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authorMarius Bakke <mbakke@fastmail.com>2017-12-05 23:41:30 +0100
committerMarius Bakke <mbakke@fastmail.com>2017-12-05 23:41:30 +0100
commit77181815ae70cf573b6fa390a4400b718835aa8a (patch)
tree731ccaaccc7a69ddc90f04bb71a6a39aa5f3be5a /gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-15118.patch
parente3f9406b7c4b3b1afe3dd6affb7f7898434d607a (diff)
parent35377cfa908340e51fd22af7369aef15499d4a36 (diff)
downloadguix-77181815ae70cf573b6fa390a4400b718835aa8a.tar
guix-77181815ae70cf573b6fa390a4400b718835aa8a.tar.gz
Merge branch 'master' into core-updates
Diffstat (limited to 'gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-15118.patch')
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-15118.patch58
1 files changed, 58 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-15118.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-15118.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d427317be9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-15118.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+Fix CVE-2017-15118:
+
+https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-15118
+https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1516922
+
+Patch copied from upstream source repository:
+
+https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=51ae4f8455c9e32c54770c4ebc25bf86a8128183
+
+From 51ae4f8455c9e32c54770c4ebc25bf86a8128183 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 22 Nov 2017 15:07:22 -0600
+Subject: [PATCH] nbd/server: CVE-2017-15118 Stack smash on large export name
+
+Introduced in commit f37708f6b8 (2.10). The NBD spec says a client
+can request export names up to 4096 bytes in length, even though
+they should not expect success on names longer than 256. However,
+qemu hard-codes the limit of 256, and fails to filter out a client
+that probes for a longer name; the result is a stack smash that can
+potentially give an attacker arbitrary control over the qemu
+process.
+
+The smash can be easily demonstrated with this client:
+$ qemu-io f raw nbd://localhost:10809/$(printf %3000d 1 | tr ' ' a)
+
+If the qemu NBD server binary (whether the standalone qemu-nbd, or
+the builtin server of QMP nbd-server-start) was compiled with
+-fstack-protector-strong, the ability to exploit the stack smash
+into arbitrary execution is a lot more difficult (but still
+theoretically possible to a determined attacker, perhaps in
+combination with other CVEs). Still, crashing a running qemu (and
+losing the VM) is bad enough, even if the attacker did not obtain
+full execution control.
+
+CC: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
+Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
+---
+ nbd/server.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/nbd/server.c b/nbd/server.c
+index a81801e3bc..92c0fdd03b 100644
+--- a/nbd/server.c
++++ b/nbd/server.c
+@@ -386,6 +386,10 @@ static int nbd_negotiate_handle_info(NBDClient *client, uint32_t length,
+ msg = "name length is incorrect";
+ goto invalid;
+ }
++ if (namelen >= sizeof(name)) {
++ msg = "name too long for qemu";
++ goto invalid;
++ }
+ if (nbd_read(client->ioc, name, namelen, errp) < 0) {
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+--
+2.15.0
+