len) > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) {
- 			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow "
- 				   "attack detected! (%d+%d > %d)",
-@@ -981,6 +981,8 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
- 		}
- 		wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
- 		data->in_frag_pos += len;
-+	}
-+	if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
- 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Got a %d byte fragment",
- 			   (int) len);
- 		return;
-@@ -990,8 +992,6 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
- 	 * buffering fragments so that's how we know it's the last)
- 	 */
- 	if (data->in_frag_pos) {
--		wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
--		data->in_frag_pos += len;
- 		pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf);
- 		len = data->in_frag_pos;
- 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes",
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5315.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5315.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 82c26398b6..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5315.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-From 8057821706784608b828e769ccefbced95591e50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 18:18:17 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd peer: Fix last fragment length validation
-
-All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining
-room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last
-fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer.
-The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual
-buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process
-termination. (CVE-2015-5315)
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 7 +++----
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-index 1f78544..75ceef1 100644
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-@@ -903,7 +903,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
- 	/*
- 	 * buffer and ACK the fragment
- 	 */
--	if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
-+	if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) {
- 		data->in_frag_pos += len;
- 		if (data->in_frag_pos > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) {
- 			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow attack "
-@@ -916,7 +916,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
- 			return NULL;
- 		}
- 		wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
--
-+	}
-+	if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
- 		resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD,
- 				     EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE,
- 				     EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, eap_get_id(reqData));
-@@ -930,10 +931,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
- 	 * we're buffering and this is the last fragment
- 	 */
- 	if (data->in_frag_pos) {
--		wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
- 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes",
- 			   (int) len);
--		data->in_frag_pos += len;
- 		pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf);
- 		len = data->in_frag_pos;
- 	}
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5316.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5316.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 3088f6a6dc..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5316.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-From 95577884ca4fa76be91344ff7a8d5d1e6dc3da61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 19:35:44 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd peer: Fix error path for unexpected Confirm message
-
-If the Confirm message is received from the server before the Identity
-exchange has been completed, the group has not yet been determined and
-data->grp is NULL. The error path in eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange()
-did not take this corner case into account and could end up
-dereferencing a NULL pointer and terminating the process if invalid
-message sequence is received. (CVE-2015-5316)
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 3 ++-
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-index 75ceef1..892b590 100644
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-@@ -774,7 +774,8 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
- 	wpabuf_put_data(data->outbuf, conf, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
- 
- fin:
--	bin_clear_free(cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
-+	if (data->grp)
-+		bin_clear_free(cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
- 	BN_clear_free(x);
- 	BN_clear_free(y);
- 	if (data->outbuf == NULL) {
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4476.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4476.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index acad6be0a4..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4476.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
-From ecbb0b3dc122b0d290987cf9c84010bbe53e1022 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
-Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2016 17:20:18 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 1/5] WPS: Reject a Credential with invalid passphrase
-
-WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase is not allowed to include control
-characters. Reject a Credential received from a WPS Registrar both as
-STA (Credential) and AP (AP Settings) if the credential is for WPAPSK or
-WPA2PSK authentication type and includes an invalid passphrase.
