diff options
293 files changed, 14636 insertions, 4665 deletions
diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore index e48918d32..65f4d3f39 100644 --- a/.gitignore +++ b/.gitignore @@ -110,9 +110,7 @@ /doc/tor-resolve.html.in /doc/tor-resolve.1.xml /doc/torify.1 -/doc/torify.1.in /doc/torify.html -/doc/torify.html.in /doc/torify.1.xml # /doc/spec/ @@ -128,10 +126,13 @@ /src/common/Makefile.in /src/common/common_sha1.i /src/common/libor.a +/src/common/libor-testing.a /src/common/libor.lib /src/common/libor-crypto.a +/src/common/libor-crypto-testing.a /src/common/libor-crypto.lib /src/common/libor-event.a +/src/common/libor-event-testing.a /src/common/libor-event.lib /src/common/libcurve25519_donna.a /src/common/libcurve25519_donna.lib @@ -149,7 +150,10 @@ /src/or/or_sha1.i /src/or/tor /src/or/tor.exe +/src/or/tor-cov +/src/or/tor-cov.exe /src/or/libtor.a +/src/or/libtor-testing.a /src/or/libtor.lib # /src/test @@ -1,3 +1,815 @@ +Changes in version 0.2.5.1-alpha - 2013-10-02 + Tor 0.2.5.1-alpha introduces experimental support for syscall sandboxing + on Linux, allows bridges that offer pluggable transports to report usage + statistics, fixes many issues to make testing easier, and provides + a pile of minor features and bugfixes that have been waiting for a + release of the new branch. + + This is the first alpha release in a new series, so expect there to + be bugs. Users who would rather test out a more stable branch should + stay with 0.2.4.x for now. + + o Major features (security): + - Use the seccomp2 syscall filtering facility on Linux to limit + which system calls Tor can invoke. This is an experimental, + Linux-only feature to provide defense-in-depth against unknown + attacks. To try turning it on, set "Sandbox 1" in your torrc + file. Please be ready to report bugs. We hope to add support + for better sandboxing in the future, including more fine-grained + filters, better division of responsibility, and support for more + platforms. This work has been done by Cristian-Matei Toader for + Google Summer of Code. + - Re-enable TLS 1.1 and 1.2 when built with OpenSSL 1.0.1e or later. + Resolves ticket 6055. (OpenSSL before 1.0.1 didn't have TLS 1.1 or + 1.2, and OpenSSL from 1.0.1 through 1.0.1d had bugs that prevented + renegotiation from working with TLS 1.1 or 1.2, so we had disabled + them to solve bug 6033.) + + o Major features (other): + - Add support for passing arguments to managed pluggable transport + proxies. Implements ticket 3594. + - Bridges now track GeoIP information and the number of their users + even when pluggable transports are in use, and report usage + statistics in their extra-info descriptors. Resolves tickets 4773 + and 5040. + - Make testing Tor networks bootstrap better: lower directory fetch + retry schedules and maximum interval without directory requests, + and raise maximum download tries. Implements ticket 6752. + - Add make target 'test-network' to run tests on a Chutney network. + Implements ticket 8530. + - The ntor handshake is now on-by-default, no matter what the + directory authorities recommend. Implements ticket 8561. + + o Major bugfixes: + - Instead of writing destroy cells directly to outgoing connection + buffers, queue them and intersperse them with other outgoing cells. + This can prevent a set of resource starvation conditions where too + many pending destroy cells prevent data cells from actually getting + delivered. Reported by "oftc_must_be_destroyed". Fixes bug 7912; + bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha. + - If we are unable to save a microdescriptor to the journal, do not + drop it from memory and then reattempt downloading it. Fixes bug + 9645; bugfix on 0.2.2.6-alpha. + - The new channel code sometimes lost track of in-progress circuits, + causing long-running clients to stop building new circuits. The + fix is to always call circuit_n_chan_done(chan, 0) from + channel_closed(). Fixes bug 9776; bugfix on 0.2.4.17-rc. + + o Build features: + - Tor now builds each source file in two modes: a mode that avoids + exposing identifiers needlessly, and another mode that exposes + more identifiers for testing. This lets the compiler do better at + optimizing the production code, while enabling us to take more + radical measures to let the unit tests test things. + - The production builds no longer include functions used only in + the unit tests; all functions exposed from a module only for + unit-testing are now static in production builds. + - Add an --enable-coverage configuration option to make the unit + tests (and a new src/or/tor-cov target) to build with gcov test + coverage support. + + o Testing: + - We now have rudimentary function mocking support that our unit + tests can use to test functions in isolation. Function mocking + lets the tests temporarily replace a function's dependencies with + stub functions, so that the tests can check the function without + invoking the other functions it calls. + - Add more unit tests for the <circid,channel>->circuit map, and + the destroy-cell-tracking code to fix bug 7912. + - Unit tests for failing cases of the TAP onion handshake. + - More unit tests for address-manipulation functions. + + o Minor features (protecting client timestamps): + - Clients no longer send timestamps in their NETINFO cells. These were + not used for anything, and they provided one small way for clients + to be distinguished from each other as they moved from network to + network or behind NAT. Implements part of proposal 222. + - Clients now round timestamps in INTRODUCE cells down to the nearest + 10 minutes. If a new Support022HiddenServices option is set to 0, or + if it's set to "auto" and the feature is disabled in the consensus, + the timestamp is sent as 0 instead. Implements part of proposal 222. + - Stop sending timestamps in AUTHENTICATE cells. This is not such + a big deal from a security point of view, but it achieves no actual + good purpose, and isn't needed. Implements part of proposal 222. + - Reduce down accuracy of timestamps in hidden service descriptors. + Implements part of proposal 222. + + o Minor features (config options): + - Config (torrc) lines now handle fingerprints which are missing + their initial '$'. Resolves ticket 4341; improvement over 0.0.9pre5. + - Support a --dump-config option to print some or all of the + configured options. Mainly useful for debugging the command-line + option parsing code. Helps resolve ticket 4647. + - Raise awareness of safer logging: notify user of potentially + unsafe config options, like logging more verbosely than severity + "notice" or setting SafeLogging to 0. Resolves ticket 5584. + - Add a new configuration option TestingV3AuthVotingStartOffset + that bootstraps a network faster by changing the timing for + consensus votes. Addresses ticket 8532. + - Add a new torrc option "ServerTransportOptions" that allows + bridge operators to pass configuration parameters to their + pluggable transports. Resolves ticket 8929. + - The config (torrc) file now accepts bandwidth and space limits in + bits as well as bytes. (Anywhere that you can say "2 Kilobytes", + you can now say "16 kilobits", and so on.) Resolves ticket 9214. + Patch by CharlieB. + + o Minor features (build): + - Add support for `--library-versions` flag. Implements ticket 6384. + - Return the "unexpected sendme" warnings to a warn severity, but make + them rate limited, to help diagnose ticket 8093. + - Detect a missing asciidoc, and warn the user about it, during + configure rather than at build time. Fixes issue 6506. Patch from + Arlo Breault. + + o Minor features (other): + - Use the SOCK_NONBLOCK socket type, if supported, to open nonblocking + sockets in a single system call. Implements ticket 5129. + - Log current accounting state (bytes sent and received + remaining + time for the current accounting period) in the relay's heartbeat + message. Implements ticket 5526; patch from Peter Retzlaff. + - Implement the TRANSPORT_LAUNCHED control port event that + notifies controllers about new launched pluggable + transports. Resolves ticket 5609. + - If we're using the pure-C 32-bit curve25519_donna implementation + of curve25519, build it with the -fomit-frame-pointer option to + make it go faster on register-starved hosts. This improves our + handshake performance by about 6% on i386 hosts without nacl. + Closes ticket 8109. + - Update to the September 4 2013 Maxmind GeoLite Country database. + + o Minor bugfixes: + - Set the listen() backlog limit to the largest actually supported + on the system, not to the value in a header file. Fixes bug 9716; + bugfix on every released Tor. + - No longer accept malformed http headers when parsing urls from + headers. Now we reply with Bad Request ("400"). Fixes bug 2767; + bugfix on 0.0.6pre1. + - In munge_extrainfo_into_routerinfo(), check the return value of + memchr(). This would have been a serious issue if we ever passed + it a non-extrainfo. Fixes bug 8791; bugfix on 0.2.0.6-alpha. Patch + from Arlo Breault. + - On the chance that somebody manages to build Tor on a + platform where time_t is unsigned, correct the way that + microdesc_add_to_cache() handles negative time arguments. + Fixes bug 8042; bugfix on 0.2.3.1-alpha. + - Reject relative control socket paths and emit a warning. Previously, + single-component control socket paths would be rejected, but Tor + would not log why it could not validate the config. Fixes bug 9258; + bugfix on 0.2.3.16-alpha. + + o Minor bugfixes (command line): + - Use a single command-line parser for parsing torrc options on the + command line and for finding special command-line options to avoid + inconsistent behavior for torrc option arguments that have the same + names as command-line options. Fixes bugs 4647 and 9578; bugfix on + 0.0.9pre5. + - No longer allow 'tor --hash-password' with no arguments. Fixes bug + 9573; bugfix on 0.0.9pre5. + + o Minor fixes (build, auxiliary programs): + - Stop preprocessing the "torify" script with autoconf, since + it no longer refers to LOCALSTATEDIR. Fixes bug 5505; patch + from Guilhem. + - The tor-fw-helper program now follows the standard convention and + exits with status code "0" on success. Fixes bug 9030; bugfix on + 0.2.3.1-alpha. Patch by Arlo Breault. + - Corrected ./configure advice for what openssl dev package you should + install on Debian. Fixes bug 9207; bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha. + + o Minor code improvements: + - Remove constants and tests for PKCS1 padding; it's insecure and + shouldn't be used for anything new. Fixes bug 8792; patch + from Arlo Breault. + - Remove instances of strcpy() from the unit tests. They weren't + hurting anything, since they were only in the unit tests, but it's + embarassing to have strcpy() in the code at all, and some analysis + tools don't like it. Fixes bug 8790; bugfix on 0.2.3.6-alpha and + 0.2.3.8-alpha. Patch from Arlo Breault. + + o Removed features: + - Remove migration code from when we renamed the "cached-routers" + file to "cached-descriptors" back in 0.2.0.8-alpha. This + incidentally resolves ticket 6502 by cleaning up the related code + a bit. Patch from Akshay Hebbar. + + o Code simplification and refactoring: + - Extract the common duplicated code for creating a subdirectory + of the data directory and writing to a file in it. Fixes ticket + 4282; patch from Peter Retzlaff. + - Since OpenSSL 0.9.7, the i2d_*() functions support allocating output + buffer. Avoid calling twice: i2d_RSAPublicKey(), i2d_DHparams(), + i2d_X509(), and i2d_PublicKey(). Resolves ticket 5170. + - Add a set of accessor functions for the circuit timeout data + structure. Fixes ticket 6153; patch from "piet". + - Clean up exit paths from connection_listener_new(). Closes ticket + 8789. Patch from Arlo Breault. + - Since we rely on OpenSSL 0.9.8 now, we can use EVP_PKEY_cmp() + and drop our own custom pkey_eq() implementation. Fixes bug 9043. + - Use a doubly-linked list to implement the global circuit list. + Resolves ticket 9108. Patch from Marek Majkowski. + - Remove contrib/id_to_fp.c since it wasn't used anywhere. + + +Changes in version 0.2.4.17-rc - 2013-09-05 + Tor 0.2.4.17-rc is the third release candidate for the Tor 0.2.4.x + series. It adds an emergency step to help us tolerate the massive + influx of users: 0.2.4 clients using the new (faster and safer) "NTor" + circuit-level handshakes now effectively jump the queue compared to + the 0.2.3 clients using "TAP" handshakes. This release also fixes a + big bug hindering bridge reachability tests. + + o Major features: + - Relays now process the new "NTor" circuit-level handshake requests + with higher priority than the old "TAP" circuit-level handshake + requests. We still process some TAP requests to not totally starve + 0.2.3 clients when NTor becomes popular. A new consensus parameter + "NumNTorsPerTAP" lets us tune the balance later if we need to. + Implements ticket 9574. + + o Major bugfixes: + - If the circuit build timeout logic is disabled (via the consensus, + or because we are an authority), then don't build testing circuits. + Fixes bug 9657; bugfix on 0.2.2.14-alpha. + - Bridges now send AUTH_CHALLENGE cells during their v3 handshakes; + previously they did not, which prevented them from receiving + successful connections from relays for self-test or bandwidth + testing. Also, when a relay is extending a circuit to a bridge, + it needs to send a NETINFO cell, even when the bridge hasn't sent + an AUTH_CHALLENGE cell. Fixes bug 9546; bugfix on 0.2.3.6-alpha. + - If the time to download the next old-style networkstatus is in + the future, do not decline to consider whether to download the + next microdescriptor networkstatus. Fixes bug 9564; bugfix on + 0.2.3.14-alpha. + + o Minor bugfixes: + - Avoid double-closing the listener socket in our socketpair() + replacement (used on Windows) in the case where the addresses on + our opened sockets don't match what we expected. Fixes bug 9400; + bugfix on 0.0.2pre7. Found by Coverity. + + o Minor fixes (config options): + - Avoid overflows when the user sets MaxCircuitDirtiness to a + ridiculously high value, by imposing a (ridiculously high) 30-day + maximum on MaxCircuitDirtiness. + - Fix the documentation of HeartbeatPeriod to say that the heartbeat + message is logged at notice, not at info. + - Warn and fail if a server is configured not to advertise any + ORPorts at all. (We need *something* to put in our descriptor, + or we just won't work.) + + o Minor features: + - Track how many "TAP" and "NTor" circuit handshake requests we get, + and how many we complete, and log it every hour to help relay + operators follow trends in network load. Addresses ticket 9658. + - Update to the August 7 2013 Maxmind GeoLite Country database. + + +Changes in version 0.2.4.16-rc - 2013-08-10 + Tor 0.2.4.16-rc is the second release candidate for the Tor 0.2.4.x + series. It fixes several crash bugs in the 0.2.4 branch. + + o Major bugfixes: + - Fix a bug in the voting algorithm that could yield incorrect results + when a non-naming authority declared too many flags. Fixes bug 9200; + bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha. + - Fix an uninitialized read that could in some cases lead to a remote + crash while parsing INTRODUCE2 cells. Bugfix on 0.2.4.1-alpha. + Anybody running a hidden service on the experimental 0.2.4.x + branch should upgrade. (This is, so far as we know, unrelated to + the recent news.) + - Avoid an assertion failure when processing DNS replies without the + answer types we expected. Fixes bug 9337; bugfix on 0.2.4.7-alpha. + - Avoid a crash when using --hash-password. Fixes bug 9295; bugfix on + 0.2.4.15-rc. Found by stem integration tests. + + o Minor bugfixes: + - Fix an invalid memory read that occured when a pluggable + transport proxy failed its configuration protocol. + Fixes bug 9288; bugfix on 0.2.4.1-alpha. + - When evaluating whether to use a connection that we haven't + decided is canonical using a recent link protocol version, + decide that it's canonical only if it used address _does_ + match the desired address. Fixes bug 9309; bugfix on + 0.2.4.4-alpha. Reported by skruffy. + - Make the default behavior of NumDirectoryGuards be to track + NumEntryGuards. Now a user who changes only NumEntryGuards will get + the behavior she expects. Fixes bug 9354; bugfix on 0.2.4.8-alpha. + - Fix a spurious compilation warning with some older versions of + GCC on FreeBSD. Fixes bug 9254; bugfix on 0.2.4.14-alpha. + + o Minor features: + - Update to the July 3 2013 Maxmind GeoLite Country database. + + +Changes in version 0.2.4.15-rc - 2013-07-01 + Tor 0.2.4.15-rc is the first release candidate for the Tor 0.2.4.x + series. It fixes a few smaller bugs, but generally appears stable. + Please test it and let us know whether it is! + + o Major bugfixes: + - When receiving a new configuration file via the control port's + LOADCONF command, do not treat the defaults file as absent. + Fixes bug 9122; bugfix on 0.2.3.9-alpha. + + o Minor features: + - Issue a warning when running with the bufferevents backend enabled. + It's still not stable, and people should know that they're likely + to hit unexpected problems. Closes ticket 9147. + + +Changes in version 0.2.4.14-alpha - 2013-06-18 + Tor 0.2.4.14-alpha fixes a pair of client guard enumeration problems + present in 0.2.4.13-alpha. + + o Major bugfixes: + - When we have too much memory queued in circuits (according to a new + MaxMemInCellQueues option), close the circuits consuming the most + memory. This prevents us from running out of memory as a relay if + circuits fill up faster than they can be drained. Fixes bug 9063; + bugfix on the 54th commit of Tor. This bug is a further fix beyond + bug 6252, whose fix was merged into 0.2.3.21-rc. + + This change also fixes an earlier approach taken in 0.2.4.13-alpha, + where we tried to solve this issue simply by imposing an upper limit + on the number of queued cells for a single circuit. That approach + proved to be problematic, since there are ways to provoke clients to + send a number of cells in excess of any such reasonable limit. Fixes + bug 9072; bugfix on 0.2.4.13-alpha. + + - Limit hidden service descriptors to at most ten introduction + points, to slow one kind of guard enumeration. Fixes bug 9002; + bugfix on 0.1.1.11-alpha. + + +Changes in version 0.2.4.13-alpha - 2013-06-14 + Tor 0.2.4.13-alpha fixes a variety of potential remote crash + vulnerabilities, makes socks5 username/password circuit isolation + actually actually work (this time for sure!), and cleans up a bunch + of other issues in preparation for a release candidate. + + o Major bugfixes (robustness): + - Close any circuit that has too many cells queued on it. Fixes + bug 9063; bugfix on the 54th commit of Tor. This bug is a further + fix beyond bug 6252, whose fix was merged into 0.2.3.21-rc. + - Prevent the get_freelists() function from running off the end of + the list of freelists if it somehow gets an unrecognized + allocation. Fixes bug 8844; bugfix on 0.2.0.16-alpha. Reported by + eugenis. + - Avoid an assertion failure on OpenBSD (and perhaps other BSDs) + when an exit connection with optimistic data succeeds immediately + rather than returning EINPROGRESS. Fixes bug 9017; bugfix on + 0.2.3.1-alpha. + - Fix a directory authority crash bug when building a consensus + using an older consensus as its basis. Fixes bug 8833. Bugfix + on 0.2.4.12-alpha. + + o Major bugfixes: + - Avoid a memory leak where we would leak a consensus body when we + find that a consensus which we couldn't previously verify due to + missing certificates is now verifiable. Fixes bug 8719; bugfix + on 0.2.0.10-alpha. + - We used to always request authority certificates by identity digest, + meaning we'd get the newest one even when we wanted one with a + different signing key. Then we would complain about being given + a certificate we already had, and never get the one we really + wanted. Now we use the "fp-sk/" resource as well as the "fp/" + resource to request the one we want. Fixes bug 5595; bugfix on + 0.2.0.8-alpha. + - Follow the socks5 protocol when offering username/password + authentication. The fix for bug 8117 exposed this bug, and it + turns out real-world applications like Pidgin do care. Bugfix on + 0.2.3.2-alpha; fixes bug 8879. + - Prevent failures on Windows Vista and later when rebuilding the + microdescriptor cache. Diagnosed by Robert Ransom. Fixes bug 8822; + bugfix on 0.2.4.12-alpha. + + o Minor bugfixes: + - Fix an impossible buffer overrun in the AES unit tests. Fixes + bug 8845; bugfix on 0.2.0.7-alpha. Found by eugenis. + - If for some reason we fail to write a microdescriptor while + rebuilding the cache, do not let the annotations from that + microdescriptor linger in the cache file, and do not let the + microdescriptor stay recorded as present in its old location. + Fixes bug 9047; bugfix on 0.2.2.6-alpha. + - Fix a memory leak that would occur whenever a configuration + option changed. Fixes bug 8718; bugfix on 0.2.3.3-alpha. + - Paste the description for PathBias parameters from the man + page into or.h, so the code documents them too. Fixes bug 7982; + bugfix on 0.2.3.17-beta and 0.2.4.8-alpha. + - Relays now treat a changed IPv6 ORPort as sufficient reason to + publish an updated descriptor. Fixes bug 6026; bugfix on + 0.2.4.1-alpha. + - When launching a resolve request on behalf of an AF_UNIX control + socket, omit the address field of the new entry connection, used in + subsequent controller events, rather than letting tor_dup_addr() + set it to "<unknown address type>". Fixes bug 8639; bugfix on + 0.2.4.12-alpha. + + o Minor bugfixes (log messages): + - Fix a scaling issue in the path bias accounting code that + resulted in "Bug:" log messages from either + pathbias_scale_close_rates() or pathbias_count_build_success(). + This represents a bugfix on a previous bugfix: the original fix + attempted in 0.2.4.10-alpha was incomplete. Fixes bug 8235; bugfix + on 0.2.4.1-alpha. + - Give a less useless error message when the user asks for an IPv4 + address on an IPv6-only port, or vice versa. Fixes bug 8846; bugfix + on 0.2.4.7-alpha. + + o Minor features: + - Downgrade "unexpected SENDME" warnings to protocol-warn for 0.2.4.x, + to tolerate bug 8093 for now. + - Add an "ignoring-advertised-bws" boolean to the flag-threshold lines + in directory authority votes to describe whether they have enough + measured bandwidths to ignore advertised (relay descriptor) + bandwidth claims. Resolves ticket 8711. + - Update to the June 5 2013 Maxmind GeoLite Country database. + + o Removed documentation: + - Remove some of the older contents of doc/ as obsolete; move others + to torspec.git. Fixes bug 8965. + + o Code simplification and refactoring: + - Avoid using character buffers when constructing most directory + objects: this approach was unwieldy and error-prone. Instead, + build smartlists of strings, and concatenate them when done. + + +Changes in version 0.2.4.12-alpha - 2013-04-18 + Tor 0.2.4.12-alpha moves Tor forward on several fronts: it starts the + process for lengthening the guard rotation period, makes directory + authority opinions in the consensus a bit less gameable, makes socks5 + username/password circuit isolation actually work, and fixes a wide + variety of other issues. + + o Major features: + - Raise the default time that a client keeps an entry guard from + "1-2 months" to "2-3 months", as suggested by Tariq Elahi's WPES + 2012 paper. (We would make it even longer, but we need better client + load balancing first.) Also, make the guard lifetime controllable + via a new GuardLifetime torrc option and a GuardLifetime consensus + parameter. Start of a fix for bug 8240; bugfix on 0.1.1.11-alpha. + - Directory authorities now prefer using measured bandwidths to + advertised ones when computing flags and thresholds. Resolves + ticket 8273. + - Directory authorities that have more than a threshold number + of relays with measured bandwidths now treat relays with unmeasured + bandwidths as having bandwidth 0. Resolves ticket 8435. + + o Major bugfixes (assert / resource use): + - Avoid a bug where our response to TLS renegotiation under certain + network conditions could lead to a busy-loop, with 100% CPU + consumption. Fixes bug 5650; bugfix on 0.2.0.16-alpha. + - Avoid an assertion when we discover that we'd like to write a cell + onto a closing connection: just discard the cell. Fixes another + case of bug 7350; bugfix on 0.2.4.4-alpha. + + o Major bugfixes (client-side privacy): + - When we mark a circuit as unusable for new circuits, have it + continue to be unusable for new circuits even if MaxCircuitDirtiness + is increased too much at the wrong time, or the system clock jumps + backwards. Fixes bug 6174; bugfix on 0.0.2pre26. + - If ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses ("do not believe DNS queries + which have resolved to internal addresses") is set, apply that + rule to IPv6 as well. Fixes bug 8475; bugfix on 0.2.0.7-alpha. + - When an exit relay rejects a stream with reason "exit policy", but + we only know an exit policy summary (e.g. from the microdesc + consensus) for it, do not mark the relay as useless for all exiting. + Instead, mark just the circuit as unsuitable for that particular + address. Fixes part of bug 7582; bugfix on 0.2.3.2-alpha. + - Allow applications to get proper stream isolation with + IsolateSOCKSAuth. Many SOCKS5 clients that want to offer + username/password authentication also offer "no authentication". Tor + had previously preferred "no authentication", so the applications + never actually sent Tor their auth details. Now Tor selects + username/password authentication if it's offered. You can disable + this behavior on a per-SOCKSPort basis via PreferSOCKSNoAuth. Fixes + bug 8117; bugfix on 0.2.3.3-alpha. + + o Major bugfixes (other): + - When unable to find any working directory nodes to use as a + directory guard, give up rather than adding the same non-working + nodes to the directory guard list over and over. Fixes bug 8231; + bugfix on 0.2.4.8-alpha. + + o Minor features: + - Reject as invalid most directory objects containing a NUL. + Belt-and-suspender fix for bug 8037. + - In our testsuite, create temporary directories with a bit more + entropy in their name to make name collisions less likely. Fixes + bug 8638. + - Add CACHED keyword to ADDRMAP events in the control protocol + to indicate whether a DNS result will be cached or not. Resolves + ticket 8596. + - Update to the April 3 2013 Maxmind GeoLite Country database. + + o Minor features (build): + - Detect and reject attempts to build Tor with threading support + when OpenSSL has been compiled without threading support. + Fixes bug 6673. + - Clarify that when autoconf is checking for nacl, it is checking + specifically for nacl with a fast curve25519 implementation. + Fixes bug 8014. + - Warn if building on a platform with an unsigned time_t: there + are too many places where Tor currently assumes that time_t can + hold negative values. We'd like to fix them all, but probably + some will remain. + + o Minor bugfixes (build): + - Fix some bugs in tor-fw-helper-natpmp when trying to build and + run it on Windows. More bugs likely remain. Patch from Gisle Vanem. + Fixes bug 7280; bugfix on 0.2.3.1-alpha. + - Add the old src/or/micro-revision.i filename to CLEANFILES. + On the off chance that somebody has one, it will go away as soon + as they run "make clean". Fix for bug 7143; bugfix on 0.2.4.1-alpha. + - Build Tor correctly on 32-bit platforms where the compiler can build + but not run code using the "uint128_t" construction. Fixes bug 8587; + bugfix on 0.2.4.8-alpha. + - Fix compilation warning with some versions of clang that would + prefer the -Wswitch-enum compiler flag to warn about switch + statements with missing enum values, even if those switch + statements have a "default:" statement. Fixes bug 8598; bugfix + on 0.2.4.10-alpha. + + o Minor bugfixes (protocol): + - Fix the handling of a TRUNCATE cell when it arrives while the + circuit extension is in progress. Fixes bug 7947; bugfix on 0.0.7.1. + - Fix a misframing issue when reading the version numbers in a + VERSIONS cell. Previously we would recognize [00 01 00 02] as + 'version 1, version 2, and version 0x100', when it should have + only included versions 1 and 2. Fixes bug 8059; bugfix on + 0.2.0.10-alpha. Reported pseudonymously. + - Make the format and order of STREAM events for DNS lookups + consistent among the various ways to launch DNS lookups. Fixes + bug 8203; bugfix on 0.2.0.24-rc. Patch by "Desoxy." + - Correct our check for which versions of Tor support the EXTEND2 + cell. We had been willing to send it to Tor 0.2.4.7-alpha and + later, when support was really added in version 0.2.4.8-alpha. + Fixes bug 8464; bugfix on 0.2.4.8-alpha. + + o Minor bugfixes (other): + - Correctly store microdescriptors and extrainfo descriptors with + an internal NUL byte. Fixes bug 8037; bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha. + Bug reported by "cypherpunks". + - Increase the width of the field used to remember a connection's + link protocol version to two bytes. Harmless for now, since the + only currently recognized versions are one byte long. Reported + pseudonymously. Fixes bug 8062; bugfix on 0.2.0.10-alpha. + - If the state file's path bias counts are invalid (presumably from a + buggy Tor prior to 0.2.4.10-alpha), make them correct. Also add + additional checks and log messages to the scaling of Path Bias + counts, in case there still are remaining issues with scaling. + Should help resolve bug 8235. + - Eliminate several instances where we use "Nickname=ID" to refer to + nodes in logs. Use "Nickname (ID)" instead. (Elsewhere, we still use + "$ID=Nickname", which is also acceptable.) Fixes bug 7065. Bugfix + on 0.2.3.21-rc, 0.2.4.5-alpha, 0.2.4.8-alpha, and 0.2.4.10-alpha. + + o Minor bugfixes (syscalls): + - Always check the return values of functions fcntl() and + setsockopt(). We don't believe these are ever actually failing in + practice, but better safe than sorry. Also, checking these return + values should please analysis tools like Coverity. Patch from + 'flupzor'. Fixes bug 8206; bugfix on all versions of Tor. + - Use direct writes rather than stdio when building microdescriptor + caches, in an attempt to mitigate bug 8031, or at least make it + less common. + + o Minor bugfixes (config): + - When rejecting a configuration because we were unable to parse a + quoted string, log an actual error message. Fixes bug 7950; bugfix + on 0.2.0.16-alpha. + - Behave correctly when the user disables LearnCircuitBuildTimeout + but doesn't tell us what they would like the timeout to be. Fixes + bug 6304; bugfix on 0.2.2.14-alpha. + - When autodetecting the number of CPUs, use the number of available + CPUs in preference to the number of configured CPUs. Inform the + user if this reduces the number of available CPUs. Fixes bug 8002; + bugfix on 0.2.3.1-alpha. + - Make it an error when you set EntryNodes but disable UseGuardNodes, + since it will (surprisingly to some users) ignore EntryNodes. Fixes + bug 8180; bugfix on 0.2.3.11-alpha. + - Allow TestingTorNetworks to override the 4096-byte minimum for + the Fast threshold. Otherwise they can't bootstrap until they've + observed more traffic. Fixes bug 8508; bugfix on 0.2.4.10-alpha. + - Fix some logic errors when the user manually overrides the + PathsNeededToBuildCircuits option in torrc. Fixes bug 8599; bugfix + on 0.2.4.10-alpha. + + o Minor bugfixes (log messages to help diagnose bugs): + - If we fail to free a microdescriptor because of bug 7164, log + the filename and line number from which we tried to free it. + - Add another diagnostic to the heartbeat message: track and log + overhead that TLS is adding to the data we write. If this is + high, we are sending too little data to SSL_write at a time. + Diagnostic for bug 7707. + - Add more detail to a log message about relaxed timeouts, to help + track bug 7799. + - Warn more aggressively when flushing microdescriptors to a + microdescriptor cache fails, in an attempt to mitigate bug 8031, + or at least make it more diagnosable. + - Improve debugging output to help track down bug 8185 ("Bug: + outgoing relay cell has n_chan==NULL. Dropping.") + - Log the purpose of a path-bias testing circuit correctly. + Improves a log message from bug 8477; bugfix on 0.2.4.8-alpha. + + o Minor bugfixes (0.2.4.x log messages that were too noisy): + - Don't attempt to relax the timeout of already opened 1-hop circuits. + They might never timeout. This should eliminate some/all cases of + the relaxed timeout log message. + - Use circuit creation time for network liveness evaluation. This + should eliminate warning log messages about liveness caused + by changes in timeout evaluation. Fixes bug 6572; bugfix on + 0.2.4.8-alpha. + - Reduce a path bias length check from notice to info. The message + is triggered when creating controller circuits. Fixes bug 8196; + bugfix on 0.2.4.8-alpha. + - Fix a path state issue that triggered a notice during relay startup. + Fixes bug 8320; bugfix on 0.2.4.10-alpha. + - Reduce occurrences of warns about circuit purpose in + connection_ap_expire_building(). Fixes bug 8477; bugfix on + 0.2.4.11-alpha. + + o Minor bugfixes (pre-0.2.4.x log messages that were too noisy): + - If we encounter a write failure on a SOCKS connection before we + finish our SOCKS handshake, don't warn that we closed the + connection before we could send a SOCKS reply. Fixes bug 8427; + bugfix on 0.1.0.1-rc. + - Correctly recognize that [::1] is a loopback address. Fixes + bug 8377; bugfix on 0.2.1.3-alpha. + - Fix a directory authority warn caused when we have a large amount + of badexit bandwidth. Fixes bug 8419; bugfix on 0.2.2.10-alpha. + - Don't log inappropriate heartbeat messages when hibernating: a + hibernating node is _expected_ to drop out of the consensus, + decide it isn't bootstrapped, and so forth. Fixes bug 7302; + bugfix on 0.2.3.1-alpha. + - Don't complain about bootstrapping problems while hibernating. + These complaints reflect a general code problem, but not one + with any problematic effects (no connections are actually + opened). Fixes part of bug 7302; bugfix on 0.2.3.2-alpha. + + o Documentation fixes: + - Update tor-fw-helper.1.txt and tor-fw-helper.c to make option + names match. Fixes bug 7768. + - Make the torify manpage no longer refer to tsocks; torify hasn't + supported tsocks since 0.2.3.14-alpha. + - Make the tor manpage no longer reference tsocks. + - Fix the GeoIPExcludeUnknown documentation to refer to + ExcludeExitNodes rather than the currently nonexistent + ExcludeEntryNodes. Spotted by "hamahangi" on tor-talk. + + o Removed files: + - The tor-tsocks.conf is no longer distributed or installed. We + recommend that tsocks users use torsocks instead. Resolves + ticket 8290. + + +Changes in version 0.2.4.11-alpha - 2013-03-11 + Tor 0.2.4.11-alpha makes relay measurement by directory authorities + more robust, makes hidden service authentication work again, and + resolves a DPI fingerprint for Tor's SSL transport. + + o Major features (directory authorities): + - Directory authorities now support a new consensus method (17) + where they cap the published bandwidth of servers for which + insufficient bandwidth measurements exist. Fixes part of bug 2286. + - Directory authorities that set "DisableV2DirectoryInfo_ 1" no longer + serve any v2 directory information. Now we can test disabling the + old deprecated v2 directory format, and see whether doing so has + any effect on network load. Begins to fix bug 6783. + - Directory authorities now include inside each vote a statement of + the performance thresholds they used when assigning flags. + Implements ticket 8151. + + o Major bugfixes (directory authorities): + - Stop marking every relay as having been down for one hour every + time we restart a directory authority. These artificial downtimes + were messing with our Stable and Guard flag calculations. Fixes + bug 8218 (introduced by the fix for 1035). Bugfix on 0.2.2.23-alpha. + + o Major bugfixes (hidden services): + - Allow hidden service authentication to succeed again. When we + refactored the hidden service introduction code back + in 0.2.4.1-alpha, we didn't update the code that checks + whether authentication information is present, causing all + authentication checks to return "false". Fix for bug 8207; bugfix + on 0.2.4.1-alpha. Found by Coverity; this is CID 718615. + + o Minor features (relays, bridges): + - Make bridge relays check once a minute for whether their IP + address has changed, rather than only every 15 minutes. Resolves + bugs 1913 and 1992. + - Refactor resolve_my_address() so it returns the method by which we + decided our public IP address (explicitly configured, resolved from + explicit hostname, guessed from interfaces, learned by gethostname). + Now we can provide more helpful log messages when a relay guesses + its IP address incorrectly (e.g. due to unexpected lines in + /etc/hosts). Resolves ticket 2267. + - Teach bridge-using clients to avoid 0.2.2 bridges when making + microdescriptor-related dir requests, and only fall back to normal + descriptors if none of their bridges can handle microdescriptors + (as opposed to the fix in ticket 4013, which caused them to fall + back to normal descriptors if *any* of their bridges preferred + them). Resolves ticket 4994. + - Randomize the lifetime of our SSL link certificate, so censors can't + use the static value for filtering Tor flows. Resolves ticket 8443; + related to ticket 4014 which was included in 0.2.2.33. + + o Minor features (portability): + - Tweak the curve25519-donna*.c implementations to tolerate systems + that lack stdint.h. Fixes bug 3894; bugfix on 0.2.4.8-alpha. + - Use Ville Laurikari's implementation of AX_CHECK_SIGN() to determine + the signs of types during autoconf. This is better than our old + approach, which didn't work when cross-compiling. + - Detect the sign of enum values, rather than assuming that MSC is the + only compiler where enum types are all signed. Fixes bug 7727; + bugfix on 0.2.4.10-alpha. + + o Minor features (other): + - Say "KBytes" rather than "KB" in the man page (for various values + of K), to further reduce confusion about whether Tor counts in + units of memory or fractions of units of memory. Resolves ticket 7054. + - Clear the high bit on curve25519 public keys before passing them to + our backend, in case we ever wind up using a backend that doesn't do + so itself. If we used such a backend, and *didn't* clear the high bit, + we could wind up in a situation where users with such backends would + be distinguishable from users without. Fixes bug 8121; bugfix on + 0.2.4.8-alpha. + - Update to the March 6 2013 Maxmind GeoLite Country database. + + o Minor bugfixes (clients): + - When we receive a RELAY_END cell with the reason DONE, or with no + reason, before receiving a RELAY_CONNECTED cell, report the SOCKS + status as "connection refused". Previously we reported these cases + as success but then immediately closed the connection. Fixes bug + 7902; bugfix on 0.1.0.1-rc. Reported by "oftc_must_be_destroyed". + - Downgrade an assertion in connection_ap_expire_beginning to an + LD_BUG message. The fix for bug 8024 should prevent this message + from displaying, but just in case, a warn that we can diagnose + is better than more assert crashes. Fixes bug 8065; bugfix on + 0.2.4.8-alpha. + - Lower path use bias thresholds to .80 for notice and .60 for warn. + Also make the rate limiting flags for the path use bias log messages + independent from the original path bias flags. Fixes bug 8161; + bugfix on 0.2.4.10-alpha. + + o Minor bugfixes (relays): + - Stop trying to resolve our hostname so often (e.g. every time we + think about doing a directory fetch). Now we reuse the cached + answer in some cases. Fixes bugs 1992 (bugfix on 0.2.0.20-rc) + and 2410 (bugfix on 0.1.2.2-alpha). + - Stop sending a stray "(null)" in some cases for the server status + "EXTERNAL_ADDRESS" controller event. Resolves bug 8200; bugfix + on 0.1.2.6-alpha. + - When choosing which stream on a formerly stalled circuit to wake + first, make better use of the platform's weak RNG. Previously, + we had been using the % ("modulo") operator to try to generate a + 1/N chance of picking each stream, but this behaves badly with + many platforms' choice of weak RNG. Fixes bug 7801; bugfix on + 0.2.2.20-alpha. + - Use our own weak RNG when we need a weak RNG. Windows's rand() and + Irix's random() only return 15 bits; Solaris's random() returns more + bits but its RAND_MAX says it only returns 15, and so on. Motivated + by the fix for bug 7801; bugfix on 0.2.2.20-alpha. + + o Minor bugfixes (directory authorities): + - Directory authorities now use less space when formatting identical + microdescriptor lines in directory votes. Fixes bug 8158; bugfix + on 0.2.4.1-alpha. + + o Minor bugfixes (memory leaks spotted by Coverity -- bug 7816): + - Avoid leaking memory if we fail to compute a consensus signature + or we generate a consensus we can't parse. Bugfix on 0.2.0.5-alpha. + - Fix a memory leak when receiving headers from an HTTPS proxy. Bugfix + on 0.2.1.1-alpha. + - Fix a memory leak during safe-cookie controller authentication. + Bugfix on 0.2.3.13-alpha. + - Avoid memory leak of IPv6 policy content if we fail to format it into + a router descriptor. Bugfix on 0.2.4.7-alpha. + + o Minor bugfixes (other code correctness issues): + - Avoid a crash if we fail to generate an extrainfo descriptor. + Fixes bug 8208; bugfix on 0.2.3.16-alpha. Found by Coverity; + this is CID 718634. + - When detecting the largest possible file descriptor (in order to + close all file descriptors when launching a new program), actually + use _SC_OPEN_MAX. The old code for doing this was very, very broken. + Fixes bug 8209; bugfix on 0.2.3.1-alpha. Found by Coverity; this + is CID 743383. + - Fix a copy-and-paste error when adding a missing A1 to a routerset + because of GeoIPExcludeUnknown. Fix for Coverity CID 980650. + Bugfix on 0.2.4.10-alpha. + - Fix an impossible-to-trigger integer overflow when estimating how + long our onionskin queue would take. (This overflow would require us + to accept 4 million onionskins before processing 100 of them.) Fixes + bug 8210; bugfix on 0.2.4.10-alpha. + + o Code simplification and refactoring: + - Add a wrapper function for the common "log a message with a + rate-limit" case. + + Changes in version 0.2.4.10-alpha - 2013-02-04 Tor 0.2.4.10-alpha adds defenses at the directory authority level from certain attacks that flood the network with relays; changes the queue @@ -976,7 +1788,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.4.1-alpha - 2012-09-05 o Minor features (code security and spec conformance): - Clear keys and key-derived material left on the stack in rendservice.c and rendclient.c. Check return value of - crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_string() in end_service_load_keys(). + crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_string() in rend_service_load_keys(). These fixes should make us more forward-secure against cold-boot attacks and the like. Fixes bug 2385. - Reject EXTEND cells sent to nonexistent streams. According to the @@ -3321,7 +4133,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.3.4-alpha - 2011-09-13 by an attacker who controls both an introduction point and a rendezvous point, and who uses the malleability of AES-CTR to alter the encrypted g^x portion of the INTRODUCE1 cell. We think - that these attacks is infeasible (requiring the attacker to send + that these attacks are infeasible (requiring the attacker to send on the order of zettabytes of altered cells in a short interval), but we'd rather block them off in case there are any classes of this attack that we missed. Reported by Willem Pinckaers. diff --git a/Makefile.am b/Makefile.am index 4639c22c4..0361d87ce 100644 --- a/Makefile.am +++ b/Makefile.am @@ -32,6 +32,12 @@ EXTRA_DIST+= \ README \ ReleaseNotes +if COVERAGE_ENABLED +TEST_CFLAGS=-fno-inline -fprofile-arcs -ftest-coverage +else +TEST_CFLAGS= +endif + #install-data-local: # $(INSTALL) -m 755 -d $(LOCALSTATEDIR)/lib/tor @@ -60,6 +66,14 @@ doxygen: test: all ./src/test/test +# Note that test-network requires a copy of Chutney in $CHUTNEY_PATH. +# Chutney can be cloned from https://git.torproject.org/chutney.git . +test-network: all + ./src/test/test-network.sh + +reset-gcov: + rm -f src/*/*.gcda + # Avoid strlcpy.c, strlcat.c, aes.c, OpenBSD_malloc_Linux.c, sha256.c, # eventdns.[hc], tinytest*.[ch] check-spaces: @@ -84,3 +98,5 @@ version: (cd "$(top_srcdir)" && git rev-parse --short=16 HEAD); \ fi +mostlyclean-local: + rm -f src/*/*.gc{da,no} diff --git a/acinclude.m4 b/acinclude.m4 index af1505156..294373414 100644 --- a/acinclude.m4 +++ b/acinclude.m4 @@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ AC_DEFUN([TOR_DEFINE_CODEPATH], ]) dnl 1:flags +dnl 2:also try to link (yes: non-empty string) +dnl will set yes or no in $tor_can_link_$1 (as modified by AS_VAR_PUSHDEF) AC_DEFUN([TOR_CHECK_CFLAGS], [ AS_VAR_PUSHDEF([VAR],[tor_cv_cflags_$1]) AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether the compiler accepts $1], VAR, [ @@ -51,6 +53,13 @@ AC_DEFUN([TOR_CHECK_CFLAGS], [ AC_TRY_COMPILE([], [return 0;], [AS_VAR_SET(VAR,yes)], [AS_VAR_SET(VAR,no)]) + if test x$2 != x; then + AS_VAR_PUSHDEF([can_link],[tor_can_link_$1]) + AC_TRY_LINK([], [return 0;], + [AS_VAR_SET(can_link,yes)], + [AS_VAR_SET(can_link,no)]) + AS_VAR_POPDEF([can_link]) + fi CFLAGS="$tor_saved_CFLAGS" ]) if test x$VAR = xyes; then diff --git a/changes/6783_big_hammer b/changes/6783_big_hammer deleted file mode 100644 index 2ff3249b3..000000000 --- a/changes/6783_big_hammer +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6 +0,0 @@ - o Major features (deprecation): - - There's now a "DisableV2DirectoryInfo_" option that prevents us - from serving any directory requests for v2 directory information. - This is for us to test disabling the old deprecated V2 directory - format, so that we can see whether doing so has any effect on - network load. Part of a fix for bug 6783. diff --git a/changes/bug10046 b/changes/bug10046 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b2f545efe --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug10046 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - Fix an always-true assertion in pluggable transports code. Fixes + issue 10046. Found by dcb. diff --git a/changes/bug1376 b/changes/bug1376 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..bee42a39a --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug1376 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + + - Added additional argument to write_chunks_to_file to optionally skip + using a temp file to do non-atomic writes. Implements ticket #1376. diff --git a/changes/bug1992 b/changes/bug1992 deleted file mode 100644 index 6a751dc7e..000000000 --- a/changes/bug1992 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - Stop trying to resolve our hostname so often (e.g. every time we - think about doing a directory fetch). Now we reuse the cached - answer in some cases. Fixes bugs 1992 (bugfix on 0.2.0.20-rc) - and 2410 (bugfix on 0.1.2.2-alpha). - - o Minor features: - - Make bridge relays check once a minute for whether their IP - address has changed, rather than only every 15 minutes. Resolves - bugs 1913 and 1992. - diff --git a/changes/bug2286 b/changes/bug2286 deleted file mode 100644 index 4f8dfbbf6..000000000 --- a/changes/bug2286 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Major features (directory authority): - - Directory authorities now support a new consensus method (17) - where they cap the published bandwidth of servers for which - insufficient bandwidth measurements exist. Fixes part of bug - 2286. diff --git a/changes/bug5018 b/changes/bug5018 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c5c12efab --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug5018 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Minor features: + - Don't launch pluggable transport proxies that contribute + transports we don't need. Resolves ticket 5018. diff --git a/changes/bug5595 b/changes/bug5595 deleted file mode 100644 index 31f4b84b0..000000000 --- a/changes/bug5595 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,8 +0,0 @@ - o Critical bugfixes: - - Distinguish downloading an authority certificate by identity digest from - downloading one by identity digest/signing key digest pair; formerly we - always request them only by identity digest and get the newest one even - when we wanted one with a different signing key. Then we would complain - about being given a certificate we already had, and never get the one we - really wanted. Now we use the "fp-sk/" resource as well as the "fp/" - resource to request the one we want. Fixes bug 5595. diff --git a/changes/bug5605 b/changes/bug5605 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2144d968f --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug5605 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +o Minor Bugfixes: + - No longer writing control ports to file if updating reversible + options fail. Fixes bug 5605; bugfix on 0.2.2.26-beta. Patch from + Ryman. + diff --git a/changes/bug5650 b/changes/bug5650 deleted file mode 100644 index 401e31707..000000000 --- a/changes/bug5650 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Major bugfixes: - - Avoid a bug where our response to TLS renegotation under certain - network conditions could lead to a busy-loop, with 100% CPU - consumption. Fixes bug 5650; bugfix on 0.2.0.16-alpha. - diff --git a/changes/bug6026 b/changes/bug6026 deleted file mode 100644 index de5d6ead0..000000000 --- a/changes/bug6026 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - Relays now treat a changed IPv6 ORPort as sufficient reason to - publish an updated descriptor. Fix for bug 6026; bugfix for - 0.2.4.1-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug6055 b/changes/bug6055 deleted file mode 100644 index 00730073a..000000000 --- a/changes/bug6055 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6 +0,0 @@ - o Major enhancements: - - Re-enable TLS 1.1 and 1.2 when built with OpenSSL 1.0.1e or later. - (OpenSSL before 1.0.1 didn't have TLS 1.1 or 1.2. OpenSSL from 1.0.1 - through 1.0.1d had bugs that prevented renegotiation from working - with TLS 1.1 or 1.2, so we disabled them to solve bug 6033.) Fix for - issue #6055. diff --git a/changes/bug6174 b/changes/bug6174 deleted file mode 100644 index 79d2930ec..000000000 --- a/changes/bug6174 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6 +0,0 @@ - o Major bugfixes: - - When we mark a circuit as unusable for new circuits, have it - continue to be unusable for new circuits even if MaxCircuitDirtiness - is increased too much at the wrong time, or the system clock jumped - backwards. Fix for bug 6174; bugfix on 0.0.2pre26. - diff --git a/changes/bug6206 b/changes/bug6206 deleted file mode 100644 index 61a16d291..000000000 --- a/changes/bug6206 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - Always check the return values of functions fcntl() and - setsockopt(). We don't believe these are ever actually failing in - practice, but better safe than sorry. Also, checking these return - values should please some analysis tools (like Coverity). Patch - from 'flupzor'. Fix for bug 8206; bugfix on all versions of Tor. diff --git a/changes/bug6304 b/changes/bug6304 deleted file mode 100644 index 445560a8e..000000000 --- a/changes/bug6304 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - Behave correctly when the user disables LearnCircuitBuildTimeout - but doesn't tell us what they would like the timeout to be. Fixes - bug 6304; bugfix on 0.2.2.14-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug6572 b/changes/bug6572 deleted file mode 100644 index 6508d1bcb..000000000 --- a/changes/bug6572 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes (log messages) - - Use circuit creation time for network liveness evaluation. This - should eliminate warning log messages about liveness caused by - changes in timeout evaluation. Fixes bug 6572; bugfix on 0.2.4.8-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug6673 b/changes/bug6673 deleted file mode 100644 index 506b44989..000000000 --- a/changes/bug6673 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Minor features (build): - - Detect and reject attempts to build Tor with threading support - when OpenSSL have been compiled with threading support disabled. - Fixes bug 6673. diff --git a/changes/bug7054 b/changes/bug7054 deleted file mode 100644 index 15680d72c..000000000 --- a/changes/bug7054 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes (man page): - - Say "KBytes" rather than "KB" in the man page (for various values - of K), to further reduce confusion about whether Tor counts in - units of memory or fractions of units of memory. Fixes bug 7054. diff --git a/changes/bug7065 b/changes/bug7065 deleted file mode 100644 index 1ca684102..000000000 --- a/changes/bug7065 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfix (log cleanups): - - Eliminate several instances where we use Nickname=ID to refer to - nodes in logs. Use Nickname (ID) instead. (Elsewhere, we still use - $ID=Nickname, which is also acceptable.) Fixes bug #7065. Bugfix - on 0.2.3.21-rc, 