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authorEfraim Flashner <efraim@flashner.co.il>2016-07-06 07:28:09 +0300
committerEfraim Flashner <efraim@flashner.co.il>2016-07-06 07:28:09 +0300
commit6baa83d2838d11808ad0f317fbbd276f7c5904cb (patch)
tree4ffde3157e8e808b3528a54a5d20631c21893688
parentfda746b19803dadd6e7c097f41513b4c6784c8d1 (diff)
downloadpatches-6baa83d2838d11808ad0f317fbbd276f7c5904cb.tar
patches-6baa83d2838d11808ad0f317fbbd276f7c5904cb.tar.gz
gnu: sudo: Update to 1.8.17p1.
* gnu/packages/admin.scm (sudo): Update to 1.8.17p1. [source]: Remove patch. * gnu/packages/patches/sudo-CVE-2015-5602.patch: Remove file. * gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Remove it.
-rw-r--r--gnu/local.mk1
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/admin.scm9
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/sudo-CVE-2015-5602.patch372
3 files changed, 4 insertions, 378 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/local.mk b/gnu/local.mk
index 3a0d5c2557..947d1b0efc 100644
--- a/gnu/local.mk
+++ b/gnu/local.mk
@@ -774,7 +774,6 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \
%D%/packages/patches/slim-sigusr1.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/slurm-configure-remove-nonfree-contribs.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/soprano-find-clucene.patch \
- %D%/packages/patches/sudo-CVE-2015-5602.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/superlu-dist-scotchmetis.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/synfig-build-fix.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/t1lib-CVE-2010-2642.patch \
diff --git a/gnu/packages/admin.scm b/gnu/packages/admin.scm
index 9afe1f8ee0..7ece6bdcb5 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/admin.scm
+++ b/gnu/packages/admin.scm
@@ -789,18 +789,17 @@ system administrator.")
(define-public sudo
(package
(name "sudo")
- (version "1.8.15")
+ (version "1.8.17p1")
(source (origin
(method url-fetch)
(uri
- (list (string-append "http://www.sudo.ws/sudo/dist/sudo-"
+ (list (string-append "https://www.sudo.ws/sudo/dist/sudo-"
version ".tar.gz")
(string-append "ftp://ftp.sudo.ws/pub/sudo/OLD/sudo-"
version ".tar.gz")))
(sha256
(base32
- "0263gi6i19fyzzc488n0qw3m518i39f6a7qmrfvahk9j10bkh5j3"))
- (patches (search-patches "sudo-CVE-2015-5602.patch"))))
+ "1k2mn65l1kmsxm8wh0gjxy496xhbpiimbpm6yv6kw6snzc3xg466"))))
(build-system gnu-build-system)
(arguments
`(#:configure-flags
@@ -849,7 +848,7 @@ system administrator.")
`(("groff" ,groff)
("linux-pam" ,linux-pam)
("coreutils" ,coreutils)))
- (home-page "http://www.sudo.ws/")
+ (home-page "https://www.sudo.ws/")
(synopsis "Run commands as root")
(description
"Sudo (su \"do\") allows a system administrator to delegate authority to
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/sudo-CVE-2015-5602.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/sudo-CVE-2015-5602.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 36c90fbee7..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/sudo-CVE-2015-5602.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,372 +0,0 @@
-Based on the patch from https://www.sudo.ws/repos/sudo/raw-rev/c2e36a80a279
-Backported to 1.8.15 by Mark H Weaver <mhw@netris.org>
-
-# HG changeset patch
-# User Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
-# Date 1452475889 25200
-# Node ID c2e36a80a27927c32cba55afae78b8dc830cddc3
-# Parent 94ffd6b18431fa4b9ed0a0c3f0b7b9582a4f6bde
-Rewritten sudoedit_checkdir support that checks all the dirs in the
-path and refuses to follow symlinks in writable directories.
-This is a better fix for CVE-2015-5602.
-Adapted from a diff by Ben Hutchings. Bug #707
-
-diff -r 94ffd6b18431 -r c2e36a80a279 doc/CONTRIBUTORS
---- a/doc/CONTRIBUTORS Mon Jan 04 10:47:11 2016 -0700
-+++ b/doc/CONTRIBUTORS Sun Jan 10 18:31:29 2016 -0700
-@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
- Holloway, Nick
- Hoover, Adam
- Hunter, Michael T.
-+ Hutchings, Ben
- Irrgang, Eric
- Jackson, Brian
- Jackson, John R.
