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authorMark H Weaver <mhw@netris.org>2017-06-25 20:58:17 -0400
committerMark H Weaver <mhw@netris.org>2017-06-25 21:56:22 -0400
commitffc015bea26f24d862e7e877d907fbe1ab9a9967 (patch)
tree0386ba824424b7c64b9adf5845e1ba93e9fcf626 /gnu
parentafc9d8ec2b724b67f85b05011725bb636f209a1a (diff)
downloadgnu-guix-ffc015bea26f24d862e7e877d907fbe1ab9a9967.tar
gnu-guix-ffc015bea26f24d862e7e877d907fbe1ab9a9967.tar.gz
gnu: glibc: Fix replacement on i686.
This is followup to 665d6a59161769e10b52ffcbcd5cd2db22f32681. Fixes <https://bugs.gnu.org/27489>. * gnu/packages/base.scm (glibc-2.25-patched, glibc-2.24, glibc-2.23) (glibc-2.22): Add glibc-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch to patches. Move a comment where it belongs. * gnu/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt2.patch: Swap with ... * gnu/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt3.patch: ... this. * gnu/packages/patches/glibc-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch: New file. * gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Add it. Fix formatting.
Diffstat (limited to 'gnu')
-rw-r--r--gnu/local.mk7
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/base.scm10
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt2.patch274
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt3.patch274
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/glibc-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch23
5 files changed, 308 insertions, 280 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/local.mk b/gnu/local.mk
index 102fe98e60..5d024de07e 100644
--- a/gnu/local.mk
+++ b/gnu/local.mk
@@ -630,14 +630,15 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \
%D%/packages/patches/ghostscript-runpath.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/glib-networking-ssl-cert-file.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/glib-tests-timer.patch \
- %D%/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt1.patch \
- %D%/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt2.patch \
- %D%/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt3.patch \
+ %D%/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt1.patch \
+ %D%/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt2.patch \
+ %D%/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt3.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/glibc-bootstrap-system.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/glibc-ldd-x86_64.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/glibc-locales.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/glibc-memchr-overflow-i686.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/glibc-o-largefile.patch \
+ %D%/packages/patches/glibc-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/glibc-versioned-locpath.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/glog-gcc-5-demangling.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/gmp-arm-asm-nothumb.patch \
diff --git a/gnu/packages/base.scm b/gnu/packages/base.scm
index 2767909805..979d657957 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/base.scm
+++ b/gnu/packages/base.scm
@@ -902,9 +902,6 @@ GLIBC/HURD for a Hurd host"
(define-syntax glibc
(identifier-syntax (glibc-for-target)))
-;; Below are old libc versions, which we use mostly to build locale data in
-;; the old format (which the new libc cannot cope with.)
-
(define glibc-2.25-patched
(package
(inherit glibc)
@@ -914,10 +911,14 @@ GLIBC/HURD for a Hurd host"
(patches (search-patches "glibc-ldd-x86_64.patch"
"glibc-versioned-locpath.patch"
"glibc-o-largefile.patch"
+ "glibc-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch"
"glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt1.patch"
"glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt2.patch"
"glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt3.patch"))))))
+;; Below are old libc versions, which we use mostly to build locale data in
+;; the old format (which the new libc cannot cope with.)
