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authorLeo Famulari <leo@famulari.name>2016-10-05 13:25:09 -0400
committerLeo Famulari <leo@famulari.name>2016-10-05 17:37:22 -0400
commit666d40193c1880b6b68387389fb69eda60a5c7ee (patch)
tree07970ac95c6ab95636d51a8d1e7ed6aff735790c /gnu/packages/patches
parenta300db1c7f319406d7fa4b408db45aeceac2cc0c (diff)
downloadguix-666d40193c1880b6b68387389fb69eda60a5c7ee.tar
guix-666d40193c1880b6b68387389fb69eda60a5c7ee.tar.gz
gnu: libxrender: Fix CVE-2016-{7949,7950}.
* gnu/packages/patches/libxrender-CVE-2016-7949.patch, gnu/packages/patches/libxrender-CVE-2016-7950.patch: New files. * gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Add them. * gnu/packages/xorg.scm (libxrender)[replacement]: New field. (libxrender/fixed): New variable.
Diffstat (limited to 'gnu/packages/patches')
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/libxrender-CVE-2016-7949.patch66
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/libxrender-CVE-2016-7950.patch73
2 files changed, 139 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libxrender-CVE-2016-7949.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libxrender-CVE-2016-7949.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3a2be4ea8e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libxrender-CVE-2016-7949.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+Fix CVE-2016-7949:
+
+https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-7949
+
+Patch copied from upstream source repository:
+
+https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libXrender/commit/?id=9362c7ddd1af3b168953d0737877bc52d79c94f4
+
+From 9362c7ddd1af3b168953d0737877bc52d79c94f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
+Date: Sun, 25 Sep 2016 21:43:09 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Validate lengths while parsing server data.
+
+Individual lengths inside received server data can overflow
+the previously reserved memory.
+
+It is therefore important to validate every single length
+field to not overflow the previously agreed sum of all invidual
+length fields.
+
+v2: consume remaining bytes in the reply buffer on error.
+
+Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
+Reviewed-by: Matthieu Herrb@laas.fr
+---
+ src/Xrender.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/Xrender.c b/src/Xrender.c
+index 3102eb2..71cf3e6 100644
+--- a/src/Xrender.c
++++ b/src/Xrender.c
+@@ -533,12 +533,30 @@ XRenderQueryFormats (Display *dpy)
+ screen->fallback = _XRenderFindFormat (xri, xScreen->fallback);
+ screen->subpixel = SubPixelUnknown;
+ xDepth = (xPictDepth *) (xScreen + 1);
++ if (screen->ndepths > rep.numDepths) {
++ Xfree (xri);
++ Xfree (xData);
++ _XEatDataWords (dpy, rep.length);
++ UnlockDisplay (dpy);
++ SyncHandle ();
++ return 0;
++ }
++ rep.numDepths -= screen->ndepths;
+ for (nd = 0; nd < screen->ndepths; nd++)
+ {
+ depth->depth = xDepth->depth;
+ depth->nvisuals = xDepth->nPictVisuals;
+ depth->visuals = visual;
+ xVisual = (xPictVisual *) (xDepth + 1);
++ if (depth->nvisuals > rep.numVisuals) {
++ Xfree (xri);
++ Xfree (xData);
++ _XEatDataWords (dpy, rep.length);
++ UnlockDisplay (dpy);
++ SyncHandle ();
++ return 0;
++ }
++ rep.numVisuals -= depth->nvisuals;
+ for (nv = 0; nv < depth->nvisuals; nv++)
+ {
+ visual->visual = _XRenderFindVisual (dpy, xVisual->visual);
+--
+2.10.1
+
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libxrender-CVE-2016-7950.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libxrender-CVE-2016-7950.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1a64b6e724
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/libxrender-CVE-2016-7950.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+Fix CVE-2016-7950:
+
+https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-7950
+
+Patch copied from upstream source repository:
+
+https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libXrender/commit/?id=8fad00b0b647ee662ce4737ca15be033b7a21714
+
+From 8fad00b0b647ee662ce4737ca15be033b7a21714 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
+Date: Sun, 25 Sep 2016 21:42:09 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Avoid OOB write in XRenderQueryFilters
+
+The memory for filter names is reserved right after receiving the reply.
+After that, filters are iterated and each individual filter name is
+stored in that reserved memory.
+
+The individual name lengths are not checked for validity, which means
+that a malicious server can reserve less memory than it will write to
+during each iteration.
+
+v2: consume remaining bytes in reply buffer on error.
+
+Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
+Reviewed-by: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
+---
+ src/Filter.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/Filter.c b/src/Filter.c
+index edfa572..8d701eb 100644
+--- a/src/Filter.c
++++ b/src/Filter.c
+@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ XRenderQueryFilters (Display *dpy, Drawable drawable)
+ char *name;
+ char len;
+ int i;
+- unsigned long nbytes, nbytesAlias, nbytesName;
++ unsigned long nbytes, nbytesAlias, nbytesName, reply_left;
+
+ if (!RenderHasExtension (info))
+ return NULL;
+@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ XRenderQueryFilters (Display *dpy, Drawable drawable)
+ * Read the filter aliases
+ */
+ _XRead16Pad (dpy, filters->alias, 2 * rep.numAliases);
++ reply_left = 8 + rep.length - 2 * rep.numAliases;;
+
+ /*
+ * Read the filter names
+@@ -122,9 +123,19 @@ XRenderQueryFilters (Display *dpy, Drawable drawable)
+ {
+ int l;
+ _XRead (dpy, &len, 1);
++ reply_left--;
+ l = len & 0xff;
++ if ((unsigned long)l + 1 > nbytesName) {
++ _XEatDataWords(dpy, reply_left);
++ Xfree(filters);
++ UnlockDisplay (dpy);
++ SyncHandle ();
++ return NULL;
++ }
++ nbytesName -= l + 1;
+ filters->filter[i] = name;
+ _XRead (dpy, name, l);
++ reply_left -= l;
+ name[l] = '\0';
+ name += l + 1;
+ }
+--
+2.10.1
+