0.2.4.5-alpha, 0.2.4.8-alpha, and 0.2.4.10-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug7143 b/changes/bug7143 deleted file mode 100644 index d26135ae6..000000000 --- a/changes/bug7143 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes (build): - - Add the old src/or/micro-revision.i filename to CLEANFILES. - On the off chance that somebody has one, it will go away as soon - as they run "make clean". Fix for bug 7143; bugfix on 0.2.4.1-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug7164_diagnostic b/changes/bug7164_diagnostic deleted file mode 100644 index 8bedfc4bd..000000000 --- a/changes/bug7164_diagnostic +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Minor features (bug diagnostic): - - If we fail to free a microdescriptor because of bug #7164, log - the filename and line number from which we tried to free it. - This should help us finally fix #7164. diff --git a/changes/bug7280 b/changes/bug7280 deleted file mode 100644 index ef5d36a80..000000000 --- a/changes/bug7280 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - Fix some bugs in tor-fw-helper-natpmp when trying to build and - run it on Windows. More bugs likely remain. Patch from Gisle Vanem. - Fixes bug 7280; bugfix on 0.2.3.1-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug7302 b/changes/bug7302 deleted file mode 100644 index fec615ff9..000000000 --- a/changes/bug7302 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - Don't log inappropriate heartbeat messages when hibernating: a - hibernating node is _expected_ to drop out of the consensus, - decide it isn't bootstrapped, and so forth. Fixes part of bug - 7302; bugfix on 0.2.3.1-alpha. - - - Don't complain about bootstrapping problems while hibernating. - These complaints reflect a general code problems, but not one - with any problematic effects. (No connections are actually - opened.) Fixes part of bug 7302; bugfix on 0.2.3.2-alpha. - diff --git a/changes/bug7350 b/changes/bug7350 deleted file mode 100644 index b0ee9d091..000000000 --- a/changes/bug7350 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Major bugfixes: - - Avoid an assertion when we discover that we'd like to write a cell - onto a closing connection: just discard the cell. Fixes another - case of bug 7350; bugfix on 0.2.4.4-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug7359 b/changes/bug7359 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d1bff0afa --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug7359 @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ + o Minor features (controller): + - Extend ORCONN controller event by ID parameter and add four new + controller event types CONN_BW, CIRC_BW, CELL_STATS, and TB_EMPTY + that shall help understand connection and circuit usage. The new + events are emitted in private Tor networks only. Implements + proposal 218. Resolves ticket #7359. + diff --git a/changes/bug7582 b/changes/bug7582 deleted file mode 100644 index f3b063576..000000000 --- a/changes/bug7582 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ - o Major bugfixes: - - - When an exit node tells us that it is rejecting because of its - exit policy a stream we expected it to accept (because of its exit - policy), do not mark the node as useless for exiting if our - expectation was only based on an exit policy summary. Instead, - mark the circuit as unsuitable for that particular address. Fixes - part of bug 7582; bugfix on 0.2.3.2-alpha. - diff --git a/changes/bug7707_diagnostic b/changes/bug7707_diagnostic deleted file mode 100644 index 0c3138e78..000000000 --- a/changes/bug7707_diagnostic +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Minor features: - - Add another diagnostic to the heartbeat message: track and log - overhead that TLS is adding to the data we write. If this is - high, we are sending too little data to SSL_write at a time. - Diagnostic for bug 7707. diff --git a/changes/bug7768 b/changes/bug7768 deleted file mode 100644 index e3f9600af..000000000 --- a/changes/bug7768 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Documentation fixes: - - Update tor-fw-helper.1.txt and tor-fw-helper.c to make option - names match. Fixes bug 7768. diff --git a/changes/bug7799 b/changes/bug7799 deleted file mode 100644 index ed4570129..000000000 --- a/changes/bug7799 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,7 +0,0 @@ - o Minor changes (log clarification) - - Add more detail to a log message about relaxed timeouts. Hopefully - this additional detail will allow us to diagnose the cause of bug 7799. - o Minor bugfixes - - Don't attempt to relax the timeout of already opened 1-hop circuits. - They might never timeout. This should eliminate some/all cases of - the relaxed timeout log message. diff --git a/changes/bug7801 b/changes/bug7801 deleted file mode 100644 index 1d6d021f3..000000000 --- a/changes/bug7801 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,13 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - When choosing which stream on a formerly stalled circuit to wake - first, make better use of the platform's weak RNG. Previously, we - had been using the % ("modulo") operator to try to generate a 1/N - chance of picking each stream, but this behaves badly with many - platforms' choice of weak RNG. Fix for bug 7801; bugfix on - 0.2.2.20-alpha. - - Use our own weak RNG when we need a weak RNG. Windows's rand() - and Irix's random() only return 15 bits; Solaris's random() - returns more bits but its RAND_MAX says it only returns 15, and - so on. Fixes another aspect of bug 7801; bugfix on - 0.2.2.20-alpha. - diff --git a/changes/bug7816.024 b/changes/bug7816.024 deleted file mode 100644 index b5d55f5d6..000000000 --- a/changes/bug7816.024 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,8 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - Avoid leaking IPv6 policy content if we fail to format it into - a router descriptor. Spotted by Coverity. Fixes part of 7816; - bugfix on 0.2.4.7-alpha. - - - Avoid leaking memory if we fail to compute a consensus signature - or we generated a consensus we couldn't parse. Spotted by Coverity. - Fixes part of 7816; bugfix on 0.2.0.5-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug7816_023 b/changes/bug7816_023 deleted file mode 100644 index a4530292c..000000000 --- a/changes/bug7816_023 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,7 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes (memory leak, controller): - - Fix a memory leak during safe-cookie controller authentication. - Spotted by Coverity. Fixes part of bug 7816; bugfix on 0.2.3.13-alpha. - - o Minor bugfixes (memory leak, HTTPS proxy support): - - Fix a memory leak when receiving headers from an HTTPS proxy. - Spotted by Coverity. Fixes part of bug 7816; bugfix on 0.2.1.1-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug7816_023_small b/changes/bug7816_023_small deleted file mode 100644 index cd90f035f..000000000 --- a/changes/bug7816_023_small +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - Fix various places where we leak file descriptors or memory on - error cases. Spotted by coverity. Fixes parts of bug 7816. diff --git a/changes/bug7902 b/changes/bug7902 deleted file mode 100644 index 051759dc0..000000000 --- a/changes/bug7902 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,7 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - When we receive a RELAY_END cell with the reason DONE, or with no - reason, before receiving a RELAY_CONNECTED cell, report the SOCKS - status as "connection refused." Previously we reporting these - cases as success but then immediately closing the connection. - Fixes bug 7902; bugfix on 0.1.0.1-rc. Reported by "oftc_must_ - be_destroyed." diff --git a/changes/bug7947 b/changes/bug7947 deleted file mode 100644 index 6200ba2d8..000000000 --- a/changes/bug7947 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - Fix the handling of a TRUNCATE cell when it arrives while the circuit - extension is in progress. Fixes bug 7947; bugfix on 0.0.7.1. - diff --git a/changes/bug7950 b/changes/bug7950 deleted file mode 100644 index e62cca07a..000000000 --- a/changes/bug7950 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - When rejecting a configuration because we were unable to parse a - quoted string, log an actual error message. Fix for bug 7950; - bugfix on 0.2.0.16-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug7982 b/changes/bug7982 deleted file mode 100644 index 46aa53249..000000000 --- a/changes/bug7982 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - Copy-paste description for PathBias params from man page into or.h - comment. Fixes bug 7982. diff --git a/changes/bug8002 b/changes/bug8002 deleted file mode 100644 index d6e2ff249..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8002 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - When autodetecting the number of CPUs, use the number of available - CPUs in preferernce to the number of configured CPUs. Inform the - user if this reduces the number of avialable CPUs. Fix for bug 8002. - Bugfix on 0.2.3.1-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug8014 b/changes/bug8014 deleted file mode 100644 index c09a86098..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8014 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Minor usability improvements (build): - - Clarify that when autconf is checking for nacl, it is checking - specifically for nacl with a fast curve25519 implementation. - Fixes bug 8014. - diff --git a/changes/bug8031 b/changes/bug8031 deleted file mode 100644 index 17329ec5b..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8031 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,7 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - Use direct writes rather than stdio when building microdescriptor - caches, in an attempt to mitigate bug 8031, or at least make it - less common. - - Warn more aggressively when flushing microdescriptors to a - microdescriptor cache fails, in an attempt to mitegate bug 8031, - or at least make it more diagnosable. diff --git a/changes/bug8037 b/changes/bug8037 deleted file mode 100644 index 989745fc3..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8037 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,8 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - Correctly store microdescriptors and extrainfo descriptors with - an internal NUL byte. Fixes bug 8037; bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha. - Bug reported by "cypherpunks". - - o Minor features: - - Reject as invalid most directory objects containing a - NUL. Belt-and-suspender fix for bug 8037. diff --git a/changes/bug8059 b/changes/bug8059 deleted file mode 100644 index 47273ed0a..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8059 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes (protocol conformance): - - Fix a misframing issue when reading the version numbers in a - VERSIONS cell. Previously we would recognize [00 01 00 02] as - 'version 1, version 2, and version 0x100', when it should have - only included versions 1 and 2. Fixes bug 8059; bugfix on - 0.2.0.10-alpha. Reported pseudonymously. diff --git a/changes/bug8062 b/changes/bug8062 deleted file mode 100644 index 805e51ed4..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8062 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - Increase the width of the field used to remember a connection's - link protocol version to two bytes. Harmless for now, since the - only currently recognized versions are one byte long. Reported - pseudynmously. Fixes bug 8062, bugfix on 0.2.0.10-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug8065 b/changes/bug8065 deleted file mode 100644 index 06dbae8cd..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8065 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - Downgrade an assertion in connection_ap_expire_beginning to - an LD_BUG message. The fix for bug 8024 should prevent this - message from displaying, but just in case a warn that we can - diagnose is better than more assert crashes. Fix for bug 8065; - bugfix on 0.2.4.8-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug8093.part1 b/changes/bug8093.part1 deleted file mode 100644 index 2450794dd..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8093.part1 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Minor features: - - Downgrade "unexpected SENDME" warnings to protocol-warn for 0.2.4, - for bug 8093. diff --git a/changes/bug8117 b/changes/bug8117 deleted file mode 100644 index 910e8056f..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8117 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,13 +0,0 @@ - o Major bugfixes: - - - Many SOCKS5 clients, when configured to offer a username/password, - offer both username/password authentication and "no authentication". - Tor had previously preferred no authentication, but this was - problematic when trying to make applications get proper stream - isolation with IsolateSOCKSAuth. Now, on any SOCKS port with - IsolateSOCKSAuth turned on (which is the default), Tor selects - username/password authentication if it's offered. If this confuses your - application, you can disable it on a per-SOCKSPort basis via - PreferSOCKSNoAuth. Fixes bug 8117; bugfix on 0.2.3.3-alpha. - - diff --git a/changes/bug8121 b/changes/bug8121 deleted file mode 100644 index 60cba7284..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8121 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,7 +0,0 @@ - o Minor features: - - Clear the high bit on curve25519 public keys before passing them to - our backend, in case we ever wind up using a backend that doesn't do - so itself. If we used such a backend, and *didn't* clear the high bit, - we could wind up in a situation where users with such backends would - be distinguishable from users without. Fix for bug 8121; bugfix on - 0.2.4.8-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug8151 b/changes/bug8151 deleted file mode 100644 index e20fa3c31..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8151 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Minor features (directory authority): - - Include inside each vote a statement of the performance - thresholds that made the authority vote for its flags. Implements - ticket 8151. -
\ No newline at end of file diff --git a/changes/bug8158 b/changes/bug8158 deleted file mode 100644 index 65b21c2a2..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8158 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - Use less space when formatting identical microdescriptor lines in - directory votes. Fixes bug 8158; bugfix on 0.2.4.1-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug8161 b/changes/bug8161 deleted file mode 100644 index ab7b9c0ca..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8161 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6 +0,0 @@ - o Minor changes: - - Lower path use bias thresholds to .80 for notice and .60 for warn. - Fixes bug #8161; bugfix on 0.2.4.10-alpa. - - Make the rate limiting flags for the path use bias log messages - independent from the original path bias flags. Fixes bug #8161; - bugfix on 0.2.4.10-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug8180 b/changes/bug8180 deleted file mode 100644 index 39e6ce7f9..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8180 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,7 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes (security usability): - - Elevate the severity of the warning message when setting - EntryNodes but disabling UseGuardNodes to an error. The outcome - of letting Tor procede with those options enabled (which causes - EntryNodes to get ignored) is sufficiently different from what - was expected that it's best to just refuse to proceed. Fixes bug - 8180; bugfix on 0.2.3.11-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug8185_diagnostic b/changes/bug8185_diagnostic deleted file mode 100644 index b0f888475..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8185_diagnostic +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Minor features: - - Improve debugging output to attempt to diagnose the underlying - cause of bug 8185. diff --git a/changes/bug8200 b/changes/bug8200 deleted file mode 100644 index 65fc9dd03..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8200 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfix: - - Stop sending a stray "(null)" in some cases for the server status - "EXTERNAL_ADDRESS" controller event. Resolves bug 8200; bugfix - on 0.1.2.6-alpha. - diff --git a/changes/bug8203 b/changes/bug8203 deleted file mode 100644 index d26dc0fcc..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8203 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - Make the format and order of STREAM events for DNS lookups consistent - among the various ways to launch DNS lookups. Fix for bug 8203; - bugfix on 0.2.0.24-rc. Patch by "Desoxy." diff --git a/changes/bug8207 b/changes/bug8207 deleted file mode 100644 index 0028d3380..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8207 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,7 +0,0 @@ - o Major bugfixes (hidden services): - - Allow hidden service authentication to succeed again. When we - refactored the hidden service introduction code back in 0.2.4.1-alpha, - we didn't update the code that checks whether authentication - information is present, causing all authentication checks to - return "false". Fix for bug 8207; bugfix on 0.2.4.1-alpha. Found by - Coverity; this is CID 718615. diff --git a/changes/bug8208 b/changes/bug8208 deleted file mode 100644 index c85db90b5..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8208 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - Avoid a crash if we fail to generate an extrinfo descriptor. - Fixes bug 8208; bugfix on 0.2.3.16-alpha. Found by Coverity; - this is CID 718634. diff --git a/changes/bug8209 b/changes/bug8209 deleted file mode 100644 index c58923540..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8209 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - When detecting the largest possible file descriptor (in order to close - all file descriptors when launching a new program), actually use - _SC_OPEN_MAX. The old code for doing this was very, very broken. - Fix for bug 8209; bugfix on 0.2.3.1-alpha. Found by Coverity; this - is CID 743383. diff --git a/changes/bug8210 b/changes/bug8210 deleted file mode 100644 index 85d41b844..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8210 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - Fix an impossible-to-trigger integer overflow when - estimating how long out onionskin queue would take. (This overflow - would require us to accept 4 million onionskins before processing - 100 of them.) Fixes bug 8210; bugfix on 0.2.4.10-alpha. - diff --git a/changes/bug8218 b/changes/bug8218 deleted file mode 100644 index ce8d53ba6..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8218 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6 +0,0 @@ - o Major bugfixes: - - Stop marking every relay as having been down for one hour every - time we restart a directory authority. These artificial downtimes - were messing with our Stable and Guard flag calculations. Fixes - bug 8218 (introduced by the fix for 1035). Bugfix on 0.2.2.23-alpha. - diff --git a/changes/bug8231 b/changes/bug8231 deleted file mode 100644 index fd87a1dae..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8231 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Major bugfixes: - - When unable to find any working directory nodes to use as a - directory guard, give up rather than adding the same non-working - nodes to the list over and over. Fixes bug 8231; bugfix on - 0.2.4.8-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug8235-diagnosing b/changes/bug8235-diagnosing deleted file mode 100644 index b760035cf..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8235-diagnosing +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Minor features (diagnostic) - - If the state file's path bias counts are invalid (presumably from a - buggy tor prior to 0.2.4.10-alpha), make them correct. - - Add additional checks and log messages to the scaling of Path Bias - counts, in case there still are remaining issues with scaling. diff --git a/changes/bug8253-fix b/changes/bug8253-fix deleted file mode 100644 index 3d36d06c8..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8253-fix +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes (log messages) - - Fix a scaling issue in the path bias accounting code that resulted in - "Bug:" log messages from either pathbias_scale_close_rates() or - pathbias_count_build_success(). This represents a bugfix on a previous - bugfix: The original fix attempted in 0.2.4.10-alpha was incomplete. - Fixes bug 8235; bugfix on 0.2.4.1-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug8273 b/changes/bug8273 deleted file mode 100644 index 257f57e7a..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8273 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Critical bugfixes: - - When dirserv.c computes flags and thresholds, use measured bandwidths - in preference to advertised ones. diff --git a/changes/bug8290 b/changes/bug8290 deleted file mode 100644 index d1fce7d8b..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8290 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ - o Removed files: - - The tor-tsocks.conf is no longer distributed or installed. We - recommend that tsocks users use torsocks instead. Resolves - ticket 8290. - - o Documentation fixes: - - The torify manpage no longer refers to tsocks; torify hasn't - supported tsocks since 0.2.3.14-alpha. - - The manpages no longer reference tsocks. diff --git a/changes/bug8377 b/changes/bug8377 deleted file mode 100644 index c9ad151bc..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8377 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - Correctly recognize that [::1] is a loopback address. Fixes bug #8377; - bugfix on 0.2.1.3-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug8408 b/changes/bug8408 deleted file mode 100644 index ae9cf172e..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8408 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - Allow TestingTorNetworks to override the 4096-byte minimum for the Fast - threshold. Otherwise they can't bootstrap until they've observed more - traffic. Fixes bug 8508; bugfix on 0.2.4.10-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug8427 b/changes/bug8427 deleted file mode 100644 index 22b003fc3..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8427 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - If we encounter a write failure on a SOCKS connection before we - finish our SOCKS handshake, don't warn that we closed the - connection before we could send a SOCKS reply. Fixes bug 8427; - bugfix on 0.1.0.1-rc. diff --git a/changes/bug8435 b/changes/bug8435 deleted file mode 100644 index da7ca7c1f..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8435 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Major bugfixes: - - When dirserv.c computes flags and thresholds, ignore advertised - bandwidths if we have more than a threshold number of routers with - measured bandwidths. diff --git a/changes/bug8464 b/changes/bug8464 deleted file mode 100644 index 74ff2e39f..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8464 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - Correct our check for which versions of Tor support the EXTEND2 - cell. We had been willing to send it to Tor 0.2.4.7-alpha and - later, when support was really added in version 0.2.4.8-alpha. - Fixes bug 8464; bugfix on 0.2.4.8-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug8475 b/changes/bug8475 deleted file mode 100644 index eb8debedb..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8475 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Major bugfixes: - - If configured via ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses not to report - DNS queries which have resolved to internal addresses, apply that - rule to IPv6 as well. Fixes bug 8475; bugfix on 0.2.0.7-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug8477-easypart b/changes/bug8477-easypart deleted file mode 100644 index 0f8f1031c..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8477-easypart +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - Log the purpose of a path-bias testing circuit correctly. - Improves a log message from bug 8477; bugfix on 0.2.4.8-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug8587 b/changes/bug8587 deleted file mode 100644 index 84d2f1ec0..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8587 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes (build): - - Build Tor correctly on 32-bit platforms where the compiler can build - but not run code using the "uint128_t" construction. Fixes bug 8587; - bugfix on 0.2.4.8-alpha. - diff --git a/changes/bug8596 b/changes/bug8596 deleted file mode 100644 index dd36bad85..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8596 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Minor features: - - Add CACHED keyword to ADDRMAP events in the control protocol to indicate - whether a DNS result will be cached or not. diff --git a/changes/bug8598 b/changes/bug8598 deleted file mode 100644 index e31c8f3c7..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8598 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6 +0,0 @@ - o Bugfixes: - - Fix compilation warning with some versions of clang that would prefer - the -Wswitch-enum compiler flag to warn about switch statements with - missing enum values, even if those switch statements have a default: - statement. Fixes bug 8598; bugfix on 0.2.4.10-alpha. - diff --git a/changes/bug8599 b/changes/bug8599 deleted file mode 100644 index 204ef58c3..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8599 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - Fix some logic errors when the user manually overrides the - PathsNeededToBuildCircuits option in torrc. Fixes bug 8599; bugfix - on 0.2.4.10-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug8638 b/changes/bug8638 deleted file mode 100644 index 3a790e567..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8638 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Minor features - In our testsuite, create temporary directories with a bit more entropy - in their name to make name collissions less likely. Fixes bug 8638. diff --git a/changes/bug8639 b/changes/bug8639 deleted file mode 100644 index 0db5c9142..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8639 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Normal bugfixes: - - When launching a resolve request on behalf of an AF_UNIX control - socket, omit the address field of the new entry connection, used in - subsequent controller events, rather than letting tor_dup_addr() set - it to "<unknown address type>". Fixes bug 8639. diff --git a/changes/bug8711 b/changes/bug8711 deleted file mode 100644 index 28a1daa45..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8711 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6 +0,0 @@ - o Minor features (authority): - - Add a "ignoring-advertised-bws" boolean to our flag-thresholds - lines to describe whether we have enough measured bandwidths to - ignore advertised bandwidth claims. Closes ticket 8711. - - diff --git a/changes/bug8716 b/changes/bug8716 deleted file mode 100644 index 74c74f82a..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8716 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes (memory leak): - - Fix a memory leak that would occur whenever a configuration - option changed. Fixes bug #8718; bugfix on 0.2.3.3-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug8719 b/changes/bug8719 deleted file mode 100644 index c05b79dde..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8719 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6 +0,0 @@ - o Major bugfixes (memory leak): - - Avoid a memory leak where we would leak a consensus body when we find - that a consensus which we couldn't previously verify due to missing - certificates is now verifiable. Fixes bug 8719; bugfix on - 0.2.0.10-alpha. - diff --git a/changes/bug8822 b/changes/bug8822 deleted file mode 100644 index c6787afe0..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8822 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Major bugfixes (windows): - - Prevent failures on Windows Vista and later when rebuilding the - microdescriptor cache. Diagnosed by Robert Ransom. Fixes bug 8822; - bugfix on 0.2.4.12-alpha. - diff --git a/changes/bug8833 b/changes/bug8833 deleted file mode 100644 index 681a86191..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8833 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Major bugfixes (directory authority): - - Fix a crash bug when building a consensus using an older consensus as - its basis. Fixes bug 8833. Bugfix on 0.2.4.12-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug8844 b/changes/bug8844 deleted file mode 100644 index 320e5f284..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8844 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6 +0,0 @@ - o Major bugfixes: - - Prevent the get_freelists() function from running off the end of - the list of freelists if it somehow gets an unrecognized - allocation. Fixes bug 8844; bugfix on 0.2.0.16-alpha. Reported by - eugenis. - diff --git a/changes/bug8845 b/changes/bug8845 deleted file mode 100644 index ace043ab9..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8845 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes (test): - - Fix an impossible buffer overrun in the AES unit tests. Fixes bug 8845; - bugfix on 0.2.0.7-alpha. Found by eugenis. diff --git a/changes/bug8846 b/changes/bug8846 deleted file mode 100644 index 377cc3708..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8846 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - Give a less useless error message when the user asks for an IPv4 - address on an IPv6-only port, or vice versa. Fixes bug 8846; bugfix - on 0.2.4.7-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug8879 b/changes/bug8879 deleted file mode 100644 index 0d2a70086..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8879 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Major bugfixes: - - Follow the socks5 protocol when offering username/password - authentication. The fix for bug 8117 exposed this bug, and it - turns out real-world applications like Pidgin do care. Bugfix on - 0.2.3.2-alpha; fixes bug 8879. diff --git a/changes/bug8965 b/changes/bug8965 deleted file mode 100644 index b5af27963..000000000 --- a/changes/bug8965 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Removed documentation: - - Remove some of the older contents of doc/ as obsolete; move others - to torspec.git. Fixes bug 8965. diff --git a/changes/bug9002 b/changes/bug9002 deleted file mode 100644 index c41ace394..000000000 --- a/changes/bug9002 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Major bugfixes: - - Limit hidden service descriptors to at most ten introduction - points, to slow one kind of guard enumeration. Fixes bug 9002; - bugfix on 0.1.1.11-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug9017 b/changes/bug9017 deleted file mode 100644 index 359c526b0..000000000 --- a/changes/bug9017 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6 +0,0 @@ - o Major bugfixes: - - Avoid an assertion failure on OpenBSD (and perhaps other BSDs) - when an exit connection with optimistic data succeeds immediately - rather than returning EINPROGRESS. Fixes bug 9017; bugfix on - 0.2.3.1-alpha. - diff --git a/changes/bug9047 b/changes/bug9047 deleted file mode 100644 index 497f0d337..000000000 --- a/changes/bug9047 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - If for some reason we fail to write a microdescriptor while - rebuilding the cache, do not let the annotations from that - microdescriptor linger in the cache file, and do not let the - microdescriptor stay recorded as present in its old location. - Fixes bug 9047; bugfix on 0.2.2.6-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug9063 b/changes/bug9063 deleted file mode 100644 index dcbecf617..000000000 --- a/changes/bug9063 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Normal bugfixes: - - Close any circuit that has more cells queued than the spec permits. - Fixes bug #9063; bugfix on 0.2.4.12. diff --git a/changes/bug9063_redux b/changes/bug9063_redux deleted file mode 100644 index e6fae72ef..000000000 --- a/changes/bug9063_redux +++ /dev/null @@ -1,15 +0,0 @@ - o Major bugfixes: - - When we have too much memory queued in circuits (according to a new - MaxMemInCellQueues option), close the circuits consuming the most - memory. This prevents us from running out of memory as a relay if - circuits fill up faster than they can be drained. Fixes - bug 9063; bugfix on the 54th commit of Tor. This bug is a further - fix beyond bug 6252, whose fix was merged into 0.2.3.21-rc. - - Also fixes an earlier approach taken in 0.2.4.13-alpha, where we - tried to solve this issue simply by imposing an upper limit on the - number of queued cells for a single circuit. That approach proved to - be problematic, since there are ways to provoke clients to send a - number of cells in excess of any such reasonable limit. - Fixes bug 9072; bugfix on 0.2.4.13-alpha. - diff --git a/changes/bug9072 b/changes/bug9072 deleted file mode 100644 index e594a3833..000000000 --- a/changes/bug9072 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Critical bugfixes: - - Disable middle relay queue overfill detection code due to possible - guard discovery attack, pending further analysis. Fixes bug #9072. diff --git a/changes/bug9122 b/changes/bug9122 deleted file mode 100644 index 5009da612..000000000 --- a/changes/bug9122 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Major bugfixes: - - When receiving a new configuration file via the control port's - LOADCONF command, do not treat the defaults file as absent. - Fixes bug 9122; bugfix on 0.2.3.9-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug9147 b/changes/bug9147 deleted file mode 100644 index e6064ea0e..000000000 --- a/changes/bug9147 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Minor features: - - Issue a warning when running with the bufferevents backend enabled. - It's still not stable, and people should know that they're likely - to hit unexpected problems. Closes ticket 9147. diff --git a/changes/bug9200 b/changes/bug9200 deleted file mode 100644 index 7b64dd174..000000000 --- a/changes/bug9200 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Major bugfixes: - - Fix a bug in the voting algorithm that could yield incorrect results - when a non-naming authority declared too many flags. Fixes bug 9200; - bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha. - diff --git a/changes/bug9206 b/changes/bug9206 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7acb36699 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug9206 @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + o Minor features (testing): + + - When bootstrapping a test network, few relays get the Guard + flag. There is now a new option, TestingDirAuthVoteGuard, which + can be used to specify a set of relays which should be voted + Guard regardless of uptime or bandwidth. Addresses ticket 9206. diff --git a/changes/bug9254 b/changes/bug9254 deleted file mode 100644 index 5179bdc52..000000000 --- a/changes/bug9254 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - Fix a spurious compilation warning with some older versions of - GCC on FreeBSD. Fixes bug 9254; bugfix on 0.2.4.14-alpha. - diff --git a/changes/bug9288 b/changes/bug9288 deleted file mode 100644 index 59bf414ea..000000000 --- a/changes/bug9288 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - Fix an invalid memory read that occured when a pluggable - transport proxy failed its configuration protocol. - Fixes bug 9288. diff --git a/changes/bug9295 b/changes/bug9295 deleted file mode 100644 index 2c113616c..000000000 --- a/changes/bug9295 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Major bugfixes: - - Avoid a crash when using --hash-password. Fixes bug 9295; bugfix on - 0.2.4.15-rc. Found by stem integration tests. - diff --git a/changes/bug9309 b/changes/bug9309 deleted file mode 100644 index 38c462bc0..000000000 --- a/changes/bug9309 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - When evaluating whether to use a connection that we haven't - decided is canonical using a recent link protocol version, - decide that it's canonical only if it used address _does_ - match the desired address. Fixes bug 9309; bugfix on - 0.2.4.4-alpha. Reported by skruffy. diff --git a/changes/bug9337 b/changes/bug9337 deleted file mode 100644 index ce99bc818..000000000 --- a/changes/bug9337 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Major bugfixes (DNS): - - Avoid an assertion failure when processing DNS replies without the - answer types we expected. Fixes bug 9337; bugfix on 0.2.4.7-alpha. - diff --git a/changes/bug9354 b/changes/bug9354 deleted file mode 100644 index 68fc81a59..000000000 --- a/changes/bug9354 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - Make the default behavior of NumDirectoryGuards be to track - NumEntryGuards. Now a user who changes only NumEntryGuards will get - the behavior she expects. Fixes bug 9354; bugfix on 0.2.4.8-alpha. - diff --git a/changes/bug9366 b/changes/bug9366 deleted file mode 100644 index acc919e77..000000000 --- a/changes/bug9366 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Minor features (usability): - - Warn and fail if a server is configured not to advertise any - ORPorts at all. (We need *something* to put in our descriptor, or - we just won't work.) diff --git a/changes/bug9400 b/changes/bug9400 deleted file mode 100644 index 974224068..000000000 --- a/changes/bug9400 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,7 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - - Avoid double-closing the listener socket in our socketpair replacement - (used on Windows) in the case where the addresses on our opened - sockets don't match what we expected. Fixes bug 9400; bugfix on - every released Tor version. Found by Coverity. - diff --git a/changes/bug9543 b/changes/bug9543 deleted file mode 100644 index 753947f6f..000000000 --- a/changes/bug9543 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - Avoid overflows when the user sets MaxCircuitDirtiness to a - ridiculously high value, by imposing a (ridiculously high) 30-day - maximum on MaxCircuitDirtiness. diff --git a/changes/bug9546 b/changes/bug9546 deleted file mode 100644 index 2145e35d8..000000000 --- a/changes/bug9546 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ - o Major bugfixes: - - - When a relay is extending a circuit to a bridge, it needs to send a - NETINFO cell, even when the bridge hasn't sent an AUTH_CHALLENGE - cell. Fixes bug 9546; bugfix on 0.2.3.6-alpha. - - - Bridges send AUTH_CHALLENGE cells during their handshakes; previously - they did not, which prevented relays from successfully connecting - to a bridge for self-test or bandwidth testing. Fixes bug 9546; - bugfix on 0.2.3.6-alpha. - diff --git a/changes/bug9564 b/changes/bug9564 deleted file mode 100644 index 0df00e369..000000000 --- a/changes/bug9564 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - If the time to download the next old-style networkstatus is in - the future, do not decline to consider whether to download the - next microdescriptor networkstatus. Fixes bug 9564. Bugfix on - 0.2.3.14-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug9578 b/changes/bug9578 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..96d66fe1f --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug9578 @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - When a command-line option such as --version or --help that ordinarily + implies --hush appears on the command line along with --quiet, obey + --quiet. Previously, we obeyed --quiet only if it appeared later on the + command line. Fixes bug 9578; bugfix on 0.2.5.1-alpha. + diff --git a/changes/bug9645a b/changes/bug9645a deleted file mode 100644 index 2daba65a0..000000000 --- a/changes/bug9645a +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - If we are unable to save a microdescriptor to the journal, do not - drop it from memory and then reattempt downloading it. Fixes bug - 9645; bugfix on 0.2.2.6-alpha. - diff --git a/changes/bug9651 b/changes/bug9651 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..453fe9a4a --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug9651 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Minor features: + - Warn when the Extended ORPort should be set, but it isn't. Resolves + ticket 9651. diff --git a/changes/bug9671_023 b/changes/bug9671_023 deleted file mode 100644 index 035ca5cde..000000000 --- a/changes/bug9671_023 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Major bugfixes: - - If the circuit build timeout logic is disabled (via the consensus, - or because we are an authority), then don't build testing circuits. - Fixes bug 9657; bugfix on 0.2.2.14-alpha. - diff --git a/changes/bug9698 b/changes/bug9698 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ee5c4f64a --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug9698 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Minor features: + - When receiving a new controller connection, log the origin address. + Resolves ticket 9698; patch from "sigpipe". diff --git a/changes/bug9731 b/changes/bug9731 index 828496af3..11bbc6ab6 100644 --- a/changes/bug9731 +++ b/changes/bug9731 @@ -1,3 +1,3 @@ o Major bugfixes: - Do not apply connection_consider_empty_read/write_buckets to - cpuworker connections. + non-rate-limited connections. diff --git a/changes/bug9776 b/changes/bug9776 deleted file mode 100644 index ea3a96abb..000000000 --- a/changes/bug9776 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Normal bugfixes: - - Always call circuit_n_chan_done(chan, 0) from channel_closed(), so we - can't leak pending circuits in some cases where - run_connection_housekeeping() calls connection_or_close_normally(). - Fixes bug #9776; bugfix on 0.2.4.17. diff --git a/changes/bug9869 b/changes/bug9869 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d67156d38 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug9869 @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ + o Minor features (build): + + - Assume that a user using configure --host wants to cross- + compile and error if we cannot find a properly named tool- + chain. Add --disable-tool-name-check to enable the user + to build nevertheless. Addresses ticket 9869. Patch by + Benedikt Gollatz. diff --git a/changes/bug9922 b/changes/bug9922 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9ac21118d --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug9922 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - Fix a bug where clients using bridges would report themselves + as 50% bootstrapped even without a live consensus document. + Fixes bug 9922; bugfix on 0.2.1.1-alpha. + diff --git a/changes/bug9926 b/changes/bug9926 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..51af5e088 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug9926 @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - Remove some old fallback code designed to keep Tor clients working + in a network with only two working nodes. Elsewhere in the code we + have long since stopped supporting such networks, so there wasn't + much point in keeping it around. Fixes bug 9926. + diff --git a/changes/bug9934 b/changes/bug9934 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2a636dba8 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug9934 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor features (controller): + - New DROPGUARDS command to forget all current entry guards. Not + recommended for ordinary use, since replacing guards too frequently + makes several attacks easier. Resolves ticket #9934; patch from "ra". diff --git a/changes/bug9948 b/changes/bug9948 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6a673c054 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug9948 @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + o Minor features (build): + + - Check in configure whether we can link an executable when + stack protection is enabled so we can warn the user about a + potentially missing libssp. Addresses ticket 9948. Patch + from Benedikt Gollatz. diff --git a/changes/bug9958 b/changes/bug9958 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b801dcf77 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug9958 @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - Report bootstrapping progress correctly when we're downloading + microdescriptors. We had updated our "do we have enough microdescs + to begin building circuits?" logic most recently in 0.2.4.10-alpha + (see bug 5956), but we left the bootstrap status event logic at + "how far through getting 1/4 of them are we?" Fixes bug 9958; + bugfix on 0.2.2.36, which is where they diverged (see bug 5343). + diff --git a/changes/cov980650 b/changes/cov980650 deleted file mode 100644 index cbbada2e6..000000000 --- a/changes/cov980650 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - Fix a copy-and-paste error when adding a missing A1 to a routerset - because of GeoIPExcludeUnknown. Fix for coverity CID 980650. - Bugfix on 0.2.4.10-alpha. diff --git a/changes/doc-heartbeat-loglevel b/changes/doc-heartbeat-loglevel deleted file mode 100644 index 91f40ad26..000000000 --- a/changes/doc-heartbeat-loglevel +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Minor documentation fixes: - - Fix the documentation of HeartbeatPeriod to say that the heartbeat - message is logged at notice, not at info. diff --git a/changes/easy.ratelim b/changes/easy.ratelim deleted file mode 100644 index cadd1e4f5..000000000 --- a/changes/easy.ratelim +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Code simplification and refactoring: - - Add a wrapper function for the common "log a message with a rate-limit" - case. diff --git a/changes/feature4994 b/changes/feature4994 deleted file mode 100644 index 4fa0e037b..000000000 --- a/changes/feature4994 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,7 +0,0 @@ - o Minor features: - - Teach bridge-using clients to avoid 0.2.2 bridges when making - microdescriptor-related dir requests, and only fall back to normal - descriptors if none of their bridges can handle microdescriptors - (as opposed to the fix in ticket 4013, which caused them to fall - back to normal descriptors if *any* of their bridges preferred - them). Resolves ticket 4994. diff --git a/changes/feature9574 b/changes/feature9574 deleted file mode 100644 index 723606e39..000000000 --- a/changes/feature9574 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,7 +0,0 @@ - o Major features: - - Relays now process the new "NTor" circuit-level handshake requests - with higher priority than the old "TAP" circuit-level handshake - requests. We still process some TAP requests to not totally starve - 0.2.3 clients when NTor becomes popular. A new consensus parameter - "NumNTorsPerTAP" lets us tune the balance later if we need to. - Implements ticket 9574. diff --git a/changes/fix-geoipexclude-doc b/changes/fix-geoipexclude-doc deleted file mode 100644 index 63b544ef2..000000000 --- a/changes/fix-geoipexclude-doc +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Documentation fixes: - - Fix the GeoIPExcludeUnknown documentation to refer to ExcludeExitNodes - rather than the currently nonexistent ExcludeEntryNodes. Spotted by - "hamahangi" on tor-talk. diff --git a/changes/geoip-apr2013 b/changes/geoip-apr2013 deleted file mode 100644 index 74d9c63b7..000000000 --- a/changes/geoip-apr2013 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Minor features: - - Update to the April 3 2013 Maxmind GeoLite Country database. - diff --git a/changes/geoip-august2013 b/changes/geoip-august2013 deleted file mode 100644 index bd15177a0..000000000 --- a/changes/geoip-august2013 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Minor features: - - Update to the August 7 2013 Maxmind GeoLite Country database. - diff --git a/changes/geoip-feb2013 b/changes/geoip-feb2013 deleted file mode 100644 index b5d794258..000000000 --- a/changes/geoip-feb2013 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Minor features: - - Update to the February 6 2013 Maxmind GeoLite Country database. - diff --git a/changes/geoip-july2013 b/changes/geoip-july2013 deleted file mode 100644 index 097819dd7..000000000 --- a/changes/geoip-july2013 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Minor features: - - Update to the July 3 2013 Maxmind GeoLite Country database. - diff --git a/changes/geoip-june2013 b/changes/geoip-june2013 deleted file mode 100644 index f8e00a62c..000000000 --- a/changes/geoip-june2013 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Minor features: - - Update to the June 5 2013 Maxmind GeoLite Country database. - diff --git a/changes/geoip-mar2013 b/changes/geoip-mar2013 deleted file mode 100644 index e9cc3981b..000000000 --- a/changes/geoip-mar2013 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Minor features: - - Update to the March 6 2013 Maxmind GeoLite Country database. - diff --git a/changes/geoip-may2013 b/changes/geoip-may2013 deleted file mode 100644 index ff4b98f22..000000000 --- a/changes/geoip-may2013 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Minor features: - - Update to the May 9 2013 Maxmind GeoLite Country database. - diff --git a/changes/geoip-september2013 b/changes/geoip-september2013 deleted file mode 100644 index 0173f4cfe..000000000 --- a/changes/geoip-september2013 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Minor features: - - Update to the September 4 2013 Maxmind GeoLite Country database. - diff --git a/changes/integers_donna b/changes/integers_donna deleted file mode 100644 index e9c69e8e1..000000000 --- a/changes/integers_donna +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes (portability) - - Tweak the curve25519-donna*.c implementations to tolerate systems - that lack stdint.h. Fixes bug 3894; bugfix on 0.2.4.8-alpha. diff --git a/changes/less_charbuf_usage b/changes/less_charbuf_usage deleted file mode 100644 index 2ec42b544..000000000 --- a/changes/less_charbuf_usage +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Code simplification and refactoring: - - Avoid using character buffers when constructing most directory - objects: this approach was unweildy and error-prone. Instead, - build smartlists of strings, and concatenate them when done. - diff --git a/changes/log-noise b/changes/log-noise deleted file mode 100644 index bbbf0d2c0..000000000 --- a/changes/log-noise +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes (log message reduction) - - Fix a path state issue that triggered a notice during relay startup. - Fixes bug #8320; bugfix on 0.2.4.10-alpha. - - Reduce occurrences of warns about circuit purpose in - connection_ap_expire_building(). Fixes bug #8477; bugfix on - 0.2.4.11-alpha. - - Fix a directory authority warn caused when we have a large amount - of badexit bandwidth. Fixes bug #8419; bugfix on 0.2.2.10-alpha. - - Reduce a path bias length check notice log to info. The notice - is triggered when creating controller circuits. Fixes bug #8196; - bugfix on 0.2.4.8-alpha. diff --git a/changes/no_client_timestamps_024 b/changes/no_client_timestamps_024 deleted file mode 100644 index 41dea2f1a..000000000 --- a/changes/no_client_timestamps_024 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14 +0,0 @@ - o Minor features (security, timestamp avoidance, proposal 222): - - Clients no longer send timestamps in their NETINFO cells. These were - not used for anything, and they provided one small way for clients - to be distinguished from each other as they moved from network to - network or behind NAT. Implements part of proposal 222. - - Clients now round timestamps in INTRODUCE cells down to the nearest - 10 minutes. If a new Support022HiddenServices option is set to 0, - or if it's set to "auto" and the feature is disabled in the consensus, - the timestamp is sent as 0 instead. Implements part of proposal 222. - - Stop sending timestamps in AUTHENTICATE cells. This is not such - a big deal from a security point of view, but it achieves no actual - good purpose, and isn't needed. Implements part of proposal 222. - - Reduce down accuracy of timestamps in hidden service descriptors. - Implements part of proposal 222. diff --git a/changes/prop221 b/changes/prop221 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b2bf44bc3 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/prop221 @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + o Minor features: + - Stop sending the CREATE_FAST cells by default; instead, use a + parameter in the consensus to decide whether to use + CREATE_FAST. This can improve security on connections where + Tor's circuit handshake is stronger than the available TLS + connection security levels. Implements proposal 221. diff --git a/changes/python-tests b/changes/python-tests new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4373e31e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/python-tests @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor features: + - "make check" now runs extra tests beyond the unit test scripts if + Python is installed. + diff --git a/changes/signof_enum b/changes/signof_enum deleted file mode 100644 index ba4fb597d..000000000 --- a/changes/signof_enum +++ /dev/null @@ -1,7 +0,0 @@ - o Code simplifications and refactoring: - - Use Ville Laurikari's implementation of AX_CHECK_SIGN() to determine - the signs of types during autoconf. This is better than our old - approach, which didn't work when cross-compiling. - - Detect the sign of enum values, rather than assuming that MSC is the - only compiler where enum types are all signed. Fix for bug 7727; - bugfix on 0.2.4.10-alpha. diff --git a/changes/ticket10060 b/changes/ticket10060 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..867c46436 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket10060 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor features: + - Adding --allow-missing-torrc commandline option that allows Tor to + run if configuration file specified by -f is not available. + Implements ticket 10060. + diff --git a/changes/ticket2267 b/changes/ticket2267 deleted file mode 100644 index b589b5721..000000000 --- a/changes/ticket2267 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,8 +0,0 @@ - o Minor features: - - Refactor resolve_my_address() so it returns the method by which we - decided our public IP address (explicitly configured, resolved from - explicit hostname, guessed from interfaces, learned by gethostname). - Now we can provide more helpful log messages when a relay guesses - its IP address incorrectly (e.g. due to unexpected lines in - /etc/hosts). Resolves ticket 2267. - diff --git a/changes/ticket8240 b/changes/ticket8240 deleted file mode 100644 index 91e6f8c14..000000000 --- a/changes/ticket8240 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Major security fixes: - - Make the default guard lifetime controllable via a new - GuardLifetime torrc option and a GuardLifetime consensus - parameter. Start of a fix for bug 8240; bugfix on 0.1.1.11-alpha. diff --git a/changes/ticket8443 b/changes/ticket8443 deleted file mode 100644 index ca6fb2f47..000000000 --- a/changes/ticket8443 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Minor features: - - Randomize the lifetime of our SSL link certificate, so censors can't - use the static value for filtering Tor flows. Resolves ticket 8443; - related to ticket 4014 which was included in 0.2.2.33. diff --git a/changes/ticket9658 b/changes/ticket9658 deleted file mode 100644 index a8db2efba..000000000 --- a/changes/ticket9658 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Minor features: - - Track how many "TAP" and "NTor" circuit handshake requests we get, - and how many we complete, and log it every hour to help relay - operators follow trends in network load. Addresses ticket 9658. diff --git a/changes/v3_intro_len b/changes/v3_intro_len deleted file mode 100644 index fbe39bce3..000000000 --- a/changes/v3_intro_len +++ /dev/null @@ -1,8 +0,0 @@ - o Major bugfixes: - - - Fix an uninitialized read that could (in some cases) lead to a remote - crash while parsing INTRODUCE 1 cells. (This is, so far as we know, - unrelated to the recent news.) Fixes bug XXX; bugfix on - 0.2.4.1-alpha. Anybody running a hidden service on the experimental - 0.2.4.x branch should upgrade. - diff --git a/changes/warn-unsigned-time_t b/changes/warn-unsigned-time_t deleted file mode 100644 index 5f0c36d09..000000000 --- a/changes/warn-unsigned-time_t +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Build improvements: - - Warn if building on a platform with an unsigned time_t: there - are too many places where Tor currently assumes that time_t can - hold negative values. We'd like to fix them all, but probably - some will remain. diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac index 6f40ac4ad..536a2b383 100644 --- a/configure.ac +++ b/configure.ac @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ dnl Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson dnl Copyright (c) 2007-2013, The Tor Project, Inc. dnl See LICENSE for licensing information -AC_INIT([tor],[0.2.4.10-alpha-dev]) +AC_INIT([tor],[0.2.5.1-alpha-dev]) AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([src/or/main.c]) AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIR([m4]) AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE @@ -39,6 +39,13 @@ AC_ARG_ENABLE(static-tor, AS_HELP_STRING(--enable-static-tor, Create an entirely static Tor binary. Requires --with-openssl-dir and --with-libevent-dir and --with-zlib-dir)) AC_ARG_ENABLE(curve25519, AS_HELP_STRING(--disable-curve25519, Build Tor with no curve25519 elliptic-curve crypto support)) +AC_ARG_ENABLE(unittests, + AS_HELP_STRING(--disable-unittests, [Don't build unit tests for Tor. Risky!])) +AC_ARG_ENABLE(coverage, + AS_HELP_STRING(--enable-coverage, [Enable coverage support in the unit-test build])) + +AM_CONDITIONAL(UNITTESTS_ENABLED, test x$enable_unittests != xno) +AM_CONDITIONAL(COVERAGE_ENABLED, test x$enable_coverage = xyes) if test "$enable_static_tor" = "yes"; then enable_static_libevent="yes"; @@ -151,12 +158,29 @@ fi]) AC_ARG_ENABLE(bufferevents, AS_HELP_STRING(--enable-bufferevents, use Libevent's buffered IO.)) +AC_ARG_ENABLE(tool-name-check, + AS_HELP_STRING(--disable-tool-name-check, check for sanely named toolchain when cross-compiling)) + dnl check for the correct "ar" when cross-compiling AN_MAKEVAR([AR], [AC_PROG_AR]) AN_PROGRAM([ar], [AC_PROG_AR]) AC_DEFUN([AC_PROG_AR], [AC_CHECK_TOOL([AR], [ar], [ar])]) AC_PROG_AR +dnl Check whether the above macro has settled for a simply named tool even +dnl though we're cross compiling. We must do this before running AC_PROG_CC, +dnl because that will find any cc on the system, not only the cross-compiler, +dnl and then verify that a binary built with this compiler runs on the +dnl build system. It will then come to the false conclusion that we're not +dnl cross-compiling. +if test x$enable_tool_name_check != xno; then + if test x$ac_tool_warned = xyes; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([We are cross compiling but could not find a properly named toolchain. Do you have your cross-compiling toolchain in PATH? (You can --disable-tool-name-check to ignore this.)]) + elif test "x$ac_ct_AR" != x -a x$cross_compiling = xmaybe; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([We think we are cross compiling but could not find a properly named toolchain. Do you have your cross-compiling toolchain in PATH? (You can --disable-tool-name-check to ignore this.)]) + fi +fi + AC_PROG_CC AC_PROG_CPP AC_PROG_MAKE_SET @@ -176,6 +200,13 @@ AM_CONDITIONAL(NAT_PMP, test x$natpmp = xtrue) AM_CONDITIONAL(MINIUPNPC, test x$upnp = xtrue) AM_PROG_CC_C_O +AC_ARG_VAR(PYTHON) +AC_CHECK_PROGS(PYTHON, [python python2 python3]) +if test "x$PYTHON" = "x"; then + AC_MSG_WARN([Python unavailable; some tests will not be run.]) +fi +AM_CONDITIONAL(USEPYTHON, [test "x$PYTHON" != "x"]) + ifdef([AC_C_FLEXIBLE_ARRAY_MEMBER], [ AC_C_FLEXIBLE_ARRAY_MEMBER ], [ @@ -395,7 +426,13 @@ save_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS" LIBS="-levent $STATIC_LIBEVENT_FLAGS $TOR_LIB_WS32 $LIBS" LDFLAGS="$TOR_LDFLAGS_libevent $LDFLAGS" CPPFLAGS="$TOR_CPPFLAGS_libevent $CPPFLAGS" -AC_CHECK_FUNCS(event_get_version event_get_version_number event_get_method event_set_log_callback evdns_set_outgoing_bind_address event_base_loopexit) +AC_CHECK_FUNCS([event_get_version \ + event_get_version_number \ + event_get_method \ + event_set_log_callback \ + evdns_set_outgoing_bind_address \ + evutil_secure_rng_set_urandom_device_file \ + event_base_loopexit]) AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct event.min_heap_idx], , , [#include <event.h> ]) @@ -492,7 +529,7 @@ dnl ------------------------------------------------------ dnl Where do you live, openssl? And how do we call you? tor_openssl_pkg_redhat="openssl" -tor_openssl_pkg_debian="libssl" +tor_openssl_pkg_debian="libssl-dev" tor_openssl_devpkg_redhat="openssl-devel" tor_openssl_devpkg_debian="libssl-dev" @@ -569,7 +606,16 @@ if test x$enable_gcc_hardening != xno; then if test x$have_clang = xyes; then TOR_CHECK_CFLAGS(-Qunused-arguments) fi - TOR_CHECK_CFLAGS(-fstack-protector-all) + TOR_CHECK_CFLAGS(-fstack-protector-all, also_link) + AS_VAR_PUSHDEF([can_compile], [tor_cv_cflags_-fstack-protector-all]) + AS_VAR_PUSHDEF([can_link], [tor_can_link_-fstack-protector-all]) + AS_VAR_IF(can_compile, [yes], + AS_VAR_IF(can_link, [yes], + [], + AC_MSG_ERROR([We tried to build with stack protection; it looks like your compiler supports it but your libc does not provide it. Are you missing libssp? (You can --disable-gcc-hardening to ignore this error.)])) + ) + AS_VAR_POPDEF([can_link]) + AS_VAR_POPDEF([can_compile]) TOR_CHECK_CFLAGS(-Wstack-protector) TOR_CHECK_CFLAGS(-fwrapv) TOR_CHECK_CFLAGS(--param ssp-buffer-size=1) @@ -584,6 +630,19 @@ if test x$enable_linker_hardening != xno; then fi dnl ------------------------------------------------------ +dnl Now see if we have a -fomit-frame-pointer compiler option. + +saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" +TOR_CHECK_CFLAGS(-fomit-frame-pointer) +if test "$saved_CFLAGS" != "$CFLAGS"; then + F_OMIT_FRAME_POINTER='-fomit-frame-pointer' +else + F_OMIT_FRAME_POINTER='' +fi +CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" +AC_SUBST(F_OMIT_FRAME_POINTER) + +dnl ------------------------------------------------------ dnl Where do you live, libnatpmp? And how do we call you? dnl There are no packages for Debian or Redhat as of this patch @@ -643,6 +702,12 @@ if test "$upnp" = "true"; then fi dnl ============================================================ +dnl Check for libseccomp + +AC_CHECK_HEADERS([seccomp.h]) +AC_SEARCH_LIBS(seccomp_init, [seccomp]) + +dnl ============================================================ dnl We need an implementation of curve25519. dnl set these defaults. @@ -1381,6 +1446,12 @@ if test x$enable_gcc_warnings = xyes || test x$enable_gcc_warnings_advisory = xy #error #endif])], have_gcc43=yes, have_gcc43=no) + AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([], [ +#if !defined(__GNUC__) || (__GNUC__ < 4) || (__GNUC__ == 4 && __GNUC_MINOR__ < 6) +#error +#endif])], have_gcc46=yes, have_gcc46=no) + + save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wshorten-64-to-32" AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([], [])], have_shorten64_flag=yes, @@ -1432,15 +1503,28 @@ if test x$enable_gcc_warnings = xyes || test x$enable_gcc_warnings_advisory = xy CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wextra -Warray-bounds" fi + if test x$have_gcc46 = xyes ; then + # This warning was added in gcc 4.3, but it appears to generate + # spurious warnings in gcc 4.4. I don't know if it works in 4.5. + CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wlogical-op" + fi + if test x$have_shorten64_flag = xyes ; then CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wshorten-64-to-32" fi + + ##This will break the world on some 64-bit architectures # CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Winline" fi - +if test "$enable_coverage" = yes && test "$have_clang" = "no"; then + case "$host_os" in + darwin*) + AC_MSG_WARN([Tried to enable coverage on OSX without using the clang compiler. This might not work! If coverage fails, use CC=clang when configuring with --enable-profiling.]) + esac +fi CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $TOR_CPPFLAGS_libevent $TOR_CPPFLAGS_openssl $TOR_CPPFLAGS_zlib" @@ -1451,10 +1535,25 @@ AC_CONFIG_FILES([ contrib/tor.logrotate contrib/tor.sh contrib/torctl - contrib/torify src/config/torrc.sample ]) +if test x$asciidoc = xtrue && test "$ASCIIDOC" = "none" ; then + regular_mans="doc/tor doc/tor-gencert doc/tor-resolve doc/torify" + for file in $regular_mans ; do + if ! [[ -f "$srcdir/$file.1.in" ]] || ! [[ -f "$srcdir/$file.html.in" ]] ; then + echo "=================================="; + echo; + echo "You need asciidoc installed to be able to build the manpage."; + echo "To build without manpages, use the --disable-asciidoc argument"; + echo "when calling configure."; + echo; + echo "=================================="; + exit 1; + fi + done +fi + AC_OUTPUT if test -x /usr/bin/perl && test -x ./contrib/updateVersions.pl ; then diff --git a/contrib/cov-blame b/contrib/cov-blame new file mode 100755 index 000000000..601f21195 --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/cov-blame @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +#!/usr/bin/python + +import os +import re +import subprocess +import sys + +def handle_file(source_fname, cov_fname): + + lines_blm = subprocess.Popen(["git", "blame", source_fname], stdout=subprocess.PIPE).stdout.readlines() + lines_cov = open(cov_fname).readlines() + + # XXXX expensive! + while re.match(r'\s*-:\s*0:', lines_cov[0]): + del lines_cov[0] + + if len(lines_blm) != len(lines_cov): + print >>sys.stderr, "MISMATCH IN NUMBER OF LINES in",source_fname + + for b,c in zip(lines_blm, lines_cov): + m = re.match(r'\s*([^\s:]+):', c) + if not m: + print >>sys.stderr, "CONFUSING LINE %r"% c + cov = 'X' + elif m.group(1) == '-': + cov = '-' + elif m.group(1)[0] == '#': + cov = '#' + elif m.group(1)[0].isdigit(): + cov = '1' + else: + print >>sys.stderr, "CONFUSING LINE %r"% c + cov = 'X' + + print cov, b, + +COV_DIR = sys.argv[1] +SOURCES = sys.argv[2:] + +for fn in SOURCES: + _, base = os.path.split(fn) + cfn = os.path.join(COV_DIR, base) + cfn += ".gcov" + if os.path.exists(cfn): + handle_file(fn, cfn) + else: + print >>sys.stderr, "NO FILE EXISTS CALLED ",cfn + diff --git a/contrib/cov-diff b/contrib/cov-diff new file mode 100755 index 000000000..33a54802b --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/cov-diff @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# Copyright 2013 The Tor Project, Inc. +# See LICENSE for licensing information. + +# cov-diff -- compare two directories full of gcov files. + +DIRA="$1" +DIRB="$2" + +for A in $DIRA/*; do + B=$DIRB/`basename $A` + perl -pe 's/^\s*\d+:/ 1:/; s/^([^:]+:)[\d\s]+:/$1/;' "$A" > "$A.tmp" + perl -pe 's/^\s*\d+:/ 1:/; s/^([^:]+:)[\d\s]+:/$1/;' "$B" > "$B.tmp" + diff -u "$A.tmp" "$B.tmp" + rm "$A.tmp" "$B.tmp" +done + diff --git a/contrib/coverage b/contrib/coverage new file mode 100755 index 000000000..f4ae47582 --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/coverage @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# Copyright 2013 The Tor Project, Inc. +# See LICENSE for licensing information. + +# coverage -- run gcov on the appropriate set of object files to extract +# coverage information. + +dst=$1 + +for fn in src/or/*.c src/common/*.c; do + BN=`basename $fn` + DN=`dirname $fn` + F=`echo $BN | sed -e 's/\.c$//;'` + GC="${BN}.gcov" + # Figure out the object file names + ONS=`echo ${DN}/src_*-${F}.o` + ONS_WILDCARD_LITERAL="${DN}/src_*-${F}.o" + # If the wildcard didn't expand, no files + if [ "$ONS" != "${ONS_WILDCARD_LITERAL}" ] + then + for on in $ONS; do + # We should have a gcno file + GCNO=`echo $on | sed -e 's/\.o$/\.gcno/;'` + if [ -e $GCNO ] + then + # No need to test for gcda, since gcov assumes no execution + # if it's absent + rm -f $GC + gcov -o $on $fn + if [ -e $GC ] + then + if [ -n $dst ] + then + mv $GC $dst/$GC + fi + else + echo "gcov -o $on $fn didn't make a .gcov file" + fi + else + echo "Couldn't find gcno file for $on" + fi + done + else + echo "No object file found matching source file $fn" + fi +done diff --git a/contrib/findMergedChanges.pl b/contrib/findMergedChanges.pl index e4ff6163e..a35b0cf50 100755 --- a/contrib/findMergedChanges.pl +++ b/contrib/findMergedChanges.pl @@ -21,13 +21,13 @@ if (! @ARGV) { Usage: findMergedChanges.pl [--merged/--unmerged/--weird/--list] [--branch=<branchname] changes/* -A change is "merged" if it has ever been merged to release-0.2.2 and it has had +A change is "merged" if it has ever been merged to release-0.2.4 and it has had no subsequent changes in master. -A change is "unmerged" if it has never been merged to release-0.2.2 and it +A change is "unmerged" if it has never been merged to release-0.2.4 and it has had changes in master. -A change is "weird" if it has been merged to release-0.2.2 and it *has* had +A change is "weird" if it has been merged to release-0.2.4 and it *has* had subsequent changes in master. Suggested application: @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Suggested application: EOF } -my $target_branch = "origin/release-0.2.2"; +my $target_branch = "origin/release-0.2.4"; while (@ARGV and $ARGV[0] =~ /^--/) { my $flag = shift @ARGV; diff --git a/contrib/id_to_fp.c b/contrib/id_to_fp.c deleted file mode 100644 index 55b025dfa..000000000 --- a/contrib/id_to_fp.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,77 +0,0 @@ -/* Copyright 2006 Nick Mathewson; see LICENSE for licensing information */ - -/* id_to_fp.c : Helper for directory authority ops. When somebody sends us - * a private key, this utility converts the private key into a fingerprint - * so you can de-list that fingerprint. - */ - -#include <openssl/rsa.h> -#include <openssl/bio.h> -#include <openssl/sha.h> -#include <openssl/pem.h> - -#include <stdio.h> -#include <stdlib.h> -#include <string.h> - -#define die(s) do { fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", s); goto err; } while (0) - -int -main(int argc, char **argv) -{ - BIO *b = NULL; - RSA *key = NULL; - unsigned char *buf = NULL, *bufp; - int len, i; - unsigned char digest[20]; - int status = 1; - - if (argc < 2) { - fprintf(stderr, "Reading key from stdin...\n"); - if (!(b = BIO_new_fp(stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE))) - die("couldn't read from stdin"); - } else if (argc == 2) { - if (strcmp(argv[1], "-h") == 0 || - strcmp(argv[1], "--help") == 0) { - fprintf(stdout, "Usage: %s [keyfile]\n", argv[0]); - status = 0; - goto err; - } else { - if (!(b = BIO_new_file(argv[1], "r"))) - die("couldn't open file"); - } - } else { - fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [keyfile]\n", argv[0]); - goto err; - } - if (!(key = PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey(b, NULL, NULL, NULL))) - die("couldn't parse key"); - - len = i2d_RSAPublicKey(key, NULL); - if (len < 0) - die("Bizarre key"); - bufp = buf = malloc(len+1); - if (!buf) - die("Out of memory"); - len = i2d_RSAPublicKey(key, &bufp); - if (len < 0) - die("Bizarre key"); - - SHA1(buf, len, digest); - for (i=0; i < 20; i += 2) { - printf("%02X%02X ", (int)digest[i], (int)digest[i+1]); - } - printf("\n"); - - status = 0; - -err: - if (buf) - free(buf); - if (key) - RSA_free(key); - if (b) - BIO_free(b); - return status; -} - diff --git a/contrib/include.am b/contrib/include.am index 6d7fb16f9..62b76ebeb 100644 --- a/contrib/include.am +++ b/contrib/include.am @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ EXTRA_DIST+= \ contrib/tor.ico \ contrib/tor.nsi.in \ contrib/tor.sh \ + contrib/torify \ contrib/torctl bin_SCRIPTS+= contrib/torify diff --git a/contrib/tor-mingw.nsi.in b/contrib/tor-mingw.nsi.in index d5379bd57..d6a2f3362 100644 --- a/contrib/tor-mingw.nsi.in +++ b/contrib/tor-mingw.nsi.in @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ !include "LogicLib.nsh" !include "FileFunc.nsh" !insertmacro GetParameters -!define VERSION "0.2.4.10-alpha-dev" +!define VERSION "0.2.5.1-alpha-dev" !define INSTALLER "tor-${VERSION}-win32.exe" !define WEBSITE "https://www.torproject.org/" !define LICENSE "LICENSE" diff --git a/contrib/torify.in b/contrib/torify index 54acfed65..54acfed65 100755 --- a/contrib/torify.in +++ b/contrib/torify diff --git a/doc/HACKING b/doc/HACKING index b7cd8952d..a0072ec53 100644 --- a/doc/HACKING +++ b/doc/HACKING @@ -118,25 +118,29 @@ Running gcov for unit test coverage ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ----- - make clean - make CFLAGS='-g -fprofile-arcs -ftest-coverage' - ./src/test/test - gcov -o src/common src/common/*.[ch] - gcov -o src/or src/or/*.[ch] - cd ../or; gcov *.[ch] + ./configure --enable-coverage + make + ./src/test/test + mkdir coverage-output + ./contrib/coverage coverage-output ----- -Then, look at the .gcov files. '-' before a line means that the -compiler generated no code for that line. '######' means that the -line was never reached. Lines with numbers were called that number -of times. +(On OSX, you'll need to start with "--enable-coverage CC=clang".) + +Then, look at the .gcov files in coverage-output. '-' before a line means +that the compiler generated no code for that line. '######' means that the +line was never reached. Lines with numbers were called that number of times. If that doesn't work: * Try configuring Tor with --disable-gcc-hardening - * On recent OSX versions, you might need to add CC=clang to your - build line, as in: - make CFLAGS='-g -fprofile-arcs -ftest-coverage' CC=clang - Their llvm-gcc doesn't work so great for me. + * You might need to run 'make clean' after you run './configure'. + +Running integration tests +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +We have the beginnings of a set of scripts to run integration tests using +Chutney. To try them, set CHUTNEY_PATH to your chutney source directory, and +run "make test-network". Profiling Tor with oprofile ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ @@ -493,12 +497,8 @@ in their approved versions list. 8) scp the tarball and its sig to the website in the dist/ directory (i.e. /srv/www-master.torproject.org/htdocs/dist/ on vescum). Edit -include/versions.wmi to note the new version. From your website checkout, -run ./publish to build and publish the website. - -Try not to delay too much between scp'ing the tarball and running -./publish -- the website has multiple A records and your scp only sent -it to one of them. +"include/versions.wmi" and "Makefile" to note the new version. From your +website checkout, run ./publish to build and publish the website. 9) Email Erinn and weasel (cc'ing tor-assistants) that a new tarball is up. This step should probably change to mailing more packagers. diff --git a/doc/include.am b/doc/include.am index 9695292bd..37c0237a0 100644 --- a/doc/include.am +++ b/doc/include.am @@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ # part of the source distribution, so that people without asciidoc can # just use the .1 and .html files. -regular_mans = doc/tor doc/tor-gencert doc/tor-resolve doc/torify -all_mans = $(regular_mans) doc/tor-fw-helper +regular_mans = doc/tor doc/tor-gencert doc/tor-resolve +all_mans = $(regular_mans) doc/torify doc/tor-fw-helper if USE_ASCIIDOC if USE_FW_HELPER @@ -55,13 +55,11 @@ $(man_in) : doc/tor.1.in: doc/tor.1.txt doc/tor-gencert.1.in: doc/tor-gencert.1.txt doc/tor-resolve.1.in: doc/tor-resolve.1.txt -doc/torify.1.in: doc/torify.1.txt doc/tor-fw-helper.1.in: doc/tor-fw-helper.1.txt doc/tor.html.in: doc/tor.1.txt doc/tor-gencert.html.in: doc/tor-gencert.1.txt doc/tor-resolve.html.in: doc/tor-resolve.1.txt -doc/torify.html.in: doc/torify.1.txt doc/tor-fw-helper.html.in: doc/tor-fw-helper.1.txt # use ../config.status to swap all machine-specific magic strings @@ -76,13 +74,13 @@ $(asciidoc_product) : doc/tor.html: doc/tor.html.in doc/tor-gencert.html: doc/tor-gencert.html.in doc/tor-resolve.html: doc/tor-resolve.html.in -doc/torify.html: doc/torify.html.in +doc/torify.html: doc/torify.1.txt doc/tor-fw-helper.html: doc/tor-fw-helper.html.in doc/tor.1: doc/tor.1.in doc/tor-gencert.1: doc/tor-gencert.1.in doc/tor-resolve.1: doc/tor-resolve.1.in -doc/torify.1: doc/torify.1.in +doc/torify.1: doc/torify.1.txt doc/tor-fw-helper.1: doc/tor-fw-helper.1.in CLEANFILES+= $(asciidoc_product) config.log diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index 938ed2c78..34a9f24eb 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -18,18 +18,23 @@ SYNOPSIS DESCRIPTION ----------- -__tor__ is a connection-oriented anonymizing communication +Tor is a connection-oriented anonymizing communication service. Users choose a source-routed path through a set of nodes, and negotiate a "virtual circuit" through the network, in which each node knows its predecessor and successor, but no others. Traffic flowing down the circuit is unwrapped by a symmetric key at each node, which reveals the downstream node. + -Basically __tor__ provides a distributed network of servers ("onion routers"). -Users bounce their TCP streams -- web traffic, ftp, ssh, etc -- around the -routers, and recipients, observers, and even the routers themselves have +Basically, Tor provides a distributed network of servers or relays ("onion routers"). +Users bounce their TCP streams -- web traffic, ftp, ssh, etc. -- around the +network, and recipients, observers, and even the relays themselves have difficulty tracking the source of the stream. +By default, **tor** will only act as a client only. To help the network +by providing bandwidth as a relay, change the **ORPort** configuration +option -- see below. Please also consult the documentation on the Tor +Project's website. + COMMAND-LINE OPTIONS -------------------- [[opt-h]] **-h**, **-help**:: @@ -40,13 +45,22 @@ COMMAND-LINE OPTIONS options. (Default: $HOME/.torrc, or @CONFDIR@/torrc if that file is not found) +[[opt-allow-missing-torrc]] **--allow-missing-torrc**:: + Do not require that configuration file specified by **-f** exist if + default torrc can be accessed. + [[opt-defaults-torrc]] **--defaults-torrc** __FILE__:: Specify a file in which to find default values for Tor options. The contents of this file are overridden by those in the regular configuration file, and by those on the command line. (Default: @CONFDIR@/torrc-defaults.) -[[opt-hash-password]] **--hash-password**:: +[[opt-ignore-missing-torrc]] **--ignore-missing-torrc**:: + Specifies that Tor should treat a missing torrc file as though it + were empty. Ordinarily, Tor does this for missing default torrc files, + but not for those specified on the command line. + +[[opt-hash-password]] **--hash-password** __PASSWORD__:: Generates a hashed password for control port access. [[opt-list-fingerprint]] **--list-fingerprint**:: @@ -124,42 +138,42 @@ option name with a forward slash. GENERAL OPTIONS --------------- -[[BandwidthRate]] **BandwidthRate** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**:: +[[BandwidthRate]] **BandwidthRate** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**:: A token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth usage on this node to the specified number of bytes per second, and the average outgoing bandwidth usage to that same value. If you want to run a relay in the public network, this needs to be _at the very least_ 30 KBytes (that is, 30720 bytes). (Default: 1 GByte) -[[BandwidthBurst]] **BandwidthBurst** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**:: +[[BandwidthBurst]] **BandwidthBurst** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**:: Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) to the given number of bytes in each direction. (Default: 1 GByte) -[[MaxAdvertisedBandwidth]] **MaxAdvertisedBandwidth** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**:: +[[MaxAdvertisedBandwidth]] **MaxAdvertisedBandwidth** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**:: If set, we will not advertise more than this amount of bandwidth for our BandwidthRate. Server operators who want to reduce the number of clients who ask to build circuits through them (since this is proportional to advertised bandwidth rate) can thus reduce the CPU demands on their server without impacting network performance. -[[RelayBandwidthRate]] **RelayBandwidthRate** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**:: +[[RelayBandwidthRate]] **RelayBandwidthRate** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**:: If not 0, a separate token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth usage for \_relayed traffic_ on this node to the specified number of bytes per second, and the average outgoing bandwidth usage to that same value. Relayed traffic currently is calculated to include answers to directory requests, but that may change in future versions. (Default: 0) -[[RelayBandwidthBurst]] **RelayBandwidthBurst** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**:: +[[RelayBandwidthBurst]] **RelayBandwidthBurst** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**:: If not 0, limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) for \_relayed traffic_ to the given number of bytes in each direction. (Default: 0) -[[PerConnBWRate]] **PerConnBWRate** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**:: +[[PerConnBWRate]] **PerConnBWRate** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**:: If set, do separate rate limiting for each connection from a non-relay. You should never need to change this value, since a network-wide value is published in the consensus and your relay will use that value. (Default: 0) -[[PerConnBWBurst]] **PerConnBWBurst** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**:: +[[PerConnBWBurst]] **PerConnBWBurst** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**:: If set, do separate rate limiting for each connection from a non-relay. You should never need to change this value, since a network-wide value is published in the consensus and your relay will use that value. (Default: 0) @@ -186,6 +200,20 @@ GENERAL OPTIONS listening address of any pluggable transport proxy that tries to launch __transport__. +[[ServerTransportOptions]] **ServerTransportOptions** __transport__ __k=v__ __k=v__ ...:: + When this option is set, Tor will pass the __k=v__ parameters to + any pluggable transport proxy that tries to launch __transport__. + + (Example: ServerTransportOptions obfs45 shared-secret=bridgepasswd cache=/var/lib/tor/cache) + +[[ExtORPort]] **ExtORPort** \['address':]__port__|**auto** + Open this port to listen for Extended ORPort connections from your + pluggable transports. + +[[ExtORPortCookieAuthFile]] **ExtORPortCookieAuthFile** __Path__:: + If set, this option overrides the default location and file name + for the Extended ORPort's cookie file -- the cookie file is needed + for pluggable transports to communicate through the Extended ORPort. + [[ConnLimit]] **ConnLimit** __NUM__:: The minimum number of file descriptors that must be available to the Tor process before it will start. Tor will ask the OS for as many file @@ -197,7 +225,8 @@ GENERAL OPTIONS [[DisableNetwork]] **DisableNetwork** **0**|**1**:: When this option is set, we don't listen for or accept any connections - other than controller connections, and we don't make any outbound + other than controller connections, and we close (and don't reattempt) + any outbound connections. Controllers sometimes use this option to avoid using the network until Tor is fully configured. (Default: 0) @@ -424,6 +453,11 @@ GENERAL OPTIONS proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if you want it to support others. +[[Sandbox]] **Sandbox** **0**|**1**:: + If set to 1, Tor will run securely through the use of a syscall sandbox. + Otherwise the sandbox will be disabled. The option is currently an + experimental feature. (Default: 0) + [[Socks4Proxy]] **Socks4Proxy** __host__[:__port__]:: Tor will make all OR connections through the SOCKS 4 proxy at host:port (or host:1080 if port is not specified). @@ -1115,15 +1149,17 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if the node "foo". Disabled by default since attacking websites and exit relays can use it to manipulate your path selection. (Default: 0) -[[FastFirstHopPK]] **FastFirstHopPK** **0**|**1**:: +[[FastFirstHopPK]] **FastFirstHopPK** **0**|**1**|**auto**:: When this option is disabled, Tor uses the public key step for the first hop of creating circuits. Skipping it is generally safe since we have already used TLS to authenticate the relay and to establish forward-secure - keys. Turning this option off makes circuit building slower. + + keys. Turning this option off makes circuit building a little + slower. Setting this option to "auto" takes advice from the authorities + in the latest consensus about whether to use this feature. + + Note that Tor will always use the public key step for the first hop if it's operating as a relay, and it will never use the public key step if it - doesn't yet know the onion key of the first hop. (Default: 1) + doesn't yet know the onion key of the first hop. (Default: auto) [[TransPort]] **TransPort** \['address':]__port__|**auto** [_isolation flags_]:: Open this port to listen for transparent proxy connections. Set this to @@ -1256,9 +1292,9 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if it too early might make your client stand out. If this option is 0, your Tor client won't use the ntor handshake. If it's 1, your Tor client will use the ntor handshake to extend circuits through servers that - support it. If this option is "auto" (recommended), then your client + support it. If this option is "auto", then your client will use the ntor handshake once enough directory authorities recommend - it. (Default: auto) + it. (Default: 1) [[PathBiasCircThreshold]] **PathBiasCircThreshold** __NUM__ + @@ -1548,7 +1584,7 @@ is non-zero): server is still alive and doing useful things. Settings this to 0 will disable the heartbeat. (Default: 6 hours) -[[AccountingMax]] **AccountingMax** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**:: +[[AccountingMax]] **AccountingMax** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBytes**:: Never send more than the specified number of bytes in a given accounting period, or receive more than that number in the period. For example, with AccountingMax set to 1 GByte, a server could send 900 MBytes and @@ -1880,12 +1916,12 @@ DIRECTORY AUTHORITY SERVER OPTIONS Authoritative directories only. Like AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr, but applies to addresses shared with directory authorities. (Default: 5) -[[AuthDirFastGuarantee]] **AuthDirFastGuarantee** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**:: +[[AuthDirFastGuarantee]] **AuthDirFastGuarantee** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**:: Authoritative directories only. If non-zero, always vote the Fast flag for any relay advertising this amount of capacity or more. (Default: 100 KBytes) -[[AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee]] **AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**:: +[[AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee]] **AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**:: Authoritative directories only. If non-zero, this advertised capacity or more is always sufficient to satisfy the bandwidth requirement for the Guard flag. (Default: 250 KBytes) @@ -2031,6 +2067,20 @@ The following options are used for running a testing Tor network. TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay 20 seconds TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability 0 minutes TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime 0 minutes + TestingServerDownloadSchedule 0, 0, 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 30, 60 + TestingClientDownloadSchedule 0, 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 30, 60 + TestingServerConsensusDownloadSchedule 0, 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 30, 60 + TestingClientConsensusDownloadSchedule 0, 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 30, 60 + TestingBridgeDownloadSchedule 60, 30, 30, 60 + TestingClientMaxIntervalWithoutRequest 5 seconds + TestingDirConnectionMaxStall 30 seconds + TestingConsensusMaxDownloadTries 80 + TestingDescriptorMaxDownloadTries 80 + TestingMicrodescMaxDownloadTries 80 + TestingCertMaxDownloadTries 80 + TestingEnableConnBwEvent 1 + TestingEnableCellStatsEvent 1 + TestingEnableTbEmptyEvent 1 [[TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval]] **TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**:: Like V3AuthVotingInterval, but for initial voting interval before the first @@ -2047,6 +2097,10 @@ The following options are used for running a testing Tor network. the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 5 minutes) +[[TestingV3AuthVotingStartOffset]] **TestingV3AuthVotingStartOffset** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**:: + Directory authorities offset voting start time by this much. + Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 0) + [[TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability]] **TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**:: After starting as an authority, do not make claims about whether routers are Running until this much time has passed. Changing this requires @@ -2057,10 +2111,85 @@ The following options are used for running a testing Tor network. time. Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 10 minutes) -[[TestingMinFastFlagThreshold]] **TestingMinFastFlagThreshold** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**:: +[[TestingMinFastFlagThreshold]] **TestingMinFastFlagThreshold** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**:: Minimum value for the Fast flag. Overrides the ordinary minimum taken from the consensus when TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 0.) +[[TestingServerDownloadSchedule]] **TestingServerDownloadSchedule** __N__,__N__,__...__:: + Schedule for when servers should download things in general. Changing this + requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 0, 0, 0, 60, 60, 120, + 300, 900, 2147483647) + +[[TestingClientDownloadSchedule]] **TestingClientDownloadSchedule** __N__,__N__,__...__:: + Schedule for when clients should download things in general. Changing this + requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 0, 0, 60, 300, 600, + 2147483647) + +[[TestingServerConsensusDownloadSchedule]] **TestingServerConsensusDownloadSchedule** __N__,__N__,__...__:: + Schedule for when servers should download consensuses. Changing this + requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 0, 0, 60, 300, 600, + 1800, 1800, 1800, 1800, 1800, 3600, 7200) + +[[TestingClientConsensusDownloadSchedule]] **TestingClientConsensusDownloadSchedule** __N__,__N__,__...__:: + Schedule for when clients should download consensuses. Changing this + requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 0, 0, 60, 300, 600, + 1800, 3600, 3600, 3600, 10800, 21600, 43200) + +[[TestingBridgeDownloadSchedule]] **TestingBridgeDownloadSchedule** __N__,__N__,__...__:: + Schedule for when clients should download bridge descriptors. Changing this + requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 3600, 900, 900, 3600) + +[[TestingClientMaxIntervalWithoutRequest]] **TestingClientMaxIntervalWithoutRequest** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**:: + When directory clients have only a few descriptors to request, they batch + them until they have more, or until this amount of time has passed. + Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 10 + minutes) + +[[TestingDirConnectionMaxStall]] **TestingDirConnectionMaxStall** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**:: + Let a directory connection stall this long before expiring it. + Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: + 5 minutes) + +[[TestingConsensusMaxDownloadTries]] **TestingConsensusMaxDownloadTries** __NUM__:: + Try this often to download a consensus before giving up. Changing + this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 8) + +[[TestingDescriptorMaxDownloadTries]] **TestingDescriptorMaxDownloadTries** __NUM__:: + Try this often to download a router descriptor before giving up. + Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 8) + +[[TestingMicrodescMaxDownloadTries]] **TestingMicrodescMaxDownloadTries** __NUM__:: + Try this often to download a microdesc descriptor before giving up. + Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 8) + +[[TestingCertMaxDownloadTries]] **TestingCertMaxDownloadTries** __NUM__:: + Try this often to download a v3 authority certificate before giving up. + Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 8) + +**TestingDirAuthVoteGuard** __node__,__node__,__...__:: + A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and + address patterns of nodes to vote Guard for regardless of their + uptime and bandwidth. See the **ExcludeNodes** option for more + information on how to specify nodes. + + + In order for this option to have any effect, **TestingTorNetwork** + has to be set. + +[[TestingEnableConnBwEvent]] **TestingEnableConnBwEvent** **0**|**1**:: + If this option is set, then Tor controllers may register for CONN_BW + events. Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. + (Default: 0) + +[[TestingEnableCellStatsEvent]] **TestingEnableCellStatsEvent** **0**|**1**:: + If this option is set, then Tor controllers may register for CELL_STATS + events. Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. + (Default: 0) + +[[TestingEnableTbEmptyEvent]] **TestingEnableTbEmptyEvent** **0**|**1**:: + If this option is set, then Tor controllers may register for TB_EMPTY + events. Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. + (Default: 0) + SIGNALS ------- @@ -2110,6 +2239,10 @@ __DataDirectory__**/cached-status/**:: Each file holds one such document; the filenames are the hexadecimal identity key fingerprints of the directory authorities. Mostly obsolete. +__DataDirectory__**/cached-certs**:: + This file holds downloaded directory key certificates that are used to + verify authenticity of documents generated by Tor directory authorities. + __DataDirectory__**/cached-consensus** and/or **cached-microdesc-consensus**:: The most recent consensus network status document we've downloaded. @@ -2153,6 +2286,11 @@ __DataDirectory__**/control_auth_cookie**:: control-spec.txt for details. Only used when cookie authentication is enabled. +__DataDirectory__**/lock**:: + This file is used to prevent two Tor instances from using same data + directory. If access to this file is locked, data directory is already + in use by Tor. + __DataDirectory__**/keys/***:: Only used by servers. Holds identity keys and onion keys. @@ -2169,11 +2307,53 @@ __DataDirectory__**/approved-routers**:: **!invalid** then descriptors are accepted but marked in the directory as not valid, that is, not recommended. +__DataDirectory__**/v3-status-votes**:: + Only for authoritative directory servers. This file contains status votes + from all the authoritative directory servers and is used to generate the + network consensus document. + +__DataDirectory__**/unverified-consensus**:: + This file contains a network consensus document that has been downloaded, + but which we didn't have the right certificates to check yet. + +__DataDirectory__**/unverified-microdesc-consensus**:: + This file contains a microdescriptor-flavored network consensus document + that has been downloaded, but which we didn't have the right certificates + to check yet. + +__DataDirectory__**/unparseable-desc**:: + Onion router descriptors that Tor was unable to parse are dumped to this + file. Only used for debugging. + __DataDirectory__**/router-stability**:: Only used by authoritative directory servers. Tracks measurements for router mean-time-between-failures so that authorities have a good idea of how to set their Stable flags. +__DataDirectory__**/status/dirreq-stats**:: + Only used by directory caches and authorities. This file is used to + collect directory request statistics. + +__DataDirectory__**/status/entry-stats**:: + Only used by servers. This file is used to collect incoming connection + statistics by Tor entry nodes. + +__DataDirectory__**/status/bridge-stats**:: + Only used by servers. This file is used to collect incoming connection + statistics by Tor bridges. + +__DataDirectory__**/status/exit-stats**:: + Only used by servers. This file is used to collect outgoing connection + statistics by Tor exit routers. + +__DataDirectory__**/status/buffer-stats**:: + Only used by servers. This file is used to collect buffer usage + history. + +__DataDirectory__**/status/conn-stats**:: + Only used by servers. This file is used to collect approximate connection + history (number of active connections over time). + __HiddenServiceDirectory__**/hostname**:: The <base32-encoded-fingerprint>.onion domain name for this hidden service. If the hidden service is restricted to authorized clients only, this file @@ -2201,4 +2381,3 @@ Plenty, probably. Tor is still in development. Please report them. AUTHORS ------- Roger Dingledine [arma at mit.edu], Nick Mathewson [nickm at alum.mit.edu]. - diff --git a/src/common/address.c b/src/common/address.c index 14a7b6bc9..b9f2d9315 100644 --- a/src/common/address.c +++ b/src/common/address.c @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include "address.h" #include "torlog.h" #include "container.h" +#include "sandbox.h" #ifdef _WIN32 #include <process.h> @@ -234,7 +235,7 @@ tor_addr_lookup(const char *name, uint16_t family, tor_addr_t *addr) memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = family; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; - err = getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &res); + err = sandbox_getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &res); if (!err) { best = NULL; for (res_p = res; res_p; res_p = res_p->ai_next) { diff --git a/src/common/compat.c b/src/common/compat.c index d88c5f92d..8e2619f84 100644 --- a/src/common/compat.c +++ b/src/common/compat.c @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ * we can also take out the configure check. */ #define _GNU_SOURCE +#define COMPAT_PRIVATE #include "compat.h" #ifdef _WIN32 @@ -109,6 +110,7 @@ #include "util.h" #include "container.h" #include "address.h" +#include "sandbox.h" /* Inline the strl functions if the platform doesn't have them. */ #ifndef HAVE_STRLCPY @@ -125,6 +127,7 @@ tor_open_cloexec(const char *path, int flags, unsigned mode) { int fd; #ifdef O_CLOEXEC + path = sandbox_intern_string(path); fd = open(path, flags|O_CLOEXEC, mode); if (fd >= 0) return fd; @@ -948,24 +951,40 @@ socket_accounting_unlock(void) } /** As close(), but guaranteed to work for sockets across platforms (including - * Windows, where close()ing a socket doesn't work. Returns 0 on success, -1 - * on failure. */ + * Windows, where close()ing a socket doesn't work. Returns 0 on success and + * the socket error code on failure. */ int -tor_close_socket(tor_socket_t s) +tor_close_socket_simple(tor_socket_t s) { int r = 0; /* On Windows, you have to call close() on fds returned by open(), - * and closesocket() on fds returned by socket(). On Unix, everything - * gets close()'d. We abstract this difference by always using - * tor_close_socket to close sockets, and always using close() on - * files. - */ -#if defined(_WIN32) - r = closesocket(s); -#else - r = close(s); -#endif + * and closesocket() on fds returned by socket(). On Unix, everything + * gets close()'d. We abstract this difference by always using + * tor_close_socket to close sockets, and always using close() on + * files. + */ + #if defined(_WIN32) + r = closesocket(s); + #else + r = close(s); + #endif + + if (r != 0) { + int err = tor_socket_errno(-1); + log_info(LD_NET, "Close returned an error: %s", tor_socket_strerror(err)); + return err; + } + + return r; +} + +/** As tor_close_socket_simple(), but keeps track of the number + * of open sockets. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure. */ +int +tor_close_socket(tor_socket_t s) +{ + int r = tor_close_socket_simple(s); socket_accounting_lock(); #ifdef DEBUG_SOCKET_COUNTING @@ -980,13 +999,11 @@ tor_close_socket(tor_socket_t s) if (r == 0) { --n_sockets_open; } else { - int err = tor_socket_errno(-1); - log_info(LD_NET, "Close returned an error: %s", tor_socket_strerror(err)); #ifdef _WIN32 - if (err != WSAENOTSOCK) + if (r != WSAENOTSOCK) --n_sockets_open; #else - if (err != EBADF) + if (r != EBADF) --n_sockets_open; #endif r = -1; @@ -1032,33 +1049,61 @@ mark_socket_open(tor_socket_t s) tor_socket_t tor_open_socket(int domain, int type, int protocol) { + return tor_open_socket_with_extensions(domain, type, protocol, 1, 0); +} + +/** As socket(), but creates a nonblocking socket and + * counts the number of open sockets. */ +tor_socket_t +tor_open_socket_nonblocking(int domain, int type, int protocol) +{ + return tor_open_socket_with_extensions(domain, type, protocol, 1, 1); +} + +/** As socket(), but counts the number of open sockets and handles + * socket creation with either of SOCK_CLOEXEC and SOCK_NONBLOCK specified. + * <b>cloexec</b> and <b>nonblock</b> should be either 0 or 1 to indicate + * if the corresponding extension should be used.*/ +tor_socket_t +tor_open_socket_with_extensions(int domain, int type, int protocol, + int cloexec, int nonblock) +{ tor_socket_t s; -#ifdef SOCK_CLOEXEC - s = socket(domain, type|SOCK_CLOEXEC, protocol); +#if defined(SOCK_CLOEXEC) && defined(SOCK_NONBLOCK) + int ext_flags = (cloexec ? SOCK_CLOEXEC : 0) | + (nonblock ? SOCK_NONBLOCK : 0); + s = socket(domain, type|ext_flags, protocol); if (SOCKET_OK(s)) goto socket_ok; /* If we got an error, see if it is EINVAL. EINVAL might indicate that, - * even though we were built on a system with SOCK_CLOEXEC support, we - * are running on one without. */ + * even though we were built on a system with SOCK_CLOEXEC and SOCK_NONBLOCK + * support, we are running on one without. */ if (errno != EINVAL) return s; -#endif /* SOCK_CLOEXEC */ +#endif /* SOCK_CLOEXEC && SOCK_NONBLOCK */ s = socket(domain, type, protocol); if (! SOCKET_OK(s)) return s; #if defined(FD_CLOEXEC) - if (fcntl(s, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) { - log_warn(LD_FS,"Couldn't set FD_CLOEXEC: %s", strerror(errno)); -#if defined(_WIN32) - closesocket(s); + if (cloexec) { + if (fcntl(s, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) { + log_warn(LD_FS,"Couldn't set FD_CLOEXEC: %s", strerror(errno)); + tor_close_socket_simple(s); + return TOR_INVALID_SOCKET; + } + } #else - close(s); + (void)cloexec; #endif - return -1; + + if (nonblock) { + if (set_socket_nonblocking(s) == -1) { + tor_close_socket_simple(s); + return TOR_INVALID_SOCKET; + } } -#endif goto socket_ok; /* So that socket_ok will not be unused. */ @@ -1070,19 +1115,41 @@ tor_open_socket(int domain, int type, int protocol) return s; } -/** As socket(), but counts the number of open sockets. */ +/** As accept(), but counts the number of open sockets. */ tor_socket_t tor_accept_socket(tor_socket_t sockfd, struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t *len) { + return tor_accept_socket_with_extensions(sockfd, addr, len, 1, 0); +} + +/** As accept(), but returns a nonblocking socket and + * counts the number of open sockets. */ +tor_socket_t +tor_accept_socket_nonblocking(tor_socket_t sockfd, struct sockaddr *addr, + socklen_t *len) +{ + return tor_accept_socket_with_extensions(sockfd, addr, len, 1, 1); +} + +/** As accept(), but counts the number of open sockets and handles + * socket creation with either of SOCK_CLOEXEC and SOCK_NONBLOCK specified. + * <b>cloexec</b> and <b>nonblock</b> should be either 0 or 1 to indicate + * if the corresponding extension should be used.