diff options
| author | Leo Famulari <leo@famulari.name> | 2016-02-19 17:50:50 -0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Leo Famulari <leo@famulari.name> | 2016-02-19 18:04:15 -0500 |
| commit | 4e58a402ff9f28686501ab390be93a6866d382f6 (patch) | |
| tree | f53b903be11d7e3b04b5e7fe173bbaa0c445b43d /gnu | |
| parent | 6399941555b8ddac3a928626f91659282eba41b2 (diff) | |
| download | gnu-guix-4e58a402ff9f28686501ab390be93a6866d382f6.tar gnu-guix-4e58a402ff9f28686501ab390be93a6866d382f6.tar.gz | |
gnu: cpio: Add fix for CVE-2016-2037.
* gnu/packages/patches/cpio-CVE-2016-2037.patch: New file.
* gnu-system.am (dist_patch_DATA): Add it.
* gnu/packages/cpio.scm (cpio)[source]: Add patch.
Diffstat (limited to 'gnu')
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/cpio.scm | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/cpio-CVE-2016-2037.patch | 49 |
2 files changed, 51 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/packages/cpio.scm b/gnu/packages/cpio.scm index 925b0eed5b..e8eede6524 100644 --- a/gnu/packages/cpio.scm +++ b/gnu/packages/cpio.scm @@ -35,7 +35,8 @@ version ".tar.bz2")) (sha256 (base32 - "0vi9q475h1rki53100zml75vxsykzyhrn70hidy41s5c2rc8r6bh")))) + "0vi9q475h1rki53100zml75vxsykzyhrn70hidy41s5c2rc8r6bh")) + (patches (list (search-patch "cpio-CVE-2016-2037.patch"))))) (build-system gnu-build-system) (home-page "https://www.gnu.org/software/cpio/") (synopsis "Manage cpio and tar file archives") diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/cpio-CVE-2016-2037.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/cpio-CVE-2016-2037.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f1e068fb45 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/cpio-CVE-2016-2037.patch @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +Fix CVE-2016-2037 (out of bounds write in process_copy_in()). + +Copied from upstream mailing list: +https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-cpio/2016-01/msg00005.html + +--- + + Other calls to cpio_safer_name_suffix seem to be safe. + . + * src/copyin.c (process_copy_in): Make sure that file_hdr.c_name + has at least two bytes allocated. + * src/util.c (cpio_safer_name_suffix): Document that use of this + function requires to be careful. +Author: Pavel Raiskup <praiskup@redhat.com> + +--- + src/copyin.c | 2 ++ + src/util.c | 5 ++++- + 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +Index: cpio-2.11+dfsg/src/copyin.c +=================================================================== +--- cpio-2.11+dfsg.orig/src/copyin.c ++++ cpio-2.11+dfsg/src/copyin.c +@@ -1433,6 +1433,8 @@ process_copy_in () + break; + } + ++ if (file_hdr.c_namesize <= 1) ++ file_hdr.c_name = xrealloc(file_hdr.c_name, 2); + cpio_safer_name_suffix (file_hdr.c_name, false, !no_abs_paths_flag, + false); + +Index: cpio-2.11+dfsg/src/util.c +=================================================================== +--- cpio-2.11+dfsg.orig/src/util.c ++++ cpio-2.11+dfsg/src/util.c +@@ -1374,7 +1374,10 @@ set_file_times (int fd, + } + + /* Do we have to ignore absolute paths, and if so, does the filename +- have an absolute path? */ ++ have an absolute path? ++ Before calling this function make sure that the allocated NAME buffer has ++ capacity at least 2 bytes to allow us to store the "." string inside. */ ++ + void + cpio_safer_name_suffix (char *name, bool link_target, bool absolute_names, + bool strip_leading_dots) |