+
(define-public glibc-2.24
(package
(inherit glibc)
@@ -933,6 +934,7 @@ GLIBC/HURD for a Hurd host"
(patches (search-patches "glibc-ldd-x86_64.patch"
"glibc-versioned-locpath.patch"
"glibc-o-largefile.patch"
+ "glibc-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch"
"glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt1.patch"
"glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt2.patch"
"glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt3.patch"))))))
@@ -952,6 +954,7 @@ GLIBC/HURD for a Hurd host"
(patches (search-patches "glibc-ldd-x86_64.patch"
"glibc-versioned-locpath.patch"
"glibc-o-largefile.patch"
+ "glibc-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch"
"glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt1.patch"
"glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt2.patch"
"glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt3.patch"))))))
@@ -969,6 +972,7 @@ GLIBC/HURD for a Hurd host"
(base32
"0j49682pm2nh4qbdw35bas82p1pgfnz4d2l7iwfyzvrvj0318wzb"))
(patches (search-patches "glibc-ldd-x86_64.patch"
+ "glibc-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch"
"glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt1.patch"
"glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt2.patch"
"glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt3.patch"))))
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt2.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt2.patch
index 3d8f6d2bf8..4b859c4bfd 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt2.patch
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt2.patch
@@ -1,206 +1,124 @@
-From 81b82fb966ffbd94353f793ad17116c6088dedd9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 6d0ba622891bed9d8394eef1935add53003b12e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2017 22:32:12 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] ld.so: Reject overly long LD_AUDIT path elements
-
-Also only process the last LD_AUDIT entry.
+Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2017 22:31:04 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] ld.so: Reject overly long LD_PRELOAD path elements
patch from:
-https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commit;h=81b82fb966ffbd94353f793ad17116c6088dedd9
+https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=patch;h=6d0ba622891bed9d8394eef1935add53003b12e8
---
- ChangeLog | 11 +++++++
- elf/rtld.c | 110 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
- 2 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+ ChangeLog | 7 ++++++
+ elf/rtld.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
+ 2 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/elf/rtld.c b/elf/rtld.c
-index 86ae20c..65647fb 100644
+index 2269dbe..86ae20c 100644
--- a/elf/rtld.c
+++ b/elf/rtld.c
-@@ -129,13 +129,91 @@ dso_name_valid_for_suid (const char *p)
- return *p != '\0';
- }
+@@ -99,6 +99,35 @@ uintptr_t __pointer_chk_guard_local
+ strong_alias (__pointer_chk_guard_local, __pointer_chk_guard)
+ #endif
--/* List of auditing DSOs. */
-+/* LD_AUDIT variable contents. Must be processed before the
-+ audit_list below. */
-+const char *audit_list_string;
++/* Length limits for names and paths, to protect the dynamic linker,
++ particularly when __libc_enable_secure is active. */
++#ifdef NAME_MAX
++# define SECURE_NAME_LIMIT NAME_MAX
++#else
++# define SECURE_NAME_LIMIT 255
++#endif
++#ifdef PATH_MAX
++# define SECURE_PATH_LIMIT PATH_MAX
++#else
++# define SECURE_PATH_LIMIT 1024
++#endif
+
-+/* Cyclic list of auditing DSOs. audit_list->next is the first
-+ element. */
++/* Check that AT_SECURE=0, or that the passed name does not contain
++ directories and is not overly long. Reject empty names
++ unconditionally. */
++static bool
++dso_name_valid_for_suid (const char *p)
++{
++ if (__glibc_unlikely (__libc_enable_secure))
++ {
++ /* Ignore pathnames with directories for AT_SECURE=1
++ programs, and also skip overlong names. */
++ size_t len = strlen (p);
++ if (len >= SECURE_NAME_LIMIT || memchr (p, '/', len) != NULL)
++ return false;
++ }
++ return *p != '\0';
++}
+
+ /* List of auditing DSOs. */
static struct audit_list
- {
- const char *name;
- struct audit_list *next;
- } *audit_list;
+@@ -718,6 +747,42 @@ static const char *preloadlist attribute_relro;
+ /* Nonzero if information about versions has to be printed. */
+ static int version_info attribute_relro;
-+/* Iterator for audit_list_string followed by audit_list. */
-+struct audit_list_iter
-+{
-+ /* Tail of audit_list_string still needing processing, or NULL. */
-+ const char *audit_list_tail;
-+
-+ /* The list element returned in the previous iteration. NULL before
-+ the first element. */
-+ struct audit_list *previous;
-+
-+ /* Scratch buffer for returning a name which is part of
-+ audit_list_string. */
-+ char fname[SECURE_NAME_LIMIT];
-+};
-+
-+/* Initialize an audit list iterator. */
-+static void
-+audit_list_iter_init (struct audit_list_iter *iter)
++/* The LD_PRELOAD environment variable gives list of libraries
++ separated by white space or colons that are loaded before the
++ executable's dependencies and prepended to the global scope list.