*/ +tor_socket_t +tor_accept_socket_with_extensions(tor_socket_t sockfd, struct sockaddr *addr, + socklen_t *len, int cloexec, int nonblock) +{ tor_socket_t s; -#if defined(HAVE_ACCEPT4) && defined(SOCK_CLOEXEC) - s = accept4(sockfd, addr, len, SOCK_CLOEXEC); +#if defined(HAVE_ACCEPT4) && defined(SOCK_CLOEXEC) && defined(SOCK_NONBLOCK) + int ext_flags = (cloexec ? SOCK_CLOEXEC : 0) | + (nonblock ? SOCK_NONBLOCK : 0); + s = accept4(sockfd, addr, len, ext_flags); if (SOCKET_OK(s)) goto socket_ok; /* If we got an error, see if it is ENOSYS. ENOSYS indicates that, * even though we were built on a system with accept4 support, we * are running on one without. Also, check for EINVAL, which indicates that - * we are missing SOCK_CLOEXEC support. */ + * we are missing SOCK_CLOEXEC/SOCK_NONBLOCK support. */ if (errno != EINVAL && errno != ENOSYS) return s; #endif @@ -1092,13 +1159,24 @@ tor_accept_socket(tor_socket_t sockfd, struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t *len) return s; #if defined(FD_CLOEXEC) - if (fcntl(s, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) { - log_warn(LD_NET, "Couldn't set FD_CLOEXEC: %s", strerror(errno)); - close(s); - return TOR_INVALID_SOCKET; + if (cloexec) { + if (fcntl(s, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) { + log_warn(LD_NET, "Couldn't set FD_CLOEXEC: %s", strerror(errno)); + tor_close_socket_simple(s); + return TOR_INVALID_SOCKET; + } } +#else + (void)cloexec; #endif + if (nonblock) { + if (set_socket_nonblocking(s) == -1) { + tor_close_socket_simple(s); + return TOR_INVALID_SOCKET; + } + } + goto socket_ok; /* So that socket_ok will not be unused. */ socket_ok: @@ -1220,6 +1298,18 @@ tor_socketpair(int family, int type, int protocol, tor_socket_t fd[2]) return 0; #else + return tor_ersatz_socketpair(family, type, protocol, fd); +#endif +} + +#ifdef NEED_ERSATZ_SOCKETPAIR +/** + * Helper used to implement socketpair on systems that lack it, by + * making a direct connection to localhost. + */ +STATIC int +tor_ersatz_socketpair(int family, int type, int protocol, tor_socket_t fd[2]) +{ /* This socketpair does not work when localhost is down. So * it's really not the same thing at all. But it's close enough * for now, and really, when localhost is down sometimes, we @@ -1230,7 +1320,7 @@ tor_socketpair(int family, int type, int protocol, tor_socket_t fd[2]) tor_socket_t acceptor = TOR_INVALID_SOCKET; struct sockaddr_in listen_addr; struct sockaddr_in connect_addr; - int size; + socklen_t size; int saved_errno = -1; if (protocol @@ -1313,8 +1403,8 @@ tor_socketpair(int family, int type, int protocol, tor_socket_t fd[2]) if (SOCKET_OK(acceptor)) tor_close_socket(acceptor); return -saved_errno; -#endif } +#endif /** Number of extra file descriptors to keep in reserve beyond those that we * tell Tor it's allowed to use. */ @@ -1746,6 +1836,15 @@ get_user_homedir(const char *username) * actually examine the filesystem; does a purely syntactic modification. * * The parent of the root director is considered to be iteself. + * + * Path separators are the forward slash (/) everywhere and additionally + * the backslash (\) on Win32. + * + * Cuts off any number of trailing path separators but otherwise ignores + * them for purposes of finding the parent directory. + * + * Returns 0 if a parent directory was successfully found, -1 otherwise (fname + * did not have any path separators or only had them at the end). * */ int get_parent_directory(char *fname) diff --git a/src/common/compat.h b/src/common/compat.h index 8ab719052..8e700a9a1 100644 --- a/src/common/compat.h +++ b/src/common/compat.h @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #include "orconfig.h" #include "torint.h" +#include "testsupport.h" #ifdef _WIN32 #ifndef _WIN32_WINNT #define _WIN32_WINNT 0x0501 @@ -84,13 +85,19 @@ /* ===== Compiler compatibility */ -/* GCC can check printf types on arbitrary functions. */ +/* GCC can check printf and scanf types on arbitrary functions. */ #ifdef __GNUC__ #define CHECK_PRINTF(formatIdx, firstArg) \ __attribute__ ((format(printf, formatIdx, firstArg))) #else #define CHECK_PRINTF(formatIdx, firstArg) #endif +#ifdef __GNUC__ +#define CHECK_SCANF(formatIdx, firstArg) \ + __attribute__ ((format(scanf, formatIdx, firstArg))) +#else +#define CHECK_SCANF(formatIdx, firstArg) +#endif /* inline is __inline on windows. */ #ifdef _WIN32 @@ -444,10 +451,22 @@ typedef int socklen_t; #define TOR_INVALID_SOCKET (-1) #endif +int tor_close_socket_simple(tor_socket_t s); int tor_close_socket(tor_socket_t s); +tor_socket_t tor_open_socket_with_extensions( + int domain, int type, int protocol, + int cloexec, int nonblock); tor_socket_t tor_open_socket(int domain, int type, int protocol); +tor_socket_t tor_open_socket_nonblocking(int domain, int type, int protocol); tor_socket_t tor_accept_socket(tor_socket_t sockfd, struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t *len); +tor_socket_t tor_accept_socket_nonblocking(tor_socket_t sockfd, + struct sockaddr *addr, + socklen_t *len); +tor_socket_t tor_accept_socket_with_extensions(tor_socket_t sockfd, + struct sockaddr *addr, + socklen_t *len, + int cloexec, int nonblock); int get_n_open_sockets(void); #define tor_socket_send(s, buf, len, flags) send(s, buf, len, flags) @@ -720,5 +739,13 @@ char *format_win32_error(DWORD err); #endif +#ifdef COMPAT_PRIVATE +#if !defined(HAVE_SOCKETPAIR) || defined(_WIN32) || defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) +#define NEED_ERSATZ_SOCKETPAIR +STATIC int tor_ersatz_socketpair(int family, int type, int protocol, + tor_socket_t fd[2]); +#endif +#endif + #endif diff --git a/src/common/compat_libevent.c b/src/common/compat_libevent.c index 200a7c65f..4d0fff833 100644 --- a/src/common/compat_libevent.c +++ b/src/common/compat_libevent.c @@ -415,6 +415,14 @@ tor_check_libevent_version(const char *m, int server, #define HEADER_VERSION _EVENT_VERSION #endif +/** Return a string representation of the version of Libevent that was used +* at compilation time. */ +const char * +tor_libevent_get_header_version_str(void) +{ + return HEADER_VERSION; +} + /** See whether the headers we were built against differ from the library we * linked against so much that we're likely to crash. If so, warn the * user. */ diff --git a/src/common/compat_libevent.h b/src/common/compat_libevent.h index 2472e2c49..fda873359 100644 --- a/src/common/compat_libevent.h +++ b/src/common/compat_libevent.h @@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ void tor_check_libevent_version(const char *m, int server, const char **badness_out); void tor_check_libevent_header_compatibility(void); const char *tor_libevent_get_version_str(void); +const char *tor_libevent_get_header_version_str(void); #ifdef USE_BUFFEREVENTS const struct timeval *tor_libevent_get_one_tick_timeout(void); diff --git a/src/common/container.c b/src/common/container.c index eec497a3e..476dc8291 100644 --- a/src/common/container.c +++ b/src/common/container.c @@ -243,6 +243,25 @@ smartlist_strings_eq(const smartlist_t *sl1, const smartlist_t *sl2) return 1; } +/** Return true iff the two lists contain the same int pointer values in + * the same order, or if they are both NULL. */ +int +smartlist_ints_eq(const smartlist_t *sl1, const smartlist_t *sl2) +{ + if (sl1 == NULL) + return sl2 == NULL; + if (sl2 == NULL) + return 0; + if (smartlist_len(sl1) != smartlist_len(sl2)) + return 0; + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl1, int *, cp1, { + int *cp2 = smartlist_get(sl2, cp1_sl_idx); + if (*cp1 != *cp2) + return 0; + }); + return 1; +} + /** Return true iff <b>sl</b> has some element E such that * tor_memeq(E,<b>element</b>,DIGEST_LEN) */ diff --git a/src/common/container.h b/src/common/container.h index 1a68b8f67..1bcc54066 100644 --- a/src/common/container.h +++ b/src/common/container.h @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ int smartlist_contains_string_case(const smartlist_t *sl, const char *element); int smartlist_contains_int_as_string(const smartlist_t *sl, int num); int smartlist_strings_eq(const smartlist_t *sl1, const smartlist_t *sl2); int smartlist_contains_digest(const smartlist_t *sl, const char *element); +int smartlist_ints_eq(const smartlist_t *sl1, const smartlist_t *sl2); int smartlist_overlap(const smartlist_t *sl1, const smartlist_t *sl2); void smartlist_intersect(smartlist_t *sl1, const smartlist_t *sl2); void smartlist_subtract(smartlist_t *sl1, const smartlist_t *sl2); diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index 0ababeaea..c1a2f3393 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ #include "../common/util.h" #include "container.h" #include "compat.h" +#include "sandbox.h" #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(0,9,8) #error "We require OpenSSL >= 0.9.8" @@ -114,7 +115,6 @@ crypto_get_rsa_padding_overhead(int padding) switch (padding) { case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: return PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING_OVERHEAD; - case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: return PKCS1_PADDING_OVERHEAD; default: tor_assert(0); return -1; } } @@ -126,7 +126,6 @@ crypto_get_rsa_padding(int padding) { switch (padding) { - case PK_PKCS1_PADDING: return RSA_PKCS1_PADDING; case PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: return RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING; default: tor_assert(0); return -1; } @@ -197,6 +196,27 @@ try_load_engine(const char *path, const char *engine) } #endif +/* Returns a trimmed and human-readable version of an openssl version string +* <b>raw_version</b>. They are usually in the form of 'OpenSSL 1.0.0b 10 +* May 2012' and this will parse them into a form similar to '1.0.0b' */ +static char * +parse_openssl_version_str(const char *raw_version) +{ + const char *end_of_version = NULL; + /* The output should be something like "OpenSSL 1.0.0b 10 May 2012. Let's + trim that down. */ + if (!strcmpstart(raw_version, "OpenSSL ")) { + raw_version += strlen("OpenSSL "); + end_of_version = strchr(raw_version, ' '); + } + + if (end_of_version) + return tor_strndup(raw_version, + end_of_version-raw_version); + else + return tor_strdup(raw_version); +} + static char *crypto_openssl_version_str = NULL; /* Return a human-readable version of the run-time openssl version number. */ const char * @@ -204,23 +224,24 @@ crypto_openssl_get_version_str(void) { if (crypto_openssl_version_str == NULL) { const char *raw_version = SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION); - const char *end_of_version = NULL; - /* The output should be something like "OpenSSL 1.0.0b 10 May 2012. Let's - trim that down. */ - if (!strcmpstart(raw_version, "OpenSSL ")) { - raw_version += strlen("OpenSSL "); - end_of_version = strchr(raw_version, ' '); - } - - if (end_of_version) - crypto_openssl_version_str = tor_strndup(raw_version, - end_of_version-raw_version); - else - crypto_openssl_version_str = tor_strdup(raw_version); + crypto_openssl_version_str = parse_openssl_version_str(raw_version); } return crypto_openssl_version_str; } +static char *crypto_openssl_header_version_str = NULL; +/* Return a human-readable version of the compile-time openssl version +* number. */ +const char * +crypto_openssl_get_header_version_str(void) +{ + if (crypto_openssl_header_version_str == NULL) { + crypto_openssl_header_version_str = + parse_openssl_version_str(OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT); + } + return crypto_openssl_header_version_str; +} + /** Initialize the crypto library. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. */ int @@ -1154,22 +1175,21 @@ int crypto_pk_asn1_encode(crypto_pk_t *pk, char *dest, size_t dest_len) { int len; - unsigned char *buf, *cp; - len = i2d_RSAPublicKey(pk->key, NULL); - if (len < 0 || (size_t)len > dest_len || dest_len > SIZE_T_CEILING) + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + + len = i2d_RSAPublicKey(pk->key, &buf); + if (len < 0 || buf == NULL) return -1; - cp = buf = tor_malloc(len+1); - len = i2d_RSAPublicKey(pk->key, &cp); - if (len < 0) { - crypto_log_errors(LOG_WARN,"encoding public key"); - tor_free(buf); + + if ((size_t)len > dest_len || dest_len > SIZE_T_CEILING) { + OPENSSL_free(buf); return -1; } /* We don't encode directly into 'dest', because that would be illegal * type-punning. (C99 is smarter than me, C99 is smarter than me...) */ memcpy(dest,buf,len); - tor_free(buf); + OPENSSL_free(buf); return len; } @@ -1200,24 +1220,17 @@ crypto_pk_asn1_decode(const char *str, size_t len) int crypto_pk_get_digest(crypto_pk_t *pk, char *digest_out) { - unsigned char *buf, *bufp; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; int len; - len = i2d_RSAPublicKey(pk->key, NULL); - if (len < 0) + len = i2d_RSAPublicKey(pk->key, &buf); + if (len < 0 || buf == NULL) return -1; - buf = bufp = tor_malloc(len+1); - len = i2d_RSAPublicKey(pk->key, &bufp); - if (len < 0) { - crypto_log_errors(LOG_WARN,"encoding public key"); - tor_free(buf); - return -1; - } if (crypto_digest(digest_out, (char*)buf, len) < 0) { - tor_free(buf); + OPENSSL_free(buf); return -1; } - tor_free(buf); + OPENSSL_free(buf); return 0; } @@ -1226,31 +1239,24 @@ crypto_pk_get_digest(crypto_pk_t *pk, char *digest_out) int crypto_pk_get_all_digests(crypto_pk_t *pk, digests_t *digests_out) { - unsigned char *buf, *bufp; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; int len; - len = i2d_RSAPublicKey(pk->key, NULL); - if (len < 0) + len = i2d_RSAPublicKey(pk->key, &buf); + if (len < 0 || buf == NULL) return -1; - buf = bufp = tor_malloc(len+1); - len = i2d_RSAPublicKey(pk->key, &bufp); - if (len < 0) { - crypto_log_errors(LOG_WARN,"encoding public key"); - tor_free(buf); - return -1; - } if (crypto_digest_all(digests_out, (char*)buf, len) < 0) { - tor_free(buf); + OPENSSL_free(buf); return -1; } - tor_free(buf); + OPENSSL_free(buf); return 0; } /** Copy <b>in</b> to the <b>outlen</b>-byte buffer <b>out</b>, adding spaces * every four spaces. */ -/* static */ void -add_spaces_to_fp(char *out, size_t outlen, const char *in) +void +crypto_add_spaces_to_fp(char *out, size_t outlen, const char *in) { int n = 0; char *end = out+outlen; @@ -1287,7 +1293,7 @@ crypto_pk_get_fingerprint(crypto_pk_t *pk, char *fp_out, int add_space) } base16_encode(hexdigest,sizeof(hexdigest),digest,DIGEST_LEN); if (add_space) { - add_spaces_to_fp(fp_out, FINGERPRINT_LEN+1, hexdigest); + crypto_add_spaces_to_fp(fp_out, FINGERPRINT_LEN+1, hexdigest); } else { strncpy(fp_out, hexdigest, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1); } @@ -1637,21 +1643,6 @@ crypto_digest_smartlist(char *digest_out, size_t len_out, crypto_digest_free(d); } -/** Compute the HMAC-SHA-1 of the <b>msg_len</b> bytes in <b>msg</b>, using - * the <b>key</b> of length <b>key_len</b>. Store the DIGEST_LEN-byte result - * in <b>hmac_out</b>. - */ -void -crypto_hmac_sha1(char *hmac_out, - const char *key, size_t key_len, - const char *msg, size_t msg_len) -{ - tor_assert(key_len < INT_MAX); - tor_assert(msg_len < INT_MAX); - HMAC(EVP_sha1(), key, (int)key_len, (unsigned char*)msg, (int)msg_len, - (unsigned char*)hmac_out, NULL); -} - /** Compute the HMAC-SHA-256 of the <b>msg_len</b> bytes in <b>msg</b>, using * the <b>key</b> of length <b>key_len</b>. Store the DIGEST256_LEN-byte * result in <b>hmac_out</b>. @@ -1720,7 +1711,7 @@ crypto_store_dynamic_dh_modulus(const char *fname) { int len, new_len; DH *dh = NULL; - unsigned char *dh_string_repr = NULL, *cp = NULL; + unsigned char *dh_string_repr = NULL; char *base64_encoded_dh = NULL; char *file_string = NULL; int retval = -1; @@ -1744,15 +1735,8 @@ crypto_store_dynamic_dh_modulus(const char *fname) if (!BN_set_word(dh->g, DH_GENERATOR)) goto done; - len = i2d_DHparams(dh, NULL); - if (len < 0) { - log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Error occured while DER encoding DH modulus (1)."); - goto done; - } - - cp = dh_string_repr = tor_malloc_zero(len+1); - len = i2d_DHparams(dh, &cp); - if ((len < 0) || ((cp - dh_string_repr) != len)) { + len = i2d_DHparams(dh, &dh_string_repr); + if ((len < 0) || (dh_string_repr == NULL)) { log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Error occured while DER encoding DH modulus (2)."); goto done; } @@ -1779,7 +1763,8 @@ crypto_store_dynamic_dh_modulus(const char *fname) done: if (dh) DH_free(dh); - tor_free(dh_string_repr); + if (dh_string_repr) + OPENSSL_free(dh_string_repr); tor_free(base64_encoded_dh); tor_free(file_string); @@ -2387,7 +2372,7 @@ crypto_strongest_rand(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len) return 0; #else for (i = 0; filenames[i]; ++i) { - fd = open(filenames[i], O_RDONLY, 0); + fd = open(sandbox_intern_string(filenames[i]), O_RDONLY, 0); if (fd<0) continue; log_info(LD_CRYPTO, "Reading entropy from \"%s\"", filenames[i]); n = read_all(fd, (char*)out, out_len, 0); @@ -2442,8 +2427,8 @@ crypto_seed_rng(int startup) /** Write <b>n</b> bytes of strong random data to <b>to</b>. Return 0 on * success, -1 on failure. */ -int -crypto_rand(char *to, size_t n) +MOCK_IMPL(int, +crypto_rand, (char *to, size_t n)) { int r; tor_assert(n < INT_MAX); @@ -3137,6 +3122,7 @@ crypto_global_cleanup(void) } #endif tor_free(crypto_openssl_version_str); + tor_free(crypto_openssl_header_version_str); return 0; } diff --git a/src/common/crypto.h b/src/common/crypto.h index 2fbca4c26..6ce3697c9 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.h +++ b/src/common/crypto.h @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include <stdio.h> #include "torint.h" +#include "testsupport.h" /* Macro to create an arbitrary OpenSSL version number as used by @@ -69,13 +70,9 @@ * signs removed. */ #define BASE64_DIGEST256_LEN 43 -/** Constant used to indicate PKCS1 padding for public-key encryption */ -#define PK_PKCS1_PADDING 60001 /** Constant used to indicate OAEP padding for public-key encryption */ #define PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING 60002 -/** Number of bytes added for PKCS1 padding. */ -#define PKCS1_PADDING_OVERHEAD 11 /** Number of bytes added for PKCS1-OAEP padding. */ #define PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING_OVERHEAD 42 @@ -112,6 +109,7 @@ typedef struct crypto_dh_t crypto_dh_t; /* global state */ const char * crypto_openssl_get_version_str(void); +const char * crypto_openssl_get_header_version_str(void); int crypto_global_init(int hardwareAccel, const char *accelName, const char *accelPath); @@ -221,9 +219,6 @@ void crypto_digest_get_digest(crypto_digest_t *digest, crypto_digest_t *crypto_digest_dup(const crypto_digest_t *digest); void crypto_digest_assign(crypto_digest_t *into, const crypto_digest_t *from); -void crypto_hmac_sha1(char *hmac_out, - const char *key, size_t key_len, - const char *msg, size_t msg_len); void crypto_hmac_sha256(char *hmac_out, const char *key, size_t key_len, const char *msg, size_t msg_len); @@ -254,7 +249,7 @@ int crypto_expand_key_material_rfc5869_sha256( /* random numbers */ int crypto_seed_rng(int startup); -int crypto_rand(char *to, size_t n); +MOCK_DECL(int,crypto_rand,(char *to, size_t n)); int crypto_strongest_rand(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len); int crypto_rand_int(unsigned int max); uint64_t crypto_rand_uint64(uint64_t max); @@ -290,7 +285,6 @@ void secret_to_key(char *key_out, size_t key_out_len, const char *secret, /** OpenSSL-based utility functions. */ void memwipe(void *mem, uint8_t byte, size_t sz); -#ifdef CRYPTO_PRIVATE /* Prototypes for private functions only used by tortls.c, crypto.c, and the * unit tests. */ struct rsa_st; @@ -301,9 +295,8 @@ crypto_pk_t *crypto_new_pk_from_rsa_(struct rsa_st *rsa); struct evp_pkey_st *crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_(crypto_pk_t *env, int private); struct dh_st *crypto_dh_get_dh_(crypto_dh_t *dh); -/* Prototypes for private functions only used by crypto.c and test.c*/ -void add_spaces_to_fp(char *out, size_t outlen, const char *in); -#endif + +void crypto_add_spaces_to_fp(char *out, size_t outlen, const char *in); #endif diff --git a/src/common/crypto_curve25519.c b/src/common/crypto_curve25519.c index 88c723f37..9e83440e1 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto_curve25519.c +++ b/src/common/crypto_curve25519.c @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ int curve25519_donna(uint8_t *mypublic, #endif #endif -int +STATIC int curve25519_impl(uint8_t *output, const uint8_t *secret, const uint8_t *basepoint) { diff --git a/src/common/crypto_curve25519.h b/src/common/crypto_curve25519.h index 652f1883c..f9d533ba2 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto_curve25519.h +++ b/src/common/crypto_curve25519.h @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ #ifndef TOR_CRYPTO_CURVE25519_H #define TOR_CRYPTO_CURVE25519_H +#include "testsupport.h" #include "torint.h" /** Length of a curve25519 public key when encoded. */ @@ -52,8 +53,8 @@ int curve25519_keypair_read_from_file(curve25519_keypair_t *keypair_out, const char *fname); #ifdef CRYPTO_CURVE25519_PRIVATE -int curve25519_impl(uint8_t *output, const uint8_t *secret, - const uint8_t *basepoint); +STATIC int curve25519_impl(uint8_t *output, const uint8_t *secret, + const uint8_t *basepoint); #endif #endif diff --git a/src/common/crypto_format.c b/src/common/crypto_format.c index 93932f839..be669c8d2 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto_format.c +++ b/src/common/crypto_format.c @@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ /* Formatting and parsing code for crypto-related data structures. */ -#define CRYPTO_CURVE25519_PRIVATE #include "orconfig.h" #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H #include <sys/stat.h> diff --git a/src/common/include.am b/src/common/include.am index b796ebfae..032befd20 100644 --- a/src/common/include.am +++ b/src/common/include.am @@ -1,5 +1,15 @@ -noinst_LIBRARIES+= src/common/libor.a src/common/libor-crypto.a src/common/libor-event.a +noinst_LIBRARIES += \ + src/common/libor.a \ + src/common/libor-crypto.a \ + src/common/libor-event.a + +if UNITTESTS_ENABLED +noinst_LIBRARIES += \ + src/common/libor-testing.a \ + src/common/libor-crypto-testing.a \ + src/common/libor-event-testing.a +endif EXTRA_DIST+= \ src/common/common_sha1.i \ @@ -14,9 +24,13 @@ else libor_extra_source= endif +src_common_libcurve25519_donna_a_CFLAGS= + if BUILD_CURVE25519_DONNA src_common_libcurve25519_donna_a_SOURCES=\ src/ext/curve25519_donna/curve25519-donna.c +src_common_libcurve25519_donna_a_CFLAGS+=\ + @F_OMIT_FRAME_POINTER@ noinst_LIBRARIES+=src/common/libcurve25519_donna.a LIBDONNA=src/common/libcurve25519_donna.a else @@ -30,13 +44,11 @@ LIBDONNA= endif endif -src_common_libcurve25519_donna_a_CFLAGS = - if CURVE25519_ENABLED libcrypto_extra_source=src/common/crypto_curve25519.c endif -src_common_libor_a_SOURCES = \ +LIBOR_A_SOURCES = \ src/common/address.c \ src/common/compat.c \ src/common/container.c \ @@ -47,9 +59,10 @@ src_common_libor_a_SOURCES = \ src/common/procmon.c \ src/common/util.c \ src/common/util_codedigest.c \ + src/common/sandbox.c \ $(libor_extra_source) -src_common_libor_crypto_a_SOURCES = \ +LIBOR_CRYPTO_A_SOURCES = \ src/common/aes.c \ src/common/crypto.c \ src/common/crypto_format.c \ @@ -57,7 +70,23 @@ src_common_libor_crypto_a_SOURCES = \ src/common/tortls.c \ $(libcrypto_extra_source) -src_common_libor_event_a_SOURCES = src/common/compat_libevent.c +LIBOR_EVENT_A_SOURCES = src/common/compat_libevent.c + +src_common_libor_a_SOURCES = $(LIBOR_A_SOURCES) +src_common_libor_crypto_a_SOURCES = $(LIBOR_CRYPTO_A_SOURCES) +src_common_libor_event_a_SOURCES = $(LIBOR_EVENT_A_SOURCES) + +src_common_libor_testing_a_SOURCES = $(LIBOR_A_SOURCES) +src_common_libor_crypto_testing_a_SOURCES = $(LIBOR_CRYPTO_A_SOURCES) +src_common_libor_event_testing_a_SOURCES = $(LIBOR_EVENT_A_SOURCES) + +src_common_libor_testing_a_CPPFLAGS = -DTOR_UNIT_TESTS $(AM_CPPFLAGS) +src_common_libor_crypto_testing_a_CPPFLAGS = -DTOR_UNIT_TESTS $(AM_CPPFLAGS) +src_common_libor_event_testing_a_CPPFLAGS = -DTOR_UNIT_TESTS $(AM_CPPFLAGS) +src_common_libor_testing_a_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) $(TEST_CFLAGS) +src_common_libor_crypto_testing_a_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) $(TEST_CFLAGS) +src_common_libor_event_testing_a_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) $(TEST_CFLAGS) + COMMONHEADERS = \ src/common/address.h \ @@ -72,6 +101,8 @@ COMMONHEADERS = \ src/common/memarea.h \ src/common/mempool.h \ src/common/procmon.h \ + src/common/sandbox.h \ + src/common/testsupport.h \ src/common/torgzip.h \ src/common/torint.h \ src/common/torlog.h \ diff --git a/src/common/log.c b/src/common/log.c index e196a1128..303fba93a 100644 --- a/src/common/log.c +++ b/src/common/log.c @@ -36,6 +36,10 @@ #include "torlog.h" #include "container.h" +/** Given a severity, yields an index into log_severity_list_t.masks to use + * for that severity. */ +#define SEVERITY_MASK_IDX(sev) ((sev) - LOG_ERR) + /** @{ */ /** The string we stick at the end of a log message when it is too long, * and its length. */ @@ -1138,6 +1142,22 @@ get_min_log_level(void) return min; } +/** Return the fd of a file log that is receiving ERR messages, or -1 if + * no such log exists. */ +int +get_err_logging_fd(void) +{ + const logfile_t *lf; + for (lf = logfiles; lf; lf = lf->next) { + if (lf->is_temporary || lf->is_syslog || !lf->filename || + lf->callback || lf->seems_dead || lf->fd < 0) + continue; + if (lf->severities->masks[LOG_ERR] & LD_GENERAL) + return lf->fd; + } + return -1; +} + /** Switch all logs to output at most verbose level. */ void switch_logs_debug(void) diff --git a/src/common/sandbox.c b/src/common/sandbox.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..aaba9c776 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/common/sandbox.c @@ -0,0 +1,1526 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2013, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file sandbox.c + * \brief Code to enable sandboxing. + **/ + +#include "orconfig.h" + +#ifndef _LARGEFILE64_SOURCE +/** + * Temporarily required for O_LARGEFILE flag. Needs to be removed + * with the libevent fix. + */ +#define _LARGEFILE64_SOURCE +#endif + +/** Malloc mprotect limit in bytes. */ +#define MALLOC_MP_LIM 1048576 + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <stdlib.h> + +#include "sandbox.h" +#include "torlog.h" +#include "torint.h" +#include "util.h" +#include "tor_queue.h" + +#define DEBUGGING_CLOSE + +#if defined(USE_LIBSECCOMP) + +#define _GNU_SOURCE + +#include <sys/mman.h> +#include <sys/syscall.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <sys/epoll.h> +#include <sys/prctl.h> +#include <linux/futex.h> +#include <bits/signum.h> +#include <event2/event.h> + +#include <stdarg.h> +#include <seccomp.h> +#include <signal.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <time.h> +#include <poll.h> + +/**Determines if at least one sandbox is active.*/ +static int sandbox_active = 0; +/** Holds the parameter list configuration for the sandbox.*/ +static sandbox_cfg_t *filter_dynamic = NULL; +/** Holds a list of pre-recorded results from getaddrinfo().*/ +static sb_addr_info_t *sb_addr_info = NULL; + +#undef SCMP_CMP +#define SCMP_CMP(a,b,c) ((struct scmp_arg_cmp){(a),(b),(c),0}) + +/** Variable used for storing all syscall numbers that will be allowed with the + * stage 1 general Tor sandbox. + */ +static int filter_nopar_gen[] = { + SCMP_SYS(access), + SCMP_SYS(brk), + SCMP_SYS(clock_gettime), + SCMP_SYS(close), + SCMP_SYS(clone), + SCMP_SYS(epoll_create), + SCMP_SYS(epoll_wait), + SCMP_SYS(fcntl), + SCMP_SYS(fstat), +#ifdef __NR_fstat64 + SCMP_SYS(fstat64), +#endif + SCMP_SYS(getdents64), + SCMP_SYS(getegid), +#ifdef __NR_getegid32 + SCMP_SYS(getegid32), +#endif + SCMP_SYS(geteuid), +#ifdef __NR_geteuid32 + SCMP_SYS(geteuid32), +#endif + SCMP_SYS(getgid), +#ifdef __NR_getgid32 + SCMP_SYS(getgid32), +#endif + SCMP_SYS(getrlimit), + SCMP_SYS(gettimeofday), + SCMP_SYS(getuid), +#ifdef __NR_getuid32 + SCMP_SYS(getuid32), +#endif + SCMP_SYS(lseek), +#ifdef __NR__llseek + SCMP_SYS(_llseek), +#endif + SCMP_SYS(mkdir), + SCMP_SYS(mlockall), + SCMP_SYS(mmap), + SCMP_SYS(munmap), + SCMP_SYS(read), + SCMP_SYS(rename), + SCMP_SYS(rt_sigreturn), + SCMP_SYS(set_robust_list), +#ifdef __NR_sigreturn + SCMP_SYS(sigreturn), +#endif + SCMP_SYS(stat), + SCMP_SYS(uname), + SCMP_SYS(write), + SCMP_SYS(exit_group), + SCMP_SYS(exit), + + SCMP_SYS(madvise), +#ifdef __NR_stat64 + // getaddrinfo uses this.. + SCMP_SYS(stat64), +#endif + + /* + * These socket syscalls are not required on x86_64 and not supported with + * some libseccomp versions (eg: 1.0.1) + */ +#if defined(__i386) + SCMP_SYS(recv), + SCMP_SYS(send), +#endif + + // socket syscalls + SCMP_SYS(bind), + SCMP_SYS(connect), + SCMP_SYS(getsockname), + SCMP_SYS(recvmsg), + SCMP_SYS(recvfrom), + SCMP_SYS(sendto), + SCMP_SYS(unlink) +}; + +/** + * Function responsible for setting up the rt_sigaction syscall for + * the seccomp filter sandbox. + */ +static int +sb_rt_sigaction(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter) +{ + unsigned i; + int rc; + int param[] = { SIGINT, SIGTERM, SIGPIPE, SIGUSR1, SIGUSR2, SIGHUP, SIGCHLD, +#ifdef SIGXFSZ + SIGXFSZ +#endif + }; + (void) filter; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_LENGTH(param); i++) { + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(rt_sigaction), 1, + SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param[i])); + if (rc) + break; + } + + return rc; +} + +/** + * Function responsible for setting up the execve syscall for + * the seccomp filter sandbox. + */ +static int +sb_execve(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter) +{ + int rc; + sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL; + + // for each dynamic parameter filters + for (elem = filter; elem != NULL; elem = elem->next) { + smp_param_t *param = (smp_param_t*) elem->param; + + if (param != NULL && param->prot == 1 && param->syscall + == SCMP_SYS(execve)) { + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(execve), 1, + SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value)); + if (rc != 0) { + log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add execve syscall, received " + "libseccomp error %d", rc); + return rc; + } + } + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Function responsible for setting up the time syscall for + * the seccomp filter sandbox. + */ +static int +sb_time(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter) +{ + (void) filter; + return seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(time), 1, + SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, 0)); +} + +/** + * Function responsible for setting up the accept4 syscall for + * the seccomp filter sandbox. + */ +static int +sb_accept4(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter) +{ + int rc = 0; + (void)filter; + +#ifdef __i386__ + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(socketcall), 1, + SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, 18)); + if (rc) { + return rc; + } +#endif + + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(accept4), 1, + SCMP_CMP(3, SCMP_CMP_EQ, SOCK_CLOEXEC)); + if (rc) { + return rc; + } + + return 0; +} + +#ifdef __NR_mmap2 +/** + * Function responsible for setting up the mmap2 syscall for + * the seccomp filter sandbox. + */ +static int +sb_mmap2(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter) +{ + int rc = 0; + + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(mmap2), 2, + SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PROT_READ), + SCMP_CMP(3, SCMP_CMP_EQ, MAP_PRIVATE)); + if (rc) { + return rc; + } + + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(mmap2), 2, + SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PROT_NONE), + SCMP_CMP(3, SCMP_CMP_EQ, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_NORESERVE)); + if (rc) { + return rc; + } + + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(mmap2), 2, + SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE), + SCMP_CMP(3, SCMP_CMP_EQ, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS)); + if (rc) { + return rc; + } + + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(mmap2), 2, + SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE), + SCMP_CMP(3, SCMP_CMP_EQ,MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_STACK)); + if (rc) { + return rc; + } + + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(mmap2), 2, + SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE), + SCMP_CMP(3, SCMP_CMP_EQ, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED|MAP_DENYWRITE)); + if (rc) { + return rc; + } + + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(mmap2), 2, + SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE), + SCMP_CMP(3, SCMP_CMP_EQ, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED|MAP_ANONYMOUS)); + if (rc) { + return rc; + } + + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(mmap2), 2, + SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC), + SCMP_CMP(3, SCMP_CMP_EQ, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_DENYWRITE)); + if (rc) { + return rc; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif + +/** + * Function responsible for setting up the open syscall for + * the seccomp filter sandbox. + */ +static int +sb_open(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter) +{ + int rc; + sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL; + + // for each dynamic parameter filters + for (elem = filter; elem != NULL; elem = elem->next) { + smp_param_t *param = elem->param; + + if (param != NULL && param->prot == 1 && param->syscall + == SCMP_SYS(open)) { + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(open), 1, + SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value)); + if (rc != 0) { + log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add open syscall, received " + "libseccomp error %d", rc); + return rc; + } + } + } + + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(-1), SCMP_SYS(open), 1, + SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC)); + if (rc != 0) { + log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add open syscall, received libseccomp " + "error %d", rc); + return rc; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Function responsible for setting up the openat syscall for + * the seccomp filter sandbox. + */ +static int +sb_openat(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter) +{ + int rc; + sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL; + + // for each dynamic parameter filters + for (elem = filter; elem != NULL; elem = elem->next) { + smp_param_t *param = elem->param; + + if (param != NULL && param->prot == 1 && param->syscall + == SCMP_SYS(openat)) { + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat), 1, + SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, AT_FDCWD), + SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value), + SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK|O_LARGEFILE|O_DIRECTORY| + O_CLOEXEC)); + if (rc != 0) { + log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add openat syscall, received " + "libseccomp error %d", rc); + return rc; + } + } + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Function responsible for setting up the socket syscall for + * the seccomp filter sandbox. + */ +static int +sb_socket(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter) +{ + int rc = 0; + (void) filter; + +#ifdef __i386__ + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(socket), 0); + if (rc) + return rc; +#endif + + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(socket), 3, + SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PF_FILE), + SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, SOCK_STREAM|SOCK_CLOEXEC|SOCK_NONBLOCK), + SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, IPPROTO_IP)); + if (rc) + return rc; + + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(socket), 3, + SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PF_INET), + SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, SOCK_STREAM|SOCK_CLOEXEC), + SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, IPPROTO_TCP)); + if (rc) + return rc; + + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(socket), 3, + SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PF_INET), + SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, SOCK_DGRAM|SOCK_CLOEXEC|SOCK_NONBLOCK), + SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, IPPROTO_IP)); + if (rc) + return rc; + + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(socket), 3, + SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PF_NETLINK), + SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, SOCK_RAW), + SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, 0)); + if (rc) + return rc; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Function responsible for setting up the socketpair syscall for + * the seccomp filter sandbox. + */ +static int +sb_socketpair(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter) +{ + int rc = 0; + (void) filter; + +#ifdef __i386__ + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(socketpair), 0); + if (rc) + return rc; +#endif + + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(socketpair), 2, + SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PF_FILE), + SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, SOCK_STREAM|SOCK_CLOEXEC)); + if (rc) + return rc; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Function responsible for setting up the setsockopt syscall for + * the seccomp filter sandbox. + */ +static int +sb_setsockopt(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter) +{ + int rc = 0; + (void) filter; + +#ifdef __i386__ + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(setsockopt), 0); + if (rc) + return rc; +#endif + + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(setsockopt), 2, + SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, SOL_SOCKET), + SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, SO_REUSEADDR)); + if (rc) + return rc; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Function responsible for setting up the getsockopt syscall for + * the seccomp filter sandbox. + */ +static int +sb_getsockopt(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter) +{ + int rc = 0; + (void) filter; + +#ifdef __i386__ + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(getsockopt), 0); + if (rc) + return rc; +#endif + + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(getsockopt), 2, + SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, SOL_SOCKET), + SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, SO_ERROR)); + if (rc) + return rc; + + return 0; +} + +#ifdef __NR_fcntl64 +/** + * Function responsible for setting up the fcntl64 syscall for + * the seccomp filter sandbox. + */ +static int +sb_fcntl64(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter) +{ + int rc = 0; + + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(fcntl64), 1, + SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, F_GETFL)); + if (rc) + return rc; + + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(fcntl64), 2, + SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, F_SETFL), + SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, O_RDWR|O_NONBLOCK)); + if (rc) + return rc; + + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(fcntl64), 1, + SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, F_GETFD)); + if (rc) + return rc; + + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(fcntl64), 2, + SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, F_SETFD), + SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, FD_CLOEXEC)); + if (rc) + return rc; + + return 0; +} +#endif + +/** + * Function responsible for setting up the epoll_ctl syscall for + * the seccomp filter sandbox. + * + * Note: basically allows everything but will keep for now.. + */ +static int +sb_epoll_ctl(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter) +{ + int rc = 0; + (void) filter; + + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(epoll_ctl), 1, + SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, EPOLL_CTL_ADD)); + if (rc) + return rc; + + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(epoll_ctl), 1, + SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, EPOLL_CTL_MOD)); + if (rc) + return rc; + + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(epoll_ctl), 1, + SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, EPOLL_CTL_DEL)); + if (rc) + return rc; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Function responsible for setting up the fcntl64 syscall for + * the seccomp filter sandbox. + * + * NOTE: if multiple filters need to be added, the PR_SECCOMP parameter needs + * to be whitelisted in this function. + */ +static int +sb_prctl(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter) +{ + int rc = 0; + (void) filter; + + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(prctl), 1, + SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PR_SET_DUMPABLE)); + if (rc) + return rc; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Function responsible for setting up the fcntl64 syscall for + * the seccomp filter sandbox. + * + * NOTE: does not NEED to be here.. currently only occurs before filter; will + * keep just in case for the future. + */ +static int +sb_mprotect(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter) +{ + int rc = 0; + (void) filter; + + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(mprotect), 1, + SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PROT_READ)); + if (rc) + return rc; + + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(mprotect), 1, + SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PROT_NONE)); + if (rc) + return rc; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Function responsible for setting up the rt_sigprocmask syscall for + * the seccomp filter sandbox. + */ +static int +sb_rt_sigprocmask(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter) +{ + int rc = 0; + (void) filter; + + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(rt_sigprocmask), 1, + SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, SIG_UNBLOCK)); + if (rc) + return rc; + + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(rt_sigprocmask), 1, + SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, SIG_SETMASK)); + if (rc) + return rc; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Function responsible for setting up the flock syscall for + * the seccomp filter sandbox. + * + * NOTE: does not need to be here, occurs before filter is applied. + */ +static int +sb_flock(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter) +{ + int rc = 0; + (void) filter; + + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(flock), 1, + SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, LOCK_EX|LOCK_NB)); + if (rc) + return rc; + + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(flock), 1, + SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, LOCK_UN)); + if (rc) + return rc; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Function responsible for setting up the futex syscall for + * the seccomp filter sandbox. + */ +static int +sb_futex(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter) +{ + int rc = 0; + (void) filter; + + // can remove + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(futex), 1, + SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, + FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET_PRIVATE|FUTEX_CLOCK_REALTIME)); + if (rc) + return rc; + + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(futex), 1, + SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, FUTEX_WAKE_PRIVATE)); + if (rc) + return rc; + + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(futex), 1, + SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, FUTEX_WAIT_PRIVATE)); + if (rc) + return rc; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Function responsible for setting up the mremap syscall for + * the seccomp filter sandbox. + * + * NOTE: so far only occurs before filter is applied. + */ +static int +sb_mremap(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter) +{ + int rc = 0; + (void) filter; + + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(mremap), 1, + SCMP_CMP(3, SCMP_CMP_EQ, MREMAP_MAYMOVE)); + if (rc) + return rc; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Function responsible for setting up the poll syscall for + * the seccomp filter sandbox. + */ +static int +sb_poll(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter) +{ + int rc = 0; + (void) filter; + + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(poll), 2, + SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, 1), + SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, 10)); + if (rc) + return rc; + + return 0; +} + +#ifdef __NR_stat64 +/** + * Function responsible for setting up the stat64 syscall for + * the seccomp filter sandbox. + */ +static int +sb_stat64(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter) +{ + int rc = 0; + sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL; + + // for each dynamic parameter filters + for (elem = filter; elem != NULL; elem = elem->next) { + smp_param_t *param = elem->param; + + if (param != NULL && param->prot == 1 && (param->syscall == SCMP_SYS(open) + || param->syscall == SCMP_SYS(stat64))) { + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(stat64), 1, + SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value)); + if (rc != 0) { + log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add open syscall, received " + "libseccomp error %d", rc); + return rc; + } + } + } + + return 0; +} +#endif + +/** + * Array of function pointers responsible for filtering different syscalls at + * a parameter level. + */ +static sandbox_filter_func_t filter_func[] = { + sb_rt_sigaction, + sb_rt_sigprocmask, + sb_execve, + sb_time, + sb_accept4, +#ifdef __NR_mmap2 + sb_mmap2, +#endif + sb_open, + sb_openat, +#ifdef __NR_fcntl64 + sb_fcntl64, +#endif + sb_epoll_ctl, + sb_prctl, + sb_mprotect, + sb_flock, + sb_futex, + sb_mremap, + sb_poll, +#ifdef __NR_stat64 + sb_stat64, +#endif + + sb_socket, + sb_setsockopt, + sb_getsockopt, + sb_socketpair +}; + +const char* +sandbox_intern_string(const char *str) +{ + sandbox_cfg_t *elem; + + if (str == NULL) + return NULL; + + for (elem = filter_dynamic; elem != NULL; elem = elem->next) { + smp_param_t *param = elem->param; + + if (param->prot && !strcmp(str, (char*)(param->value))) { + return (char*)(param->value); + } + } + + log_info(LD_GENERAL, "(Sandbox) Parameter %s not found", str); + return str; +} + +/** + * Protects all the strings in the sandbox's parameter list configuration. It + * works by calculating the total amount of memory required by the parameter + * list, allocating the memory using mmap, and protecting it from writes with + * mprotect(). + */ +static int +prot_strings(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t* cfg) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t pr_mem_size = 0, pr_mem_left = 0; + char *pr_mem_next = NULL, *pr_mem_base; + sandbox_cfg_t *el = NULL; + + // get total number of bytes required to mmap + for (el = cfg; el != NULL; el = el->next) { + pr_mem_size += strlen((char*) ((smp_param_t*)el->param)->value) + 1; + } + + // allocate protected memory with MALLOC_MP_LIM canary + pr_mem_base = (char*) mmap(NULL, MALLOC_MP_LIM + pr_mem_size, + PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON, -1, 0); + if (pr_mem_base == MAP_FAILED) { + log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed allocate protected memory! mmap: %s", + strerror(errno)); + ret = -1; + goto out; + } + + pr_mem_next = pr_mem_base + MALLOC_MP_LIM; + pr_mem_left = pr_mem_size; + + // change el value pointer to protected + for (el = cfg; el != NULL; el = el->next) { + char *param_val = (char*)((smp_param_t *)el->param)->value; + size_t param_size = strlen(param_val) + 1; + + if (pr_mem_left >= param_size) { + // copy to protected + memcpy(pr_mem_next, param_val, param_size); + + // re-point el parameter to protected + { + void *old_val = (void *) ((smp_param_t*)el->param)->value; + tor_free(old_val); + } + ((smp_param_t*)el->param)->value = (intptr_t) pr_mem_next; + ((smp_param_t*)el->param)->prot = 1; + + // move next available protected memory + pr_mem_next += param_size; + pr_mem_left -= param_size; + } else { + log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) insufficient protected memory!"); + ret = -2; + goto out; + } + } + + // protecting from writes + if (mprotect(pr_mem_base, MALLOC_MP_LIM + pr_mem_size, PROT_READ)) { + log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to protect memory! mprotect: %s", + strerror(errno)); + ret = -3; + goto out; + } + + /* + * Setting sandbox restrictions so the string memory cannot be tampered with + */ + // no mremap of the protected base address + ret = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_KILL, SCMP_SYS(mremap), 1, + SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, (intptr_t) pr_mem_base)); + if (ret) { + log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) mremap protected memory filter fail!"); + return ret; + } + + // no munmap of the protected base address + ret = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_KILL, SCMP_SYS(munmap), 1, + SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, (intptr_t) pr_mem_base)); + if (ret) { + log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) munmap protected memory filter fail!"); + return ret; + } + + /* + * Allow mprotect with PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE because openssl uses it, but + * never over the memory region used by the protected strings. + * + * PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE was originally fully allowed in sb_mprotect(), but + * had to be removed due to limitation of libseccomp regarding intervals. + * + * There is a restriction on how much you can mprotect with R|W up to the + * size of the canary. + */ + ret = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(mprotect), 2, + SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_LT, (intptr_t) pr_mem_base), + SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_LE, MALLOC_MP_LIM), + SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE)); + if (ret) { + log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) mprotect protected memory filter fail (LT)!"); + return ret; + } + + ret = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(mprotect), 2, + SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_GT, (intptr_t) pr_mem_base + pr_mem_size + + MALLOC_MP_LIM), + SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_LE, MALLOC_MP_LIM), + SCMP_CMP(2, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE)); + if (ret) { + log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) mprotect protected memory filter fail (GT)!"); + return ret; + } + + out: + return ret; +} + +/** + * Auxiliary function used in order to allocate a sandbox_cfg_t element and set + * it's values according the the parameter list. All elements are initialised + * with the 'prot' field set to false, as the pointer is not protected at this + * point. + */ +static sandbox_cfg_t* +new_element(int syscall, int index, intptr_t value) +{ + smp_param_t *param = NULL; + + sandbox_cfg_t *elem = tor_malloc(sizeof(sandbox_cfg_t)); + elem->param = tor_malloc(sizeof(smp_param_t)); + + param = elem->param; + param->syscall = syscall; + param->pindex = index; + param->value = value; + param->prot = 0; + + return elem; +} + +#ifdef __NR_stat64 +#define SCMP_stat SCMP_SYS(stat64) +#else +#define SCMP_stat SCMP_SYS(stat) +#endif + +int +sandbox_cfg_allow_stat_filename(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, char *file, int fr) +{ + sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL; + + elem = new_element(SCMP_stat, 0, (intptr_t)(void*) tor_strdup(file)); + if (!elem) { + log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to register parameter!"); + return -1; + } + + elem->next = *cfg; + *cfg = elem; + + if (fr) tor_free(file); + return 0; +} + +int +sandbox_cfg_allow_stat_filename_array(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, ...) +{ + int rc = 0; + char *fn = NULL; + + va_list ap; + va_start(ap, cfg); + + while ((fn = va_arg(ap, char*)) != NULL) { + int fr = va_arg(ap, int); + + rc = sandbox_cfg_allow_stat_filename(cfg, fn, fr); + if (rc) { + log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) sandbox_cfg_allow_stat_filename_array fail"); + goto end; + } + } + + end: + va_end(ap); + return 0; +} + +int +sandbox_cfg_allow_open_filename(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, char *file, int fr) +{ + sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL; + + elem = new_element(SCMP_SYS(open), 0, (intptr_t)(void *)tor_strdup(file)); + if (!elem) { + log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to register parameter!"); + return -1; + } + + elem->next = *cfg; + *cfg = elem; + + if (fr) tor_free(file); + + return 0; +} + +int +sandbox_cfg_allow_open_filename_array(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, ...) +{ + int rc = 0; + char *fn = NULL; + + va_list ap; + va_start(ap, cfg); + + while ((fn = va_arg(ap, char*)) != NULL) { + int fr = va_arg(ap, int); + + rc = sandbox_cfg_allow_open_filename(cfg, fn, fr); + if (rc) { + log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) sandbox_cfg_allow_open_filename_array fail"); + goto end; + } + } + + end: + va_end(ap); + return 0; +} + +int +sandbox_cfg_allow_openat_filename(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, char *file, int fr) +{ + sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL; + + elem = new_element(SCMP_SYS(openat), 1, (intptr_t)(void *)tor_strdup(file)); + if (!elem) { + log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to register parameter!"); + return -1; + } + + elem->next = *cfg; + *cfg = elem; + + if (fr) tor_free(file); + + return 0; +} + +int +sandbox_cfg_allow_openat_filename_array(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, ...) +{ + int rc = 0; + char *fn = NULL; + + va_list ap; + va_start(ap, cfg); + + while ((fn = va_arg(ap, char*)) != NULL) { + int fr = va_arg(ap, int); + + rc = sandbox_cfg_allow_openat_filename(cfg, fn, fr); + if (rc) { + log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) sandbox_cfg_allow_openat_filename_array fail"); + goto end; + } + } + + end: + va_end(ap); + return 0; +} + +int +sandbox_cfg_allow_execve(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, const char *com) +{ + sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL; + + elem = new_element(SCMP_SYS(execve), 1, (intptr_t)(void *)tor_strdup(com)); + if (!elem) { + log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to register parameter!"); + return -1; + } + + elem->next = *cfg; + *cfg = elem; + + return 0; +} + +int +sandbox_cfg_allow_execve_array(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, ...) +{ + int rc = 0; + char *fn = NULL; + + va_list ap; + va_start(ap, cfg); + + while ((fn = va_arg(ap, char*)) != NULL) { + + rc = sandbox_cfg_allow_execve(cfg, fn); + if (rc) { + log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) sandbox_cfg_allow_execve_array failed"); + goto end; + } + } + + end: + va_end(ap); + return 0; +} + +int +sandbox_getaddrinfo(const char *name, const char *servname, + const struct addrinfo *hints, + struct addrinfo **res) +{ + sb_addr_info_t *el; + + if (servname != NULL) + return -1; + + *res = NULL; + + for (el = sb_addr_info; el; el = el->next) { + if (!strcmp(el->name, name)) { + *res = tor_malloc(sizeof(struct addrinfo)); + + memcpy(*res, el->info, sizeof(struct addrinfo)); + /* XXXX What if there are multiple items in the list? */ + return 0; + } + } + + if (!sandbox_active) { + if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, hints, res)) { + log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) getaddrinfo failed!"); + return -1; + } + + return 0; + } + + // getting here means something went wrong + log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to get address %s!", name); + if (*res) { + tor_free(*res); + res = NULL; + } + return -1; +} + +int +sandbox_add_addrinfo(const char* name) +{ + int ret; + struct addrinfo hints; + sb_addr_info_t *el = NULL; + + el = tor_malloc(sizeof(sb_addr_info_t)); + + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = AF_INET; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + + ret = getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &(el->info)); + if (ret) { + log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to getaddrinfo"); + ret = -2; + tor_free(el); + goto out; + } + + el->name = tor_strdup(name); + el->next = sb_addr_info; + sb_addr_info = el; + + out: + return ret; +} + +/** + * Function responsible for going through the parameter syscall filters and + * call each function pointer in the list. + */ +static int +add_param_filter(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t* cfg) +{ + unsigned i; + int rc = 0; + + // function pointer + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_LENGTH(filter_func); i++) { + if ((filter_func[i])(ctx, cfg)) { + log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add syscall %d, received libseccomp " + "error %d", i, rc); + return rc; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Function responsible of loading the libseccomp syscall filters which do not + * have parameter filtering. + */ +static int +add_noparam_filter(scmp_filter_ctx ctx) +{ + unsigned i; + int rc = 0; + + // add general filters + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_LENGTH(filter_nopar_gen); i++) { + rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, filter_nopar_gen[i], 0); + if (rc != 0) { + log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add syscall index %d (NR=%d), " + "received libseccomp error %d", i, filter_nopar_gen[i], rc); + return rc; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Function responsible for setting up and enabling a global syscall filter. + * The function is a prototype developed for stage 1 of sandboxing Tor. + * Returns 0 on success. + */ +static int +install_syscall_filter(sandbox_cfg_t* cfg) +{ + int rc = 0; + scmp_filter_ctx ctx; + + ctx = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_TRAP); + if (ctx == NULL) { + log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to initialise libseccomp context"); + rc = -1; + goto end; + } + + // protectign sandbox parameter strings + if ((rc = prot_strings(ctx, cfg))) { + goto end; + } + + // add parameter filters + if ((rc = add_param_filter(ctx, cfg))) { + log_err(LD_BUG, "(Sandbox) failed to add param filters!"); + goto end; + } + + // adding filters with no parameters + if ((rc = add_noparam_filter(ctx))) { + log_err(LD_BUG, "(Sandbox) failed to add param filters!"); + goto end; + } + + // loading the seccomp2 filter + if ((rc = seccomp_load(ctx))) { + log_err(LD_BUG, "(Sandbox) failed to load!"); + goto end; + } + + // marking the sandbox as active + sandbox_active = 1; + + end: + seccomp_release(ctx); + return (rc < 0 ? -rc : rc); +} + +/** Additional file descriptor to use when logging seccomp2 failures */ +static int sigsys_debugging_fd = -1; + +/** Use the file descriptor <b>fd</b> to log seccomp2 failures. */ +static void +sigsys_set_debugging_fd(int fd) +{ + sigsys_debugging_fd = fd; +} + +/** + * Function called when a SIGSYS is caught by the application. It notifies the + * user that an error has occurred and either terminates or allows the + * application to continue execution, based on the DEBUGGING_CLOSE symbol. + */ +static void +sigsys_debugging(int nr, siginfo_t *info, void *void_context) +{ + ucontext_t *ctx = (ucontext_t *) (void_context); + char message[256]; + int rv = 0, syscall, length, err; + (void) nr; + + if (info->si_code != SYS_SECCOMP) + return; + + if (!ctx) + return; + + syscall = ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_SYSCALL]; + + strlcpy(message, "\n\n(Sandbox) Caught a bad syscall attempt (syscall 0x", + sizeof(message)); + (void) format_hex_number_sigsafe(syscall, message+strlen(message), + sizeof(message)-strlen(message)); + strlcat(message, ")\n", sizeof(message)); + length = strlen(message); + + err = 0; + if (sigsys_debugging_fd >= 0) { + rv = write(sigsys_debugging_fd, message, length); + err += rv != length; + } + + rv = write(STDOUT_FILENO, message, length); + err += rv != length; + + if (err) + _exit(2); + +#if defined(DEBUGGING_CLOSE) + _exit(1); +#endif // DEBUGGING_CLOSE +} + +/** + * Function that adds a handler for SIGSYS, which is the signal thrown + * when the application is issuing a syscall which is not allowed. The + * main purpose of this function is to help with debugging by identifying + * filtered syscalls. + */ +static int +install_sigsys_debugging(void) +{ + struct sigaction act; + sigset_t mask; + + memset(&act, 0, sizeof(act)); + sigemptyset(&mask); + sigaddset(&mask, SIGSYS); + + act.sa_sigaction = &sigsys_debugging; + act.