diff options
author | Leo Famulari <leo@famulari.name> | 2016-10-05 13:25:09 -0400 |
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committer | Leo Famulari <leo@famulari.name> | 2016-10-05 17:37:22 -0400 |
commit | 666d40193c1880b6b68387389fb69eda60a5c7ee (patch) | |
tree | 07970ac95c6ab95636d51a8d1e7ed6aff735790c /gnu/packages/patches | |
parent | a300db1c7f319406d7fa4b408db45aeceac2cc0c (diff) | |
download | guix-666d40193c1880b6b68387389fb69eda60a5c7ee.tar guix-666d40193c1880b6b68387389fb69eda60a5c7ee.tar.gz |
gnu: libxrender: Fix CVE-2016-{7949,7950}.
* gnu/packages/patches/libxrender-CVE-2016-7949.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/libxrender-CVE-2016-7950.patch: New files.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Add them.
* gnu/packages/xorg.scm (libxrender)[replacement]: New field.
(libxrender/fixed): New variable.
Diffstat (limited to 'gnu/packages/patches')
-rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/libxrender-CVE-2016-7949.patch | 66 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/libxrender-CVE-2016-7950.patch | 73 |
2 files changed, 139 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libxrender-CVE-2016-7949.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libxrender-CVE-2016-7949.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3a2be4ea8e --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libxrender-CVE-2016-7949.patch @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +Fix CVE-2016-7949: + +https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-7949 + +Patch copied from upstream source repository: + +https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libXrender/commit/?id=9362c7ddd1af3b168953d0737877bc52d79c94f4 + +From 9362c7ddd1af3b168953d0737877bc52d79c94f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org> +Date: Sun, 25 Sep 2016 21:43:09 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Validate lengths while parsing server data. + +Individual lengths inside received server data can overflow +the previously reserved memory. + +It is therefore important to validate every single length +field to not overflow the previously agreed sum of all invidual +length fields. + +v2: consume remaining bytes in the reply buffer on error. + +Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org> +Reviewed-by: Matthieu Herrb@laas.fr +--- + src/Xrender.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/Xrender.c b/src/Xrender.c +index 3102eb2..71cf3e6 100644 +--- a/src/Xrender.c ++++ b/src/Xrender.c +@@ -533,12 +533,30 @@ XRenderQueryFormats (Display *dpy) + screen->fallback = _XRenderFindFormat (xri, xScreen->fallback); + screen->subpixel = SubPixelUnknown; + xDepth = (xPictDepth *) (xScreen + 1); ++ if (screen->ndepths > rep.numDepths) { ++ Xfree (xri); ++ Xfree (xData); ++ _XEatDataWords (dpy, rep.length); ++ UnlockDisplay (dpy); ++ SyncHandle (); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ rep.numDepths -= screen->ndepths; + for (nd = 0; nd < screen->ndepths; nd++) + { + depth->depth = xDepth->depth; + depth->nvisuals = xDepth->nPictVisuals; + depth->visuals = visual; + xVisual = (xPictVisual *) (xDepth + 1); ++ if (depth->nvisuals > rep.numVisuals) { ++ Xfree (xri); ++ Xfree (xData); ++ _XEatDataWords (dpy, rep.length); ++ UnlockDisplay (dpy); ++ SyncHandle (); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ rep.numVisuals -= depth->nvisuals; + for (nv = 0; nv < depth->nvisuals; nv++) + { + visual->visual = _XRenderFindVisual (dpy, xVisual->visual); +-- +2.10.1 + diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libxrender-CVE-2016-7950.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libxrender-CVE-2016-7950.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..1a64b6e724 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libxrender-CVE-2016-7950.patch @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +Fix CVE-2016-7950: + +https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-7950 + +Patch copied from upstream source repository: + +https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libXrender/commit/?id=8fad00b0b647ee662ce4737ca15be033b7a21714 + +From 8fad00b0b647ee662ce4737ca15be033b7a21714 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org> +Date: Sun, 25 Sep 2016 21:42:09 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Avoid OOB write in XRenderQueryFilters + +The memory for filter names is reserved right after receiving the reply. +After that, filters are iterated and each individual filter name is +stored in that reserved memory. + +The individual name lengths are not checked for validity, which means +that a malicious server can reserve less memory than it will write to +during each iteration. + +v2: consume remaining bytes in reply buffer on error. + +Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org> +Reviewed-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu> +--- + src/Filter.c | 13 ++++++++++++- + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/Filter.c b/src/Filter.c +index edfa572..8d701eb 100644 +--- a/src/Filter.c ++++ b/src/Filter.c +@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ XRenderQueryFilters (Display *dpy, Drawable drawable) + char *name; + char len; + int i; +- unsigned long nbytes, nbytesAlias, nbytesName; ++ unsigned long nbytes, nbytesAlias, nbytesName, reply_left; + + if (!RenderHasExtension (info)) + return NULL; +@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ XRenderQueryFilters (Display *dpy, Drawable drawable) + * Read the filter aliases + */ + _XRead16Pad (dpy, filters->alias, 2 * rep.numAliases); ++ reply_left = 8 + rep.length - 2 * rep.numAliases;; + + /* + * Read the filter names +@@ -122,9 +123,19 @@ XRenderQueryFilters (Display *dpy, Drawable drawable) + { + int l; + _XRead (dpy, &len, 1); ++ reply_left--; + l = len & 0xff; ++ if ((unsigned long)l + 1 > nbytesName) { ++ _XEatDataWords(dpy, reply_left); ++ Xfree(filters); ++ UnlockDisplay (dpy); ++ SyncHandle (); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ nbytesName -= l + 1; + filters->filter[i] = name; + _XRead (dpy, name, l); ++ reply_left -= l; + name[l] = '\0'; + name += l + 1; + } +-- +2.10.1 + |