++ (If the binary is running setuid all elements containing a '/' are
++ ignored since it is insecure.) Return the number of preloads
++ performed. */
++unsigned int
++handle_ld_preload (const char *preloadlist, struct link_map *main_map)
+{
-+ iter->audit_list_tail = audit_list_string;
-+ iter->previous = NULL;
-+}
++ unsigned int npreloads = 0;
++ const char *p = preloadlist;
++ char fname[SECURE_PATH_LIMIT];
+
-+/* Iterate through both audit_list_string and audit_list. */
-+static const char *
-+audit_list_iter_next (struct audit_list_iter *iter)
-+{
-+ if (iter->audit_list_tail != NULL)
++ while (*p != '\0')
+ {
-+ /* First iterate over audit_list_string. */
-+ while (*iter->audit_list_tail != '\0')
++ /* Split preload list at space/colon. */
++ size_t len = strcspn (p, " :");
++ if (len > 0 && len < sizeof (fname))
+ {
-+ /* Split audit list at colon. */
-+ size_t len = strcspn (iter->audit_list_tail, ":");
-+ if (len > 0 && len < sizeof (iter->fname))
-+ {
-+ memcpy (iter->fname, iter->audit_list_tail, len);
-+ iter->fname[len] = '\0';
-+ }
-+ else
-+ /* Do not return this name to the caller. */
-+ iter->fname[0] = '\0';
-+
-+ /* Skip over the substring and the following delimiter. */
-+ iter->audit_list_tail += len;
-+ if (*iter->audit_list_tail == ':')
-+ ++iter->audit_list_tail;
-+
-+ /* If the name is valid, return it. */
-+ if (dso_name_valid_for_suid (iter->fname))
-+ return iter->fname;
-+ /* Otherwise, wrap around and try the next name. */
++ memcpy (fname, p, len);
++ fname[len] = '\0';
+ }
-+ /* Fall through to the procesing of audit_list. */
-+ }
++ else
++ fname[0] = '\0';
+
-+ if (iter->previous == NULL)
-+ {
-+ if (audit_list == NULL)
-+ /* No pre-parsed audit list. */
-+ return NULL;
-+ /* Start of audit list. The first list element is at
-+ audit_list->next (cyclic list). */
-+ iter->previous = audit_list->next;
-+ return iter->previous->name;
++ /* Skip over the substring and the following delimiter. */
++ p += len;
++ if (*p != '\0')
++ ++p;
++
++ if (dso_name_valid_for_suid (fname))
++ npreloads += do_preload (fname, main_map, "LD_PRELOAD");
+ }
-+ if (iter->previous == audit_list)
-+ /* Cyclic list wrap-around. */
-+ return NULL;
-+ iter->previous = iter->previous->next;
-+ return iter->previous->name;
++ return npreloads;
+}
+
- #ifndef HAVE_INLINED_SYSCALLS
- /* Set nonzero during loading and initialization of executable and
- libraries, cleared before the executable's entry point runs. This
-@@ -1305,11 +1383,13 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend to run this program.\n\
- GL(dl_rtld_map).l_tls_modid = _dl_next_tls_modid ();
+ static void
+ dl_main (const ElfW(Phdr) *phdr,
+ ElfW(Word) phnum,
+@@ -1464,23 +1529,8 @@ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit interface: %s; ignored.\n",
- /* If we have auditing DSOs to load, do it now. */
-- if (__glibc_unlikely (audit_list != NULL))
-+ bool need_security_init = true;
-+ if (__glibc_unlikely (audit_list != NULL)
-+ || __glibc_unlikely (audit_list_string != NULL))
+ if (__glibc_unlikely (preloadlist != NULL))
{
-- /* Iterate over all entries in the list. The order is important. */
- struct audit_ifaces *last_audit = NULL;
-- struct audit_list *al = audit_list->next;
-+ struct audit_list_iter al_iter;
-+ audit_list_iter_init (&al_iter);
-
- /* Since we start using the auditing DSOs right away we need to
- initialize the data structures now. */
-@@ -1320,9 +1400,14 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend to run this program.\n\
- use different values (especially the pointer guard) and will
- fail later on. */
- security_init ();
-+ need_security_init = false;
-
-- do
-+ while (true)
- {