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO; + if (sigaction(SIGSYS, &act, NULL) < 0) { + log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) Failed to register SIGSYS signal handler"); + return -1; + } + + if (sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &mask, NULL)) { + log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) Failed call to sigprocmask()"); + return -2; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Function responsible of registering the sandbox_cfg_t list of parameter + * syscall filters to the existing parameter list. This is used for incipient + * multiple-sandbox support. + */ +static int +register_cfg(sandbox_cfg_t* cfg) +{ + sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL; + + if (filter_dynamic == NULL) { + filter_dynamic = cfg; + return 0; + } + + for (elem = filter_dynamic; elem->next != NULL; elem = elem->next); + + elem->next = cfg; + + return 0; +} + +#endif // USE_LIBSECCOMP + +#ifdef USE_LIBSECCOMP +/** + * Initialises the syscall sandbox filter for any linux architecture, taking + * into account various available features for different linux flavours. + */ +static int +initialise_libseccomp_sandbox(sandbox_cfg_t* cfg) +{ + if (install_sigsys_debugging()) + return -1; + + if (install_syscall_filter(cfg)) + return -2; + + if (register_cfg(cfg)) + return -3; + + return 0; +} + +#endif // USE_LIBSECCOMP + +sandbox_cfg_t* +sandbox_cfg_new(void) +{ + return NULL; +} + +int +sandbox_init(sandbox_cfg_t *cfg) +{ +#if defined(USE_LIBSECCOMP) + return initialise_libseccomp_sandbox(cfg); + +#elif defined(_WIN32) + (void)cfg; + log_warn(LD_BUG,"Windows sandboxing is not implemented. The feature is " + "currently disabled."); + return 0; + +#elif defined(TARGET_OS_MAC) + (void)cfg; + log_warn(LD_BUG,"Mac OSX sandboxing is not implemented. The feature is " + "currently disabled"); + return 0; +#else + (void)cfg; + log_warn(LD_BUG,"Sandboxing is not implemented for your platform. The " + "feature is currently disabled"); + return 0; +#endif +} + +void +sandbox_set_debugging_fd(int fd) +{ +#ifdef USE_LIBSECCOMP + sigsys_set_debugging_fd(fd); +#else + (void)fd; +#endif +} + +#ifndef USE_LIBSECCOMP +int +sandbox_cfg_allow_open_filename(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, char *file, + int fr) +{ + (void)cfg; (void)file; (void)fr; + return 0; +} + +int +sandbox_cfg_allow_open_filename_array(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, ...) +{ + (void)cfg; + return 0; +} + +int +sandbox_cfg_allow_openat_filename(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, char *file, + int fr) +{ + (void)cfg; (void)file; (void)fr; + return 0; +} + +int +sandbox_cfg_allow_openat_filename_array(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, ...) +{ + (void)cfg; + return 0; +} + +int +sandbox_cfg_allow_execve(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, const char *com) +{ + (void)cfg; (void)com; + return 0; +} + +int +sandbox_cfg_allow_execve_array(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, ...) +{ + (void)cfg; + return 0; +} + +int +sandbox_cfg_allow_stat_filename(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, char *file, + int fr) +{ + (void)cfg; (void)file; (void)fr; + return 0; +} + +int +sandbox_cfg_allow_stat_filename_array(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, ...) +{ + (void)cfg; + return 0; +} +#endif + diff --git a/src/common/sandbox.h b/src/common/sandbox.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1d39be409 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/common/sandbox.h @@ -0,0 +1,250 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2013, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file sandbox.h + * \brief Header file for sandbox.c. + **/ + +#ifndef SANDBOX_H_ +#define SANDBOX_H_ + +#include "orconfig.h" +#include "torint.h" + +#ifndef SYS_SECCOMP + +/** + * Used by SIGSYS signal handler to check if the signal was issued due to a + * seccomp2 filter violation. + */ +#define SYS_SECCOMP 1 + +#endif + +#if defined(HAVE_SECCOMP_H) && defined(__linux__) +#define USE_LIBSECCOMP +#endif + +struct sandbox_cfg_elem; + +/** Typedef to structure used to manage a sandbox configuration. */ +typedef struct sandbox_cfg_elem sandbox_cfg_t; + +/** + * Linux definitions + */ +#ifdef USE_LIBSECCOMP + +#ifndef __USE_GNU +#define __USE_GNU +#endif +#include <sys/ucontext.h> +#include <seccomp.h> +#include <netdb.h> + +#define PARAM_PTR 0 +#define PARAM_NUM 1 + +/** + * Enum used to manage the type of the implementation for general purpose. + */ +typedef enum { + /** Libseccomp implementation based on seccomp2*/ + LIBSECCOMP2 = 0 +} SB_IMPL; + +/** + * Configuration parameter structure associated with the LIBSECCOMP2 + * implementation. + */ +typedef struct smp_param { + /** syscall associated with parameter. */ + int syscall; + + /** parameter index. */ + int pindex; + /** parameter value. */ + intptr_t value; + + /** parameter flag (0 = not protected, 1 = protected). */ + int prot; +} smp_param_t; + +/** + * Structure used to manage a sandbox configuration. + * + * It is implemented as a linked list of parameters. Currently only controls + * parameters for open, openat, execve, stat64. + */ +struct sandbox_cfg_elem { + /** Sandbox implementation which dictates the parameter type. */ + SB_IMPL implem; + + /** Configuration parameter. */ + void *param; + + /** Next element of the configuration*/ + struct sandbox_cfg_elem *next; +}; + +/** + * Structure used for keeping a linked list of getaddrinfo pre-recorded + * results. + */ +struct sb_addr_info_el { + /** Name of the address info result. */ + char *name; + /** Pre-recorded getaddrinfo result. */ + struct addrinfo *info; + /** Next element in the list. */ + struct sb_addr_info_el *next; +}; +/** Typedef to structure used to manage an addrinfo list. */ +typedef struct sb_addr_info_el sb_addr_info_t; + +/** Function pointer defining the prototype of a filter function.*/ +typedef int (*sandbox_filter_func_t)(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, + sandbox_cfg_t *filter); + +/** Type that will be used in step 3 in order to manage multiple sandboxes.*/ +typedef struct { + /** function pointers associated with the filter */ + sandbox_filter_func_t *filter_func; + + /** filter function pointer parameters */ + sandbox_cfg_t *filter_dynamic; +} sandbox_t; + +/** + * Linux 32 bit definitions + */ +#if defined(__i386__) + +#define REG_SYSCALL REG_EAX + +/** + * Linux 64 bit definitions + */ +#elif defined(__x86_64__) + +#define REG_SYSCALL REG_RAX + +#endif + +#endif // USE_LIBSECCOMP + +#ifdef USE_LIBSECCOMP +/** Pre-calls getaddrinfo in order to pre-record result. */ +int sandbox_add_addrinfo(const char *addr); + +struct addrinfo; +/** Replacement for getaddrinfo(), using pre-recorded results. */ +int sandbox_getaddrinfo(const char *name, const char *servname, + const struct addrinfo *hints, + struct addrinfo **res); +#else +#define sandbox_getaddrinfo(name, servname, hints, res) \ + getaddrinfo((name),(servname), (hints),(res)) +#define sandbox_add_addrinfo(name) \ + ((void)(name)) +#endif + +/** Use <b>fd</b> to log non-survivable sandbox violations. */ +void sandbox_set_debugging_fd(int fd); + +#ifdef USE_LIBSECCOMP +/** Returns a registered protected string used with the sandbox, given that + * it matches the parameter. + */ +const char* sandbox_intern_string(const char *param); +#else +#define sandbox_intern_string(s) (s) +#endif + +/** Creates an empty sandbox configuration file.*/ +sandbox_cfg_t * sandbox_cfg_new(void); + +/** + * Function used to add a open allowed filename to a supplied configuration. + * The (char*) specifies the path to the allowed file, fr = 1 tells the + * function that the char* needs to be free-ed, 0 means the pointer does not + * need to be free-ed. + */ +int sandbox_cfg_allow_open_filename(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, char *file, + int fr); + +/** Function used to add a series of open allowed filenames to a supplied + * configuration. + * @param cfg sandbox configuration. + * @param ... all future parameters are specified as pairs of <(char*), 1 / 0> + * the char* specifies the path to the allowed file, 1 tells the function + * that the char* needs to be free-ed, 0 means the pointer does not need to + * be free-ed; the final parameter needs to be <NULL, 0>. + */ +int sandbox_cfg_allow_open_filename_array(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, ...); + +/** + * Function used to add a openat allowed filename to a supplied configuration. + * The (char*) specifies the path to the allowed file, fr = 1 tells the + * function that the char* needs to be free-ed, 0 means the pointer does not + * need to be free-ed. + */ +int sandbox_cfg_allow_openat_filename(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, char *file, + int fr); + +/** Function used to add a series of openat allowed filenames to a supplied + * configuration. + * @param cfg sandbox configuration. + * @param ... all future parameters are specified as pairs of <(char*), 1 / 0> + * the char* specifies the path to the allowed file, 1 tells the function + * that the char* needs to be free-ed, 0 means the pointer does not need to + * be free-ed; the final parameter needs to be <NULL, 0>. + */ +int sandbox_cfg_allow_openat_filename_array(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, ...); + +/** + * Function used to add a execve allowed filename to a supplied configuration. + * The (char*) specifies the path to the allowed file, fr = 1 tells the + * function that the char* needs to be free-ed, 0 means the pointer does not + * need to be free-ed. + */ +int sandbox_cfg_allow_execve(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, const char *com); + +/** Function used to add a series of execve allowed filenames to a supplied + * configuration. + * @param cfg sandbox configuration. + * @param ... all future parameters are specified as pairs of <(char*), 1 / 0> + * the char* specifies the path to the allowed file, 1 tells the function + * that the char* needs to be free-ed, 0 means the pointer does not need to + * be free-ed; the final parameter needs to be <NULL, 0>. + */ +int sandbox_cfg_allow_execve_array(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, ...); + +/** + * Function used to add a stat/stat64 allowed filename to a configuration. + * The (char*) specifies the path to the allowed file, fr = 1 tells the + * function that the char* needs to be free-ed, 0 means the pointer does not + * need to be free-ed. + */ +int sandbox_cfg_allow_stat_filename(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, char *file, + int fr); + +/** Function used to add a series of stat64 allowed filenames to a supplied + * configuration. + * @param cfg sandbox configuration. + * @param ... all future parameters are specified as pairs of <(char*), 1 / 0> + * the char* specifies the path to the allowed file, 1 tells the function + * that the char* needs to be free-ed, 0 means the pointer does not need to + * be free-ed; the final parameter needs to be <NULL, 0>. + */ +int sandbox_cfg_allow_stat_filename_array(sandbox_cfg_t **cfg, ...); + +/** Function used to initialise a sandbox configuration.*/ +int sandbox_init(sandbox_cfg_t* cfg); + +#endif /* SANDBOX_H_ */ + diff --git a/src/common/testsupport.h b/src/common/testsupport.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4a4f50b69 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/common/testsupport.h @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2013, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#ifndef TOR_TESTSUPPORT_H +#define TOR_TESTSUPPORT_H + +#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS +#define STATIC +#else +#define STATIC static +#endif + +/** Quick and dirty macros to implement test mocking. + * + * To use them, suppose that you have a function you'd like to mock + * with the signature "void writebuf(size_t n, char *buf)". You can then + * declare the function as: + * + * MOCK_DECL(void, writebuf, (size_t n, char *buf)); + * + * and implement it as: + * + * MOCK_IMPL(void + * writebuf,(size_t n, char *buf) + * { + * ... + * } + * + * For the non-testing build, this will expand simply into: + * + * void writebuf(size_t n, char *buf); + * void + * writebuf(size_t n, char *buf) + * { + * ... + * } + * + * But for the testing case, it will expand into: + * + * void writebuf__real(size_t n, char *buf); + * extern void (*writebuf)(size_t n, char *buf); + * + * void (*writebuf)(size_t n, char *buf) = writebuf__real; + * void + * writebuf__real(size_t n, char *buf) + * { + * ... + * } + * + * This is not a great mocking system! It is deliberately "the simplest + * thing that could work", and pays for its simplicity in its lack of + * features, and in its uglification of the Tor code. Replacing it with + * something clever would be a fine thing. + * + * @{ */ +#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS +#define MOCK_DECL(rv, funcname, arglist) \ + rv funcname ##__real arglist; \ + extern rv(*funcname) arglist +#define MOCK_IMPL(rv, funcname, arglist) \ + rv(*funcname) arglist = funcname ##__real; \ + rv funcname ##__real arglist +#define MOCK(func, replacement) \ + do { \ + (func) = (replacement); \ + } while (0) +#define UNMOCK(func) \ + do { \ + func = func ##__real; \ + } while (0) +#else +#define MOCK_DECL(rv, funcname, arglist) \ + rv funcname arglist +#define MOCK_IMPL(rv, funcname, arglist) \ + rv funcname arglist +#endif +/** @} */ + +#endif + diff --git a/src/common/torgzip.c b/src/common/torgzip.c index 4328c63c8..15451ee30 100644 --- a/src/common/torgzip.c +++ b/src/common/torgzip.c @@ -68,6 +68,22 @@ is_gzip_supported(void) return gzip_is_supported; } +/** Return a string representation of the version of the currently running + * version of zlib. */ +const char * +tor_zlib_get_version_str(void) +{ + return zlibVersion(); +} + +/** Return a string representation of the version of the version of zlib +* used at compilation. */ +const char * +tor_zlib_get_header_version_str(void) +{ + return ZLIB_VERSION; +} + /** Return the 'bits' value to tell zlib to use <b>method</b>.*/ static INLINE int method_bits(compress_method_t method) diff --git a/src/common/torgzip.h b/src/common/torgzip.h index be1016445..5db03fe6e 100644 --- a/src/common/torgzip.h +++ b/src/common/torgzip.h @@ -32,6 +32,12 @@ tor_gzip_uncompress(char **out, size_t *out_len, int is_gzip_supported(void); +const char * +tor_zlib_get_version_str(void); + +const char * +tor_zlib_get_header_version_str(void); + compress_method_t detect_compression_method(const char *in, size_t in_len); /** Return values from tor_zlib_process; see that function's documentation for diff --git a/src/common/torlog.h b/src/common/torlog.h index 8675d7b6e..ecd7e121e 100644 --- a/src/common/torlog.h +++ b/src/common/torlog.h @@ -114,12 +114,6 @@ typedef struct log_severity_list_t { log_domain_mask_t masks[LOG_DEBUG-LOG_ERR+1]; } log_severity_list_t; -#ifdef LOG_PRIVATE -/** Given a severity, yields an index into log_severity_list_t.masks to use - * for that severity. */ -#define SEVERITY_MASK_IDX(sev) ((sev) - LOG_ERR) -#endif - /** Callback type used for add_callback_log. */ typedef void (*log_callback)(int severity, uint32_t domain, const char *msg); @@ -142,6 +136,7 @@ int get_min_log_level(void); void switch_logs_debug(void); void logs_free_all(void); void add_temp_log(int min_severity); +int get_err_logging_fd(void); void close_temp_logs(void); void rollback_log_changes(void); void mark_logs_temp(void); diff --git a/src/common/tortls.c b/src/common/tortls.c index 60444f1b8..5aee664b8 100644 --- a/src/common/tortls.c +++ b/src/common/tortls.c @@ -48,9 +48,6 @@ #include "compat_libevent.h" #endif -#define CRYPTO_PRIVATE /* to import prototypes from crypto.h */ -#define TORTLS_PRIVATE - #include "crypto.h" #include "tortls.h" #include "util.h" @@ -806,24 +803,24 @@ tor_cert_new(X509 *x509_cert) tor_cert_t *cert; EVP_PKEY *pkey; RSA *rsa; - int length, length2; - unsigned char *cp; + int length; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; if (!x509_cert) return NULL; - length = i2d_X509(x509_cert, NULL); + length = i2d_X509(x509_cert, &buf); cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_cert_t)); - if (length <= 0) { + if (length <= 0 || buf == NULL) { tor_free(cert); log_err(LD_CRYPTO, "Couldn't get length of encoded x509 certificate"); X509_free(x509_cert); return NULL; } cert->encoded_len = (size_t) length; - cp = cert->encoded = tor_malloc(length); - length2 = i2d_X509(x509_cert, &cp); - tor_assert(length2 == length); + cert->encoded = tor_malloc(length); + memcpy(cert->encoded, buf, length); + OPENSSL_free(buf); cert->cert = x509_cert; @@ -979,31 +976,6 @@ tor_tls_cert_get_key(tor_cert_t *cert) return result; } -/** Return true iff <b>a</b> and <b>b</b> represent the same public key. */ -static int -pkey_eq(EVP_PKEY *a, EVP_PKEY *b) -{ - /* We'd like to do this, but openssl 0.9.7 doesn't have it: - return EVP_PKEY_cmp(a,b) == 1; - */ - unsigned char *a_enc=NULL, *b_enc=NULL, *a_ptr, *b_ptr; - int a_len1, b_len1, a_len2, b_len2, result; - a_len1 = i2d_PublicKey(a, NULL); - b_len1 = i2d_PublicKey(b, NULL); - if (a_len1 != b_len1) - return 0; - a_ptr = a_enc = tor_malloc(a_len1); - b_ptr = b_enc = tor_malloc(b_len1); - a_len2 = i2d_PublicKey(a, &a_ptr); - b_len2 = i2d_PublicKey(b, &b_ptr); - tor_assert(a_len2 == a_len1); - tor_assert(b_len2 == b_len1); - result = tor_memeq(a_enc, b_enc, a_len1); - tor_free(a_enc); - tor_free(b_enc); - return result; -} - /** Return true iff the other side of <b>tls</b> has authenticated to us, and * the key certified in <b>cert</b> is the same as the key they used to do it. */ @@ -1019,7 +991,7 @@ tor_tls_cert_matches_key(const tor_tls_t *tls, const tor_cert_t *cert) link_key = X509_get_pubkey(peercert); cert_key = X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert); - result = link_key && cert_key && pkey_eq(cert_key, link_key); + result = link_key && cert_key && EVP_PKEY_cmp(cert_key, link_key) == 1; X509_free(peercert); if (link_key) diff --git a/src/common/util.c b/src/common/util.c index 5eb0f9a69..0771c9424 100644 --- a/src/common/util.c +++ b/src/common/util.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include "torint.h" #include "container.h" #include "address.h" +#include "../common/sandbox.h" #ifdef _WIN32 #include <io.h> @@ -879,6 +880,39 @@ tor_digest_is_zero(const char *digest) return tor_memeq(digest, ZERO_DIGEST, DIGEST_LEN); } +/** Return true if <b>string</b> is a valid '<key>=[<value>]' string. + * <value> is optional, to indicate the empty string. Log at logging + * <b>severity</b> if something ugly happens. */ +int +string_is_key_value(int severity, const char *string) +{ + /* position of equal sign in string */ + const char *equal_sign_pos = NULL; + + tor_assert(string); + + if (strlen(string) < 2) { /* "x=" is shortest args string */ + tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, "'%s' is too short to be a k=v value.", + escaped(string)); + return 0; + } + + equal_sign_pos = strchr(string, '='); + if (!equal_sign_pos) { + tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, "'%s' is not a k=v value.", escaped(string)); + return 0; + } + + /* validate that the '=' is not in the beginning of the string. */ + if (equal_sign_pos == string) { + tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, "'%s' is not a valid k=v value.", + escaped(string)); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + /** Return true iff the DIGEST256_LEN bytes in digest are all zero. */ int tor_digest256_is_zero(const char *digest) @@ -1190,6 +1224,43 @@ escaped(const char *s) return escaped_val_; } +/** Return a newly allocated string equal to <b>string</b>, except that every + * character in <b>chars_to_escape</b> is preceded by a backslash. */ +char * +tor_escape_str_for_pt_args(const char *string, const char *chars_to_escape) +{ + char *new_string = NULL; + char *new_cp = NULL; + size_t length, new_length; + + tor_assert(string); + + length = strlen(string); + + if (!length) /* If we were given the empty string, return the same. */ + return tor_strdup(""); + /* (new_length > SIZE_MAX) => ((length * 2) + 1 > SIZE_MAX) => + (length*2 > SIZE_MAX - 1) => (length > (SIZE_MAX - 1)/2) */ + if (length > (SIZE_MAX - 1)/2) /* check for overflow */ + return NULL; + + /* this should be enough even if all characters must be escaped */ + new_length = (length * 2) + 1; + + new_string = new_cp = tor_malloc(new_length); + + while (*string) { + if (strchr(chars_to_escape, *string)) + *new_cp++ = '\\'; + + *new_cp++ = *string++; + } + + *new_cp = '\0'; /* NUL-terminate the new string */ + + return new_string; +} + /* ===== * Time * ===== */ @@ -1741,7 +1812,7 @@ file_status(const char *fname) int r; f = tor_strdup(fname); clean_name_for_stat(f); - r = stat(f, &st); + r = stat(sandbox_intern_string(f), &st); tor_free(f); if (r) { if (errno == ENOENT) { @@ -1791,7 +1862,7 @@ check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check, tor_assert(dirname); f = tor_strdup(dirname); clean_name_for_stat(f); - r = stat(f, &st); + r = stat(sandbox_intern_string(f), &st); tor_free(f); if (r) { if (errno != ENOENT) { @@ -2132,12 +2203,20 @@ write_chunks_to_file_impl(const char *fname, const smartlist_t *chunks, return -1; } -/** Given a smartlist of sized_chunk_t, write them atomically to a file - * <b>fname</b>, overwriting or creating the file as necessary. */ +/** Given a smartlist of sized_chunk_t, write them to a file + * <b>fname</b>, overwriting or creating the file as necessary. + * If <b>no_tempfile</b> is 0 then the file will be written + * atomically. */ int -write_chunks_to_file(const char *fname, const smartlist_t *chunks, int bin) +write_chunks_to_file(const char *fname, const smartlist_t *chunks, int bin, + int no_tempfile) { int flags = OPEN_FLAGS_REPLACE|(bin?O_BINARY:O_TEXT); + + if (no_tempfile) { + /* O_APPEND stops write_chunks_to_file from using tempfiles */ + flags |= O_APPEND; + } return write_chunks_to_file_impl(fname, chunks, flags); } @@ -2158,9 +2237,9 @@ write_bytes_to_file_impl(const char *fname, const char *str, size_t len, /** As write_str_to_file, but does not assume a NUL-terminated * string. Instead, we write <b>len</b> bytes, starting at <b>str</b>. */ -int -write_bytes_to_file(const char *fname, const char *str, size_t len, - int bin) +MOCK_IMPL(int, +write_bytes_to_file,(const char *fname, const char *str, size_t len, + int bin)) { return write_bytes_to_file_impl(fname, str, len, OPEN_FLAGS_REPLACE|(bin?O_BINARY:O_TEXT)); @@ -3022,9 +3101,10 @@ tor_listdir(const char *dirname) FindClose(handle); tor_free(pattern); #else + const char *prot_dname = sandbox_intern_string(dirname); DIR *d; struct dirent *de; - if (!(d = opendir(dirname))) + if (!(d = opendir(prot_dname))) return NULL; result = smartlist_new(); @@ -3321,13 +3401,13 @@ tor_join_win_cmdline(const char *argv[]) } /** - * Helper function to output hex numbers, called by - * format_helper_exit_status(). This writes the hexadecimal digits of x into - * buf, up to max_len digits, and returns the actual number of digits written. - * If there is insufficient space, it will write nothing and return 0. + * Helper function to output hex numbers from within a signal handler. + * + * Writes the nul-terminated hexadecimal digits of <b>x</b> into a buffer + * <b>buf</b> of size <b>buf_len</b>, and return the actual number of digits + * written, not counting the terminal NUL. * - * This function DOES NOT add a terminating NUL character to its output: be - * careful! + * If there is insufficient space, write nothing and return 0. * * This accepts an unsigned int because format_helper_exit_status() needs to * call it with a signed int and an unsigned char, and since the C standard @@ -3342,15 +3422,14 @@ tor_join_win_cmdline(const char *argv[]) * arbitrary C functions. */ int -format_hex_number_for_helper_exit_status(unsigned int x, char *buf, - int max_len) +format_hex_number_sigsafe(unsigned int x, char *buf, int buf_len) { int len; unsigned int tmp; char *cur; /* Sanity check */ - if (!buf || max_len <= 0) + if (!buf || buf_len <= 1) return 0; /* How many chars do we need for x? */ @@ -3366,7 +3445,7 @@ format_hex_number_for_helper_exit_status(unsigned int x, char *buf, } /* Bail if we would go past the end of the buffer */ - if (len > max_len) + if (len+1 > buf_len) return 0; /* Point to last one */ @@ -3378,10 +3457,13 @@ format_hex_number_for_helper_exit_status(unsigned int x, char *buf, x >>= 4; } while (x != 0 && cur >= buf); + buf[len] = '\0'; + /* Return len */ return len; } +#ifndef _WIN32 /** Format <b>child_state</b> and <b>saved_errno</b> as a hex string placed in * <b>hex_errno</b>. Called between fork and _exit, so must be signal-handler * safe. @@ -3397,7 +3479,7 @@ format_hex_number_for_helper_exit_status(unsigned int x, char *buf, * On success return the number of characters added to hex_errno, not counting * the terminating NUL; return -1 on error. */ -int +STATIC int format_helper_exit_status(unsigned char child_state, int saved_errno, char *hex_errno) { @@ -3428,8 +3510,8 @@ format_helper_exit_status(unsigned char child_state, int saved_errno, cur = hex_errno; /* Emit child_state */ - written = format_hex_number_for_helper_exit_status(child_state, - cur, left); + written = format_hex_number_sigsafe(child_state, cur, left); + if (written <= 0) goto err; @@ -3458,8 +3540,7 @@ format_helper_exit_status(unsigned char child_state, int saved_errno, } /* Emit unsigned_errno */ - written = format_hex_number_for_helper_exit_status(unsigned_errno, - cur, left); + written = format_hex_number_sigsafe(unsigned_errno, cur, left); if (written <= 0) goto err; @@ -3490,6 +3571,7 @@ format_helper_exit_status(unsigned char child_state, int saved_errno, done: return res; } +#endif /* Maximum number of file descriptors, if we cannot get it via sysconf() */ #define DEFAULT_MAX_FD 256 @@ -3906,9 +3988,9 @@ tor_spawn_background(const char *const filename, const char **argv, * <b>process_handle</b>. * If <b>also_terminate_process</b> is true, also terminate the * process of the process handle. */ -void -tor_process_handle_destroy(process_handle_t *process_handle, - int also_terminate_process) +MOCK_IMPL(void, +tor_process_handle_destroy,(process_handle_t *process_handle, + int also_terminate_process)) { if (!process_handle) return; @@ -4417,9 +4499,9 @@ stream_status_to_string(enum stream_status stream_status) /** Return a smartlist containing lines outputted from * <b>handle</b>. Return NULL on error, and set * <b>stream_status_out</b> appropriately. */ -smartlist_t * -tor_get_lines_from_handle(HANDLE *handle, - enum stream_status *stream_status_out) +MOCK_IMPL(smartlist_t *, +tor_get_lines_from_handle, (HANDLE *handle, + enum stream_status *stream_status_out)) { int pos; char stdout_buf[600] = {0}; @@ -4507,8 +4589,9 @@ log_from_handle(HANDLE *pipe, int severity) /** Return a smartlist containing lines outputted from * <b>handle</b>. Return NULL on error, and set * <b>stream_status_out</b> appropriately. */ -smartlist_t * -tor_get_lines_from_handle(FILE *handle, enum stream_status *stream_status_out) +MOCK_IMPL(smartlist_t *, +tor_get_lines_from_handle, (FILE *handle, + enum stream_status *stream_status_out)) { enum stream_status stream_status; char stdout_buf[400]; diff --git a/src/common/util.h b/src/common/util.h index 73daa6e2a..3199ab112 100644 --- a/src/common/util.h +++ b/src/common/util.h @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include "torint.h" #include "compat.h" #include "di_ops.h" +#include "testsupport.h" #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #ifdef _WIN32 @@ -222,23 +223,22 @@ const char *find_whitespace_eos(const char *s, const char *eos); const char *find_str_at_start_of_line(const char *haystack, const char *needle); int string_is_C_identifier(const char *string); +int string_is_key_value(int severity, const char *string); int tor_mem_is_zero(const char *mem, size_t len); int tor_digest_is_zero(const char *digest); int tor_digest256_is_zero(const char *digest); char *esc_for_log(const char *string) ATTR_MALLOC; const char *escaped(const char *string); + +char *tor_escape_str_for_pt_args(const char *string, + const char *chars_to_escape); + struct smartlist_t; -int tor_vsscanf(const char *buf, const char *pattern, va_list ap) -#ifdef __GNUC__ - __attribute__((format(scanf, 2, 0))) -#endif - ; +int tor_vsscanf(const char *buf, const char *pattern, va_list ap) \ + CHECK_SCANF(2, 0); int tor_sscanf(const char *buf, const char *pattern, ...) -#ifdef __GNUC__ - __attribute__((format(scanf, 2, 3))) -#endif - ; + CHECK_SCANF(2, 3); void smartlist_add_asprintf(struct smartlist_t *sl, const char *pattern, ...) CHECK_PRINTF(2, 3); @@ -356,8 +356,9 @@ FILE *fdopen_file(open_file_t *file_data); int finish_writing_to_file(open_file_t *file_data); int abort_writing_to_file(open_file_t *file_data); int write_str_to_file(const char *fname, const char *str, int bin); -int write_bytes_to_file(const char *fname, const char *str, size_t len, - int bin); +MOCK_DECL(int, +write_bytes_to_file,(const char *fname, const char *str, size_t len, + int bin)); /** An ad-hoc type to hold a string of characters and a count; used by * write_chunks_to_file. */ typedef struct sized_chunk_t { @@ -365,7 +366,7 @@ typedef struct sized_chunk_t { size_t len; } sized_chunk_t; int write_chunks_to_file(const char *fname, const struct smartlist_t *chunks, - int bin); + int bin, int no_tempfile); int append_bytes_to_file(const char *fname, const char *str, size_t len, int bin); int write_bytes_to_new_file(const char *fname, const char *str, size_t len, @@ -493,18 +494,21 @@ FILE *tor_process_get_stdout_pipe(process_handle_t *process_handle); #endif #ifdef _WIN32 -struct smartlist_t * -tor_get_lines_from_handle(HANDLE *handle, - enum stream_status *stream_status); +MOCK_DECL(struct smartlist_t *, +tor_get_lines_from_handle,(HANDLE *handle, + enum stream_status *stream_status)); #else -struct smartlist_t * -tor_get_lines_from_handle(FILE *handle, - enum stream_status *stream_status); +MOCK_DECL(struct smartlist_t *, +tor_get_lines_from_handle,(FILE *handle, + enum stream_status *stream_status)); #endif -int tor_terminate_process(process_handle_t *process_handle); -void tor_process_handle_destroy(process_handle_t *process_handle, - int also_terminate_process); +int +tor_terminate_process(process_handle_t *process_handle); + +MOCK_DECL(void, +tor_process_handle_destroy,(process_handle_t *process_handle, + int also_terminate_process)); /* ===== Insecure rng */ typedef struct tor_weak_rng_t { @@ -520,12 +524,13 @@ int32_t tor_weak_random_range(tor_weak_rng_t *rng, int32_t top); * <b>n</b> */ #define tor_weak_random_one_in_n(rng, n) (0==tor_weak_random_range((rng),(n))) +int format_hex_number_sigsafe(unsigned int x, char *buf, int max_len); + #ifdef UTIL_PRIVATE /* Prototypes for private functions only used by util.c (and unit tests) */ -int format_hex_number_for_helper_exit_status(unsigned int x, char *buf, - int max_len); -int format_helper_exit_status(unsigned char child_state, +#ifndef _WIN32 +STATIC int format_helper_exit_status(unsigned char child_state, int saved_errno, char *hex_errno); /* Space for hex values of child state, a slash, saved_errno (with @@ -534,7 +539,11 @@ int format_helper_exit_status(unsigned char child_state, 1 + sizeof(int) * 2 + 1) #endif +#endif + const char *libor_get_digests(void); +#define ARRAY_LENGTH(x) (sizeof(x)) / sizeof(x[0]) + #endif diff --git a/src/config/deanonymind.py b/src/config/deanonymind.py index c86dadca9..31d0658ee 100755 --- a/src/config/deanonymind.py +++ b/src/config/deanonymind.py @@ -156,23 +156,34 @@ def apply_manual_changes(assignments, manual_assignments): entry['end_num'] == manual_entry['end_num']: if len(manual_entry['country_code']) != 2: print '-%s' % (line, ) # only remove, don't replace - else: + del manual_dict[start_num] + elif entry['country_code'] != \ + manual_entry['country_code']: new_line = format_line_with_other_country(entry, manual_entry) print '-%s\n+%s' % (line, new_line, ) result.append(new_line) - del manual_dict[start_num] + del manual_dict[start_num] + else: + print ('Warning: not applying ineffective manual ' + 'change:\n %s\n %s' % (line, manual_line, )) + result.append(line) else: - print ('Warning: only partial match between ' - 'original/automatically replaced assignment and ' - 'manual assignment:\n %s\n %s\nNot applying ' - 'manual change.' % (line, manual_line, )) + print ('Warning: not applying manual change that is only ' + 'a partial match:\n %s\n %s' % + (line, manual_line, )) result.append(line) + elif 'country_code' in entry and \ + entry['country_code'] == 'A1': + print ('Warning: no manual replacement for A1 entry:\n %s' + % (line, )) + result.append(line) else: result.append(line) if len(manual_dict) > 0: - print ('Warning: could not apply all manual assignments: %s' % - ('\n '.join(manual_dict.values())), ) + print 'Warning: could not apply all manual assignments:' + for line in manual_dict.values(): + print ' %s' % (line, ) return result def write_file(path, assignments, long_format=True): diff --git a/src/config/geoip-manual b/src/config/geoip-manual index 99c897ff4..d51a12a1c 100644 --- a/src/config/geoip-manual +++ b/src/config/geoip-manual @@ -3,22 +3,11 @@ # directory to process this file when producing a new geoip file. See # README.geoip in the same directory for details. -# Remove MaxMind entry 0.116.0.0-0.119.255.255 which MaxMind says is AT, -# but which is part of reserved range 0.0.0.0/8. -KL 2012-06-13 -# Disabled, because MaxMind apparently removed this range from their -# database. -KL 2013-02-08 -#"0.116.0.0","0.119.255.255","7602176","7864319","","" - -# NL, because previous MaxMind entry 31.171.128.0-31.171.133.255 is NL, -# and RIR delegation files say 31.171.128.0-31.171.135.255 is NL. -# -KL 2012-11-27 -"31.171.134.0","31.171.135.255","531334656","531335167","NL","Netherlands" - -# EU, because next MaxMind entry 37.139.64.1-37.139.64.9 is EU, because -# RIR delegation files say 37.139.64.0-37.139.71.255 is EU, and because it -# just makes more sense for the next entry to start at .0 and not .1. -# -KL 2012-11-27 -"37.139.64.0","37.139.64.0","629882880","629882880","EU","Europe" +# GB, because RIR delegation files say exactly this range +# 46.16.32.0-46.16.39.255 is GB, even though neither previous nor next +# MaxMind range is GB. Both previous and next MaxMind ranges match RIR +# delegation files, too. -KL 2013-03-07 +"46.16.32.0","46.16.39.255","772808704","772810751","GB","United Kingdom" # CH, because previous MaxMind entry 46.19.141.0-46.19.142.255 is CH, and # RIR delegation files say 46.19.136.0-46.19.143.255 is CH. @@ -30,23 +19,6 @@ # -KL 2012-11-27 "46.166.128.0","46.166.128.255","782663680","782663935","GB","United Kingdom" -# US, though could as well be CA. Previous MaxMind entry -# 64.237.32.52-64.237.34.127 is US, next MaxMind entry -# 64.237.34.144-64.237.34.151 is CA, and RIR delegation files say the -# entire block 64.237.32.0-64.237.63.255 is US. -KL 2012-11-27 -"64.237.34.128","64.237.34.143","1089282688","1089282703","US","United States" - -# US, though could as well be UY. Previous MaxMind entry -# 67.15.170.0-67.15.182.255 is US, next MaxMind entry -# 67.15.183.128-67.15.183.159 is UY, and RIR delegation files say the -# entire block 67.15.0.0-67.15.255.255 is US. -KL 2012-11-27 -"67.15.183.0","67.15.183.127","1125103360","1125103487","US","United States" - -# US, because next MaxMind entry 67.43.145.0-67.43.155.255 is US, and RIR -# delegation files say 67.43.144.0-67.43.159.255 is US. -# -KL 2012-11-27 -"67.43.144.0","67.43.144.255","1126928384","1126928639","US","United States" - # US, because previous MaxMind entry 70.159.21.51-70.232.244.255 is US, # because next MaxMind entry 70.232.245.58-70.232.245.59 is A2 ("Satellite # Provider") which is a country information about as useless as A1, and @@ -66,45 +38,37 @@ # MaxMind entry and say GB for 91.228.0.0-91.228.3.255. -KL 2012-11-27 "91.228.0.0","91.228.3.255","1541668864","1541669887","GB","United Kingdom" -# GB, because next MaxMind entry 91.232.125.0-91.232.125.255 is GB, and -# RIR delegation files say 91.232.124.0-91.232.125.255 is GB. -# -KL 2012-11-27 -"91.232.124.0","91.232.124.255","1541962752","1541963007","GB","United Kingdom" - -# GB, despite neither previous (RU) nor next (PL) MaxMind entry being GB, -# but because RIR delegation files agree with both previous and next -# MaxMind entry and say GB for 91.238.214.0-91.238.215.255. -# -KL 2012-11-27 -"91.238.214.0","91.238.215.255","1542379008","1542379519","GB","United Kingdom" - -# US, because next MaxMind entry 173.0.16.0-173.0.65.255 is US, and RIR -# delegation files say 173.0.0.0-173.0.15.255 is US. -KL 2012-11-27 -"173.0.0.0","173.0.15.255","2902458368","2902462463","US","United States" - -# US, because next MaxMind entry 176.67.84.0-176.67.84.79 is US, and RIR -# delegation files say 176.67.80.0-176.67.87.255 is US. -KL 2012-11-27 -"176.67.80.0","176.67.83.255","2957201408","2957202431","US","United States" - -# US, because previous MaxMind entry 176.67.84.192-176.67.85.255 is US, -# and RIR delegation files say 176.67.80.0-176.67.87.255 is US. -# -KL 2012-11-27 -"176.67.86.0","176.67.87.255","2957202944","2957203455","US","United States" - -# EU, despite neither previous (RU) nor next (UA) MaxMind entry being EU, -# but because RIR delegation files agree with both previous and next -# MaxMind entry and say EU for 193.200.150.0-193.200.150.255. -# -KL 2012-11-27 -"193.200.150.0","193.200.150.255","3251148288","3251148543","EU","Europe" - -# US, because previous MaxMind entry 199.96.68.0-199.96.87.127 is US, and -# RIR delegation files say 199.96.80.0-199.96.87.255 is US. -# -KL 2012-11-27 -"199.96.87.128","199.96.87.255","3344979840","3344979967","US","United States" - -# US, because previous MaxMind entry 209.58.176.144-209.59.31.255 is US, -# and RIR delegation files say 209.59.32.0-209.59.63.255 is US. -# -KL 2012-11-27 -"209.59.32.0","209.59.63.255","3510312960","3510321151","US","United States" +# NL, because next MaxMind entry 176.56.173.0-176.56.173.63 is NL, and RIR +# delegation files say 176.56.160.0-176.56.191.255 is NL. -KL 2013-05-13 +"176.56.172.0","176.56.172.255","2956504064","2956504319","NL","Netherlands" + +# NL, despite neither previous (RU) nor next (GB) MaxMind entry being NL, +# but because RIR delegation files say entire range +# 176.56.160.0-176.56.191.255 is NL. -KL 2013-05-13 +"176.56.174.0","176.56.174.255","2956504576","2956504831","NL","Netherlands" + +# GB, because RIR delegation files say exactly this range +# 185.25.84.0-185.25.87.255 is GB, even though neither previous nor next +# MaxMind range is GB. Both previous and next MaxMind ranges match RIR +# delegation files, too. -KL 2013-05-13 +"185.25.84.0","185.25.87.255","3105444864","3105445887","GB","United Kingdom" + +# US, because next MaxMind entry 199.101.193.0-199.101.195.255 is US, and, +# together with next entries, matches RIR delegation file entry +# 199.101.192.0-199.101.199.255 which is US. -KL 2013-05-13 +"199.101.192.0","199.101.192.255","3345334272","3345334527","US","United States" + +# US, because ARIN says 199.255.208.0-199.255.215.255 is US. +# Changed entry start from 199.255.213.0 to 199.255.208.0 on 2013-08-12. +# Split up into 199.255.208.0-199.255.209.127 and +# 199.255.210.0-199.255.215.255 on 2013-10-11. -KL 2013-10-11 +"199.255.208.0","199.255.209.127","3355430912","3355431295","US","United States" +"199.255.210.0","199.255.215.255","3355431424","3355432959","US","United States" + +# EU, despite neither previous (RU) nor next (SE) MaxMind entry being EU, +# but because RIR delegation files agree with previous MaxMind entry and +# say EU for 217.15.160.0-217.15.175.255. -KL 2013-05-13 +"217.15.160.0","217.15.164.255","3641679872","3641681151","EU","Europe" # FR, because previous MaxMind entry 217.15.166.0-217.15.166.255 is FR, # and RIR delegation files contain a block 217.15.160.0-217.15.175.255 diff --git a/src/config/torrc.sample.in b/src/config/torrc.sample.in index c667efc5c..d842fbcaf 100644 --- a/src/config/torrc.sample.in +++ b/src/config/torrc.sample.in @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ ## Configuration file for a typical Tor user -## Last updated 12 September 2012 for Tor 0.2.4.3-alpha. +## Last updated 9 October 2013 for Tor 0.2.5.2-alpha. ## (may or may not work for much older or much newer versions of Tor.) ## ## Lines that begin with "## " try to explain what's going on. Lines @@ -120,9 +120,12 @@ ## is per month) #AccountingStart month 3 15:00 -## Contact info to be published in the directory, so we can contact you -## if your relay is misconfigured or something else goes wrong. Google -## indexes this, so spammers might also collect it. +## Administrative contact information for this relay or bridge. This line +## can be used to contact you if your relay or bridge is misconfigured or +## something else goes wrong. Note that we archive and publish all +## descriptors containing these lines and that Google indexes them, so +## spammers might also collect them. You may want to obscure the fact that +## it's an email address and/or generate a new address for this purpose. #ContactInfo Random Person <nobody AT example dot com> ## You might also include your PGP or GPG fingerprint if you have one: #ContactInfo 0xFFFFFFFF Random Person <nobody AT example dot com> diff --git a/src/ext/eventdns.c b/src/ext/eventdns.c index 66280cccd..8b934c443 100644 --- a/src/ext/eventdns.c +++ b/src/ext/eventdns.c @@ -2298,6 +2298,10 @@ _evdns_nameserver_add_impl(const struct sockaddr *address, evtimer_set(&ns->timeout_event, nameserver_prod_callback, ns); +#if 1 + ns->socket = tor_open_socket_nonblocking(address->sa_family, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); + if (!SOCKET_OK(ns->socket)) { err = 1; goto out1; } +#else ns->socket = tor_open_socket(address->sa_family, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); if (ns->socket < 0) { err = 1; goto out1; } #ifdef _WIN32 @@ -2314,6 +2318,7 @@ _evdns_nameserver_add_impl(const struct sockaddr *address, } #endif +#endif /* 1 */ if (global_bind_addr_is_set && !sockaddr_is_loopback((struct sockaddr*)&global_bind_address)) { if (bind(ns->socket, (struct sockaddr *)&global_bind_address, @@ -3473,8 +3478,12 @@ main(int c, char **v) { if (servertest) { int sock; struct sockaddr_in my_addr; +#if 1 + sock = tor_open_socket_nonblocking(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0) +#else sock = tor_open_socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); fcntl(sock, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK); +#endif my_addr.sin_family = AF_INET; my_addr.sin_port = htons(10053); my_addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; diff --git a/src/or/addressmap.c b/src/or/addressmap.c index 79e4b7c5e..9bc79bd84 100644 --- a/src/or/addressmap.c +++ b/src/or/addressmap.c @@ -798,7 +798,7 @@ address_is_in_virtual_range(const char *address) /** Return a random address conforming to the virtual address configuration * in <b>conf</b>. */ -/* private */ void +STATIC void get_random_virtual_addr(const virtual_addr_conf_t *conf, tor_addr_t *addr_out) { uint8_t tmp[4]; diff --git a/src/or/addressmap.h b/src/or/addressmap.h index 40210ee99..417832b31 100644 --- a/src/or/addressmap.h +++ b/src/or/addressmap.h @@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ #ifndef TOR_ADDRESSMAP_H #define TOR_ADDRESSMAP_H +#include "testsupport.h" + void addressmap_init(void); void addressmap_clear_excluded_trackexithosts(const or_options_t *options); void addressmap_clear_invalid_automaps(const or_options_t *options); @@ -52,8 +54,8 @@ typedef struct virtual_addr_conf_t { maskbits_t bits; } virtual_addr_conf_t; -void get_random_virtual_addr(const virtual_addr_conf_t *conf, - tor_addr_t *addr_out); +STATIC void get_random_virtual_addr(const virtual_addr_conf_t *conf, + tor_addr_t *addr_out); #endif #endif diff --git a/src/or/buffers.c b/src/or/buffers.c index c4c847ec8..50016d3a8 100644 --- a/src/or/buffers.c +++ b/src/or/buffers.c @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ #include "connection_or.h" #include "control.h" #include "reasons.h" +#include "ext_orport.h" #include "../common/util.h" #include "../common/torlog.h" #ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H @@ -1294,7 +1295,7 @@ buf_matches_at_pos(const buf_pos_t *pos, const char *s, size_t n) /** Return the first position in <b>buf</b> at which the <b>n</b>-character * string <b>s</b> occurs, or -1 if it does not occur. */ -/*private*/ int +STATIC int buf_find_string_offset(const buf_t *buf, const char *s, size_t n) { buf_pos_t pos; @@ -1702,6 +1703,64 @@ fetch_from_evbuffer_socks(struct evbuffer *buf, socks_request_t *req, } #endif +/** The size of the header of an Extended ORPort message: 2 bytes for + * COMMAND, 2 bytes for BODYLEN */ +#define EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE 4 + +/** Read <b>buf</b>, which should contain an Extended ORPort message + * from a transport proxy. If well-formed, create and populate + * <b>out</b> with the Extended ORport message. Return 0 if the + * buffer was incomplete, 1 if it was well-formed and -1 if we + * encountered an error while parsing it. */ +int +fetch_ext_or_command_from_buf(buf_t *buf, ext_or_cmd_t **out) +{ + char hdr[EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE]; + uint16_t len; + + check(); + if (buf->datalen < EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE) + return 0; + peek_from_buf(hdr, sizeof(hdr), buf); + len = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr+2)); + if (buf->datalen < (unsigned)len + EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE) + return 0; + *out = ext_or_cmd_new(len); + (*out)->cmd = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr)); + (*out)->len = len; + buf_remove_from_front(buf, EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE); + fetch_from_buf((*out)->body, len, buf); + return 1; +} + +#ifdef USE_BUFFEREVENTS +/** Read <b>buf</b>, which should contain an Extended ORPort message + * from a transport proxy. If well-formed, create and populate + * <b>out</b> with the Extended ORport message. Return 0 if the + * buffer was incomplete, 1 if it was well-formed and -1 if we + * encountered an error while parsing it. */ +int +fetch_ext_or_command_from_evbuffer(struct evbuffer *buf, ext_or_cmd_t **out) +{ + char hdr[EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE]; + uint16_t len; + size_t buf_len = evbuffer_get_length(buf); + + if (buf_len < EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE) + return 0; + evbuffer_copyout(buf, hdr, EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE); + len = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr+2)); + if (buf_len < (unsigned)len + EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE) + return 0; + *out = ext_or_cmd_new(len); + (*out)->cmd = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr)); + (*out)->len = len; + evbuffer_drain(buf, EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE); + evbuffer_remove(buf, (*out)->body, len); + return 1; +} +#endif + /** Implementation helper to implement fetch_from_*_socks. Instead of looking * at a buffer's contents, we look at the <b>datalen</b> bytes of data in * <b>data</b>. Instead of removing data from the buffer, we set diff --git a/src/or/buffers.h b/src/or/buffers.h index c947f0ba9..48b118520 100644 --- a/src/or/buffers.h +++ b/src/or/buffers.h @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ #ifndef TOR_BUFFERS_H #define TOR_BUFFERS_H +#include "testsupport.h" + buf_t *buf_new(void); buf_t *buf_new_with_capacity(size_t size); void buf_free(buf_t *buf); @@ -51,6 +53,8 @@ int fetch_from_buf_line(buf_t *buf, char *data_out, size_t *data_len); int peek_buf_has_control0_command(buf_t *buf); +int fetch_ext_or_command_from_buf(buf_t *buf, ext_or_cmd_t **out); + #ifdef USE_BUFFEREVENTS int fetch_var_cell_from_evbuffer(struct evbuffer *buf, var_cell_t **out, int linkproto); @@ -66,6 +70,8 @@ int peek_evbuffer_has_control0_command(struct evbuffer *buf); int write_to_evbuffer_zlib(struct evbuffer *buf, tor_zlib_state_t *state, const char *data, size_t data_len, int done); +int fetch_ext_or_command_from_evbuffer(struct evbuffer *buf, + ext_or_cmd_t **out); #endif #ifdef USE_BUFFEREVENTS @@ -75,6 +81,8 @@ int write_to_evbuffer_zlib(struct evbuffer *buf, tor_zlib_state_t *state, #define generic_buffer_get(b,buf,buflen) evbuffer_remove((b),(buf),(buflen)) #define generic_buffer_clear(b) evbuffer_drain((b), evbuffer_get_length((b))) #define generic_buffer_free(b) evbuffer_free((b)) +#define generic_buffer_fetch_ext_or_cmd(b, out) \ + fetch_ext_or_command_from_evbuffer((b), (out)) #else #define generic_buffer_new() buf_new() #define generic_buffer_len(b) buf_datalen((b)) @@ -82,6 +90,8 @@ int write_to_evbuffer_zlib(struct evbuffer *buf, tor_zlib_state_t *state, #define generic_buffer_get(b,buf,buflen) fetch_from_buf((buf),(buflen),(b)) #define generic_buffer_clear(b) buf_clear((b)) #define generic_buffer_free(b) buf_free((b)) +#define generic_buffer_fetch_ext_or_cmd(b, out) \ + fetch_ext_or_command_from_buf((b), (out)) #endif int generic_buffer_set_to_copy(generic_buffer_t **output, const generic_buffer_t *input); @@ -89,7 +99,7 @@ int generic_buffer_set_to_copy(generic_buffer_t **output, void assert_buf_ok(buf_t *buf); #ifdef BUFFERS_PRIVATE -int buf_find_string_offset(const buf_t *buf, const char *s, size_t n); +STATIC int buf_find_string_offset(const buf_t *buf, const char *s, size_t n); #endif #endif diff --git a/src/or/channel.c b/src/or/channel.c index 1270eace7..a345bab20 100644 --- a/src/or/channel.c +++ b/src/or/channel.c @@ -122,6 +122,8 @@ static cell_queue_entry_t * cell_queue_entry_new_fixed(cell_t *cell); static cell_queue_entry_t * cell_queue_entry_new_var(var_cell_t *var_cell); +static int is_destroy_cell(channel_t *chan, + const cell_queue_entry_t *q, circid_t *circid_out); /* Functions to maintain the digest map */ static void channel_add_to_digest_map(channel_t *chan); @@ -804,6 +806,7 @@ channel_free(channel_t *chan) /* Get rid of cmux */ if (chan->cmux) { circuitmux_detach_all_circuits(chan->cmux); + circuitmux_mark_destroyed_circids_usable(chan->cmux, chan); circuitmux_free(chan->cmux); chan->cmux = NULL; } @@ -1688,6 +1691,13 @@ channel_write_cell_queue_entry(channel_t *chan, cell_queue_entry_t *q) chan->timestamp_last_added_nonpadding = approx_time(); } + { + circid_t circ_id; + if (is_destroy_cell(chan, q, &circ_id)) { + channel_note_destroy_not_pending(chan, circ_id); + } + } + /* Can we send it right out? If so, try */ if (TOR_SIMPLEQ_EMPTY(&chan->outgoing_queue) && chan->state == CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN) { @@ -2355,7 +2365,7 @@ channel_do_open_actions(channel_t *chan) started_here = channel_is_outgoing(chan); if (started_here) { - circuit_build_times_network_is_live(&circ_times); + circuit_build_times_network_is_live(get_circuit_build_times_mutable()); rep_hist_note_connect_succeeded(chan->identity_digest, now); if (entry_guard_register_connect_status( chan->identity_digest, 1, 0, now) < 0) { @@ -2373,8 +2383,14 @@ channel_do_open_actions(channel_t *chan) /* only report it to the geoip module if it's not a known router */ if (!router_get_by_id_digest(chan->identity_digest)) { if (channel_get_addr_if_possible(chan, &remote_addr)) { - geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT, &remote_addr, + char *transport_name = NULL; + if (chan->get_transport_name(chan, &transport_name) < 0) + transport_name = NULL; + + geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT, + &remote_addr, transport_name, now); + tor_free(transport_name); } /* Otherwise the underlying transport can't tell us this, so skip it */ } @@ -2611,6 +2627,54 @@ channel_queue_var_cell(channel_t *chan, var_cell_t *var_cell) } } +/** If <b>packed_cell</b> on <b>chan</b> is a destroy cell, then set + * *<b>circid_out</b> to its circuit ID, and return true. Otherwise, return + * false. */ +/* XXXX Move this function. */ +int +packed_cell_is_destroy(channel_t *chan, + const packed_cell_t *packed_cell, + circid_t *circid_out) +{ + if (chan->wide_circ_ids) { + if (packed_cell->body[4] == CELL_DESTROY) { + *circid_out = ntohl(get_uint32(packed_cell->body)); + return 1; + } + } else { + if (packed_cell->body[2] == CELL_DESTROY) { + *circid_out = ntohs(get_uint16(packed_cell->body)); + return 1; + } + } + return 0; +} + +/** DOCDOC */ +static int +is_destroy_cell(channel_t *chan, + const cell_queue_entry_t *q, circid_t *circid_out) +{ + *circid_out = 0; + switch (q->type) { + case CELL_QUEUE_FIXED: + if (q->u.fixed.cell->command == CELL_DESTROY) { + *circid_out = q->u.fixed.cell->circ_id; + return 1; + } + break; + case CELL_QUEUE_VAR: + if (q->u.var.var_cell->command == CELL_DESTROY) { + *circid_out = q->u.var.var_cell->circ_id; + return 1; + } + break; + case CELL_QUEUE_PACKED: + return packed_cell_is_destroy(chan, q->u.packed.packed_cell, circid_out); + } + return 0; +} + /** * Send destroy cell on a channel * @@ -2622,25 +2686,20 @@ channel_queue_var_cell(channel_t *chan, var_cell_t *var_cell) int channel_send_destroy(circid_t circ_id, channel_t *chan, int reason) { - cell_t cell; - tor_assert(chan); /* Check to make sure we can send on this channel first */ if (!