-diff -r 94ffd6b18431 -r c2e36a80a279 doc/UPGRADE
---- a/doc/UPGRADE Mon Jan 04 10:47:11 2016 -0700
-+++ b/doc/UPGRADE Sun Jan 10 18:31:29 2016 -0700
-@@ -1,6 +1,15 @@
- Notes on upgrading from an older release
- ========================================
-
-+o Upgrading from a version prior to the post-1.8.15 fix for CVE-2015-5602.
-+
-+ The meaning of the sudoedit_checkdir sudoers option has changed.
-+ Previously, it would only check the parent directory
-+ of the file to be edited. After the CVE fix, all directories
-+ in the path to be edited are checked and sudoedit will refuse
-+ to follow a symbolic link in a directory that is writable by
-+ the invoking user.
-+
- o Upgrading from a version prior to 1.8.15:
-
- Prior to version 1.8.15, when env_reset was enabled (the default)
-diff -r 94ffd6b18431 -r c2e36a80a279 doc/sudoers.cat
---- a/doc/sudoers.cat Mon Jan 04 10:47:11 2016 -0700
-+++ b/doc/sudoers.cat Sun Jan 10 18:31:29 2016 -0700
-@@ -1275,12 +1275,15 @@
- system call. This flag is _o_f_f by default.
-
- sudoedit_checkdir
-- If set, ssuuddooeeddiitt will refuse to edit files located in a
-- directory that is writable by the invoking user unless
-- it is run by root. On many systems, this option
-- requires that the parent directory of the file to be
-- edited be readable by the target user. This flag is
-- _o_f_f by default.
-+ If set, ssuuddooeeddiitt will check directories in the path to
-+ be edited for writability by the invoking user.
-+ Symbolic links will not be followed in writable
-+ directories and ssuuddooeeddiitt will also refuse to edit a
-+ file located in a writable directory. Theses
-+ restrictions are not enforced when ssuuddooeeddiitt is invoked
-+ as root. On many systems, this option requires that
-+ all directories in the path to be edited be readable by
-+ the target user. This flag is _o_f_f by default.
-
- sudoedit_follow By default, ssuuddooeeddiitt will not follow symbolic links
- when opening files. The _s_u_d_o_e_d_i_t___f_o_l_l_o_w option can be
-diff -r 94ffd6b18431 -r c2e36a80a279 doc/sudoers.man.in
---- a/doc/sudoers.man.in Mon Jan 04 10:47:11 2016 -0700
-+++ b/doc/sudoers.man.in Sun Jan 10 18:31:29 2016 -0700
-@@ -2715,10 +2715,16 @@
- .br
- If set,
- \fBsudoedit\fR
--will refuse to edit files located in a directory that is writable
--by the invoking user unless it is run by root.
--On many systems, this option requires that the parent directory
--of the file to be edited be readable by the target user.
-+will check directories in the path to be edited for writability
-+by the invoking user.
-+Symbolic links will not be followed in writable directories and
-+\fBsudoedit\fR
-+will also refuse to edit a file located in a writable directory.
-+Theses restrictions are not enforced when
-+\fBsudoedit\fR
-+is invoked as root.
-+On many systems, this option requires that all directories
-+in the path to be edited be readable by the target user.
- This flag is
- \fIoff\fR
- by default.
-diff -r 94ffd6b18431 -r c2e36a80a279 doc/sudoers.mdoc.in
---- a/doc/sudoers.mdoc.in Mon Jan 04 10:47:11 2016 -0700
-+++ b/doc/sudoers.mdoc.in Sun Jan 10 18:31:29 2016 -0700
-@@ -2549,10 +2549,16 @@
- .It sudoedit_checkdir
- If set,
- .Nm sudoedit
--will refuse to edit files located in a directory that is writable
--by the invoking user unless it is run by root.
--On many systems, this option requires that the parent directory
--of the file to be edited be readable by the target user.
-+will check directories in the path to be edited for writability
-+by the invoking user.
-+Symbolic links will not be followed in writable directories and
-+.Nm sudoedit
-+will also refuse to edit a file located in a writable directory.
-+Theses restrictions are not enforced when
-+.Nm sudoedit
-+is invoked as root.
-+On many systems, this option requires that all directories
-+in the path to be edited be readable by the target user.
- This flag is
- .Em off
- by default.