-+ const char *name = audit_list_iter_next (&al_iter);
-+ if (name == NULL)
-+ break;
-+
- int tls_idx = GL(dl_tls_max_dtv_idx);
-
- /* Now it is time to determine the layout of the static TLS
-@@ -1331,7 +1416,7 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend to run this program.\n\
- no DF_STATIC_TLS bit is set. The reason is that we know
- glibc will use the static model. */
- struct dlmopen_args dlmargs;
-- dlmargs.fname = al->name;
-+ dlmargs.fname = name;
- dlmargs.map = NULL;
-
- const char *objname;
-@@ -1344,7 +1429,7 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend to run this program.\n\
- not_loaded:
- _dl_error_printf ("\
- ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit interface: %s; ignored.\n",
-- al->name, err_str);
-+ name, err_str);
- if (malloced)
- free ((char *) err_str);
- }
-@@ -1448,10 +1533,7 @@ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit interface: %s; ignored.\n",
- goto not_loaded;
- }
- }
+- /* The LD_PRELOAD environment variable gives list of libraries
+- separated by white space or colons that are loaded before the
+- executable's dependencies and prepended to the global scope
+- list. If the binary is running setuid all elements
+- containing a '/' are ignored since it is insecure. */
+- char *list = strdupa (preloadlist);
+- char *p;
-
-- al = al->next;
- }
-- while (al != audit_list->next);
-
- /* If we have any auditing modules, announce that we already
- have two objects loaded. */
-@@ -1715,7 +1797,7 @@ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit interface: %s; ignored.\n",
- if (tcbp == NULL)
- tcbp = init_tls ();
-
-- if (__glibc_likely (audit_list == NULL))
-+ if (__glibc_likely (need_security_init))
- /* Initialize security features. But only if we have not done it
- earlier. */
- security_init ();
-@@ -2346,9 +2428,7 @@ process_dl_audit (char *str)
- char *p;
-
- while ((p = (strsep) (&str, ":")) != NULL)
-- if (p[0] != '\0'
-- && (__builtin_expect (! __libc_enable_secure, 1)
-- || strchr (p, '/') == NULL))
-+ if (dso_name_valid_for_suid (p))
- {
- /* This is using the local malloc, not the system malloc. The
- memory can never be freed. */
-@@ -2412,7 +2492,7 @@ process_envvars (enum mode *modep)
- break;
- }
- if (memcmp (envline, "AUDIT", 5) == 0)
-- process_dl_audit (&envline[6]);
-+ audit_list_string = &envline[6];
- break;
-
- case 7:
+ HP_TIMING_NOW (start);
+-
+- /* Prevent optimizing strsep. Speed is not important here. */
+- while ((p = (strsep) (&list, " :")) != NULL)
+- if (p[0] != '\0'
+- && (__builtin_expect (! __libc_enable_secure, 1)
+- || strchr (p, '/') == NULL))
+- npreloads += do_preload (p, main_map, "LD_PRELOAD");
+-
++ npreloads += handle_ld_preload (preloadlist, main_map);
+ HP_TIMING_NOW (stop);
+ HP_TIMING_DIFF (diff, start, stop);
+ HP_TIMING_ACCUM_NT (load_time, diff);
--
2.9.3
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt3.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt3.patch
index 4b859c4bfd..3d8f6d2bf8 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt3.patch
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2017-1000366-pt3.patch
@@ -1,124 +1,206 @@
-From 6d0ba622891bed9d8394eef1935add53003b12e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From 81b82fb966ffbd94353f793ad17116c6088dedd9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2017 22:31:04 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] ld.so: Reject overly long LD_PRELOAD path elements
+Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2017 22:32:12 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] ld.so: Reject overly long LD_AUDIT path elements
+
+Also only process the last LD_AUDIT entry.