(chan->state == CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING || chan->state == CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSED || - chan->state == CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR)) { - memset(&cell, 0, sizeof(cell_t)); - cell.circ_id = circ_id; - cell.command = CELL_DESTROY; - cell.payload[0] = (uint8_t) reason; + chan->state == CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR) && + chan->cmux) { + channel_note_destroy_pending(chan, circ_id); + circuitmux_append_destroy_cell(chan, chan->cmux, circ_id, reason); log_debug(LD_OR, "Sending destroy (circID %u) on channel %p " "(global ID " U64_FORMAT ")", (unsigned)circ_id, chan, U64_PRINTF_ARG(chan->global_identifier)); - - channel_write_cell(chan, &cell); } else { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Someone called channel_send_destroy() for circID %u " diff --git a/src/or/channel.h b/src/or/channel.h index 2dca81705..7e3f5ad07 100644 --- a/src/or/channel.h +++ b/src/or/channel.h @@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ #define TOR_CHANNEL_H #include "or.h" -#include "tor_queue.h" #include "circuitmux.h" /* Channel handler function pointer typedefs */ @@ -87,6 +86,8 @@ struct channel_s { * available. */ int (*get_remote_addr)(channel_t *, tor_addr_t *); + int (*get_transport_name)(channel_t *chan, char **transport_out); + #define GRD_FLAG_ORIGINAL 1 #define GRD_FLAG_ADDR_ONLY 2 /* @@ -480,5 +481,9 @@ uint64_t channel_count_xmitted(channel_t *chan); uint64_t channel_listener_count_accepted(channel_listener_t *chan_l); +int packed_cell_is_destroy(channel_t *chan, + const packed_cell_t *packed_cell, + circid_t *circid_out); + #endif diff --git a/src/or/channeltls.c b/src/or/channeltls.c index f751c0da9..ca9e10b3f 100644 --- a/src/or/channeltls.c +++ b/src/or/channeltls.c @@ -55,6 +55,8 @@ static void channel_tls_close_method(channel_t *chan); static const char * channel_tls_describe_transport_method(channel_t *chan); static int channel_tls_get_remote_addr_method(channel_t *chan, tor_addr_t *addr_out); +static int +channel_tls_get_transport_name_method(channel_t *chan, char **transport_out); static const char * channel_tls_get_remote_descr_method(channel_t *chan, int flags); static int channel_tls_has_queued_writes_method(channel_t *chan); @@ -114,6 +116,7 @@ channel_tls_common_init(channel_tls_t *tlschan) chan->describe_transport = channel_tls_describe_transport_method; chan->get_remote_addr = channel_tls_get_remote_addr_method; chan->get_remote_descr = channel_tls_get_remote_descr_method; + chan->get_transport_name = channel_tls_get_transport_name_method; chan->has_queued_writes = channel_tls_has_queued_writes_method; chan->is_canonical = channel_tls_is_canonical_method; chan->matches_extend_info = channel_tls_matches_extend_info_method; @@ -406,6 +409,30 @@ channel_tls_get_remote_addr_method(channel_t *chan, tor_addr_t *addr_out) } /** + * Get the name of the pluggable transport used by a channel_tls_t. + * + * This implements the get_transport_name for channel_tls_t. If the + * channel uses a pluggable transport, copy its name to + * <b>transport_out</b> and return 0. If the channel did not use a + * pluggable transport, return -1. */ + +static int +channel_tls_get_transport_name_method(channel_t *chan, char **transport_out) +{ + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + + tor_assert(tlschan); + tor_assert(transport_out); + tor_assert(tlschan->conn); + + if (!tlschan->conn->ext_or_transport) + return -1; + + *transport_out = tor_strdup(tlschan->conn->ext_or_transport); + return 0; +} + +/** * Get endpoint description of a channel_tls_t * * This implements the get_remote_descr method for channel_tls_t; it returns diff --git a/src/or/circpathbias.c b/src/or/circpathbias.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..51a75cf50 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/circpathbias.c @@ -0,0 +1,1538 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2013, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#include "or.h" +#include "channel.h" +#include "circpathbias.h" +#include "circuitbuild.h" +#include "circuitlist.h" +#include "circuituse.h" +#include "circuitstats.h" +#include "connection_edge.h" +#include "config.h" +#include "entrynodes.h" +#include "networkstatus.h" +#include "relay.h" + +static void pathbias_count_successful_close(origin_circuit_t *circ); +static void pathbias_count_collapse(origin_circuit_t *circ); +static void pathbias_count_use_failed(origin_circuit_t *circ); +static void pathbias_measure_use_rate(entry_guard_t *guard); +static void pathbias_measure_close_rate(entry_guard_t *guard); +static void pathbias_scale_use_rates(entry_guard_t *guard); +static void pathbias_scale_close_rates(entry_guard_t *guard); +static int entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(entry_guard_t *guard); + +/** Increment the number of times we successfully extended a circuit to + * <b>guard</b>, first checking if the failure rate is high enough that + * we should eliminate the guard. Return -1 if the guard looks no good; + * return 0 if the guard looks fine. + */ +static int +entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(entry_guard_t *guard) +{ + entry_guards_changed(); + + pathbias_measure_close_rate(guard); + + if (guard->path_bias_disabled) + return -1; + + pathbias_scale_close_rates(guard); + guard->circ_attempts++; + + log_info(LD_CIRC, "Got success count %f/%f for guard %s ($%s)", + guard->circ_successes, guard->circ_attempts, guard->nickname, + hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); + return 0; +} + +/** The minimum number of circuit attempts before we start + * thinking about warning about path bias and dropping guards */ +static int +pathbias_get_min_circs(const or_options_t *options) +{ +#define DFLT_PATH_BIAS_MIN_CIRC 150 + if (options->PathBiasCircThreshold >= 5) + return options->PathBiasCircThreshold; + else + return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "pb_mincircs", + DFLT_PATH_BIAS_MIN_CIRC, + 5, INT32_MAX); +} + +/** The circuit success rate below which we issue a notice */ +static double +pathbias_get_notice_rate(const or_options_t *options) +{ +#define DFLT_PATH_BIAS_NOTICE_PCT 70 + if (options->PathBiasNoticeRate >= 0.0) + return options->PathBiasNoticeRate; + else + return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "pb_noticepct", + DFLT_PATH_BIAS_NOTICE_PCT, 0, 100)/100.0; +} + +/* XXXX024 I'd like to have this be static again, but entrynodes.c needs it. */ +/** The circuit success rate below which we issue a warn */ +static double +pathbias_get_warn_rate(const or_options_t *options) +{ +#define DFLT_PATH_BIAS_WARN_PCT 50 + if (options->PathBiasWarnRate >= 0.0) + return options->PathBiasWarnRate; + else + return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "pb_warnpct", + DFLT_PATH_BIAS_WARN_PCT, 0, 100)/100.0; +} + +/* XXXX024 I'd like to have this be static again, but entrynodes.c needs it. */ +/** + * The extreme rate is the rate at which we would drop the guard, + * if pb_dropguard is also set. Otherwise we just warn. + */ +double +pathbias_get_extreme_rate(const or_options_t *options) +{ +#define DFLT_PATH_BIAS_EXTREME_PCT 30 + if (options->PathBiasExtremeRate >= 0.0) + return options->PathBiasExtremeRate; + else + return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "pb_extremepct", + DFLT_PATH_BIAS_EXTREME_PCT, 0, 100)/100.0; +} + +/* XXXX024 I'd like to have this be static again, but entrynodes.c needs it. */ +/** + * If 1, we actually disable use of guards that fall below + * the extreme_pct. + */ +int +pathbias_get_dropguards(const or_options_t *options) +{ +#define DFLT_PATH_BIAS_DROP_GUARDS 0 + if (options->PathBiasDropGuards >= 0) + return options->PathBiasDropGuards; + else + return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "pb_dropguards", + DFLT_PATH_BIAS_DROP_GUARDS, 0, 1); +} + +/** + * This is the number of circuits at which we scale our + * counts by mult_factor/scale_factor. Note, this count is + * not exact, as we only perform the scaling in the event + * of no integer truncation. + */ +static int +pathbias_get_scale_threshold(const or_options_t *options) +{ +#define DFLT_PATH_BIAS_SCALE_THRESHOLD 300 + if (options->PathBiasScaleThreshold >= 10) + return options->PathBiasScaleThreshold; + else + return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "pb_scalecircs", + DFLT_PATH_BIAS_SCALE_THRESHOLD, 10, + INT32_MAX); +} + +/** + * Compute the path bias scaling ratio from the consensus + * parameters pb_multfactor/pb_scalefactor. + * + * Returns a value in (0, 1.0] which we multiply our pathbias + * counts with to scale them down. + */ +static double +pathbias_get_scale_ratio(const or_options_t *options) +{ + /* + * The scale factor is the denominator for our scaling + * of circuit counts for our path bias window. + * + * Note that our use of doubles for the path bias state + * file means that powers of 2 work best here. + */ + int denominator = networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "pb_scalefactor", + 2, 2, INT32_MAX); + (void) options; + /** + * The mult factor is the numerator for our scaling + * of circuit counts for our path bias window. It + * allows us to scale by fractions. + */ + return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "pb_multfactor", + 1, 1, denominator)/((double)denominator); +} + +/** The minimum number of circuit usage attempts before we start + * thinking about warning about path use bias and dropping guards */ +static int +pathbias_get_min_use(const or_options_t *options) +{ +#define DFLT_PATH_BIAS_MIN_USE 20 + if (options->PathBiasUseThreshold >= 3) + return options->PathBiasUseThreshold; + else + return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "pb_minuse", + DFLT_PATH_BIAS_MIN_USE, + 3, INT32_MAX); +} + +/** The circuit use success rate below which we issue a notice */ +static double +pathbias_get_notice_use_rate(const or_options_t *options) +{ +#define DFLT_PATH_BIAS_NOTICE_USE_PCT 80 + if (options->PathBiasNoticeUseRate >= 0.0) + return options->PathBiasNoticeUseRate; + else + return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "pb_noticeusepct", + DFLT_PATH_BIAS_NOTICE_USE_PCT, + 0, 100)/100.0; +} + +/** + * The extreme use rate is the rate at which we would drop the guard, + * if pb_dropguard is also set. Otherwise we just warn. + */ +double +pathbias_get_extreme_use_rate(const or_options_t *options) +{ +#define DFLT_PATH_BIAS_EXTREME_USE_PCT 60 + if (options->PathBiasExtremeUseRate >= 0.0) + return options->PathBiasExtremeUseRate; + else + return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "pb_extremeusepct", + DFLT_PATH_BIAS_EXTREME_USE_PCT, + 0, 100)/100.0; +} + +/** + * This is the number of circuits at which we scale our + * use counts by mult_factor/scale_factor. Note, this count is + * not exact, as we only perform the scaling in the event + * of no integer truncation. + */ +static int +pathbias_get_scale_use_threshold(const or_options_t *options) +{ +#define DFLT_PATH_BIAS_SCALE_USE_THRESHOLD 100 + if (options->PathBiasScaleUseThreshold >= 10) + return options->PathBiasScaleUseThreshold; + else + return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "pb_scaleuse", + DFLT_PATH_BIAS_SCALE_USE_THRESHOLD, + 10, INT32_MAX); +} + +/** + * Convert a Guard's path state to string. + */ +const char * +pathbias_state_to_string(path_state_t state) +{ + switch (state) { + case PATH_STATE_NEW_CIRC: + return "new"; + case PATH_STATE_BUILD_ATTEMPTED: + return "build attempted"; + case PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED: + return "build succeeded"; + case PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED: + return "use attempted"; + case PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED: + return "use succeeded"; + case PATH_STATE_USE_FAILED: + return "use failed"; + case PATH_STATE_ALREADY_COUNTED: + return "already counted"; + } + + return "unknown"; +} + +/** + * This function decides if a circuit has progressed far enough to count + * as a circuit "attempt". As long as end-to-end tagging is possible, + * we assume the adversary will use it over hop-to-hop failure. Therefore, + * we only need to account bias for the last hop. This should make us + * much more resilient to ambient circuit failure, and also make that + * failure easier to measure (we only need to measure Exit failure rates). + */ +static int +pathbias_is_new_circ_attempt(origin_circuit_t *circ) +{ +#define N2N_TAGGING_IS_POSSIBLE +#ifdef N2N_TAGGING_IS_POSSIBLE + /* cpath is a circular list. We want circs with more than one hop, + * and the second hop must be waiting for keys still (it's just + * about to get them). */ + return circ->cpath && + circ->cpath->next != circ->cpath && + circ->cpath->next->state == CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS; +#else + /* If tagging attacks are no longer possible, we probably want to + * count bias from the first hop. However, one could argue that + * timing-based tagging is still more useful than per-hop failure. + * In which case, we'd never want to use this. + */ + return circ->cpath && + circ->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS; +#endif +} + +/** + * Decide if the path bias code should count a circuit. + * + * @returns 1 if we should count it, 0 otherwise. + */ +static int +pathbias_should_count(origin_circuit_t *circ) +{ +#define PATHBIAS_COUNT_INTERVAL (600) + static ratelim_t count_limit = + RATELIM_INIT(PATHBIAS_COUNT_INTERVAL); + char *rate_msg = NULL; + + /* We can't do path bias accounting without entry guards. + * Testing and controller circuits also have no guards. + * + * We also don't count server-side rends, because their + * endpoint could be chosen maliciously. + * Similarly, we can't count client-side intro attempts, + * because clients can be manipulated into connecting to + * malicious intro points. */ + if (get_options()->UseEntryGuards == 0 || + circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING || + circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER || + circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND || + circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED || + (circ->base_.purpose >= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING && + circ->base_.purpose <= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACKED)) { + + /* Check to see if the shouldcount result has changed due to a + * unexpected purpose change that would affect our results. + * + * The reason we check the path state too here is because for the + * cannibalized versions of these purposes, we count them as successful + * before their purpose change. + */ + if (circ->pathbias_shouldcount == PATHBIAS_SHOULDCOUNT_COUNTED + && circ->path_state != PATH_STATE_ALREADY_COUNTED) { + log_info(LD_BUG, + "Circuit %d is now being ignored despite being counted " + "in the past. Purpose is %s, path state is %s", + circ->global_identifier, + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose), + pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state)); + } + circ->pathbias_shouldcount = PATHBIAS_SHOULDCOUNT_IGNORED; + return 0; + } + + /* Completely ignore one hop circuits */ + if (circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel || + circ->build_state->desired_path_len == 1) { + /* Check for inconsistency */ + if (circ->build_state->desired_path_len != 1 || + !circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel) { + if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&count_limit, approx_time()))) { + log_info(LD_BUG, + "One-hop circuit has length %d. Path state is %s. " + "Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s", + circ->build_state->desired_path_len, + pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state), + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose), + circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state), + rate_msg); + tor_free(rate_msg); + } + tor_fragile_assert(); + } + + /* Check to see if the shouldcount result has changed due to a + * unexpected change that would affect our results */ + if (circ->pathbias_shouldcount == PATHBIAS_SHOULDCOUNT_COUNTED) { + log_info(LD_BUG, + "One-hop circuit %d is now being ignored despite being counted " + "in the past. Purpose is %s, path state is %s", + circ->global_identifier, + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose), + pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state)); + } + circ->pathbias_shouldcount = PATHBIAS_SHOULDCOUNT_IGNORED; + return 0; + } + + /* Check to see if the shouldcount result has changed due to a + * unexpected purpose change that would affect our results */ + if (circ->pathbias_shouldcount == PATHBIAS_SHOULDCOUNT_IGNORED) { + log_info(LD_BUG, + "Circuit %d is now being counted despite being ignored " + "in the past. Purpose is %s, path state is %s", + circ->global_identifier, + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose), + pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state)); + } + circ->pathbias_shouldcount = PATHBIAS_SHOULDCOUNT_COUNTED; + + return 1; +} + +/** + * Check our circuit state to see if this is a successful circuit attempt. + * If so, record it in the current guard's path bias circ_attempt count. + * + * Also check for several potential error cases for bug #6475. + */ +int +pathbias_count_build_attempt(origin_circuit_t *circ) +{ +#define CIRC_ATTEMPT_NOTICE_INTERVAL (600) + static ratelim_t circ_attempt_notice_limit = + RATELIM_INIT(CIRC_ATTEMPT_NOTICE_INTERVAL); + char *rate_msg = NULL; + + if (!pathbias_should_count(circ)) { + return 0; + } + + if (pathbias_is_new_circ_attempt(circ)) { + /* Help track down the real cause of bug #6475: */ + if (circ->has_opened && circ->path_state != PATH_STATE_BUILD_ATTEMPTED) { + if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&circ_attempt_notice_limit, + approx_time()))) { + log_info(LD_BUG, + "Opened circuit is in strange path state %s. " + "Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s", + pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state), + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose), + circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state), + rate_msg); + tor_free(rate_msg); + } + } + + /* Don't re-count cannibalized circs.. */ + if (!circ->has_opened) { + entry_guard_t *guard = NULL; + + if (circ->cpath && circ->cpath->extend_info) { + guard = entry_guard_get_by_id_digest( + circ->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest); + } else if (circ->base_.n_chan) { + guard = + entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(circ->base_.n_chan->identity_digest); + } + + if (guard) { + if (circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_NEW_CIRC) { + circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_BUILD_ATTEMPTED; + + if (entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(guard) < 0) { + /* Bogus guard; we already warned. */ + return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; + } + } else { + if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&circ_attempt_notice_limit, + approx_time()))) { + log_info(LD_BUG, + "Unopened circuit has strange path state %s. " + "Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s", + pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state), + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose), + circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state), + rate_msg); + tor_free(rate_msg); + } + } + } else { + if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&circ_attempt_notice_limit, + approx_time()))) { + log_info(LD_CIRC, + "Unopened circuit has no known guard. " + "Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s", + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose), + circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state), + rate_msg); + tor_free(rate_msg); + } + } + } + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Check our circuit state to see if this is a successful circuit + * completion. If so, record it in the current guard's path bias + * success count. + * + * Also check for several potential error cases for bug #6475. + */ +void +pathbias_count_build_success(origin_circuit_t *circ) +{ +#define SUCCESS_NOTICE_INTERVAL (600) + static ratelim_t success_notice_limit = + RATELIM_INIT(SUCCESS_NOTICE_INTERVAL); + char *rate_msg = NULL; + entry_guard_t *guard = NULL; + + if (!pathbias_should_count(circ)) { + return; + } + + /* Don't count cannibalized/reused circs for path bias + * "build" success, since they get counted under "use" success. */ + if (!circ->has_opened) { + if (circ->cpath && circ->cpath->extend_info) { + guard = entry_guard_get_by_id_digest( + circ->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest); + } + + if (guard) { + if (circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_BUILD_ATTEMPTED) { + circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED; + guard->circ_successes++; + entry_guards_changed(); + + log_info(LD_CIRC, "Got success count %f/%f for guard %s ($%s)", + guard->circ_successes, guard->circ_attempts, + guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); + } else { + if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&success_notice_limit, + approx_time()))) { + log_info(LD_BUG, + "Succeeded circuit is in strange path state %s. " + "Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s", + pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state), + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose), + circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state), + rate_msg); + tor_free(rate_msg); + } + } + + if (guard->circ_attempts < guard->circ_successes) { + log_notice(LD_BUG, "Unexpectedly high successes counts (%f/%f) " + "for guard %s ($%s)", + guard->circ_successes, guard->circ_attempts, + guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); + } + /* In rare cases, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING can get converted to + * CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT and have no guards here. + * No need to log that case. */ + } else if (circ->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT) { + if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&success_notice_limit, + approx_time()))) { + log_info(LD_CIRC, + "Completed circuit has no known guard. " + "Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s", + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose), + circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state), + rate_msg); + tor_free(rate_msg); + } + } + } else { + if (circ->path_state < PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED) { + if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&success_notice_limit, + approx_time()))) { + log_info(LD_BUG, + "Opened circuit is in strange path state %s. " + "Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s", + pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state), + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose), + circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state), + rate_msg); + tor_free(rate_msg); + } + } + } +} + +/** + * Record an attempt to use a circuit. Changes the circuit's + * path state and update its guard's usage counter. + * + * Used for path bias usage accounting. + */ +void +pathbias_count_use_attempt(origin_circuit_t *circ) +{ + entry_guard_t *guard; + + if (!pathbias_should_count(circ)) { + return; + } + + if (circ->path_state < PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED) { + log_notice(LD_BUG, + "Used circuit is in strange path state %s. " + "Circuit is a %s currently %s.", + pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state), + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose), + circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state)); + } else if (circ->path_state < PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED) { + guard = entry_guard_get_by_id_digest( + circ->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest); + if (guard) { + pathbias_measure_use_rate(guard); + pathbias_scale_use_rates(guard); + guard->use_attempts++; + entry_guards_changed(); + + log_debug(LD_CIRC, + "Marked circuit %d (%f/%f) as used for guard %s ($%s).", + circ->global_identifier, + guard->use_successes, guard->use_attempts, + guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); + } + + circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED; + } else { + /* Harmless but educational log message */ + log_info(LD_CIRC, + "Used circuit %d is already in path state %s. " + "Circuit is a %s currently %s.", + circ->global_identifier, + pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state), + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose), + circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state)); + } + + return; +} + +/** + * Check the circuit's path state is appropriate and mark it as + * successfully used. Used for path bias usage accounting. + * + * We don't actually increment the guard's counters until + * pathbias_check_close(), because the circuit can still transition + * back to PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED if a stream fails later (this + * is done so we can probe the circuit for liveness at close). + */ +void +pathbias_mark_use_success(origin_circuit_t *circ) +{ + if (!pathbias_should_count(circ)) { + return; + } + + if (circ->path_state < PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED) { + log_notice(LD_BUG, + "Used circuit %d is in strange path state %s. " + "Circuit is a %s currently %s.", + circ->global_identifier, + pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state), + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose), + circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state)); + + pathbias_count_use_attempt(circ); + } + + /* We don't do any accounting at the guard until actual circuit close */ + circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED; + + return; +} + +/** + * If a stream ever detatches from a circuit in a retriable way, + * we need to mark this circuit as still needing either another + * successful stream, or in need of a probe. + * + * An adversary could let the first stream request succeed (ie the + * resolve), but then tag and timeout the remainder (via cell + * dropping), forcing them on new circuits. + * + * Rolling back the state will cause us to probe such circuits, which + * should lead to probe failures in the event of such tagging due to + * either unrecognized cells coming in while we wait for the probe, + * or the cipher state getting out of sync in the case of dropped cells. + */ +void +pathbias_mark_use_rollback(origin_circuit_t *circ) +{ + if (circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED) { + log_info(LD_CIRC, + "Rolling back pathbias use state to 'attempted' for detached " + "circuit %d", circ->global_identifier); + circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED; + } +} + +/** + * Actually count a circuit success towards a guard's usage counters + * if the path state is appropriate. + */ +static void +pathbias_count_use_success(origin_circuit_t *circ) +{ + entry_guard_t *guard; + + if (!pathbias_should_count(circ)) { + return; + } + + if (circ->path_state != PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED) { + log_notice(LD_BUG, + "Successfully used circuit %d is in strange path state %s. " + "Circuit is a %s currently %s.", + circ->global_identifier, + pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state), + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose), + circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state)); + } else { + guard = entry_guard_get_by_id_digest( + circ->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest); + if (guard) { + guard->use_successes++; + entry_guards_changed(); + + if (guard->use_attempts < guard->use_successes) { + log_notice(LD_BUG, "Unexpectedly high use successes counts (%f/%f) " + "for guard %s=%s", + guard->use_successes, guard->use_attempts, + guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); + } + + log_debug(LD_CIRC, + "Marked circuit %d (%f/%f) as used successfully for guard " + "%s ($%s).", + circ->global_identifier, guard->use_successes, + guard->use_attempts, guard->nickname, + hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); + } + } + + return; +} + +/** + * Send a probe down a circuit that the client attempted to use, + * but for which the stream timed out/failed. The probe is a + * RELAY_BEGIN cell with a 0.a.b.c destination address, which + * the exit will reject and reply back, echoing that address. + * + * The reason for such probes is because it is possible to bias + * a user's paths simply by causing timeouts, and these timeouts + * are not possible to differentiate from unresponsive servers. + * + * The probe is sent at the end of the circuit lifetime for two + * reasons: to prevent cryptographic taggers from being able to + * drop cells to cause timeouts, and to prevent easy recognition + * of probes before any real client traffic happens. + * + * Returns -1 if we couldn't probe, 0 otherwise. + */ +static int +pathbias_send_usable_probe(circuit_t *circ) +{ + /* Based on connection_ap_handshake_send_begin() */ + char payload[CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE]; + int payload_len; + origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); + crypt_path_t *cpath_layer = NULL; + char *probe_nonce = NULL; + + tor_assert(ocirc); + + cpath_layer = ocirc->cpath->prev; + + if (cpath_layer->state != CPATH_STATE_OPEN) { + /* This can happen for cannibalized circuits. Their + * last hop isn't yet open */ + log_info(LD_CIRC, + "Got pathbias probe request for unopened circuit %d. " + "Opened %d, len %d", ocirc->global_identifier, + ocirc->has_opened, ocirc->build_state->desired_path_len); + return -1; + } + + /* We already went down this road. */ + if (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING && + ocirc->pathbias_probe_id) { + log_info(LD_CIRC, + "Got pathbias probe request for circuit %d with " + "outstanding probe", ocirc->global_identifier); + return -1; + } + + /* Can't probe if the channel isn't open */ + if (circ->n_chan == NULL || + (circ->n_chan->state != CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN + && circ->n_chan->state != CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT)) { + log_info(LD_CIRC, + "Skipping pathbias probe for circuit %d: Channel is not open.", + ocirc->global_identifier); + return -1; + } + + circuit_change_purpose(circ, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING); + + /* Update timestamp for when circuit_expire_building() should kill us */ + tor_gettimeofday(&circ->timestamp_began); + + /* Generate a random address for the nonce */ + crypto_rand((char*)ô->pathbias_probe_nonce, + sizeof(ocirc->pathbias_probe_nonce)); + ocirc->pathbias_probe_nonce &= 0x00ffffff; + probe_nonce = tor_dup_ip(ocirc->pathbias_probe_nonce); + + tor_snprintf(payload,RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE, "%s:25", probe_nonce); + payload_len = (int)strlen(payload)+1; + + // XXX: need this? Can we assume ipv4 will always be supported? + // If not, how do we tell? + //if (payload_len <= RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE - 4 && edge_conn->begincell_flags) { + // set_uint32(payload + payload_len, htonl(edge_conn->begincell_flags)); + // payload_len += 4; + //} + + /* Generate+Store stream id, make sure it's non-zero */ + ocirc->pathbias_probe_id = get_unique_stream_id_by_circ(ocirc); + + if (ocirc->pathbias_probe_id==0) { + log_warn(LD_CIRC, + "Ran out of stream IDs on circuit %u during " + "pathbias probe attempt.", ocirc->global_identifier); + tor_free(probe_nonce); + return -1; + } + + log_info(LD_CIRC, + "Sending pathbias testing cell to %s:25 on stream %d for circ %d.", + probe_nonce, ocirc->pathbias_probe_id, ocirc->global_identifier); + tor_free(probe_nonce); + + /* Send a test relay cell */ + if (relay_send_command_from_edge(ocirc->pathbias_probe_id, circ, + RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN, payload, + payload_len, cpath_layer) < 0) { + log_notice(LD_CIRC, + "Failed to send pathbias probe cell on circuit %d.", + ocirc->global_identifier); + return -1; + } + + /* Mark it freshly dirty so it doesn't get expired in the meantime */ + circ->timestamp_dirty = time(NULL); + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Check the response to a pathbias probe, to ensure the + * cell is recognized and the nonce and other probe + * characteristics are as expected. + * + * If the response is valid, return 0. Otherwise return < 0. + */ +int +pathbias_check_probe_response(circuit_t *circ, const cell_t *cell) +{ + /* Based on connection_edge_process_relay_cell() */ + relay_header_t rh; + int reason; + uint32_t ipv4_host; + origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); + + tor_assert(cell); + tor_assert(ocirc); + tor_assert(circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING); + + relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload); + + reason = rh.length > 0 ? + get_uint8(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE) : END_STREAM_REASON_MISC; + + if (rh.command == RELAY_COMMAND_END && + reason == END_STREAM_REASON_EXITPOLICY && + ocirc->pathbias_probe_id == rh.stream_id) { + + /* Check length+extract host: It is in network order after the reason code. + * See connection_edge_end(). */ + if (rh.length < 9) { /* reason+ipv4+dns_ttl */ + log_notice(LD_PROTOCOL, + "Short path bias probe response length field (%d).", rh.length); + return - END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; + } + + ipv4_host = ntohl(get_uint32(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+1)); + + /* Check nonce */ + if (ipv4_host == ocirc->pathbias_probe_nonce) { + pathbias_mark_use_success(ocirc); + circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED); + log_info(LD_CIRC, + "Got valid path bias probe back for circ %d, stream %d.", + ocirc->global_identifier, ocirc->pathbias_probe_id); + return 0; + } else { + log_notice(LD_CIRC, + "Got strange probe value 0x%x vs 0x%x back for circ %d, " + "stream %d.", ipv4_host, ocirc->pathbias_probe_nonce, + ocirc->global_identifier, ocirc->pathbias_probe_id); + return -1; + } + } + log_info(LD_CIRC, + "Got another cell back back on pathbias probe circuit %d: " + "Command: %d, Reason: %d, Stream-id: %d", + ocirc->global_identifier, rh.command, reason, rh.stream_id); + return -1; +} + +/** + * Check if a circuit was used and/or closed successfully. + * + * If we attempted to use the circuit to carry a stream but failed + * for whatever reason, or if the circuit mysteriously died before + * we could attach any streams, record these two cases. + * + * If we *have* successfully used the circuit, or it appears to + * have been closed by us locally, count it as a success. + * + * Returns 0 if we're done making decisions with the circ, + * or -1 if we want to probe it first. + */ +int +pathbias_check_close(origin_circuit_t *ocirc, int reason) +{ + circuit_t *circ = ô->base_; + + if (!pathbias_should_count(ocirc)) { + return 0; + } + + switch (ocirc->path_state) { + /* If the circuit was closed after building, but before use, we need + * to ensure we were the ones who tried to close it (and not a remote + * actor). */ + case PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED: + if (reason & END_CIRC_REASON_FLAG_REMOTE) { + /* Remote circ close reasons on an unused circuit all could be bias */ + log_info(LD_CIRC, + "Circuit %d remote-closed without successful use for reason %d. " + "Circuit purpose %d currently %d,%s. Len %d.", + ocirc->global_identifier, + reason, circ->purpose, ocirc->has_opened, + circuit_state_to_string(circ->state), + ocirc->build_state->desired_path_len); + pathbias_count_collapse(ocirc); + } else if ((reason & ~END_CIRC_REASON_FLAG_REMOTE) + == END_CIRC_REASON_CHANNEL_CLOSED && + circ->n_chan && + circ->n_chan->reason_for_closing + != CHANNEL_CLOSE_REQUESTED) { + /* If we didn't close the channel ourselves, it could be bias */ + /* XXX: Only count bias if the network is live? + * What about clock jumps/suspends? */ + log_info(LD_CIRC, + "Circuit %d's channel closed without successful use for reason " + "%d, channel reason %d. Circuit purpose %d currently %d,%s. Len " + "%d.", ocirc->global_identifier, + reason, circ->n_chan->reason_for_closing, + circ->purpose, ocirc->has_opened, + circuit_state_to_string(circ->state), + ocirc->build_state->desired_path_len); + pathbias_count_collapse(ocirc); + } else { + pathbias_count_successful_close(ocirc); + } + break; + + /* If we tried to use a circuit but failed, we should probe it to ensure + * it has not been tampered with. */ + case PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED: + /* XXX: Only probe and/or count failure if the network is live? + * What about clock jumps/suspends? */ + if (pathbias_send_usable_probe(circ) == 0) + return -1; + else + pathbias_count_use_failed(ocirc); + + /* Any circuit where there were attempted streams but no successful + * streams could be bias */ + log_info(LD_CIRC, + "Circuit %d closed without successful use for reason %d. " + "Circuit purpose %d currently %d,%s. Len %d.", + ocirc->global_identifier, + reason, circ->purpose, ocirc->has_opened, + circuit_state_to_string(circ->state), + ocirc->build_state->desired_path_len); + break; + + case PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED: + pathbias_count_successful_close(ocirc); + pathbias_count_use_success(ocirc); + break; + + case PATH_STATE_USE_FAILED: + pathbias_count_use_failed(ocirc); + break; + + case PATH_STATE_NEW_CIRC: + case PATH_STATE_BUILD_ATTEMPTED: + case PATH_STATE_ALREADY_COUNTED: + default: + // Other states are uninteresting. No stats to count. + break; + } + + ocirc->path_state = PATH_STATE_ALREADY_COUNTED; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Count a successfully closed circuit. + */ +static void +pathbias_count_successful_close(origin_circuit_t *circ) +{ + entry_guard_t *guard = NULL; + if (!pathbias_should_count(circ)) { + return; + } + + if (circ->cpath && circ->cpath->extend_info) { + guard = entry_guard_get_by_id_digest( + circ->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest); + } + + if (guard) { + /* In the long run: circuit_success ~= successful_circuit_close + + * circ_failure + stream_failure */ + guard->successful_circuits_closed++; + entry_guards_changed(); + } else if (circ->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT) { + /* In rare cases, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING can get converted to + * CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT and have no guards here. + * No need to log that case. */ + log_info(LD_CIRC, + "Successfully closed circuit has no known guard. " + "Circuit is a %s currently %s", + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose), + circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state)); + } +} + +/** + * Count a circuit that fails after it is built, but before it can + * carry any traffic. + * + * This is needed because there are ways to destroy a + * circuit after it has successfully completed. Right now, this is + * used for purely informational/debugging purposes. + */ +static void +pathbias_count_collapse(origin_circuit_t *circ) +{ + entry_guard_t *guard = NULL; + + if (!pathbias_should_count(circ)) { + return; + } + + if (circ->cpath && circ->cpath->extend_info) { + guard = entry_guard_get_by_id_digest( + circ->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest); + } + + if (guard) { + guard->collapsed_circuits++; + entry_guards_changed(); + } else if (circ->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT) { + /* In rare cases, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING can get converted to + * CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT and have no guards here. + * No need to log that case. */ + log_info(LD_CIRC, + "Destroyed circuit has no known guard. " + "Circuit is a %s currently %s", + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose), + circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state)); + } +} + +/** + * Count a known failed circuit (because we could not probe it). + * + * This counter is informational. + */ +static void +pathbias_count_use_failed(origin_circuit_t *circ) +{ + entry_guard_t *guard = NULL; + if (!pathbias_should_count(circ)) { + return; + } + + if (circ->cpath && circ->cpath->extend_info) { + guard = entry_guard_get_by_id_digest( + circ->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest); + } + + if (guard) { + guard->unusable_circuits++; + entry_guards_changed(); + } else if (circ->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT) { + /* In rare cases, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING can get converted to + * CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT and have no guards here. + * No need to log that case. */ + /* XXX note cut-and-paste code in this function compared to nearby + * functions. Would be nice to refactor. -RD */ + log_info(LD_CIRC, + "Stream-failing circuit has no known guard. " + "Circuit is a %s currently %s", + circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose), + circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state)); + } +} + +/** + * Count timeouts for path bias log messages. + * + * These counts are purely informational. + */ +void +pathbias_count_timeout(origin_circuit_t *circ) +{ + entry_guard_t *guard = NULL; + + if (!pathbias_should_count(circ)) { + return; + } + + /* For hidden service circs, they can actually be used + * successfully and then time out later (because + * the other side declines to use them). */ + if (circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED) { + return; + } + + if (circ->cpath && circ->cpath->extend_info) { + guard = entry_guard_get_by_id_digest( + circ->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest); + } + + if (guard) { + guard->timeouts++; + entry_guards_changed(); + } +} + +/** + * Helper function to count all of the currently opened circuits + * for a guard that are in a given path state range. The state + * range is inclusive on both ends. + */ +static int +pathbias_count_circs_in_states(entry_guard_t *guard, + path_state_t from, + path_state_t to) +{ + circuit_t *circ; + int open_circuits = 0; + + /* Count currently open circuits. Give them the benefit of the doubt. */ + TOR_LIST_FOREACH(circ, circuit_get_global_list(), head) { + origin_circuit_t *ocirc = NULL; + if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) || /* didn't originate here */ + circ->marked_for_close) /* already counted */ + continue; + + ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); + + if (!ocirc->cpath || !ocirc->cpath->extend_info) + continue; + + if (ocirc->path_state >= from && + ocirc->path_state <= to && + pathbias_should_count(ocirc) && + fast_memeq(guard->identity, + ocirc->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest, + DIGEST_LEN)) { + log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Found opened circuit %d in path_state %s", + ocirc->global_identifier, + pathbias_state_to_string(ocirc->path_state)); + open_circuits++; + } + } + + return open_circuits; +} + +/** + * Return the number of circuits counted as successfully closed for + * this guard. + * + * Also add in the currently open circuits to give them the benefit + * of the doubt. + */ +double +pathbias_get_close_success_count(entry_guard_t *guard) +{ + return guard->successful_circuits_closed + + pathbias_count_circs_in_states(guard, + PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED, + PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED); +} + +/** + * Return the number of circuits counted as successfully used + * this guard. + * + * Also add in the currently open circuits that we are attempting + * to use to give them the benefit of the doubt. + */ +double +pathbias_get_use_success_count(entry_guard_t *guard) +{ + return guard->use_successes + + pathbias_count_circs_in_states(guard, + PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED, + PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED); +} + +/** + * Check the path bias use rate against our consensus parameter limits. + * + * Emits a log message if the use success rates are too low. + * + * If pathbias_get_dropguards() is set, we also disable the use of + * very failure prone guards. + */ +static void +pathbias_measure_use_rate(entry_guard_t *guard) +{ + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + + if (guard->use_attempts > pathbias_get_min_use(options)) { + /* Note: We rely on the < comparison here to allow us to set a 0 + * rate and disable the feature entirely. If refactoring, don't + * change to <= */ + if (pathbias_get_use_success_count(guard)/guard->use_attempts + < pathbias_get_extreme_use_rate(options)) { + /* Dropping is currently disabled by default. */ + if (pathbias_get_dropguards(options)) { + if (!guard->path_bias_disabled) { + log_warn(LD_CIRC, + "Your Guard %s ($%s) is failing to carry an extremely large " + "amount of stream on its circuits. " + "To avoid potential route manipulation attacks, Tor has " + "disabled use of this guard. " + "Use counts are %ld/%ld. Success counts are %ld/%ld. " + "%ld circuits completed, %ld were unusable, %ld collapsed, " + "and %ld timed out. " + "For reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.", + guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN), + tor_lround(pathbias_get_use_success_count(guard)), + tor_lround(guard->use_attempts), + tor_lround(pathbias_get_close_success_count(guard)), + tor_lround(guard->circ_attempts), + tor_lround(guard->circ_successes), + tor_lround(guard->unusable_circuits), + tor_lround(guard->collapsed_circuits), + tor_lround(guard->timeouts), + tor_lround(get_circuit_build_close_time_ms()/1000)); + guard->path_bias_disabled = 1; + guard->bad_since = approx_time(); + entry_guards_changed(); + return; + } + } else if (!guard->path_bias_use_extreme) { + guard->path_bias_use_extreme = 1; + log_warn(LD_CIRC, + "Your Guard %s ($%s) is failing to carry an extremely large " + "amount of streams on its circuits. " + "This could indicate a route manipulation attack, network " + "overload, bad local network connectivity, or a bug. " + "Use counts are %ld/%ld. Success counts are %ld/%ld. " + "%ld circuits completed, %ld were unusable, %ld collapsed, " + "and %ld timed out. " + "For reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.", + guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN), + tor_lround(pathbias_get_use_success_count(guard)), + tor_lround(guard->use_attempts), + tor_lround(pathbias_get_close_success_count(guard)), + tor_lround(guard->circ_attempts), + tor_lround(guard->circ_successes), + tor_lround(guard->unusable_circuits), + tor_lround(guard->collapsed_circuits), + tor_lround(guard->timeouts), + tor_lround(get_circuit_build_close_time_ms()/1000)); + } + } else if (pathbias_get_use_success_count(guard)/guard->use_attempts + < pathbias_get_notice_use_rate(options)) { + if (!guard->path_bias_use_noticed) { + guard->path_bias_use_noticed = 1; + log_notice(LD_CIRC, + "Your Guard %s ($%s) is failing to carry more streams on its " + "circuits than usual. " + "Most likely this means the Tor network is overloaded " + "or your network connection is poor. " + "Use counts are %ld/%ld. Success counts are %ld/%ld. " + "%ld circuits completed, %ld were unusable, %ld collapsed, " + "and %ld timed out. " + "For reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.", + guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN), + tor_lround(pathbias_get_use_success_count(guard)), + tor_lround(guard->use_attempts), + tor_lround(pathbias_get_close_success_count(guard)), + tor_lround(guard->circ_attempts), + tor_lround(guard->circ_successes), + tor_lround(guard->unusable_circuits), + tor_lround(guard->collapsed_circuits), + tor_lround(guard->timeouts), + tor_lround(get_circuit_build_close_time_ms()/1000)); + } + } + } +} + +/** + * Check the path bias circuit close status rates against our consensus + * parameter limits. + * + * Emits a log message if the use success rates are too low. + * + * If pathbias_get_dropguards() is set, we also disable the use of + * very failure prone guards. + * + * XXX: This function shares similar log messages and checks to + * pathbias_measure_use_rate(). It