-diff -r 94ffd6b18431 -r c2e36a80a279 include/sudo_compat.h
---- a/include/sudo_compat.h Mon Jan 04 10:47:11 2016 -0700
-+++ b/include/sudo_compat.h Sun Jan 10 18:31:29 2016 -0700
-@@ -182,6 +182,8 @@
- # ifndef UTIME_NOW
- # define UTIME_NOW -2L
- # endif
-+#endif
-+#if !defined(HAVE_OPENAT) || (!defined(HAVE_FUTIMENS) && !defined(HAVE_UTIMENSAT))
- # ifndef AT_FDCWD
- # define AT_FDCWD -100
- # endif
-diff -r 94ffd6b18431 -r c2e36a80a279 src/sudo_edit.c
---- a/src/sudo_edit.c Mon Jan 04 10:47:11 2016 -0700
-+++ b/src/sudo_edit.c Sun Jan 10 18:31:29 2016 -0700
-@@ -179,13 +179,15 @@
- }
-
- #ifndef HAVE_OPENAT
--/* This does not support AT_FDCWD... */
- static int
- sudo_openat(int dfd, const char *path, int flags, mode_t mode)
- {
- int fd, odfd;
- debug_decl(sudo_openat, SUDO_DEBUG_EDIT)
-
-+ if (dfd == AT_FDCWD)
-+ debug_return_int(open(path, flags, mode));
-+
- /* Save cwd */
- if ((odfd = open(".", O_RDONLY)) == -1)
- debug_return_int(-1);
-@@ -207,6 +209,64 @@
- #define openat sudo_openat
- #endif /* HAVE_OPENAT */
-
-+#ifdef O_NOFOLLOW
-+static int
-+sudo_edit_openat_nofollow(int dfd, char *path, int oflags, mode_t mode)
-+{
-+ debug_decl(sudo_edit_open_nofollow, SUDO_DEBUG_EDIT)
-+
-+ debug_return_int(openat(dfd, path, oflags|O_NOFOLLOW, mode));
-+}
-+#else
-+/*
-+ * Returns true if fd and path don't match or path is a symlink.
-+ * Used on older systems without O_NOFOLLOW.
-+ */
-+static bool
-+sudo_edit_is_symlink(int fd, char *path)
-+{
-+ struct stat sb1, sb2;
-+ debug_decl(sudo_edit_is_symlink, SUDO_DEBUG_EDIT)
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Treat [fl]stat() failure like there was a symlink.
-+ */
-+ if (fstat(fd, &sb1) == -1 || lstat(path, &sb2) == -1)
-+ debug_return_bool(true);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Make sure we did not open a link and that what we opened
-+ * matches what is currently on the file system.
-+ */
-+ if (S_ISLNK(sb2.st_mode) ||
-+ sb1.st_dev != sb2.st_dev || sb1.st_ino != sb2.st_ino) {
-+ debug_return_bool(true);
-+ }
-+
-+ debug_return_bool(false);
-+}
-+
-+static int
-+sudo_edit_openat_nofollow(char *path, int oflags, mode_t mode)
-+{
-+ struct stat sb1, sb2;
-+ int fd;
-+ debug_decl(sudo_edit_openat_nofollow, SUDO_DEBUG_EDIT)
-+
-+ fd = openat(dfd, path, oflags, mode);
-+ if (fd == -1)
-+ debug_return_int(-1);
-+
-+ if (sudo_edit_is_symlink(fd, path)) {
-+ close(fd);
-+ fd = -1;
-+ errno = ELOOP;
-+ }
-+
-+ debug_return_int(fd);
-+}
-+#endif /* O_NOFOLLOW */
-+
- /*
- * Returns true if the directory described by sb is writable
- * by the user. We treat directories with the sticky bit as
-@@ -245,49 +305,94 @@
- debug_return_bool(false);
- }
-
-+/*
-+ * Directory open flags for use with openat(2) and fstat(2).
-+ * Use O_PATH and O_DIRECTORY where possible.
