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Fix CVE-2017-15118:
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-15118
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1516922
Patch copied from upstream source repository:
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=51ae4f8455c9e32c54770c4ebc25bf86a8128183
From 51ae4f8455c9e32c54770c4ebc25bf86a8128183 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Nov 2017 15:07:22 -0600
Subject: [PATCH] nbd/server: CVE-2017-15118 Stack smash on large export name
Introduced in commit f37708f6b8 (2.10). The NBD spec says a client
can request export names up to 4096 bytes in length, even though
they should not expect success on names longer than 256. However,
qemu hard-codes the limit of 256, and fails to filter out a client
that probes for a longer name; the result is a stack smash that can
potentially give an attacker arbitrary control over the qemu
process.
The smash can be easily demonstrated with this client:
$ qemu-io f raw nbd://localhost:10809/$(printf %3000d 1 | tr ' ' a)
If the qemu NBD server binary (whether the standalone qemu-nbd, or
the builtin server of QMP nbd-server-start) was compiled with
-fstack-protector-strong, the ability to exploit the stack smash
into arbitrary execution is a lot more difficult (but still
theoretically possible to a determined attacker, perhaps in
combination with other CVEs). Still, crashing a running qemu (and
losing the VM) is bad enough, even if the attacker did not obtain
full execution control.
CC: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
---
nbd/server.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/nbd/server.c b/nbd/server.c
index a81801e3bc..92c0fdd03b 100644
--- a/nbd/server.c
+++ b/nbd/server.c
@@ -386,6 +386,10 @@ static int nbd_negotiate_handle_info(NBDClient *client, uint32_t length,
msg = "name length is incorrect";
goto invalid;
}
+ if (namelen >= sizeof(name)) {
+ msg = "name too long for qemu";
+ goto invalid;
+ }
if (nbd_read(client->ioc, name, namelen, errp) < 0) {
return -EIO;
}
--
2.15.0
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