patch from:
-https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=patch;h=6d0ba622891bed9d8394eef1935add53003b12e8
+https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commit;h=81b82fb966ffbd94353f793ad17116c6088dedd9
---
- ChangeLog | 7 ++++++
- elf/rtld.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
- 2 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
+ ChangeLog | 11 +++++++
+ elf/rtld.c | 110 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
+ 2 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/elf/rtld.c b/elf/rtld.c
-index 2269dbe..86ae20c 100644
+index 86ae20c..65647fb 100644
--- a/elf/rtld.c
+++ b/elf/rtld.c
-@@ -99,6 +99,35 @@ uintptr_t __pointer_chk_guard_local
- strong_alias (__pointer_chk_guard_local, __pointer_chk_guard)
- #endif
+@@ -129,13 +129,91 @@ dso_name_valid_for_suid (const char *p)
+ return *p != '\0';
+ }
-+/* Length limits for names and paths, to protect the dynamic linker,
-+ particularly when __libc_enable_secure is active. */
-+#ifdef NAME_MAX
-+# define SECURE_NAME_LIMIT NAME_MAX
-+#else
-+# define SECURE_NAME_LIMIT 255
-+#endif
-+#ifdef PATH_MAX
-+# define SECURE_PATH_LIMIT PATH_MAX
-+#else
-+# define SECURE_PATH_LIMIT 1024
-+#endif
+-/* List of auditing DSOs. */
++/* LD_AUDIT variable contents. Must be processed before the
++ audit_list below. */
++const char *audit_list_string;
+
-+/* Check that AT_SECURE=0, or that the passed name does not contain
-+ directories and is not overly long. Reject empty names
-+ unconditionally. */
-+static bool
-+dso_name_valid_for_suid (const char *p)
-+{
-+ if (__glibc_unlikely (__libc_enable_secure))
-+ {
-+ /* Ignore pathnames with directories for AT_SECURE=1
-+ programs, and also skip overlong names. */
-+ size_t len = strlen (p);
-+ if (len >= SECURE_NAME_LIMIT || memchr (p, '/', len) != NULL)
-+ return false;
-+ }
-+ return *p != '\0';
-+}
-
- /* List of auditing DSOs. */
++/* Cyclic list of auditing DSOs. audit_list->next is the first
++ element. */
static struct audit_list
-@@ -718,6 +747,42 @@ static const char *preloadlist attribute_relro;
- /* Nonzero if information about versions has to be printed. */
- static int version_info attribute_relro;
+ {
+ const char *name;
+ struct audit_list *next;
+ } *audit_list;
-+/* The LD_PRELOAD environment variable gives list of libraries
-+ separated by white space or colons that are loaded before the
-+ executable's dependencies and prepended to the global scope list.