may be possible to combine them + * eventually, especially if we can ever remove the need for 3 + * levels of closure warns (if the overall circuit failure rate + * goes down with ntor). One way to do so would be to multiply + * the build rate with the use rate to get an idea of the total + * fraction of the total network paths the user is able to use. + * See ticket #8159. + */ +static void +pathbias_measure_close_rate(entry_guard_t *guard) +{ + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + + if (guard->circ_attempts > pathbias_get_min_circs(options)) { + /* Note: We rely on the < comparison here to allow us to set a 0 + * rate and disable the feature entirely. If refactoring, don't + * change to <= */ + if (pathbias_get_close_success_count(guard)/guard->circ_attempts + < pathbias_get_extreme_rate(options)) { + /* Dropping is currently disabled by default. */ + if (pathbias_get_dropguards(options)) { + if (!guard->path_bias_disabled) { + log_warn(LD_CIRC, + "Your Guard %s ($%s) is failing an extremely large " + "amount of circuits. " + "To avoid potential route manipulation attacks, Tor has " + "disabled use of this guard. " + "Success counts are %ld/%ld. Use counts are %ld/%ld. " + "%ld circuits completed, %ld were unusable, %ld collapsed, " + "and %ld timed out. " + "For reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.", + guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN), + tor_lround(pathbias_get_close_success_count(guard)), + tor_lround(guard->circ_attempts), + tor_lround(pathbias_get_use_success_count(guard)), + tor_lround(guard->use_attempts), + tor_lround(guard->circ_successes), + tor_lround(guard->unusable_circuits), + tor_lround(guard->collapsed_circuits), + tor_lround(guard->timeouts), + tor_lround(get_circuit_build_close_time_ms()/1000)); + guard->path_bias_disabled = 1; + guard->bad_since = approx_time(); + entry_guards_changed(); + return; + } + } else if (!guard->path_bias_extreme) { + guard->path_bias_extreme = 1; + log_warn(LD_CIRC, + "Your Guard %s ($%s) is failing an extremely large " + "amount of circuits. " + "This could indicate a route manipulation attack, " + "extreme network overload, or a bug. " + "Success counts are %ld/%ld. Use counts are %ld/%ld. " + "%ld circuits completed, %ld were unusable, %ld collapsed, " + "and %ld timed out. " + "For reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.", + guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN), + tor_lround(pathbias_get_close_success_count(guard)), + tor_lround(guard->circ_attempts), + tor_lround(pathbias_get_use_success_count(guard)), + tor_lround(guard->use_attempts), + tor_lround(guard->circ_successes), + tor_lround(guard->unusable_circuits), + tor_lround(guard->collapsed_circuits), + tor_lround(guard->timeouts), + tor_lround(get_circuit_build_close_time_ms()/1000)); + } + } else if (pathbias_get_close_success_count(guard)/guard->circ_attempts + < pathbias_get_warn_rate(options)) { + if (!guard->path_bias_warned) { + guard->path_bias_warned = 1; + log_warn(LD_CIRC, + "Your Guard %s ($%s) is failing a very large " + "amount of circuits. " + "Most likely this means the Tor network is " + "overloaded, but it could also mean an attack against " + "you or potentially the guard itself. " + "Success counts are %ld/%ld. Use counts are %ld/%ld. " + "%ld circuits completed, %ld were unusable, %ld collapsed, " + "and %ld timed out. " + "For reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.", + guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN), + tor_lround(pathbias_get_close_success_count(guard)), + tor_lround(guard->circ_attempts), + tor_lround(pathbias_get_use_success_count(guard)), + tor_lround(guard->use_attempts), + tor_lround(guard->circ_successes), + tor_lround(guard->unusable_circuits), + tor_lround(guard->collapsed_circuits), + tor_lround(guard->timeouts), + tor_lround(get_circuit_build_close_time_ms()/1000)); + } + } else if (pathbias_get_close_success_count(guard)/guard->circ_attempts + < pathbias_get_notice_rate(options)) { + if (!guard->path_bias_noticed) { + guard->path_bias_noticed = 1; + log_notice(LD_CIRC, + "Your Guard %s ($%s) is failing more circuits than " + "usual. " + "Most likely this means the Tor network is overloaded. " + "Success counts are %ld/%ld. Use counts are %ld/%ld. " + "%ld circuits completed, %ld were unusable, %ld collapsed, " + "and %ld timed out. " + "For reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.", + guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN), + tor_lround(pathbias_get_close_success_count(guard)), + tor_lround(guard->circ_attempts), + tor_lround(pathbias_get_use_success_count(guard)), + tor_lround(guard->use_attempts), + tor_lround(guard->circ_successes), + tor_lround(guard->unusable_circuits), + tor_lround(guard->collapsed_circuits), + tor_lround(guard->timeouts), + tor_lround(get_circuit_build_close_time_ms()/1000)); + } + } + } +} + +/** + * This function scales the path bias use rates if we have + * more data than the scaling threshold. This allows us to + * be more sensitive to recent measurements. + * + * XXX: The attempt count transfer stuff here might be done + * better by keeping separate pending counters that get + * transfered at circuit close. See ticket #8160. + */ +static void +pathbias_scale_close_rates(entry_guard_t *guard) +{ + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + + /* If we get a ton of circuits, just scale everything down */ + if (guard->circ_attempts > pathbias_get_scale_threshold(options)) { + double scale_ratio = pathbias_get_scale_ratio(options); + int opened_attempts = pathbias_count_circs_in_states(guard, + PATH_STATE_BUILD_ATTEMPTED, PATH_STATE_BUILD_ATTEMPTED); + int opened_built = pathbias_count_circs_in_states(guard, + PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED, + PATH_STATE_USE_FAILED); + /* Verify that the counts are sane before and after scaling */ + int counts_are_sane = (guard->circ_attempts >= guard->circ_successes); + + guard->circ_attempts -= (opened_attempts+opened_built); + guard->circ_successes -= opened_built; + + guard->circ_attempts *= scale_ratio; + guard->circ_successes *= scale_ratio; + guard->timeouts *= scale_ratio; + guard->successful_circuits_closed *= scale_ratio; + guard->collapsed_circuits *= scale_ratio; + guard->unusable_circuits *= scale_ratio; + + guard->circ_attempts += (opened_attempts+opened_built); + guard->circ_successes += opened_built; + + entry_guards_changed(); + + log_info(LD_CIRC, + "Scaled pathbias counts to (%f,%f)/%f (%d/%d open) for guard " + "%s ($%s)", + guard->circ_successes, guard->successful_circuits_closed, + guard->circ_attempts, opened_built, opened_attempts, + guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); + + /* Have the counts just become invalid by this scaling attempt? */ + if (counts_are_sane && guard->circ_attempts < guard->circ_successes) { + log_notice(LD_BUG, + "Scaling has mangled pathbias counts to %f/%f (%d/%d open) " + "for guard %s ($%s)", + guard->circ_successes, guard->circ_attempts, opened_built, + opened_attempts, guard->nickname, + hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); + } + } +} + +/** + * This function scales the path bias circuit close rates if we have + * more data than the scaling threshold. This allows us to be more + * sensitive to recent measurements. + * + * XXX: The attempt count transfer stuff here might be done + * better by keeping separate pending counters that get + * transfered at circuit close. See ticket #8160. + */ +void +pathbias_scale_use_rates(entry_guard_t *guard) +{ + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + + /* If we get a ton of circuits, just scale everything down */ + if (guard->use_attempts > pathbias_get_scale_use_threshold(options)) { + double scale_ratio = pathbias_get_scale_ratio(options); + int opened_attempts = pathbias_count_circs_in_states(guard, + PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED, PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED); + /* Verify that the counts are sane before and after scaling */ + int counts_are_sane = (guard->use_attempts >= guard->use_successes); + + guard->use_attempts -= opened_attempts; + + guard->use_attempts *= scale_ratio; + guard->use_successes *= scale_ratio; + + guard->use_attempts += opened_attempts; + + log_info(LD_CIRC, + "Scaled pathbias use counts to %f/%f (%d open) for guard %s ($%s)", + guard->use_successes, guard->use_attempts, opened_attempts, + guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); + + /* Have the counts just become invalid by this scaling attempt? */ + if (counts_are_sane && guard->use_attempts < guard->use_successes) { + log_notice(LD_BUG, + "Scaling has mangled pathbias usage counts to %f/%f " + "(%d open) for guard %s ($%s)", + guard->circ_successes, guard->circ_attempts, + opened_attempts, guard->nickname, + hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); + } + + entry_guards_changed(); + } +} + diff --git a/src/or/circpathbias.h b/src/or/circpathbias.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c95d801a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/circpathbias.h @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2013, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file circuitbuild.h + * \brief Header file for circuitbuild.c. + **/ + +#ifndef TOR_CIRCPATHBIAS_H +#define TOR_CIRCPATHBIAS_H + +double pathbias_get_extreme_rate(const or_options_t *options); +double pathbias_get_extreme_use_rate(const or_options_t *options); +int pathbias_get_dropguards(const or_options_t *options); +void pathbias_count_timeout(origin_circuit_t *circ); +void pathbias_count_build_success(origin_circuit_t *circ); +int pathbias_count_build_attempt(origin_circuit_t *circ); +int pathbias_check_close(origin_circuit_t *circ, int reason); +int pathbias_check_probe_response(circuit_t *circ, const cell_t *cell); +void pathbias_count_use_attempt(origin_circuit_t *circ); +void pathbias_mark_use_success(origin_circuit_t *circ); +void pathbias_mark_use_rollback(origin_circuit_t *circ); +const char *pathbias_state_to_string(path_state_t state); + +#endif + diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 43d2ffe4d..8e6bb59ef 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include "or.h" #include "channel.h" +#include "circpathbias.h" #include "circuitbuild.h" #include "circuitlist.h" #include "circuitstats.h" @@ -40,19 +41,11 @@ #include "routerparse.h" #include "routerset.h" #include "crypto.h" -#include "connection_edge.h" #ifndef MIN #define MIN(a,b) ((a)<(b)?(a):(b)) #endif -/********* START VARIABLES **********/ - -/** A global list of all circuits at this hop. */ -extern circuit_t *global_circuitlist; - -/********* END VARIABLES ************/ - static channel_t * channel_connect_for_circuit(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, const char *id_digest); @@ -64,14 +57,6 @@ static crypt_path_t *onion_next_hop_in_cpath(crypt_path_t *cpath); static int onion_extend_cpath(origin_circuit_t *circ); static int count_acceptable_nodes(smartlist_t *routers); static int onion_append_hop(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, extend_info_t *choice); -static int entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(entry_guard_t *guard); -static void pathbias_count_build_success(origin_circuit_t *circ); -static void pathbias_count_successful_close(origin_circuit_t *circ); -static void pathbias_count_collapse(origin_circuit_t *circ); -static void pathbias_count_use_failed(origin_circuit_t *circ); -static void pathbias_measure_use_rate(entry_guard_t *guard); -static void pathbias_measure_close_rate(entry_guard_t *guard); -static void pathbias_scale_use_rates(entry_guard_t *guard); /** This function tries to get a channel to the specified endpoint, * and then calls command_setup_channel() to give it the right @@ -600,16 +585,18 @@ should_use_create_fast_for_circuit(origin_circuit_t *circ) if (!circ->cpath->extend_info->onion_key) return 1; /* our hand is forced: only a create_fast will work. */ - if (!options->FastFirstHopPK) - return 0; /* we prefer to avoid create_fast */ if (public_server_mode(options)) { /* We're a server, and we know an onion key. We can choose. * Prefer to blend our circuit into the other circuits we are * creating on behalf of others. */ return 0; } + if (options->FastFirstHopPK == -1) { + /* option is "auto", so look at the consensus. */ + return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "usecreatefast", 1, 0, 1); + } - return 1; + return options->FastFirstHopPK; } /** Return true if <b>circ</b> is the type of circuit we want to count @@ -779,20 +766,24 @@ circuit_send_next_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ) * it off at, we probably had a suspend event along this codepath, * and we should discard the value. */ - if (timediff < 0 || timediff > 2*circ_times.close_ms+1000) { + if (timediff < 0 || + timediff > 2*get_circuit_build_close_time_ms()+1000) { log_notice(LD_CIRC, "Strange value for circuit build time: %ldmsec. " "Assuming clock jump. Purpose %d (%s)", timediff, circ->base_.purpose, circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose)); } else if (!circuit_build_times_disabled()) { /* Only count circuit times if the network is live */ - if (circuit_build_times_network_check_live(&circ_times)) { - circuit_build_times_add_time(&circ_times, (build_time_t)timediff); - circuit_build_times_set_timeout(&circ_times); + if (circuit_build_times_network_check_live( + get_circuit_build_times())) { + circuit_build_times_add_time(get_circuit_build_times_mutable(), + (build_time_t)timediff); + circuit_build_times_set_timeout(get_circuit_build_times_mutable()); } if (circ->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT) { - circuit_build_times_network_circ_success(&circ_times); + circuit_build_times_network_circ_success( + get_circuit_build_times_mutable()); } } } @@ -1087,1516 +1078,6 @@ circuit_init_cpath_crypto(crypt_path_t *cpath, const char *key_data, return 0; } -/** The minimum number of circuit attempts before we start - * thinking about warning about path bias and dropping guards */ -static int -pathbias_get_min_circs(const or_options_t *options) -{ -#define DFLT_PATH_BIAS_MIN_CIRC 150 - if (options->PathBiasCircThreshold >= 5) - return options->PathBiasCircThreshold; - else - return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "pb_mincircs", - DFLT_PATH_BIAS_MIN_CIRC, - 5, INT32_MAX); -} - -/** The circuit success rate below which we issue a notice */ -static double -pathbias_get_notice_rate(const or_options_t *options) -{ -#define DFLT_PATH_BIAS_NOTICE_PCT 70 - if (options->PathBiasNoticeRate >= 0.0) - return options->PathBiasNoticeRate; - else - return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "pb_noticepct", - DFLT_PATH_BIAS_NOTICE_PCT, 0, 100)/100.0; -} - -/* XXXX024 I'd like to have this be static again, but entrynodes.c needs it. */ -/** The circuit success rate below which we issue a warn */ -static double -pathbias_get_warn_rate(const or_options_t *options) -{ -#define DFLT_PATH_BIAS_WARN_PCT 50 - if (options->PathBiasWarnRate >= 0.0) - return options->PathBiasWarnRate; - else - return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "pb_warnpct", - DFLT_PATH_BIAS_WARN_PCT, 0, 100)/100.0; -} - -/* XXXX024 I'd like to have this be static again, but entrynodes.c needs it. */ -/** - * The extreme rate is the rate at which we would drop the guard, - * if pb_dropguard is also set. Otherwise we just warn. - */ -double -pathbias_get_extreme_rate(const or_options_t *options) -{ -#define DFLT_PATH_BIAS_EXTREME_PCT 30 - if (options->PathBiasExtremeRate >= 0.0) - return options->PathBiasExtremeRate; - else - return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "pb_extremepct", - DFLT_PATH_BIAS_EXTREME_PCT, 0, 100)/100.0; -} - -/* XXXX024 I'd like to have this be static again, but entrynodes.c needs it. */ -/** - * If 1, we actually disable use of guards that fall below - * the extreme_pct. - */ -int -pathbias_get_dropguards(const or_options_t *options) -{ -#define DFLT_PATH_BIAS_DROP_GUARDS 0 - if (options->PathBiasDropGuards >= 0) - return options->PathBiasDropGuards; - else - return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "pb_dropguards", - DFLT_PATH_BIAS_DROP_GUARDS, 0, 1); -} - -/** - * This is the number of circuits at which we scale our - * counts by mult_factor/scale_factor. Note, this count is - * not exact, as we only perform the scaling in the event - * of no integer truncation. - */ -static int -pathbias_get_scale_threshold(const or_options_t *options) -{ -#define DFLT_PATH_BIAS_SCALE_THRESHOLD 300 - if (options->PathBiasScaleThreshold >= 10) - return options->PathBiasScaleThreshold; - else - return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "pb_scalecircs", - DFLT_PATH_BIAS_SCALE_THRESHOLD, 10, - INT32_MAX); -} - -/** - * Compute the path bias scaling ratio from the consensus - * parameters pb_multfactor/pb_scalefactor. - * - * Returns a value in (0, 1.0] which we multiply our pathbias - * counts with to scale them down. - */ -static double -pathbias_get_scale_ratio(const or_options_t *options) -{ - /* - * The scale factor is the denominator for our scaling - * of circuit counts for our path bias window. - * - * Note that our use of doubles for the path bias state - * file means that powers of 2 work best here. - */ - int denominator = networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "pb_scalefactor", - 2, 2, INT32_MAX); - (void) options; - /** - * The mult factor is the numerator for our scaling - * of circuit counts for our path bias window. It - * allows us to scale by fractions. - */ - return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "pb_multfactor", - 1, 1, denominator)/((double)denominator); -} - -/** The minimum number of circuit usage attempts before we start - * thinking about warning about path use bias and dropping guards */ -static int -pathbias_get_min_use(const or_options_t *options) -{ -#define DFLT_PATH_BIAS_MIN_USE 20 - if (options->PathBiasUseThreshold >= 3) - return options->PathBiasUseThreshold; - else - return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "pb_minuse", - DFLT_PATH_BIAS_MIN_USE, - 3, INT32_MAX); -} - -/** The circuit use success rate below which we issue a notice */ -static double -pathbias_get_notice_use_rate(const or_options_t *options) -{ -#define DFLT_PATH_BIAS_NOTICE_USE_PCT 80 - if (options->PathBiasNoticeUseRate >= 0.0) - return options->PathBiasNoticeUseRate; - else - return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "pb_noticeusepct", - DFLT_PATH_BIAS_NOTICE_USE_PCT, - 0, 100)/100.0; -} - -/** - * The extreme use rate is the rate at which we would drop the guard, - * if pb_dropguard is also set. Otherwise we just warn. - */ -double -pathbias_get_extreme_use_rate(const or_options_t *options) -{ -#define DFLT_PATH_BIAS_EXTREME_USE_PCT 60 - if (options->PathBiasExtremeUseRate >= 0.0) - return options->PathBiasExtremeUseRate; - else - return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "pb_extremeusepct", - DFLT_PATH_BIAS_EXTREME_USE_PCT, - 0, 100)/100.0; -} - -/** - * This is the number of circuits at which we scale our - * use counts by mult_factor/scale_factor. Note, this count is - * not exact, as we only perform the scaling in the event - * of no integer truncation. - */ -static int -pathbias_get_scale_use_threshold(const or_options_t *options) -{ -#define DFLT_PATH_BIAS_SCALE_USE_THRESHOLD 100 - if (options->PathBiasScaleUseThreshold >= 10) - return options->PathBiasScaleUseThreshold; - else - return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "pb_scaleuse", - DFLT_PATH_BIAS_SCALE_USE_THRESHOLD, - 10, INT32_MAX); -} - -/** - * Convert a Guard's path state to string. - */ -const char * -pathbias_state_to_string(path_state_t state) -{ - switch (state) { - case PATH_STATE_NEW_CIRC: - return "new"; - case PATH_STATE_BUILD_ATTEMPTED: - return "build attempted"; - case PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED: - return "build succeeded"; - case PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED: - return "use attempted"; - case PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED: - return "use succeeded"; - case PATH_STATE_USE_FAILED: - return "use failed"; - case PATH_STATE_ALREADY_COUNTED: - return "already counted"; - } - - return "unknown"; -} - -/** - * This function decides if a circuit has progressed far enough to count - * as a circuit "attempt". As long as end-to-end tagging is possible, - * we assume the adversary will use it over hop-to-hop failure. Therefore, - * we only need to account bias for the last hop. This should make us - * much more resilient to ambient circuit failure, and also make that - * failure easier to measure (we only need to measure Exit failure rates). - */ -static int -pathbias_is_new_circ_attempt(origin_circuit_t *circ) -{ -#define N2N_TAGGING_IS_POSSIBLE -#ifdef N2N_TAGGING_IS_POSSIBLE - /* cpath is a circular list. We want circs with more than one hop, - * and the second hop must be waiting for keys still (it's just - * about to get them). */ - return circ->cpath && - circ->cpath->next != circ->cpath && - circ->cpath->next->state == CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS; -#else - /* If tagging attacks are no longer possible, we probably want to - * count bias from the first hop. However, one could argue that - * timing-based tagging is still more useful than per-hop failure. - * In which case, we'd never want to use this. - */ - return circ->cpath && - circ->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS; -#endif -} - -/** - * Decide if the path bias code should count a circuit. - * - * @returns 1 if we should count it, 0 otherwise. - */ -static int -pathbias_should_count(origin_circuit_t *circ) -{ -#define PATHBIAS_COUNT_INTERVAL (600) - static ratelim_t count_limit = - RATELIM_INIT(PATHBIAS_COUNT_INTERVAL); - char *rate_msg = NULL; - - /* We can't do path bias accounting without entry guards. - * Testing and controller circuits also have no guards. - * - * We also don't count server-side rends, because their - * endpoint could be chosen maliciously. - * Similarly, we can't count client-side intro attempts, - * because clients can be manipulated into connecting to - * malicious intro points. */ - if (get_options()->UseEntryGuards == 0 || - circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING || - circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER || - circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND || - circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED || - (circ->base_.purpose >= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING && - circ->base_.purpose <= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACKED)) { - - /* Check to see if the shouldcount result has changed due to a - * unexpected purpose change that would affect our results. - * - * The reason we check the path state too here is because for the - * cannibalized versions of these purposes, we count them as successful - * before their purpose change. - */ - if (circ->pathbias_shouldcount == PATHBIAS_SHOULDCOUNT_COUNTED - && circ->path_state != PATH_STATE_ALREADY_COUNTED) { - log_info(LD_BUG, - "Circuit %d is now being ignored despite being counted " - "in the past. Purpose is %s, path state is %s", - circ->global_identifier, - circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose), - pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state)); - } - circ->pathbias_shouldcount = PATHBIAS_SHOULDCOUNT_IGNORED; - return 0; - } - - /* Completely ignore one hop circuits */ - if (circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel || - circ->build_state->desired_path_len == 1) { - /* Check for inconsistency */ - if (circ->build_state->desired_path_len != 1 || - !circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel) { - if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&count_limit, approx_time()))) { - log_info(LD_BUG, - "One-hop circuit has length %d. Path state is %s. " - "Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s", - circ->build_state->desired_path_len, - pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state), - circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose), - circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state), - rate_msg); - tor_free(rate_msg); - } - tor_fragile_assert(); - } - - /* Check to see if the shouldcount result has changed due to a - * unexpected change that would affect our results */ - if (circ->pathbias_shouldcount == PATHBIAS_SHOULDCOUNT_COUNTED) { - log_info(LD_BUG, - "One-hop circuit %d is now being ignored despite being counted " - "in the past. Purpose is %s, path state is %s", - circ->global_identifier, - circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose), - pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state)); - } - circ->pathbias_shouldcount = PATHBIAS_SHOULDCOUNT_IGNORED; - return 0; - } - - /* Check to see if the shouldcount result has changed due to a - * unexpected purpose change that would affect our results */ - if (circ->pathbias_shouldcount == PATHBIAS_SHOULDCOUNT_IGNORED) { - log_info(LD_BUG, - "Circuit %d is now being counted despite being ignored " - "in the past. Purpose is %s, path state is %s", - circ->global_identifier, - circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose), - pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state)); - } - circ->pathbias_shouldcount = PATHBIAS_SHOULDCOUNT_COUNTED; - - return 1; -} - -/** - * Check our circuit state to see if this is a successful circuit attempt. - * If so, record it in the current guard's path bias circ_attempt count. - * - * Also check for several potential error cases for bug #6475. - */ -static int -pathbias_count_build_attempt(origin_circuit_t *circ) -{ -#define CIRC_ATTEMPT_NOTICE_INTERVAL (600) - static ratelim_t circ_attempt_notice_limit = - RATELIM_INIT(CIRC_ATTEMPT_NOTICE_INTERVAL); - char *rate_msg = NULL; - - if (!pathbias_should_count(circ)) { - return 0; - } - - if (pathbias_is_new_circ_attempt(circ)) { - /* Help track down the real cause of bug #6475: */ - if (circ->has_opened && circ->path_state != PATH_STATE_BUILD_ATTEMPTED) { - if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&circ_attempt_notice_limit, - approx_time()))) { - log_info(LD_BUG, - "Opened circuit is in strange path state %s. " - "Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s", - pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state), - circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose), - circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state), - rate_msg); - tor_free(rate_msg); - } - } - - /* Don't re-count cannibalized circs.. */ - if (!circ->has_opened) { - entry_guard_t *guard = NULL; - - if (circ->cpath && circ->cpath->extend_info) { - guard = entry_guard_get_by_id_digest( - circ->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest); - } else if (circ->base_.n_chan) { - guard = - entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(circ->base_.n_chan->identity_digest); - } - - if (guard) { - if (circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_NEW_CIRC) { - circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_BUILD_ATTEMPTED; - - if (entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(guard) < 0) { - /* Bogus guard; we already warned. */ - return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; - } - } else { - if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&circ_attempt_notice_limit, - approx_time()))) { - log_info(LD_BUG, - "Unopened circuit has strange path state %s. " - "Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s", - pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state), - circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose), - circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state), - rate_msg); - tor_free(rate_msg); - } - } - } else { - if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&circ_attempt_notice_limit, - approx_time()))) { - log_info(LD_CIRC, - "Unopened circuit has no known guard. " - "Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s", - circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose), - circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state), - rate_msg); - tor_free(rate_msg); - } - } - } - } - - return 0; -} - -/** - * Check our circuit state to see if this is a successful circuit - * completion. If so, record it in the current guard's path bias - * success count. - * - * Also check for several potential error cases for bug #6475. - */ -static void -pathbias_count_build_success(origin_circuit_t *circ) -{ -#define SUCCESS_NOTICE_INTERVAL (600) - static ratelim_t success_notice_limit = - RATELIM_INIT(SUCCESS_NOTICE_INTERVAL); - char *rate_msg = NULL; - entry_guard_t *guard = NULL; - - if (!pathbias_should_count(circ)) { - return; - } - - /* Don't count cannibalized/reused circs for path bias - * "build" success, since they get counted under "use" success. */ - if (!circ->has_opened) { - if (circ->cpath && circ->cpath->extend_info) { - guard = entry_guard_get_by_id_digest( - circ->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest); - } - - if (guard) { - if (circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_BUILD_ATTEMPTED) { - circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED; - guard->circ_successes++; - entry_guards_changed(); - - log_info(LD_CIRC, "Got success count %f/%f for guard %s ($%s)", - guard->circ_successes, guard->circ_attempts, - guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); - } else { - if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&success_notice_limit, - approx_time()))) { - log_info(LD_BUG, - "Succeeded circuit is in strange path state %s. " - "Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s", - pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state), - circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose), - circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state), - rate_msg); - tor_free(rate_msg); - } - } - - if (guard->circ_attempts < guard->circ_successes) { - log_notice(LD_BUG, "Unexpectedly high successes counts (%f/%f) " - "for guard %s ($%s)", - guard->circ_successes, guard->circ_attempts, - guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); - } - /* In rare cases, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING can get converted to - * CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT and have no guards here. - * No need to log that case. */ - } else if (circ->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT) { - if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&success_notice_limit, - approx_time()))) { - log_info(LD_CIRC, - "Completed circuit has no known guard. " - "Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s", - circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose), - circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state), - rate_msg); - tor_free(rate_msg); - } - } - } else { - if (circ->path_state < PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED) { - if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&success_notice_limit, - approx_time()))) { - log_info(LD_BUG, - "Opened circuit is in strange path state %s. " - "Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s", - pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state), - circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose), - circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state), - rate_msg); - tor_free(rate_msg); - } - } - } -} - -/** - * Record an attempt to use a circuit. Changes the circuit's - * path state and update its guard's usage counter. - * - * Used for path bias usage accounting. - */ -void -pathbias_count_use_attempt(origin_circuit_t *circ) -{ - entry_guard_t *guard; - - if (!pathbias_should_count(circ)) { - return; - } - - if (circ->path_state < PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED) { - log_notice(LD_BUG, - "Used circuit is in strange path state %s. " - "Circuit is a %s currently %s.", - pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state), - circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose), - circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state)); - } else if (circ->path_state < PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED) { - guard = entry_guard_get_by_id_digest( - circ->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest); - if (guard) { - pathbias_measure_use_rate(guard); - pathbias_scale_use_rates(guard); - guard->use_attempts++; - entry_guards_changed(); - - log_debug(LD_CIRC, - "Marked circuit %d (%f/%f) as used for guard %s ($%s).", - circ->global_identifier, - guard->use_successes, guard->use_attempts, - guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); - } - - circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED; - } else { - /* Harmless but educational log message */ - log_info(LD_CIRC, - "Used circuit %d is already in path state %s. " - "Circuit is a %s currently %s.", - circ->global_identifier, - pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state), - circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose), - circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state)); - } - - return; -} - -/** - * Check the circuit's path state is appropriate and mark it as - * successfully used. Used for path bias usage accounting. - * - * We don't actually increment the guard's counters until - * pathbias_check_close(), because the circuit can still transition - * back to PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED if a stream fails later (this - * is done so we can probe the circuit for liveness at close). - */ -void -pathbias_mark_use_success(origin_circuit_t *circ) -{ - if (!pathbias_should_count(circ)) { - return; - } - - if (circ->path_state < PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED) { - log_notice(LD_BUG, - "Used circuit %d is in strange path state %s. " - "Circuit is a %s currently %s.", - circ->global_identifier, - pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state), - circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose), - circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state)); - - pathbias_count_use_attempt(circ); - } - - /* We don't do any accounting at the guard until actual circuit close */ - circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED; - - return; -} - -/** - * If a stream ever detatches from a circuit in a retriable way, - * we need to mark this circuit as still needing either another - * successful stream, or in need of a probe. - * - * An adversary could let the first stream request succeed (ie the - * resolve), but then tag and timeout the remainder (via cell - * dropping), forcing them on new circuits. - * - * Rolling back the state will cause us to probe such circuits, which - * should lead to probe failures in the event of such tagging due to - * either unrecognized cells coming in while we wait for the probe, - * or the cipher state getting out of sync in the case of dropped cells. - */ -void -pathbias_mark_use_rollback(origin_circuit_t *circ) -{ - if (circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED) { - log_info(LD_CIRC, - "Rolling back pathbias use state to 'attempted' for detached " - "circuit %d", circ->global_identifier); - circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED; - } -} - -/** - * Actually count a circuit success towards a guard's usage counters - * if the path state is appropriate. - */ -static void -pathbias_count_use_success(origin_circuit_t *circ) -{ - entry_guard_t *guard; - - if (!pathbias_should_count(circ)) { - return; - } - - if (circ->path_state != PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED) { - log_notice(LD_BUG, - "Successfully used circuit %d is in strange path state %s. " - "Circuit is a %s currently %s.", - circ->global_identifier, - pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state), - circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose), - circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state)); - } else { - guard = entry_guard_get_by_id_digest( - circ->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest); - if (guard) { - guard->use_successes++; - entry_guards_changed(); - - if (guard->use_attempts < guard->use_successes) { - log_notice(LD_BUG, "Unexpectedly high use successes counts (%f/%f) " - "for guard %s=%s", - guard->use_successes, guard->use_attempts, - guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); - } - - log_debug(LD_CIRC, - "Marked circuit %d (%f/%f) as used successfully for guard " - "%s ($%s).", - circ->global_identifier, guard->use_successes, - guard->use_attempts, guard->nickname, - hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); - } - } - - return; -} - -/** - * Send a probe down a circuit that the client attempted to use, - * but for which the stream timed out/failed. The probe is a - * RELAY_BEGIN cell with a 0.a.b.c destination address, which - * the exit will reject and reply back, echoing that address. - * - * The reason for such probes is because it is possible to bias - * a user's paths simply by causing timeouts, and these timeouts - * are not possible to differentiate from unresponsive servers. - * - * The probe is sent at the end of the circuit lifetime for two - * reasons: to prevent cryptographic taggers from being able to - * drop cells to cause timeouts, and to prevent easy recognition - * of probes before any real client traffic happens. - * - * Returns -1 if we couldn't probe, 0 otherwise. - */ -static int -pathbias_send_usable_probe(circuit_t *circ) -{ - /* Based on connection_ap_handshake_send_begin() */ - char payload[CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE]; - int payload_len; - origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); - crypt_path_t *cpath_layer = NULL; - char *probe_nonce = NULL; - - tor_assert(ocirc); - - cpath_layer = ocirc->cpath->prev; - - if (cpath_layer->state != CPATH_STATE_OPEN) { - /* This can happen for cannibalized circuits. Their - * last hop isn't yet open */ - log_info(LD_CIRC, - "Got pathbias probe request for unopened circuit %d. " - "Opened %d, len %d", ocirc->global_identifier, - ocirc->has_opened, ocirc->build_state->desired_path_len); - return -1; - } - - /* We already went down this road. */ - if (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING && - ocirc->pathbias_probe_id) { - log_info(LD_CIRC, - "Got pathbias probe request for circuit %d with " - "outstanding probe", ocirc->global_identifier); - return -1; - } - - /* Can't probe if the channel isn't open */ - if (circ->n_chan == NULL || - (circ->n_chan->state != CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN - && circ->n_chan->state != CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT)) { - log_info(LD_CIRC, - "Skipping pathbias probe for circuit %d: Channel is not open.", - ocirc->global_identifier); - return -1; - } - - circuit_change_purpose(circ, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING); - - /* Update timestamp for when circuit_expire_building() should kill us */ - tor_gettimeofday(&circ->timestamp_began); - - /* Generate a random address for the nonce */ - crypto_rand((char*)ô->pathbias_probe_nonce, - sizeof(ocirc->pathbias_probe_nonce)); - ocirc->pathbias_probe_nonce &= 0x00ffffff; - probe_nonce = tor_dup_ip(ocirc->pathbias_probe_nonce); - - tor_snprintf(payload,RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE, "%s:25", probe_nonce); - payload_len = (int)strlen(payload)+1; - - // XXX: need this? Can we assume ipv4 will always be supported? - // If not, how do we tell? - //if (payload_len <= RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE - 4 && edge_conn->begincell_flags) { - // set_uint32(payload + payload_len, htonl(edge_conn->begincell_flags)); - // payload_len += 4; - //} - - /* Generate+Store stream id, make sure it's non-zero */ - ocirc->pathbias_probe_id = get_unique_stream_id_by_circ(ocirc); - - if (ocirc->pathbias_probe_id==0) { - log_warn(LD_CIRC, - "Ran out of stream IDs on circuit %u during " - "pathbias probe attempt.", ocirc->global_identifier); - tor_free(probe_nonce); - return -1; - } - - log_info(LD_CIRC, - "Sending pathbias testing cell to %s:25 on stream %d for circ %d.", - probe_nonce, ocirc->pathbias_probe_id, ocirc->global_identifier); - tor_free(probe_nonce); - - /* Send a test relay cell */ - if (relay_send_command_from_edge(ocirc->pathbias_probe_id, circ, - RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN, payload, - payload_len, cpath_layer) < 0) { - log_notice(LD_CIRC, - "Failed to send pathbias probe cell on circuit %d.", - ocirc->global_identifier); - return -1; - } - - /* Mark it freshly dirty so it doesn't get expired in the meantime */ - circ->timestamp_dirty = time(NULL); - - return 0; -} - -/** - * Check the response to a pathbias probe, to ensure the - * cell is recognized and the nonce and other probe - * characteristics are as expected. - * - * If the response is valid, return 0. Otherwise return < 0. - */ -int -pathbias_check_probe_response(circuit_t *circ, const cell_t *cell) -{ - /* Based on connection_edge_process_relay_cell() */ - relay_header_t rh; - int reason; - uint32_t ipv4_host; - origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); - - tor_assert(cell); - tor_assert(ocirc); - tor_assert(circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING); - - relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload); - - reason = rh.length > 0 ? - get_uint8(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE) : END_STREAM_REASON_MISC; - - if (rh.command == RELAY_COMMAND_END && - reason == END_STREAM_REASON_EXITPOLICY && - ocirc->pathbias_probe_id == rh.stream_id) { - - /* Check length+extract host: It is in network order after the reason code. - * See connection_edge_end(). */ - if (rh.length < 9) { /* reason+ipv4+dns_ttl */ - log_notice(LD_PROTOCOL, - "Short path bias probe response length field (%d).", rh.length); - return - END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; - } - - ipv4_host = ntohl(get_uint32(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+1)); - - /* Check nonce */ - if (ipv4_host == ocirc->pathbias_probe_nonce) { - pathbias_mark_use_success(ocirc); - circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED); - log_info(LD_CIRC, - "Got valid path bias probe back for circ %d, stream %d.", - ocirc->global_identifier, ocirc->pathbias_probe_id); - return 0; - } else { - log_notice(LD_CIRC, - "Got strange probe value 0x%x vs 0x%x back for circ %d, " - "stream %d.", ipv4_host, ocirc->pathbias_probe_nonce, - ocirc->global_identifier, ocirc->pathbias_probe_id); - return -1; - } - } - log_info(LD_CIRC, - "Got another cell back back on pathbias probe circuit %d: " - "Command: %d, Reason: %d, Stream-id: %d", - ocirc->global_identifier, rh.command, reason, rh.stream_id); - return -1; -} - -/** - * Check if a circuit was used and/or closed successfully. - * - * If we attempted to use the circuit to carry a stream but failed - * for whatever reason, or if the circuit mysteriously died before - * we could attach any streams, record these two cases. - * - * If we *have* successfully used the circuit, or it appears to - * have been closed by us locally, count it as a success. - * - * Returns 0 if we're done making decisions with the circ, - * or -1 if we want to probe it first. - */ -int -pathbias_check_close(origin_circuit_t *ocirc, int reason) -{ - circuit_t *circ = ô->base_; - - if (!pathbias_should_count(ocirc)) { - return 0; - } - - switch (ocirc->path_state) { - /* If the circuit was closed after building, but before use, we need - * to ensure we were the ones who tried to close it (and not a remote - * actor). */ - case PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED: - if (reason & END_CIRC_REASON_FLAG_REMOTE) { - /* Remote circ close reasons on an unused circuit all could be bias */ - log_info(LD_CIRC, - "Circuit %d remote-closed without successful use for reason %d. " - "Circuit purpose %d currently %d,%s. Len %d.", - ocirc->global_identifier, - reason, circ->purpose, ocirc->has_opened, - circuit_state_to_string(circ->state), - ocirc->build_state->desired_path_len); - pathbias_count_collapse(ocirc); - } else if ((reason & ~END_CIRC_REASON_FLAG_REMOTE) - == END_CIRC_REASON_CHANNEL_CLOSED && - circ->n_chan && - circ->n_chan->reason_for_closing - != CHANNEL_CLOSE_REQUESTED) { - /* If we didn't close the channel ourselves, it could be bias */ - /* XXX: Only count bias if the network is live? - * What about clock jumps/suspends? */ - log_info(LD_CIRC, - "Circuit %d's channel closed without successful use for reason " - "%d, channel reason %d. Circuit purpose %d currently %d,%s. Len " - "%d.", ocirc->global_identifier, - reason, circ->n_chan->reason_for_closing, - circ->purpose, ocirc->has_opened, - circuit_state_to_string(circ->state), - ocirc->build_state->desired_path_len); - pathbias_count_collapse(ocirc); - } else { - pathbias_count_successful_close(ocirc); - } - break; - - /* If we tried to use a circuit but failed, we should probe it to ensure - * it has not been tampered with. */ - case PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED: - /* XXX: Only probe and/or count failure if the network is live? - * What about clock jumps/suspends? */ - if (pathbias_send_usable_probe(circ) == 0) - return -1; - else - pathbias_count_use_failed(ocirc); - - /* Any circuit where there were attempted streams but no successful - * streams could be bias */ - log_info(LD_CIRC, - "Circuit %d closed without successful use for reason %d. " - "Circuit purpose %d currently %d,%s. Len %d.", - ocirc->global_identifier, - reason, circ->purpose, ocirc->has_opened, - circuit_state_to_string(circ->state), - ocirc->build_state->desired_path_len); - break; - - case PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED: - pathbias_count_successful_close(ocirc); - pathbias_count_use_success(ocirc); - break; - - case PATH_STATE_USE_FAILED: - pathbias_count_use_failed(ocirc); - break; - - case PATH_STATE_NEW_CIRC: - case PATH_STATE_BUILD_ATTEMPTED: - case PATH_STATE_ALREADY_COUNTED: - default: - // Other states are uninteresting. No stats to count. - break; - } - - ocirc->path_state = PATH_STATE_ALREADY_COUNTED; - - return 0; -} - -/** - * Count a successfully closed circuit. - */ -static void -pathbias_count_successful_close(origin_circuit_t *circ) -{ - entry_guard_t *guard = NULL; - if (!pathbias_should_count(circ)) { - return; - } - - if (circ->cpath && circ->cpath->extend_info) { - guard = entry_guard_get_by_id_digest( - circ->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest); - } - - if (guard) { - /* In the long run: circuit_success ~= successful_circuit_close + - * circ_failure + stream_failure */ - guard->successful_circuits_closed++; - entry_guards_changed(); - } else if (circ->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT) { - /* In rare cases, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING can get converted to - * CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT and have no guards here. - * No need to log that case. */ - log_info(LD_CIRC, - "Successfully closed circuit has no known guard. " - "Circuit is a %s currently %s", - circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose), - circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state)); - } -} - -/** - * Count a circuit that fails after it is built, but before it can - * carry any traffic. - * - * This is needed because there are ways to destroy a - * circuit after it has successfully completed. Right now, this is - * used for purely informational/debugging purposes. - */ -static void -pathbias_count_collapse(origin_circuit_t *circ) -{ - entry_guard_t *guard = NULL; - - if (!pathbias_should_count(circ)) { - return; - } - - if (circ->cpath && circ->cpath->extend_info) { - guard = entry_guard_get_by_id_digest( - circ->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest); - } - - if (guard) { - guard->collapsed_circuits++; - entry_guards_changed(); - } else if (circ->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT) { - /* In rare cases, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING can get converted to - * CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT and have no guards here. - * No need to log that case. */ - log_info(LD_CIRC, - "Destroyed circuit has no known guard. " - "Circuit is a %s currently %s", - circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose), - circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state)); - } -} - -/** - * Count a known failed circuit (because we could not probe it). - * - * This counter is informational. - */ -static void -pathbias_count_use_failed(origin_circuit_t *circ) -{ - entry_guard_t *guard = NULL; - if (!pathbias_should_count(circ)) { - return; - } - - if (circ->cpath && circ->cpath->extend_info) { - guard = entry_guard_get_by_id_digest( - circ->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest); - } - - if (guard) { - guard->unusable_circuits++; - entry_guards_changed(); - } else if (circ->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT) { - /* In rare cases, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING can get converted to - * CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT and have no guards here. - * No need to log that case. */ - /* XXX note cut-and-paste code in this function compared to nearby - * functions. Would be nice to refactor. -RD */ - log_info(LD_CIRC, - "Stream-failing circuit has no known guard. " - "Circuit is a %s currently %s", - circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose), - circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state)); - } -} - -/** - * Count timeouts for path bias log messages. - * - * These counts are purely informational. - */ -void -pathbias_count_timeout(origin_circuit_t *circ) -{ - entry_guard_t *guard = NULL; - - if (!pathbias_should_count(circ)) { - return; - } - - /* For hidden service circs, they can actually be used - * successfully and then time out later (because - * the other side declines to use them). */ - if (circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED) { - return; - } - - if (circ->cpath && circ->cpath->extend_info) { - guard = entry_guard_get_by_id_digest( - circ->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest); - } - - if (guard) { - guard->timeouts++; - entry_guards_changed(); - } -} - -/** - * Helper function to count all of the currently opened circuits - * for a guard that are in a given path state range. The state - * range is inclusive on both ends. - */ -static int -pathbias_count_circs_in_states(entry_guard_t *guard, - path_state_t from, - path_state_t to) -{ - circuit_t *circ; - int open_circuits = 0; - - /* Count currently open circuits. Give them the benefit of the doubt. */ - for (circ = global_circuitlist; circ; circ = circ->next) { - origin_circuit_t *ocirc = NULL; - if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) || /* didn't originate here */ - circ->marked_for_close) /* already counted */ - continue; - - ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); - - if (!ocirc->cpath || !ocirc->cpath->extend_info) - continue; - - if (ocirc->path_state >= from && - ocirc->path_state <= to && - pathbias_should_count(ocirc) && - fast_memeq(guard->identity, - ocirc->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest, - DIGEST_LEN)) { - log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Found opened circuit %d in path_state %s", - ocirc->global_identifier, - pathbias_state_to_string(ocirc->path_state)); - open_circuits++; - } - } - - return open_circuits; -} - -/** - * Return the number of circuits counted as successfully closed for - * this guard. - * - * Also add in the currently open circuits to give them the benefit - * of the doubt. - */ -double -pathbias_get_close_success_count(entry_guard_t *guard) -{ - return guard->successful_circuits_closed + - pathbias_count_circs_in_states(guard, - PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED, - PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED); -} - -/** - * Return the number of circuits counted as successfully used - * this guard. - * - * Also add in the currently open circuits that we are attempting - * to use to give them the benefit of the doubt. - */ -double -pathbias_get_use_success_count(entry_guard_t *guard) -{ - return guard->use_successes + - pathbias_count_circs_in_states(guard, - PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED, - PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED); -} - -/** - * Check the path bias use rate against our consensus parameter limits. - * - * Emits a log message if the use success rates are too low. - * - * If pathbias_get_dropguards() is set, we also disable the use of - * very failure prone guards. - */ -static void -pathbias_measure_use_rate(entry_guard_t *guard) -{ - const or_options_t *options = get_options(); - - if (guard->use_attempts > pathbias_get_min_use(options)) { - /* Note: We rely on the < comparison here to allow us to set a 0 - * rate and disable the feature entirely. If refactoring, don't - * change to <= */ - if (pathbias_get_use_success_count(guard)/guard->use_attempts - < pathbias_get_extreme_use_rate(options)) { - /* Dropping is currently disabled by default. */ - if (pathbias_get_dropguards(options)) { - if (!guard->path_bias_disabled) { - log_warn(LD_CIRC, - "Your Guard %s ($%s) is failing to carry an extremely large " - "amount of stream on its circuits. " - "To avoid