-
-This fixes an issue where hostapd or wpa_supplicant could have updated
-the configuration file PSK/passphrase parameter with arbitrary data from
-an external device (Registrar) that may not be fully trusted. Should
-such data include a newline character, the resulting configuration file
-could become invalid and fail to be parsed.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
----
- src/utils/common.c         | 12 ++++++++++++
- src/utils/common.h         |  1 +
- src/wps/wps_attr_process.c | 10 ++++++++++
- 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/utils/common.c b/src/utils/common.c
-index 450e2c6..27b7c02 100644
---- a/src/utils/common.c
-+++ b/src/utils/common.c
-@@ -697,6 +697,18 @@ int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len)
- }
- 
- 
-+int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len)
-+{
-+	size_t i;
-+
-+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
-+		if (data[i] < 32 || data[i] == 127)
-+			return 1;
-+	}
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+
- size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len,
- 			 const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len,
- 			 const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len)
-diff --git a/src/utils/common.h b/src/utils/common.h
-index 701dbb2..a972240 100644
---- a/src/utils/common.h
-+++ b/src/utils/common.h
-@@ -488,6 +488,7 @@ const char * wpa_ssid_txt(const u8 *ssid, size_t ssid_len);
- 
- char * wpa_config_parse_string(const char *value, size_t *len);
- int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len);
-+int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len);
- size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len,
- 			 const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len,
- 			 const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len);
-diff --git a/src/wps/wps_attr_process.c b/src/wps/wps_attr_process.c
-index eadb22f..e8c4579 100644
---- a/src/wps/wps_attr_process.c
-+++ b/src/wps/wps_attr_process.c
-@@ -229,6 +229,16 @@ static int wps_workaround_cred_key(struct wps_credential *cred)
- 		cred->key_len--;
- #endif /* CONFIG_WPS_STRICT */
- 	}
-+
-+
-+	if (cred->auth_type & (WPS_AUTH_WPAPSK | WPS_AUTH_WPA2PSK) &&
-+	    (cred->key_len < 8 || has_ctrl_char(cred->key, cred->key_len))) {
-+		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPS: Reject credential with invalid WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase");
-+		wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_INFO, "WPS: Network Key",
-+				      cred->key, cred->key_len);
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt1.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt1.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 507a96e47c..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt1.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-From 73e4abb24a936014727924d8b0b2965edfc117dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
-Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2016 18:46:41 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 2/5] Reject psk parameter set with invalid passphrase
- character
-
-WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase is not allowed to include control
-characters. Reject a passphrase configuration attempt if that passphrase
-includes an invalid passphrase.
-
-This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the
-configuration file psk parameter with arbitrary data from the control
-interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be
-accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that
-an untrusted user has access to a management software component that
-does not validate the passphrase value before passing it to
-wpa_supplicant.
-
-This could allow such an untrusted user to inject up to 63 characters of
-almost arbitrary data into the configuration file. Such configuration
-file could result in wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g.,
-opensc_engine_path, pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path,
-load_dynamic_eap) from user controlled location when starting again.
-This would allow code from that library to be executed under the
-wpa_supplicant process privileges.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
----
- wpa_supplicant/config.c | 6 ++++++
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
-index b1c7870..fdd9643 100644
---- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c
-+++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
-@@ -478,6 +478,12 @@ static int wpa_config_parse_psk(const struct parse_data *data,
- 		}
- 		wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PSK (ASCII passphrase)",
- 				      (u8 *) value, len);
-+		if (has_ctrl_char((u8 *) value, len)) {
-+			wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
-+				   "Line %d: Invalid passphrase character",
-+				   line);
-+			return -1;
-+		}
- 		if (ssid->passphrase && os_strlen(ssid->passphrase) == len &&
- 		    os_memcmp(ssid->passphrase, value, len) == 0) {
- 			/* No change to the previously configured value */
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt2.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt2.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 684d25de96..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt2.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
-From 0fe5a234240a108b294a87174ad197f6b5cb38e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Paul Stewart <pstew@google.com>
-Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2016 15:40:19 -0800
-Subject: [PATCH 3/5] Remove newlines from wpa_supplicant config network
- output
-
-Spurious newlines output while writing the config file can corrupt the
-wpa_supplicant configuration. Avoid writing these for the network block
-parameters. This is a generic filter that cover cases that may not have
-been explicitly addressed with a more specific commit to avoid control
-characters in the psk parameter.