-+ (If the binary is running setuid all elements containing a '/' are
-+ ignored since it is insecure.) Return the number of preloads
-+ performed. */
-+unsigned int
-+handle_ld_preload (const char *preloadlist, struct link_map *main_map)
++/* Iterator for audit_list_string followed by audit_list. */
++struct audit_list_iter
++{
++ /* Tail of audit_list_string still needing processing, or NULL. */
++ const char *audit_list_tail;
++
++ /* The list element returned in the previous iteration. NULL before
++ the first element. */
++ struct audit_list *previous;
++
++ /* Scratch buffer for returning a name which is part of
++ audit_list_string. */
++ char fname[SECURE_NAME_LIMIT];
++};
++
++/* Initialize an audit list iterator. */
++static void
++audit_list_iter_init (struct audit_list_iter *iter)
+{
-+ unsigned int npreloads = 0;
-+ const char *p = preloadlist;
-+ char fname[SECURE_PATH_LIMIT];
++ iter->audit_list_tail = audit_list_string;
++ iter->previous = NULL;
++}
+
-+ while (*p != '\0')
++/* Iterate through both audit_list_string and audit_list. */
++static const char *
++audit_list_iter_next (struct audit_list_iter *iter)
++{
++ if (iter->audit_list_tail != NULL)
+ {
-+ /* Split preload list at space/colon. */
-+ size_t len = strcspn (p, " :");
-+ if (len > 0 && len < sizeof (fname))
++ /* First iterate over audit_list_string. */
++ while (*iter->audit_list_tail != '\0')
+ {
-+ memcpy (fname, p, len);
-+ fname[len] = '\0';
-+ }
-+ else
-+ fname[0] = '\0';
++ /* Split audit list at colon. */
++ size_t len = strcspn (iter->audit_list_tail, ":");
++ if (len > 0 && len < sizeof (iter->fname))
++ {
++ memcpy (iter->fname, iter->audit_list_tail, len);
++ iter->fname[len] = '\0';
++ }
++ else
++ /* Do not return this name to the caller. */
++ iter->fname[0] = '\0';
++
++ /* Skip over the substring and the following delimiter. */
++ iter->audit_list_tail += len;
++ if (*iter->audit_list_tail == ':')
++ ++iter->audit_list_tail;
+
-+ /* Skip over the substring and the following delimiter. */
-+ p += len;
-+ if (*p != '\0')
-+ ++p;
++ /* If the name is valid, return it. */
++ if (dso_name_valid_for_suid (iter->fname))
++ return iter->fname;
++ /* Otherwise, wrap around and try the next name. */
++ }
++ /* Fall through to the procesing of audit_list. */
++ }
+
-+ if (dso_name_valid_for_suid (fname))
-+ npreloads += do_preload (fname, main_map, "LD_PRELOAD");
++ if (iter->previous == NULL)
++ {
++ if (audit_list == NULL)
++ /* No pre-parsed audit list. */
++ return NULL;
++ /* Start of audit list. The first list element is at
++ audit_list->next (cyclic list). */
++ iter->previous = audit_list->next;
++ return iter->previous->name;
+ }
-+ return npreloads;
++ if (iter->previous == audit_list)
++ /* Cyclic list wrap-around. */
++ return NULL;
++ iter->previous = iter->previous->next;
++ return iter->previous->name;
+}
+
- static void
- dl_main (const ElfW(Phdr) *phdr,
- ElfW(Word) phnum,
-@@ -1464,23 +1529,8 @@ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit interface: %s; ignored.\n",
+ #ifndef HAVE_INLINED_SYSCALLS
+ /* Set nonzero during loading and initialization of executable and
+ libraries, cleared before the executable's entry point runs. This
+@@ -1305,11 +1383,13 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend to run this program.\n\
+ GL(dl_rtld_map).l_tls_modid = _dl_next_tls_modid ();
- if (__glibc_unlikely (preloadlist != NULL))
+ /* If we have auditing DSOs to load, do it now. */
+- if (__glibc_unlikely (audit_list != NULL))
++ bool need_security_init = true;
++ if (__glibc_unlikely (audit_list != NULL)
++ || __glibc_unlikely (audit_list_string != NULL))
{
-- /* The LD_PRELOAD environment variable gives list of libraries
-- separated by white space or colons that are loaded before the
-- executable's dependencies and prepended to the global scope
-- list. If the binary is running setuid all elements
-- containing a '/' are ignored since it is insecure. */
-- char *list = strdupa (preloadlist);
-- char *p;
--
- HP_TIMING_NOW (start);
--
-- /* Prevent optimizing strsep. Speed is not important here. */
-- while ((p = (strsep) (&list, " :")) != NULL)
-- if (p[0] != '\0'
-- && (__builtin_expect (! __libc_enable_secure, 1)
-- || strchr (p, '/') == NULL))
