From 4e23e8d80913fc2a69e97b29b5640e745b0d550b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Leo Famulari Date: Wed, 8 Aug 2018 11:35:46 -0400 Subject: gnu: wpa_supplicant: Fix CVE-2018-14526. * gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch: New file. * gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Add it. * gnu/packages/admin.scm (wpa-supplicant-minimal)[source]: Use it. --- .../patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 53 insertions(+) create mode 100644 gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch (limited to 'gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch') diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d3d5cbc46a --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2018-14526.patch @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +Fix CVE-2018-14526: + +https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-14526 +https://w1.fi/security/2018-1/unauthenticated-eapol-key-decryption.txt + +Patch downloaded from upstream: + +https://w1.fi/security/2018-1/rebased-v2.6-0001-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch + +From 3e34cfdff6b192fe337c6fb3f487f73e96582961 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mathy Vanhoef +Date: Sun, 15 Jul 2018 01:25:53 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] WPA: Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data + +Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data in supplicant +processing. When using WPA2, these are frames that have the Encrypted +flag set, but not the MIC flag. + +When using WPA2, EAPOL-Key frames that had the Encrypted flag set but +not the MIC flag, had their data field decrypted without first verifying +the MIC. In case the data field was encrypted using RC4 (i.e., when +negotiating TKIP as the pairwise cipher), this meant that +unauthenticated but decrypted data would then be processed. An adversary +could abuse this as a decryption oracle to recover sensitive information +in the data field of EAPOL-Key messages (e.g., the group key). +(CVE-2018-14526) + +Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef +--- + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 11 +++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) + +diff -upr wpa_supplicant-2.6.orig/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +--- wpa_supplicant-2.6.orig/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c 2016-10-02 21:51:11.000000000 +0300 ++++ wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c 2018-08-08 16:55:11.506831029 +0300 +@@ -2016,6 +2016,17 @@ int wpa_sm_rx_eapol(struct wpa_sm *sm, c + + if ((sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN || sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_OSEN) && + (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA)) { ++ /* ++ * Only decrypt the Key Data field if the frame's authenticity ++ * was verified. When using AES-SIV (FILS), the MIC flag is not ++ * set, so this check should only be performed if mic_len != 0 ++ * which is the case in this code branch. ++ */ ++ if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)) { ++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, ++ "WPA: Ignore EAPOL-Key with encrypted but unauthenticated data"); ++ goto out; ++ } + if (wpa_supplicant_decrypt_key_data(sm, key, ver, key_data, + &key_data_len)) + goto out; -- cgit v1.2.3