-+ */
-+#if defined(O_PATH) && defined(O_DIRECTORY)
-+# define DIR_OPEN_FLAGS (O_PATH|O_DIRECTORY)
-+#elif defined(O_PATH) && !defined(O_DIRECTORY)
-+# define DIR_OPEN_FLAGS O_PATH
-+#elif !defined(O_PATH) && defined(O_DIRECTORY)
-+# define DIR_OPEN_FLAGS (O_RDONLY|O_DIRECTORY)
-+#else
-+# define DIR_OPEN_FLAGS (O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)
-+#endif
-+
- static int
- sudo_edit_open_nonwritable(char *path, int oflags, mode_t mode)
- {
-- char *base, *dir;
-+ int dfd, fd, dflags = DIR_OPEN_FLAGS;
-+#if defined(__linux__) && defined(O_PATH)
-+ char *opath = path;
-+#endif
-+ bool is_writable;
- struct stat sb;
-- int dfd, fd;
- debug_decl(sudo_edit_open_nonwritable, SUDO_DEBUG_EDIT)
-
-- base = strrchr(path, '/');
-- if (base != NULL) {
-- *base++ = '\0';
-- dir = path;
-+#if defined(__linux__) && defined(O_PATH)
-+restart:
-+#endif
-+ if (path[0] == '/') {
-+ dfd = open("/", dflags);
-+ path++;
- } else {
-- base = path;
-- dir = ".";
-+ dfd = open(".", dflags);
-+ if (path[0] == '.' && path[1] == '/')
-+ path += 2;
- }
--#ifdef O_PATH
-- if ((dfd = open(dir, O_PATH)) != -1) {
-- /* Linux kernels < 3.6 can't do fstat on O_PATH fds. */
-- if (fstat(dfd, &sb) == -1) {
-- close(dfd);
-- dfd = open(dir, O_RDONLY);
-- if (fstat(dfd, &sb) == -1) {
-- close(dfd);
-- dfd = -1;
-- }
-- }
-- }
--#else
-- if ((dfd = open(dir, O_RDONLY)) != -1) {
-- if (fstat(dfd, &sb) == -1) {
-- close(dfd);
-- dfd = -1;
-- }
-- }
--#endif
-- if (base != path)
-- base[-1] = '/'; /* restore path */
- if (dfd == -1)
- debug_return_int(-1);
-
-- if (dir_is_writable(&sb, user_details.uid, user_details.gid,
-- user_details.ngroups, user_details.groups)) {
-+ for (;;) {
-+ char *slash;
-+ int subdfd;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Look up one component at a time, avoiding symbolic links in
-+ * writable directories.
-+ */
-+ if (fstat(dfd, &sb) == -1) {
-+ close(dfd);
-+#if defined(__linux__) && defined(O_PATH)
-+ /* Linux prior to 3.6 can't fstat an O_PATH fd */
-+ if (ISSET(dflags, O_PATH)) {
-+ CLR(dflags, O_PATH);
-+ path = opath;
-+ goto restart;
-+ }
-+#endif
-+ debug_return_int(-1);
-+ }
-+#ifndef O_DIRECTORY
-+ if (!S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) {
-+ close(dfd);
-+ errno = ENOTDIR;
-+ debug_return_int(-1);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+ is_writable = dir_is_writable(&sb, user_details.uid, user_details.gid,
-+ user_details.ngroups, user_details.groups);
-+
-+ while (path[0] == '/')
-+ path++;
-+ slash = strchr(path, '/');
-+ if (slash == NULL)
-+ break;
-+ *slash = '\0';
-+ if (is_writable)
-+ subdfd = sudo_edit_openat_nofollow(dfd, path, dflags, 0);
-+ else
-+ subdfd = openat(dfd, path, dflags, 0);
-+ *slash = '/'; /* restore path */
-+ close(dfd);
-+ if (subdfd == -1)
-+ debug_return_int(-1);
-+ path = slash + 1;
-+ dfd = subdfd;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (is_writable) {
- close(dfd);
- errno = EISDIR;
- debug_return_int(-1);
-@@ -332,27 +437,10 @@
- if (!ISSET(oflags, O_NONBLOCK))
- (void) fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0) & ~O_NONBLOCK);
-
-- /*
-- * Treat [fl]stat() failure like an open() failure.
-- */
-- if (fstat(fd, &sb1) == -1 || lstat(path, &sb2) == -1) {
-- const int serrno = errno;
-+ if (!ISSET(sflags, CD_SUDOEDIT_FOLLOW) && sudo_edit_is_symlink(fd, path)) {
- close(fd);
-- errno = serrno;
-- debug_return_int(-1);
-- }
--
-- /*
-- * Make sure we did not open a link and that what we opened
-- * matches what is currently on the file system.
-- */
-- if (!ISSET(sflags, CD_SUDOEDIT_FOLLOW)) {
-- if (S_ISLNK(sb2.st_mode) ||
-- sb1.st_dev != sb2.st_dev || sb1.st_ino != sb2.st_ino) {
-- close(fd);
-- errno = ELOOP;
-- debug_return_int(-1);
-- }
-+ fd = -1;
-+ errno = ELOOP;
- }
-
- debug_return_int(fd);
-