-- npreloads += do_preload (p, main_map, "LD_PRELOAD");
+- /* Iterate over all entries in the list. The order is important. */
+ struct audit_ifaces *last_audit = NULL;
+- struct audit_list *al = audit_list->next;
++ struct audit_list_iter al_iter;
++ audit_list_iter_init (&al_iter);
+
+ /* Since we start using the auditing DSOs right away we need to
+ initialize the data structures now. */
+@@ -1320,9 +1400,14 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend to run this program.\n\
+ use different values (especially the pointer guard) and will
+ fail later on. */
+ security_init ();
++ need_security_init = false;
+
+- do
++ while (true)
+ {
++ const char *name = audit_list_iter_next (&al_iter);
++ if (name == NULL)
++ break;
++
+ int tls_idx = GL(dl_tls_max_dtv_idx);
+
+ /* Now it is time to determine the layout of the static TLS
+@@ -1331,7 +1416,7 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend to run this program.\n\
+ no DF_STATIC_TLS bit is set. The reason is that we know
+ glibc will use the static model. */
+ struct dlmopen_args dlmargs;
+- dlmargs.fname = al->name;
++ dlmargs.fname = name;
+ dlmargs.map = NULL;
+
+ const char *objname;
+@@ -1344,7 +1429,7 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend to run this program.\n\
+ not_loaded:
+ _dl_error_printf ("\
+ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit interface: %s; ignored.\n",
+- al->name, err_str);
++ name, err_str);
+ if (malloced)
+ free ((char *) err_str);
+ }
+@@ -1448,10 +1533,7 @@ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit interface: %s; ignored.\n",
+ goto not_loaded;
+ }
+ }
-
-+ npreloads += handle_ld_preload (preloadlist, main_map);
- HP_TIMING_NOW (stop);
- HP_TIMING_DIFF (diff, start, stop);
- HP_TIMING_ACCUM_NT (load_time, diff);
+- al = al->next;
+ }
+- while (al != audit_list->next);
+
+ /* If we have any auditing modules, announce that we already
+ have two objects loaded. */
+@@ -1715,7 +1797,7 @@ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit interface: %s; ignored.\n",
+ if (tcbp == NULL)
+ tcbp = init_tls ();
+
+- if (__glibc_likely (audit_list == NULL))
++ if (__glibc_likely (need_security_init))
+ /* Initialize security features. But only if we have not done it
+ earlier. */
+ security_init ();
+@@ -2346,9 +2428,7 @@ process_dl_audit (char *str)
+ char *p;
+
+ while ((p = (strsep) (&str, ":")) != NULL)
+- if (p[0] != '\0'
+- && (__builtin_expect (! __libc_enable_secure, 1)
+- || strchr (p, '/') == NULL))
++ if (dso_name_valid_for_suid (p))
+ {
+ /* This is using the local malloc, not the system malloc. The
+ memory can never be freed. */
+@@ -2412,7 +2492,7 @@ process_envvars (enum mode *modep)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (memcmp (envline, "AUDIT", 5) == 0)
+- process_dl_audit (&envline[6]);
++ audit_list_string = &envline[6];
+ break;
+
+ case 7:
--
2.9.3
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/glibc-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/glibc-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3d6c7749d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/glibc-vectorized-strcspn-guards.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+Copied from Debian.
+
+2017-06-14 Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
+
+ * sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/strcspn-c.c: Add IS_IN (libc) guard.
+ * sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/varshift.c: Likewise.
+
+--- a/sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/strcspn-c.c
++++ b/sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/strcspn-c.c
+@@ -1,2 +1,4 @@
+-#define __strcspn_sse2 __strcspn_ia32
+-#include <sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/strcspn-c.c>
++#if IS_IN (libc)
++# define __strcspn_sse2 __strcspn_ia32
++# include <sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/strcspn-c.c>
++#endif
+--- a/sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/varshift.c
++++ b/sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/varshift.c
+@@ -1 +1,3 @@
+-#include <sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/varshift.c>
++#if IS_IN (libc)
++# include <sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/varshift.c>
++#endif