-
-Signed-off-by: Paul Stewart <pstew@google.com>
----
- src/utils/common.c      | 11 +++++++++++
- src/utils/common.h      |  1 +
- wpa_supplicant/config.c | 15 +++++++++++++--
- 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/utils/common.c b/src/utils/common.c
-index 27b7c02..9856463 100644
---- a/src/utils/common.c
-+++ b/src/utils/common.c
-@@ -709,6 +709,17 @@ int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len)
- }
- 
- 
-+int has_newline(const char *str)
-+{
-+	while (*str) {
-+		if (*str == '\n' || *str == '\r')
-+			return 1;
-+		str++;
-+	}
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+
- size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len,
- 			 const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len,
- 			 const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len)
-diff --git a/src/utils/common.h b/src/utils/common.h
-index a972240..d19927b 100644
---- a/src/utils/common.h
-+++ b/src/utils/common.h
-@@ -489,6 +489,7 @@ const char * wpa_ssid_txt(const u8 *ssid, size_t ssid_len);
- char * wpa_config_parse_string(const char *value, size_t *len);
- int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len);
- int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len);
-+int has_newline(const char *str);
- size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len,
- 			 const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len,
- 			 const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len);
-diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
-index fdd9643..eb97cd5 100644
---- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c
-+++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
-@@ -2699,8 +2699,19 @@ char * wpa_config_get(struct wpa_ssid *ssid, const char *var)
- 
- 	for (i = 0; i < NUM_SSID_FIELDS; i++) {
- 		const struct parse_data *field = &ssid_fields[i];
--		if (os_strcmp(var, field->name) == 0)
--			return field->writer(field, ssid);
-+		if (os_strcmp(var, field->name) == 0) {
-+			char *ret = field->writer(field, ssid);
-+
-+			if (ret && has_newline(ret)) {
-+				wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
-+					   "Found newline in value for %s; not returning it",
-+					   var);
-+				os_free(ret);
-+				ret = NULL;
-+			}
-+
-+			return ret;
-+		}
- 	}
- 
- 	return NULL;
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt3.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt3.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 2dd38fee31..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt3.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
-From b166cd84a77a6717be9600bf95378a0055d6f5a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
-Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2016 23:33:10 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 4/5] Reject SET_CRED commands with newline characters in the
- string values
-
-Most of the cred block parameters are written as strings without
-filtering and if there is an embedded newline character in the value,
-unexpected configuration file data might be written.
-
-This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the
-configuration file cred parameter with arbitrary data from the control
-interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be
-accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that
-an untrusted user has access to a management software component that
-does not validate the credential value before passing it to
-wpa_supplicant.
-
-This could allow such an untrusted user to inject almost arbitrary data
-into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in
-wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path,
-pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user
-controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that
-library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
----
- wpa_supplicant/config.c | 9 ++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
-index eb97cd5..69152ef 100644
---- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c
-+++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
-@@ -2896,6 +2896,8 @@ int wpa_config_set_cred(struct wpa_cred *cred, const char *var,
- 
- 	if (os_strcmp(var, "password") == 0 &&
- 	    os_strncmp(value, "ext:", 4) == 0) {
-+		if (has_newline(value))
-+			return -1;
- 		str_clear_free(cred->password);
- 		cred->password = os_strdup(value);
- 		cred->ext_password = 1;
-@@ -2946,9 +2948,14 @@ int wpa_config_set_cred(struct wpa_cred *cred, const char *var,
- 	}
- 
- 	val = wpa_config_parse_string(value, &len);
--	if (val == NULL) {
-+	if (val == NULL ||
-+	    (os_strcmp(var, "excluded_ssid") != 0 &&
-+	     os_strcmp(var, "roaming_consortium") != 0 &&
-+	     os_strcmp(var, "required_roaming_consortium") != 0 &&
-+	     has_newline(val))) {
- 		wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Line %d: invalid field '%s' string "
- 			   "value '%s'.", line, var, value);
-+		os_free(val);
- 		return -1;
- 	}
- 
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt4.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt4.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 5f42aa9219..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt4.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-From 2a3f56502b52375c3bf113cf92adfa99bad6b488 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
-Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2016 23:55:48 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 5/5] Reject SET commands with newline characters in the
- string values
-
-Many of the global configuration parameters are written as strings
-without filtering and if there is an embedded newline character in the
-value, unexpected configuration file data might be written.
-
-This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the
-configuration file global parameter with arbitrary data from the control
-interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be
-accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that
-an untrusted user has access to a management software component that
-does not validate the value of a parameter before passing it to
-wpa_supplicant.
-
-This could allow such an untrusted user to inject almost arbitrary data
-into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in
-wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path,
-pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user
-controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that
-library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
----
- wpa_supplicant/config.c | 6 ++++++
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
-index 69152ef..d9a1603 100644
---- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c
-+++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
-@@ -3764,6 +3764,12 @@ static int wpa_global_config_parse_str(const struct global_parse_data *data,
- 		return -1;
- 	}
- 
-+	if (has_newline(pos)) {
-+		wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Line %d: invalid %s value with newline",
-+			   line, data->name);
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+
- 	tmp = os_strdup(pos);
- 	if (tmp == NULL)
- 		return -1;
--- 
-1.9.1
-