potential route manipulation attacks, Tor has " - "disabled use of this guard. " - "Use counts are %ld/%ld. Success counts are %ld/%ld. " - "%ld circuits completed, %ld were unusable, %ld collapsed, " - "and %ld timed out. " - "For reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.", - guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN), - tor_lround(pathbias_get_use_success_count(guard)), - tor_lround(guard->use_attempts), - tor_lround(pathbias_get_close_success_count(guard)), - tor_lround(guard->circ_attempts), - tor_lround(guard->circ_successes), - tor_lround(guard->unusable_circuits), - tor_lround(guard->collapsed_circuits), - tor_lround(guard->timeouts), - tor_lround(circ_times.close_ms/1000)); - guard->path_bias_disabled = 1; - guard->bad_since = approx_time(); - entry_guards_changed(); - return; - } - } else if (!guard->path_bias_use_extreme) { - guard->path_bias_use_extreme = 1; - log_warn(LD_CIRC, - "Your Guard %s ($%s) is failing to carry an extremely large " - "amount of streams on its circuits. " - "This could indicate a route manipulation attack, network " - "overload, bad local network connectivity, or a bug. " - "Use counts are %ld/%ld. Success counts are %ld/%ld. " - "%ld circuits completed, %ld were unusable, %ld collapsed, " - "and %ld timed out. " - "For reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.", - guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN), - tor_lround(pathbias_get_use_success_count(guard)), - tor_lround(guard->use_attempts), - tor_lround(pathbias_get_close_success_count(guard)), - tor_lround(guard->circ_attempts), - tor_lround(guard->circ_successes), - tor_lround(guard->unusable_circuits), - tor_lround(guard->collapsed_circuits), - tor_lround(guard->timeouts), - tor_lround(circ_times.close_ms/1000)); - } - } else if (pathbias_get_use_success_count(guard)/guard->use_attempts - < pathbias_get_notice_use_rate(options)) { - if (!guard->path_bias_use_noticed) { - guard->path_bias_use_noticed = 1; - log_notice(LD_CIRC, - "Your Guard %s ($%s) is failing to carry more streams on its " - "circuits than usual. " - "Most likely this means the Tor network is overloaded " - "or your network connection is poor. " - "Use counts are %ld/%ld. Success counts are %ld/%ld. " - "%ld circuits completed, %ld were unusable, %ld collapsed, " - "and %ld timed out. " - "For reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.", - guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN), - tor_lround(pathbias_get_use_success_count(guard)), - tor_lround(guard->use_attempts), - tor_lround(pathbias_get_close_success_count(guard)), - tor_lround(guard->circ_attempts), - tor_lround(guard->circ_successes), - tor_lround(guard->unusable_circuits), - tor_lround(guard->collapsed_circuits), - tor_lround(guard->timeouts), - tor_lround(circ_times.close_ms/1000)); - } - } - } -} - -/** - * Check the path bias circuit close status rates against our consensus - * parameter limits. - * - * Emits a log message if the use success rates are too low. - * - * If pathbias_get_dropguards() is set, we also disable the use of - * very failure prone guards. - * - * XXX: This function shares similar log messages and checks to - * pathbias_measure_use_rate(). It may be possible to combine them - * eventually, especially if we can ever remove the need for 3 - * levels of closure warns (if the overall circuit failure rate - * goes down with ntor). One way to do so would be to multiply - * the build rate with the use rate to get an idea of the total - * fraction of the total network paths the user is able to use. - * See ticket #8159. - */ -static void -pathbias_measure_close_rate(entry_guard_t *guard) -{ - const or_options_t *options = get_options(); - - if (guard->circ_attempts > pathbias_get_min_circs(options)) { - /* Note: We rely on the < comparison here to allow us to set a 0 - * rate and disable the feature entirely. If refactoring, don't - * change to <= */ - if (pathbias_get_close_success_count(guard)/guard->circ_attempts - < pathbias_get_extreme_rate(options)) { - /* Dropping is currently disabled by default. */ - if (pathbias_get_dropguards(options)) { - if (!guard->path_bias_disabled) { - log_warn(LD_CIRC, - "Your Guard %s ($%s) is failing an extremely large " - "amount of circuits. " - "To avoid potential route manipulation attacks, Tor has " - "disabled use of this guard. " - "Success counts are %ld/%ld. Use counts are %ld/%ld. " - "%ld circuits completed, %ld were unusable, %ld collapsed, " - "and %ld timed out. " - "For reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.", - guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN), - tor_lround(pathbias_get_close_success_count(guard)), - tor_lround(guard->circ_attempts), - tor_lround(pathbias_get_use_success_count(guard)), - tor_lround(guard->use_attempts), - tor_lround(guard->circ_successes), - tor_lround(guard->unusable_circuits), - tor_lround(guard->collapsed_circuits), - tor_lround(guard->timeouts), - tor_lround(circ_times.close_ms/1000)); - guard->path_bias_disabled = 1; - guard->bad_since = approx_time(); - entry_guards_changed(); - return; - } - } else if (!guard->path_bias_extreme) { - guard->path_bias_extreme = 1; - log_warn(LD_CIRC, - "Your Guard %s ($%s) is failing an extremely large " - "amount of circuits. " - "This could indicate a route manipulation attack, " - "extreme network overload, or a bug. " - "Success counts are %ld/%ld. Use counts are %ld/%ld. " - "%ld circuits completed, %ld were unusable, %ld collapsed, " - "and %ld timed out. " - "For reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.", - guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN), - tor_lround(pathbias_get_close_success_count(guard)), - tor_lround(guard->circ_attempts), - tor_lround(pathbias_get_use_success_count(guard)), - tor_lround(guard->use_attempts), - tor_lround(guard->circ_successes), - tor_lround(guard->unusable_circuits), - tor_lround(guard->collapsed_circuits), - tor_lround(guard->timeouts), - tor_lround(circ_times.close_ms/1000)); - } - } else if (pathbias_get_close_success_count(guard)/guard->circ_attempts - < pathbias_get_warn_rate(options)) { - if (!guard->path_bias_warned) { - guard->path_bias_warned = 1; - log_warn(LD_CIRC, - "Your Guard %s ($%s) is failing a very large " - "amount of circuits. " - "Most likely this means the Tor network is " - "overloaded, but it could also mean an attack against " - "you or potentially the guard itself. " - "Success counts are %ld/%ld. Use counts are %ld/%ld. " - "%ld circuits completed, %ld were unusable, %ld collapsed, " - "and %ld timed out. " - "For reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.", - guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN), - tor_lround(pathbias_get_close_success_count(guard)), - tor_lround(guard->circ_attempts), - tor_lround(pathbias_get_use_success_count(guard)), - tor_lround(guard->use_attempts), - tor_lround(guard->circ_successes), - tor_lround(guard->unusable_circuits), - tor_lround(guard->collapsed_circuits), - tor_lround(guard->timeouts), - tor_lround(circ_times.close_ms/1000)); - } - } else if (pathbias_get_close_success_count(guard)/guard->circ_attempts - < pathbias_get_notice_rate(options)) { - if (!guard->path_bias_noticed) { - guard->path_bias_noticed = 1; - log_notice(LD_CIRC, - "Your Guard %s ($%s) is failing more circuits than " - "usual. " - "Most likely this means the Tor network is overloaded. " - "Success counts are %ld/%ld. Use counts are %ld/%ld. " - "%ld circuits completed, %ld were unusable, %ld collapsed, " - "and %ld timed out. " - "For reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.", - guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN), - tor_lround(pathbias_get_close_success_count(guard)), - tor_lround(guard->circ_attempts), - tor_lround(pathbias_get_use_success_count(guard)), - tor_lround(guard->use_attempts), - tor_lround(guard->circ_successes), - tor_lround(guard->unusable_circuits), - tor_lround(guard->collapsed_circuits), - tor_lround(guard->timeouts), - tor_lround(circ_times.close_ms/1000)); - } - } - } -} - -/** - * This function scales the path bias use rates if we have - * more data than the scaling threshold. This allows us to - * be more sensitive to recent measurements. - * - * XXX: The attempt count transfer stuff here might be done - * better by keeping separate pending counters that get - * transfered at circuit close. See ticket #8160. - */ -static void -pathbias_scale_close_rates(entry_guard_t *guard) -{ - const or_options_t *options = get_options(); - - /* If we get a ton of circuits, just scale everything down */ - if (guard->circ_attempts > pathbias_get_scale_threshold(options)) { - double scale_ratio = pathbias_get_scale_ratio(options); - int opened_attempts = pathbias_count_circs_in_states(guard, - PATH_STATE_BUILD_ATTEMPTED, PATH_STATE_BUILD_ATTEMPTED); - int opened_built = pathbias_count_circs_in_states(guard, - PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED, - PATH_STATE_USE_FAILED); - /* Verify that the counts are sane before and after scaling */ - int counts_are_sane = (guard->circ_attempts >= guard->circ_successes); - - guard->circ_attempts -= (opened_attempts+opened_built); - guard->circ_successes -= opened_built; - - guard->circ_attempts *= scale_ratio; - guard->circ_successes *= scale_ratio; - guard->timeouts *= scale_ratio; - guard->successful_circuits_closed *= scale_ratio; - guard->collapsed_circuits *= scale_ratio; - guard->unusable_circuits *= scale_ratio; - - guard->circ_attempts += (opened_attempts+opened_built); - guard->circ_successes += opened_built; - - entry_guards_changed(); - - log_info(LD_CIRC, - "Scaled pathbias counts to (%f,%f)/%f (%d/%d open) for guard " - "%s ($%s)", - guard->circ_successes, guard->successful_circuits_closed, - guard->circ_attempts, opened_built, opened_attempts, - guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); - - /* Have the counts just become invalid by this scaling attempt? */ - if (counts_are_sane && guard->circ_attempts < guard->circ_successes) { - log_notice(LD_BUG, - "Scaling has mangled pathbias counts to %f/%f (%d/%d open) " - "for guard %s ($%s)", - guard->circ_successes, guard->circ_attempts, opened_built, - opened_attempts, guard->nickname, - hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); - } - } -} - -/** - * This function scales the path bias circuit close rates if we have - * more data than the scaling threshold. This allows us to be more - * sensitive to recent measurements. - * - * XXX: The attempt count transfer stuff here might be done - * better by keeping separate pending counters that get - * transfered at circuit close. See ticket #8160. - */ -void -pathbias_scale_use_rates(entry_guard_t *guard) -{ - const or_options_t *options = get_options(); - - /* If we get a ton of circuits, just scale everything down */ - if (guard->use_attempts > pathbias_get_scale_use_threshold(options)) { - double scale_ratio = pathbias_get_scale_ratio(options); - int opened_attempts = pathbias_count_circs_in_states(guard, - PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED, PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED); - /* Verify that the counts are sane before and after scaling */ - int counts_are_sane = (guard->use_attempts >= guard->use_successes); - - guard->use_attempts -= opened_attempts; - - guard->use_attempts *= scale_ratio; - guard->use_successes *= scale_ratio; - - guard->use_attempts += opened_attempts; - - log_info(LD_CIRC, - "Scaled pathbias use counts to %f/%f (%d open) for guard %s ($%s)", - guard->use_successes, guard->use_attempts, opened_attempts, - guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); - - /* Have the counts just become invalid by this scaling attempt? */ - if (counts_are_sane && guard->use_attempts < guard->use_successes) { - log_notice(LD_BUG, - "Scaling has mangled pathbias usage counts to %f/%f " - "(%d open) for guard %s ($%s)", - guard->circ_successes, guard->circ_attempts, - opened_attempts, guard->nickname, - hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); - } - - entry_guards_changed(); - } -} - -/** Increment the number of times we successfully extended a circuit to - * <b>guard</b>, first checking if the failure rate is high enough that - * we should eliminate the guard. Return -1 if the guard looks no good; - * return 0 if the guard looks fine. - */ -static int -entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(entry_guard_t *guard) -{ - entry_guards_changed(); - - pathbias_measure_close_rate(guard); - - if (guard->path_bias_disabled) - return -1; - - pathbias_scale_close_rates(guard); - guard->circ_attempts++; - - log_info(LD_CIRC, "Got success count %f/%f for guard %s ($%s)", - guard->circ_successes, guard->circ_attempts, guard->nickname, - hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN)); - return 0; -} - /** A "created" cell <b>reply</b> came back to us on circuit <b>circ</b>. * (The body of <b>reply</b> varies depending on what sort of handshake * this is.) @@ -2765,11 +1246,7 @@ onionskin_answer(or_circuit_t *circ, * number of endpoints that would give something away about our destination. * * If the routerlist <b>nodes</b> doesn't have enough routers - * to handle the desired path length, return as large a path length as - * is feasible, except if it's less than 2, in which case return -1. - * XXX ^^ I think this behavior is a hold-over from back when we had only a - * few relays in the network, and certainly back before guards existed. - * We should very likely get rid of it. -RD + * to handle the desired path length, return -1. */ static int new_route_len(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit, smartlist_t *nodes) @@ -2790,19 +1267,13 @@ new_route_len(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit, smartlist_t *nodes) log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Chosen route length %d (%d/%d routers suitable).", routelen, num_acceptable_routers, smartlist_len(nodes)); - if (num_acceptable_routers < 2) { + if (num_acceptable_routers < routelen) { log_info(LD_CIRC, - "Not enough acceptable routers (%d). Discarding this circuit.", - num_acceptable_routers); + "Not enough acceptable routers (%d/%d). Discarding this circuit.", + num_acceptable_routers, routelen); return -1; } - if (num_acceptable_routers < routelen) { - log_info(LD_CIRC,"Not enough routers: cutting routelen from %d to %d.", - routelen, num_acceptable_routers); - routelen = num_acceptable_routers; - } - return routelen; } diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.h b/src/or/circuitbuild.h index a3091707e..ebcb22c45 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.h +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.h @@ -57,16 +57,6 @@ const char *build_state_get_exit_nickname(cpath_build_state_t *state); const node_t *choose_good_entry_server(uint8_t purpose, cpath_build_state_t *state); -double pathbias_get_extreme_rate(const or_options_t *options); -double pathbias_get_extreme_use_rate(const or_options_t *options); -int pathbias_get_dropguards(const or_options_t *options); -void pathbias_count_timeout(origin_circuit_t *circ); -int pathbias_check_close(origin_circuit_t *circ, int reason); -int pathbias_check_probe_response(circuit_t *circ, const cell_t *cell); -void pathbias_count_use_attempt(origin_circuit_t *circ); -void pathbias_mark_use_success(origin_circuit_t *circ); -void pathbias_mark_use_rollback(origin_circuit_t *circ); -const char *pathbias_state_to_string(path_state_t state); #endif diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.c b/src/or/circuitlist.c index b0e24a5fe..c31bc49d0 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.c +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.c @@ -8,9 +8,10 @@ * \file circuitlist.c * \brief Manage the global circuit list. **/ - +#define CIRCUITLIST_PRIVATE #include "or.h" #include "channel.h" +#include "circpathbias.h" #include "circuitbuild.h" #include "circuitlist.h" #include "circuituse.h" @@ -36,12 +37,12 @@ /********* START VARIABLES **********/ /** A global list of all circuits at this hop. */ -circuit_t *global_circuitlist=NULL; +struct global_circuitlist_s global_circuitlist = + TOR_LIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER(global_circuitlist); /** A list of all the circuits in CIRCUIT_STATE_CHAN_WAIT. */ static smartlist_t *circuits_pending_chans = NULL; -static void circuit_free(circuit_t *circ); static void circuit_free_cpath(crypt_path_t *cpath); static void circuit_free_cpath_node(crypt_path_t *victim); static void cpath_ref_decref(crypt_path_reference_t *cpath_ref); @@ -207,18 +208,123 @@ circuit_set_circid_chan_helper(circuit_t *circ, int direction, } } +/** Mark that circuit id <b>id</b> shouldn't be used on channel <b>chan</b>, + * even if there is no circuit on the channel. We use this to keep the + * circuit id from getting re-used while we have queued but not yet sent + * a destroy cell. */ +void +channel_mark_circid_unusable(channel_t *chan, circid_t id) +{ + chan_circid_circuit_map_t search; + chan_circid_circuit_map_t *ent; + + /* See if there's an entry there. That wouldn't be good. */ + memset(&search, 0, sizeof(search)); + search.chan = chan; + search.circ_id = id; + ent = HT_FIND(chan_circid_map, &chan_circid_map, &search); + + if (ent && ent->circuit) { + /* we have a problem. */ + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Tried to mark %u unusable on %p, but there was already " + "a circuit there.", (unsigned)id, chan); + } else if (ent) { + /* It's already marked. */ + } else { + ent = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(chan_circid_circuit_map_t)); + ent->chan = chan; + ent->circ_id = id; + /* leave circuit at NULL */ + HT_INSERT(chan_circid_map, &chan_circid_map, ent); + } +} + +/** Mark that a circuit id <b>id</b> can be used again on <b>chan</b>. + * We use this to re-enable the circuit ID after we've sent a destroy cell. + */ +void +channel_mark_circid_usable(channel_t *chan, circid_t id) +{ + chan_circid_circuit_map_t search; + chan_circid_circuit_map_t *ent; + + /* See if there's an entry there. That wouldn't be good. */ + memset(&search, 0, sizeof(search)); + search.chan = chan; + search.circ_id = id; + ent = HT_REMOVE(chan_circid_map, &chan_circid_map, &search); + if (ent && ent->circuit) { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Tried to mark %u usable on %p, but there was already " + "a circuit there.", (unsigned)id, chan); + return; + } + if (_last_circid_chan_ent == ent) + _last_circid_chan_ent = NULL; + tor_free(ent); +} + +/** Called to indicate that a DESTROY is pending on <b>chan</b> with + * circuit ID <b>id</b>, but hasn't been sent yet. */ +void +channel_note_destroy_pending(channel_t *chan, circid_t id) +{ + circuit_t *circ = circuit_get_by_circid_channel_even_if_marked(id,chan); + if (circ) { + if (circ->n_chan == chan && circ->n_circ_id == id) { + circ->n_delete_pending = 1; + } else { + or_circuit_t *orcirc = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ); + if (orcirc->p_chan == chan && orcirc->p_circ_id == id) { + circ->p_delete_pending = 1; + } + } + return; + } + channel_mark_circid_unusable(chan, id); +} + +/** Called to indicate that a DESTROY is no longer pending on <b>chan</b> with + * circuit ID <b>id</b> -- typically, because it has been sent. */ +void +channel_note_destroy_not_pending(channel_t *chan, circid_t id) +{ + circuit_t *circ = circuit_get_by_circid_channel_even_if_marked(id,chan); + if (circ) { + if (circ->n_chan == chan && circ->n_circ_id == id) { + circ->n_delete_pending = 0; + } else { + or_circuit_t *orcirc = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ); + if (orcirc->p_chan == chan && orcirc->p_circ_id == id) { + circ->p_delete_pending = 0; + } + } + /* XXXX this shouldn't happen; log a bug here. */ + return; + } + channel_mark_circid_usable(chan, id); +} + /** Set the p_conn field of a circuit <b>circ</b>, along * with the corresponding circuit ID, and add the circuit as appropriate * to the (chan,id)-\>circuit map. */ void -circuit_set_p_circid_chan(or_circuit_t *circ, circid_t id, +circuit_set_p_circid_chan(or_circuit_t *or_circ, circid_t id, channel_t *chan) { - circuit_set_circid_chan_helper(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CELL_DIRECTION_IN, - id, chan); + circuit_t *circ = TO_CIRCUIT(or_circ); + channel_t *old_chan = or_circ->p_chan; + circid_t old_id = or_circ->p_circ_id; + + circuit_set_circid_chan_helper(circ, CELL_DIRECTION_IN, id, chan); if (chan) - tor_assert(bool_eq(circ->p_chan_cells.n, circ->next_active_on_p_chan)); + tor_assert(bool_eq(or_circ->p_chan_cells.n, + or_circ->next_active_on_p_chan)); + + if (circ->p_delete_pending && old_chan) { + channel_mark_circid_unusable(old_chan, old_id); + circ->p_delete_pending = 0; + } } /** Set the n_conn field of a circuit <b>circ</b>, along @@ -228,10 +334,18 @@ void circuit_set_n_circid_chan(circuit_t *circ, circid_t id, channel_t *chan) { + channel_t *old_chan = circ->n_chan; + circid_t old_id = circ->n_circ_id; + circuit_set_circid_chan_helper(circ, CELL_DIRECTION_OUT, id, chan); if (chan) tor_assert(bool_eq(circ->n_chan_cells.n, circ->next_active_on_n_chan)); + + if (circ->n_delete_pending && old_chan) { + channel_mark_circid_unusable(old_chan, old_id); + circ->n_delete_pending = 0; + } } /** Change the state of <b>circ</b> to <b>state</b>, adding it to or removing @@ -257,21 +371,6 @@ circuit_set_state(circuit_t *circ, uint8_t state) circ->state = state; } -/** Add <b>circ</b> to the global list of circuits. This is called only from - * within circuit_new. - */ -static void -circuit_add(circuit_t *circ) -{ - if (!global_circuitlist) { /* first one */ - global_circuitlist = circ; - circ->next = NULL; - } else { - circ->next = global_circuitlist; - global_circuitlist = circ; - } -} - /** Append to <b>out</b> all circuits in state CHAN_WAIT waiting for * the given connection. */ void @@ -329,33 +428,17 @@ circuit_count_pending_on_channel(channel_t *chan) void circuit_close_all_marked(void) { - circuit_t *tmp,*m; - - while (global_circuitlist && global_circuitlist->marked_for_close) { - tmp = global_circuitlist->next; - circuit_free(global_circuitlist); - global_circuitlist = tmp; - } - - tmp = global_circuitlist; - while (tmp && tmp->next) { - if (tmp->next->marked_for_close) { - m = tmp->next->next; - circuit_free(tmp->next); - tmp->next = m; - /* Need to check new tmp->next; don't advance tmp. */ - } else { - /* Advance tmp. */ - tmp = tmp->next; - } - } + circuit_t *circ, *tmp; + TOR_LIST_FOREACH_SAFE(circ, &global_circuitlist, head, tmp) + if (circ->marked_for_close) + circuit_free(circ); } /** Return the head of the global linked list of circuits. */ -circuit_t * -circuit_get_global_list_(void) +struct global_circuitlist_s * +circuit_get_global_list(void) { - return global_circuitlist; + return &global_circuitlist; } /** Function to make circ-\>state human-readable */ @@ -570,8 +653,9 @@ init_circuit_base(circuit_t *circ) circ->package_window = circuit_initial_package_window(); circ->deliver_window = CIRCWINDOW_START; + cell_queue_init(&circ->n_chan_cells); - circuit_add(circ); + TOR_LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&global_circuitlist, circ, head); } /** Allocate space for a new circuit, initializing with <b>p_circ_id</b> @@ -595,7 +679,7 @@ origin_circuit_new(void) init_circuit_base(TO_CIRCUIT(circ)); - circ_times.last_circ_at = approx_time(); + circuit_build_times_update_last_circ(get_circuit_build_times_mutable()); return circ; } @@ -615,6 +699,7 @@ or_circuit_new(circid_t p_circ_id, channel_t *p_chan) circuit_set_p_circid_chan(circ, p_circ_id, p_chan); circ->remaining_relay_early_cells = MAX_RELAY_EARLY_CELLS_PER_CIRCUIT; + cell_queue_init(&circ->p_chan_cells); init_circuit_base(TO_CIRCUIT(circ)); @@ -623,7 +708,7 @@ or_circuit_new(circid_t p_circ_id, channel_t *p_chan) /** Deallocate space associated with circ. */ -static void +STATIC void circuit_free(circuit_t *circ) { void *mem; @@ -689,6 +774,8 @@ circuit_free(circuit_t *circ) extend_info_free(circ->n_hop); tor_free(circ->n_chan_create_cell); + TOR_LIST_REMOVE(circ, head); + /* Remove from map. */ circuit_set_n_circid_chan(circ, 0, NULL); @@ -724,11 +811,11 @@ circuit_free_cpath(crypt_path_t *cpath) void circuit_free_all(void) { - circuit_t *next; - while (global_circuitlist) { - next = global_circuitlist->next; - if (! CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(global_circuitlist)) { - or_circuit_t *or_circ = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(global_circuitlist); + circuit_t *tmp, *tmp2; + + TOR_LIST_FOREACH_SAFE(tmp, &global_circuitlist, head, tmp2) { + if (! CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(tmp)) { + or_circuit_t *or_circ = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(tmp); while (or_circ->resolving_streams) { edge_connection_t *next_conn; next_conn = or_circ->resolving_streams->next_stream; @@ -736,8 +823,7 @@ circuit_free_all(void) or_circ->resolving_streams = next_conn; } } - circuit_free(global_circuitlist); - global_circuitlist = next; + circuit_free(tmp); } smartlist_free(circuits_pending_chans); @@ -807,7 +893,7 @@ circuit_dump_by_conn(connection_t *conn, int severity) circuit_t *circ; edge_connection_t *tmpconn; - for (circ = global_circuitlist; circ; circ = circ->next) { + TOR_LIST_FOREACH(circ, &global_circuitlist, head) { circid_t n_circ_id = circ->n_circ_id, p_circ_id = 0; if (circ->marked_for_close) { @@ -871,7 +957,7 @@ circuit_dump_by_chan(channel_t *chan, int severity) tor_assert(chan); - for (circ = global_circuitlist; circ; circ = circ->next) { + TOR_LIST_FOREACH(circ, &global_circuitlist, head) { circid_t n_circ_id = circ->n_circ_id, p_circ_id = 0; if (circ->marked_for_close) { @@ -912,7 +998,7 @@ origin_circuit_t * circuit_get_by_global_id(uint32_t id) { circuit_t *circ; - for (circ=global_circuitlist;circ;circ = circ->next) { + TOR_LIST_FOREACH(circ, &global_circuitlist, head) { if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) && TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->global_identifier == id) { if (circ->marked_for_close) @@ -928,9 +1014,13 @@ circuit_get_by_global_id(uint32_t id) * - circ-\>n_circ_id or circ-\>p_circ_id is equal to <b>circ_id</b>, and * - circ is attached to <b>chan</b>, either as p_chan or n_chan. * Return NULL if no such circuit exists. + * + * If <b>found_entry_out</b> is provided, set it to true if we have a + * placeholder entry for circid/chan, and leave it unset otherwise. */ static INLINE circuit_t * -circuit_get_by_circid_channel_impl(circid_t circ_id, channel_t *chan) +circuit_get_by_circid_channel_impl(circid_t circ_id, channel_t *chan, + int *found_entry_out) { chan_circid_circuit_map_t search; chan_circid_circuit_map_t *found; @@ -951,21 +1041,27 @@ circuit_get_by_circid_channel_impl(circid_t circ_id, channel_t *chan) " circ_id %u, channel ID " U64_FORMAT " (%p)", found->circuit, (unsigned)circ_id, U64_PRINTF_ARG(chan->global_identifier), chan); + if (found_entry_out) + *found_entry_out = 1; return found->circuit; } log_debug(LD_CIRC, - "circuit_get_by_circid_channel_impl() found nothing for" + "circuit_get_by_circid_channel_impl() found %s for" " circ_id %u, channel ID " U64_FORMAT " (%p)", + found ? "placeholder" : "nothing", (unsigned)circ_id, U64_PRINTF_ARG(chan->global_identifier), chan); + if (found_entry_out) + *found_entry_out = found ? 1 : 0; + return NULL; /* The rest of this checks for bugs. Disabled by default. */ /* We comment it out because coverity complains otherwise. { circuit_t *circ; - for (circ=global_circuitlist;circ;circ = circ->next) { + TOR_LIST_FOREACH(circ, &global_circuitlist, head) { if (! CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { or_circuit_t *or_circ = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ); if (or_circ->p_chan == chan && or_circ->p_circ_id == circ_id) { @@ -993,7 +1089,7 @@ circuit_get_by_circid_channel_impl(circid_t circ_id, channel_t *chan) circuit_t * circuit_get_by_circid_channel(circid_t circ_id, channel_t *chan) { - circuit_t *circ = circuit_get_by_circid_channel_impl(circ_id, chan); + circuit_t *circ = circuit_get_by_circid_channel_impl(circ_id, chan, NULL); if (!circ || circ->marked_for_close) return NULL; else @@ -1009,7 +1105,7 @@ circuit_t * circuit_get_by_circid_channel_even_if_marked(circid_t circ_id, channel_t *chan) { - return circuit_get_by_circid_channel_impl(circ_id, chan); + return circuit_get_by_circid_channel_impl(circ_id, chan, NULL); } /** Return true iff the circuit ID <b>circ_id</b> is currently used by a @@ -1017,7 +1113,9 @@ circuit_get_by_circid_channel_even_if_marked(circid_t circ_id, int circuit_id_in_use_on_channel(circid_t circ_id, channel_t *chan) { - return circuit_get_by_circid_channel_impl(circ_id, chan) != NULL; + int found = 0; + return circuit_get_by_circid_channel_impl(circ_id, chan, &found) != NULL + || found; } /** Return the circuit that a given edge connection is using. */ @@ -1045,7 +1143,7 @@ circuit_unlink_all_from_channel(channel_t *chan, int reason) channel_unlink_all_circuits(chan); - for (circ = global_circuitlist; circ; circ = circ->next) { + TOR_LIST_FOREACH(circ, &global_circuitlist, head) { int mark = 0; if (circ->n_chan == chan) { circuit_set_n_circid_chan(circ, 0, NULL); @@ -1081,8 +1179,7 @@ origin_circuit_t * circuit_get_ready_rend_circ_by_rend_data(const rend_data_t *rend_data) { circuit_t *circ; - - for (circ = global_circuitlist; circ; circ = circ->next) { + TOR_LIST_FOREACH(circ, &global_circuitlist, head) { if (!circ->marked_for_close && circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY) { origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); @@ -1110,11 +1207,11 @@ circuit_get_next_by_pk_and_purpose(origin_circuit_t *start, circuit_t *circ; tor_assert(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_IS_ORIGIN(purpose)); if (start == NULL) - circ = global_circuitlist; + circ = TOR_LIST_FIRST(&global_circuitlist); else - circ = TO_CIRCUIT(start)->next; + circ = TOR_LIST_NEXT(TO_CIRCUIT(start), head); - for ( ; circ; circ = circ->next) { + for ( ; circ; circ = TOR_LIST_NEXT(circ, head)) { if (circ->marked_for_close) continue; if (circ->purpose != purpose) @@ -1137,7 +1234,7 @@ circuit_get_by_rend_token_and_purpose(uint8_t purpose, const char *token, size_t len) { circuit_t *circ; - for (circ = global_circuitlist; circ; circ = circ->next) { + TOR_LIST_FOREACH(circ, &global_circuitlist, head) { if (! circ->marked_for_close && circ->purpose == purpose && tor_memeq(TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->rend_token, token, len)) @@ -1199,7 +1296,7 @@ circuit_find_to_cannibalize(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *info, "capacity %d, internal %d", purpose, need_uptime, need_capacity, internal); - for (circ_=global_circuitlist; circ_; circ_ = circ_->next) { + TOR_LIST_FOREACH(circ_, &global_circuitlist, head) { if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ_) && circ_->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN && !circ_->marked_for_close && @@ -1289,8 +1386,7 @@ void circuit_mark_all_unused_circs(void) { circuit_t *circ; - - for (circ=global_circuitlist; circ; circ = circ->next) { + TOR_LIST_FOREACH(circ, &global_circuitlist, head) { if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) && !circ->marked_for_close && !circ->timestamp_dirty) @@ -1309,8 +1405,7 @@ void circuit_mark_all_dirty_circs_as_unusable(void) { circuit_t *circ; - - for (circ=global_circuitlist; circ; circ = circ->next) { + TOR_LIST_FOREACH(circ, &global_circuitlist, head) { if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) && !circ->marked_for_close && circ->timestamp_dirty) { @@ -1514,7 +1609,7 @@ marked_circuit_free_cells(circuit_t *circ) } /** Return the number of cells used by the circuit <b>c</b>'s cell queues. */ -static size_t +STATIC size_t n_cells_in_circ_queues(const circuit_t *c) { size_t n = c->n_chan_cells.n; @@ -1537,13 +1632,15 @@ static uint32_t circuit_max_queued_cell_age(const circuit_t *c, uint32_t now) { uint32_t age = 0; - if (c->n_chan_cells.head) - age = now - c->n_chan_cells.head->inserted_time; + packed_cell_t *cell; + + if (NULL != (cell = TOR_SIMPLEQ_FIRST(&c->n_chan_cells.head))) + age = now - cell->inserted_time; if (! CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(c)) { const or_circuit_t *orcirc = TO_OR_CIRCUIT((circuit_t*)c); - if (orcirc->p_chan_cells.head) { - uint32_t age2 = now - orcirc->p_chan_cells.head->inserted_time; + if (NULL != (cell = TOR_SIMPLEQ_FIRST(&orcirc->p_chan_cells.head))) { + uint32_t age2 = now - cell->inserted_time; if (age2 > age) return age2; } @@ -1604,7 +1701,7 @@ circuits_handle_oom(size_t current_allocation) /* This algorithm itself assumes that you've got enough memory slack * to actually run it. */ - for (circ = global_circuitlist; circ; circ = circ->next) + TOR_LIST_FOREACH(circ, &global_circuitlist, head) smartlist_add(circlist, circ); /* Set circcomp_now_tmp so that the sort can work. */ @@ -1725,15 +1822,16 @@ assert_circuit_ok(const circuit_t *c) /* We use the _impl variant here to make sure we don't fail on marked * circuits, which would not be returned by the regular function. */ circuit_t *c2 = circuit_get_by_circid_channel_impl(c->n_circ_id, - c->n_chan); + c->n_chan, NULL); tor_assert(c == c2); } } if (or_circ && or_circ->p_chan) { if (or_circ->p_circ_id) { /* ibid */ - circuit_t *c2 = circuit_get_by_circid_channel_impl(or_circ->p_circ_id, - or_circ->p_chan); + circuit_t *c2 = + circuit_get_by_circid_channel_impl(or_circ->p_circ_id, + or_circ->p_chan, NULL); tor_assert(c == c2); } } diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.h b/src/or/circuitlist.h index 874f68cd2..bf3d1b467 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.h +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.h @@ -12,7 +12,11 @@ #ifndef TOR_CIRCUITLIST_H #define TOR_CIRCUITLIST_H -circuit_t * circuit_get_global_list_(void); +#include "testsupport.h" + +TOR_LIST_HEAD(global_circuitlist_s, circuit_t); + +struct global_circuitlist_s* circuit_get_global_list(void); const char *circuit_state_to_string(int state); const char *circuit_purpose_to_controller_string(uint8_t purpose); const char *circuit_purpose_to_controller_hs_state_string(uint8_t purpose); @@ -23,6 +27,8 @@ void circuit_set_p_circid_chan(or_circuit_t *circ, circid_t id, channel_t *chan); void circuit_set_n_circid_chan(circuit_t *circ, circid_t id, channel_t *chan); +void channel_mark_circid_unusable(channel_t *chan, circid_t id); +void channel_mark_circid_usable(channel_t *chan, circid_t id); void circuit_set_state(circuit_t *circ, uint8_t state); void circuit_close_all_marked(void); int32_t circuit_initial_package_window(void); @@ -63,5 +69,13 @@ void assert_circuit_ok(const circuit_t *c); void circuit_free_all(void); void circuits_handle_oom(size_t current_allocation); +void channel_note_destroy_pending(channel_t *chan, circid_t id); +void channel_note_destroy_not_pending(channel_t *chan, circid_t id); + +#ifdef CIRCUITLIST_PRIVATE +STATIC void circuit_free(circuit_t *circ); +STATIC size_t n_cells_in_circ_queues(const circuit_t *c); +#endif + #endif diff --git a/src/or/circuitmux.c b/src/or/circuitmux.c index 545cfd065..f2af94393 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitmux.c +++ b/src/or/circuitmux.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include "channel.h" #include "circuitlist.h" #include "circuitmux.h" +#include "relay.h" /* * Private typedefs for circuitmux.c @@ -115,6 +116,22 @@ struct circuitmux_s { */ struct circuit_t *active_circuits_head, *active_circuits_tail; + /** List of queued destroy cells */ + cell_queue_t destroy_cell_queue; + /** Boolean: True iff the last cell to circuitmux_get_first_active_circuit + * returned the destroy queue. Used to force alternation between + * destroy/non-destroy cells. + * + * XXXX There is no reason to think that alternating is a particularly good + * approach -- it's just designed to prevent destroys from starving other + * cells completely. + */ + unsigned int last_cell_was_destroy : 1; + /** Destroy counter: increment this when a destroy gets queued, decrement + * when we unqueue it, so we can test to make sure they don't starve. + */ + int64_t destroy_ctr; + /* * Circuitmux policy; if this is non-NULL, it can override the built- * in round-robin active circuits behavior. This is how EWMA works in @@ -193,6 +210,11 @@ static void circuitmux_assert_okay_pass_one(circuitmux_t *cmux); static void circuitmux_assert_okay_pass_two(circuitmux_t *cmux); static void circuitmux_assert_okay_pass_three(circuitmux_t *cmux); +/* Static global variables */ + +/** Count the destroy balance to debug destroy queue logic */ +static int64_t global_destroy_ctr = 0; + /* Function definitions */ /** @@ -361,6 +383,7 @@ circuitmux_alloc(void) rv = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*rv)); rv->chanid_circid_map = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*( rv->chanid_circid_map))); HT_INIT(chanid_circid_muxinfo_map, rv->chanid_circid_map); + cell_queue_init(&rv->destroy_cell_queue); return rv; } @@ -476,6 +499,31 @@ circuitmux_detach_all_circuits(circuitmux_t *cmux) cmux->n_cells = 0; } +/** Reclaim all circuit IDs currently marked as unusable on <b>chan</b> because + * of pending destroy cells in <b>cmux</b>. + * + * This function must be called AFTER circuits are unlinked from the (channel, + * circuid-id) map with circuit_unlink_all_from_channel(), but before calling + * circuitmux_free(). + */ +void +circuitmux_mark_destroyed_circids_usable(circuitmux_t *cmux, channel_t *chan) +{ + packed_cell_t *cell; + int n_bad = 0; + TOR_SIMPLEQ_FOREACH(cell, &cmux->destroy_cell_queue.head, next) { + circid_t circid = 0; + if (packed_cell_is_destroy(chan, cell, &circid)) { + channel_mark_circid_usable(chan, circid); + } else { + ++n_bad; + } + } + if (n_bad) + log_warn(LD_BUG, "%d cell(s) on destroy queue did not look like a " + "DESTROY cell.", n_bad); +} + /** * Free a circuitmux_t; the circuits must be detached first with * circuitmux_detach_all_circuits(). @@ -508,6 +556,30 @@ circuitmux_free(circuitmux_t *cmux) tor_free(cmux->chanid_circid_map); } + /* + * We're throwing away some destroys; log the counter and + * adjust the global counter by the queue size. + */ + if (cmux->destroy_cell_queue.n > 0) { + cmux->destroy_ctr -= cmux->destroy_cell_queue.n; + global_destroy_ctr -= cmux->destroy_cell_queue.n; + log_debug(LD_CIRC, + "Freeing cmux at %p with %u queued destroys; the last cmux " + "destroy balance was "I64_FORMAT", global is "I64_FORMAT, + cmux, cmux->destroy_cell_queue.n, + I64_PRINTF_ARG(cmux->destroy_ctr), + I64_PRINTF_ARG(global_destroy_ctr)); + } else { + log_debug(LD_CIRC, + "Freeing cmux at %p with no queued destroys, the cmux destroy " + "balance was "I64_FORMAT", global is "I64_FORMAT, + cmux, + I64_PRINTF_ARG(cmux->destroy_ctr), + I64_PRINTF_ARG(global_destroy_ctr)); + } + + cell_queue_clear(&cmux->destroy_cell_queue); + tor_free(cmux); } @@ -816,7 +888,7 @@ circuitmux_num_cells(circuitmux_t *cmux) { tor_assert(cmux); - return cmux->n_cells; + return cmux->n_cells + cmux->destroy_cell_queue.n; } /** @@ -851,9 +923,9 @@ circuitmux_num_circuits(circuitmux_t *cmux) * Attach a circuit to a circuitmux, for the specified direction. */ -void -circuitmux_attach_circuit(circuitmux_t *cmux, circuit_t *circ, - cell_direction_t direction) +MOCK_IMPL(void, +circuitmux_attach_circuit,(circuitmux_t *cmux, circuit_t *circ, + cell_direction_t direction)) { channel_t *chan = NULL; uint64_t channel_id; @@ -1000,8 +1072,8 @@ circuitmux_attach_circuit(circuitmux_t *cmux, circuit_t *circ, * no-op if not attached. */ -void -circuitmux_detach_circuit(circuitmux_t *cmux, circuit_t *circ) +MOCK_IMPL(void, +circuitmux_detach_circuit,(circuitmux_t *cmux, circuit_t *circ)) { chanid_circid_muxinfo_t search, *hashent = NULL; /* @@ -1368,16 +1440,36 @@ circuitmux_set_num_cells(circuitmux_t *cmux, circuit_t *circ, /** * Pick a circuit to send from, using the active circuits list or a * circuitmux policy if one is available. This is called from channel.c. + * + * If we would rather send a destroy cell, return NULL and set + * *<b>destroy_queue_out</b> to the destroy queue. + * + * If we have nothing to send, set *<b>destroy_queue_out</b> to NULL and + * return NULL. */ circuit_t * -circuitmux_get_first_active_circuit(circuitmux_t *cmux) +circuitmux_get_first_active_circuit(circuitmux_t *cmux, + cell_queue_t **destroy_queue_out) { circuit_t *circ = NULL; tor_assert(cmux); + tor_assert(destroy_queue_out); + + *destroy_queue_out = NULL; + + if (cmux->destroy_cell_queue.n && + (!cmux->last_cell_was_destroy || cmux->n_active_circuits == 0)) { + /* We have destroy cells to send, and either we just sent a relay cell, + * or we have no relay cells to send. */ + + /* XXXX We should let the cmux policy have some say in this eventually. */ + /* XXXX Alternating is not a terribly brilliant approach here. */ + *destroy_queue_out = &cmux->destroy_cell_queue; - if (cmux->n_active_circuits > 0) { + cmux->last_cell_was_destroy = 1; + } else if (cmux->n_active_circuits > 0) { /* We also must have a cell available for this to be the case */ tor_assert(cmux->n_cells > 0); /* Do we have a policy-provided circuit selector? */ @@ -1389,7 +1481,11 @@ circuitmux_get_first_active_circuit(circuitmux_t *cmux) tor_assert(cmux->active_circuits_head); circ = cmux->active_circuits_head; } - } else tor_assert(cmux->n_cells == 0); + cmux->last_cell_was_destroy = 0; + } else { + tor_assert(cmux->n_cells == 0); + tor_assert(cmux->destroy_cell_queue.n == 0); + } return circ; } @@ -1463,6 +1559,26 @@ circuitmux_notify_xmit_cells(circuitmux_t *cmux, circuit_t *circ, circuitmux_assert_okay_paranoid(cmux); } +/** + * Notify the circuitmux that a destroy was sent, so we can update + * the counter. + */ + +void +circuitmux_notify_xmit_destroy(circuitmux_t *cmux) +{ + tor_assert(cmux); + + --(cmux->destroy_ctr); + --(global_destroy_ctr); + log_debug(LD_CIRC, + "Cmux at %p sent a destroy, cmux counter is now "I64_FORMAT", " + "global counter is now "I64_FORMAT, + cmux, + I64_PRINTF_ARG(cmux->destroy_ctr), + I64_PRINTF_ARG(global_destroy_ctr)); +} + /* * Circuitmux consistency checking assertions */ @@ -1743,3 +1859,40 @@ circuitmux_assert_okay_pass_three(circuitmux_t *cmux) } } +/*DOCDOC */ +void +circuitmux_append_destroy_cell(channel_t *chan, + circuitmux_t *cmux, + circid_t circ_id, + uint8_t reason) +{ + cell_t cell; + memset(&cell, 0, sizeof(cell_t)); + cell.circ_id = circ_id; + cell.command = CELL_DESTROY; + cell.payload[0] = (uint8_t) reason; + + cell_queue_append_packed_copy(NULL, &cmux->destroy_cell_queue, 0, &cell, + chan->wide_circ_ids, 0); + + /* Destroy entering the queue, update counters */ + ++(cmux->destroy_ctr); + ++global_destroy_ctr; + log_debug(LD_CIRC, + "Cmux at %p queued a destroy for circ %u, cmux counter is now " + I64_FORMAT", global counter is now "I64_FORMAT, + cmux, circ_id, + I64_PRINTF_ARG(cmux->destroy_ctr), + I64_PRINTF_ARG(global_destroy_ctr)); + + /* XXXX Duplicate code from append_cell_to_circuit_queue */ + if (!channel_has_queued_writes(chan)) { + /* There is no data at all waiting to be sent on the outbuf. Add a + * cell, so that we can notice when it gets flushed, flushed_some can + * get called, and we can start putting more data onto the buffer then. + */ + log_debug(LD_GENERAL, "Primed a buffer."); + channel_flush_from_first_active_circuit(chan, 1); + } +} + diff --git a/src/or/circuitmux.h b/src/or/circuitmux.h index 25644ffab..ee2f5d153 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitmux.h +++ b/src/or/circuitmux.h @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #define TOR_CIRCUITMUX_H #include "or.h" +#include "testsupport.h" typedef struct circuitmux_policy_s circuitmux_policy_t; typedef struct circuitmux_policy_data_s circuitmux_policy_data_t; @@ -120,17 +121,27 @@ unsigned int circuitmux_num_circuits(circuitmux_t *cmux); unsigned int circuitmux_num_active_circuits(circuitmux_t *cmux); /* Channel interface */ -circuit_t * circuitmux_get_first_active_circuit(circuitmux_t *cmux); +circuit_t * circuitmux_get_first_active_circuit(circuitmux_t *cmux, + cell_queue_t **destroy_queue_out); void circuitmux_notify_xmit_cells(circuitmux_t *cmux, circuit_t *circ, unsigned int n_cells); +void circuitmux_notify_xmit_destroy(circuitmux_t *cmux); /* Circuit interface */ -void circuitmux_attach_circuit(circuitmux_t *cmux, circuit_t *circ, - cell_direction_t direction); -void circuitmux_detach_circuit(circuitmux_t *cmux, circuit_t *circ); +MOCK_DECL(void, circuitmux_attach_circuit, (circuitmux_t *cmux, + circuit_t *circ, + cell_direction_t direction)); +MOCK_DECL(void, circuitmux_detach_circuit, + (circuitmux_t *cmux, circuit_t *circ)); void circuitmux_clear_num_cells(circuitmux_t *cmux, circuit_t *circ); void circuitmux_set_num_cells(circuitmux_t *cmux, circuit_t *circ, unsigned int n_cells); +void circuitmux_append_destroy_cell(channel_t *chan, + circuitmux_t *cmux, circid_t circ_id, + uint8_t reason); +void circuitmux_mark_destroyed_circids_usable(circuitmux_t *cmux, + channel_t *chan); + #endif /* TOR_CIRCUITMUX_H */ diff --git a/src/or/circuitstats.c b/src/or/circuitstats.c index 1d7812bf2..eaefc9edd 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitstats.c +++ b/src/or/circuitstats.c @@ -18,6 +18,10 @@ #undef log #include <math.h> +static void cbt_control_event_buildtimeout_set( + const circuit_build_times_t *cbt, + buildtimeout_set_event_t type); + #define CBT_BIN_TO_MS(bin) ((bin)*CBT_BIN_WIDTH + (CBT_BIN_WIDTH/2)) /** Global list of circuit build times */ @@ -26,12 +30,46 @@ // vary in their own latency. The downside of this is that guards // can change frequently, so we'd be building a lot more circuits // most likely. -/* XXXX024 Make this static; add accessor functions. */ -circuit_build_times_t circ_times; +static circuit_build_times_t circ_times; +#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS /** If set, we're running the unit tests: we should avoid clobbering * our state file or accessing get_options() or get_or_state() */ static int unit_tests = 0; +#else +#define unit_tests 0 +#endif + +/** Return a pointer to the data structure describing our current circuit + * build time history and computations. */ +const circuit_build_times_t * +get_circuit_build_times(void) +{ + return &circ_times; +} + +/** As get_circuit_build_times, but return a mutable pointer. */ +circuit_build_times_t * +get_circuit_build_times_mutable(void) +{ + return &circ_times; +} + +/** Return the time to wait before actually closing an under-construction, in + * milliseconds. */ +double +get_circuit_build_close_time_ms(void) +{ + return circ_times.close_ms; +} + +/** Return the time to wait before giving up on an under-construction circuit, + * in milliseconds. */ +double +get_circuit_build_timeout_ms(void) +{ + return circ_times.timeout_ms; +} /** * This function decides if CBT learning should be disabled. It returns @@ -154,7 +192,7 @@ circuit_build_times_min_circs_to_observe(void) /** Return true iff <b>cbt</b> has recorded enough build times that we * want to start acting on the timeout it implies. */ int -circuit_build_times_enough_to_compute(circuit_build_times_t *cbt) +circuit_build_times_enough_to_compute(const circuit_build_times_t *cbt) { return cbt->total_build_times >= circuit_build_times_min_circs_to_observe(); } @@ -438,7 +476,7 @@ circuit_build_times_get_initial_timeout(void) * Leave estimated parameters, timeout and network liveness intact * for future use. */ -void +STATIC void circuit_build_times_reset(circuit_build_times_t *cbt) { memset(cbt->circuit_build_times, 0, sizeof(cbt->circuit_build_times)); @@ -471,7 +509,7 @@ circuit_build_times_init(circuit_build_times_t *cbt) cbt->liveness.timeouts_after_firsthop = NULL; } cbt->close_ms = cbt->timeout_ms = circuit_build_times_get_initial_timeout(); - control_event_buildtimeout_set(cbt, BUILDTIMEOUT_SET_EVENT_RESET); + cbt_control_event_buildtimeout_set(cbt, BUILDTIMEOUT_SET_EVENT_RESET); } /** @@ -557,7 +595,7 @@ circuit_build_times_add_time(circuit_build_times_t *cbt, build_time_t time) * Return maximum circuit build time */ static build_time_t -circuit_build_times_max(circuit_build_times_t *cbt) +circuit_build_times_max(const circuit_build_times_t *cbt) { int i = 0; build_time_t max_build_time = 0; @@ -598,7 +636,7 @@ circuit_build_times_min(circuit_build_times_t *cbt) * The return value must be freed by the caller. */ static uint32_t * -circuit_build_times_create_histogram(circuit_build_times_t *cbt, +circuit_build_times_create_histogram(const circuit_build_times_t *cbt, build_time_t *nbins) { uint32_t *histogram; @@ -688,7 +726,7 @@ circuit_build_times_get_xm(circuit_build_times_t *cbt) * the or_state_t state structure. */ void -circuit_build_times_update_state(circuit_build_times_t *cbt, +circuit_build_times_update_state(const circuit_build_times_t *cbt, or_state_t *state) { uint32_t *histogram; @@ -949,7 +987,7 @@ circuit_build_times_parse_state(circuit_build_times_t *cbt, * an acceptable approximation because we are only concerned with the * accuracy of the CDF of the tail. */ -int +STATIC int circuit_build_times_update_alpha(circuit_build_times_t *cbt) { build_time_t *x=cbt->circuit_build_times; @@ -1033,7 +1071,7 @@ circuit_build_times_update_alpha(circuit_build_times_t *cbt) * * Return value is in milliseconds. */ -double +STATIC double circuit_build_times_calculate_timeout(circuit_build_times_t *cbt, double quantile) { @@ -1050,6 +1088,7 @@ circuit_build_times_calculate_timeout(circuit_build_times_t *cbt, return ret; } +#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS /** Pareto CDF */ double circuit_build_times_cdf(circuit_build_times_t *cbt, double x) @@ -1060,7 +1099,9 @@ circuit_build_times_cdf(circuit_build_times_t *cbt, double x) tor_assert(0 <= ret && ret <= 1.0); return ret; } +#endif +#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS /** * Generate a synthetic time using our distribution parameters. * @@ -1093,7 +1134,9 @@ circuit_build_times_generate_sample(circuit_build_times_t *cbt, tor_assert(ret > 0); return ret; } +#endif +#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS /** * Estimate an initial alpha parameter by solving the quantile * function with a quantile point and a specific timeout value. @@ -1114,12 +1157,13 @@ circuit_build_times_initial_alpha(circuit_build_times_t *cbt, (tor_mathlog(cbt->Xm)-tor_mathlog(timeout_ms)); tor_assert(cbt->alpha > 0); } +#endif /** * Returns true if we need circuits to be built */ int -circuit_build_times_needs_circuits(circuit_build_times_t *cbt) +circuit_build_times_needs_circuits(const circuit_build_times_t *cbt) { /* Return true if < MIN_CIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE */ return !circuit_build_times_enough_to_compute(cbt); @@ -1130,7 +1174,7 @@ circuit_build_times_needs_circuits(circuit_build_times_t *cbt) * right now. */ int -circuit_build_times_needs_circuits_now(circuit_build_times_t *cbt) +circuit_build_times_needs_circuits_now(const circuit_build_times_t *cbt) { return circuit_build_times_needs_circuits(cbt) && approx_time()-cbt->last_circ_at > circuit_build_times_test_frequency(); @@ -1263,7 +1307,7 @@ circuit_build_times_network_close(circuit_build_times_t *cbt, * in the case of recent liveness changes. */ int -circuit_build_times_network_check_live(circuit_build_times_t *cbt) +circuit_build_times_network_check_live(const circuit_build_times_t *cbt) { if (cbt->liveness.nonlive_timeouts > 0) { return 0; @@ -1282,7 +1326,7 @@ circuit_build_times_network_check_live(circuit_build_times_t *cbt) * to restart the process of building test circuits and estimating a * new timeout. */ -int +STATIC int circuit_build_times_network_check_changed(circuit_build_times_t *cbt) { int total_build_times = cbt->total_build_times; @@ -1329,7 +1373,7 @@ circuit_build_times_network_check_changed(circuit_build_times_t *cbt) = circuit_build_times_get_initial_timeout(); } - control_event_buildtimeout_set(cbt, BUILDTIMEOUT_SET_EVENT_RESET); + cbt_control_event_buildtimeout_set(cbt, BUILDTIMEOUT_SET_EVENT_RESET); log_notice(LD_CIRC, "Your network connection speed appears to have changed. Resetting " @@ -1511,7 +1555,7 @@ circuit_build_times_set_timeout(circuit_build_times_t *cbt) } } - control_event_buildtimeout_set(cbt, BUILDTIMEOUT_SET_EVENT_COMPUTED); + cbt_control_event_buildtimeout_set(cbt, BUILDTIMEOUT_SET_EVENT_COMPUTED); timeout_rate = circuit_build_times_timeout_rate(cbt); @@ -1546,6 +1590,8 @@ circuit_build_times_set_timeout(circuit_build_times_t *cbt) cbt->total_build_times); } } + +#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS /** Make a note that we're running unit tests (rather than running Tor * itself), so we avoid clobbering our state file. */ void @@ -1553,4 +1599,46 @@ circuitbuild_running_unit_tests(void) { unit_tests = 1; } +#endif + +void +circuit_build_times_update_last_circ(circuit_build_times_t *cbt) +{ + cbt->last_circ_at = approx_time(); +} + +static void +cbt_control_event_buildtimeout_set(const circuit_build_times_t *cbt, + buildtimeout_set_event_t type) +{ + char *args = NULL; + double qnt; + + switch (type) { + case BUILDTIMEOUT_SET_EVENT_RESET: + case BUILDTIMEOUT_SET_EVENT_SUSPENDED: + case BUILDTIMEOUT_SET_EVENT_DISCARD: + qnt = 1.0; + break; + case BUILDTIMEOUT_SET_EVENT_COMPUTED: + case BUILDTIMEOUT_SET_EVENT_RESUME: + default: + qnt = circuit_build_times_quantile_cutoff(); + break; + } + + tor_asprintf(&args, "TOTAL_TIMES=%lu " + "TIMEOUT_MS=%lu XM=%lu ALPHA=%f CUTOFF_QUANTILE=%f " + "TIMEOUT_RATE=%f CLOSE_MS=%lu CLOSE_RATE=%f", + (unsigned long)cbt->total_build_times, + (unsigned long)cbt->timeout_ms, + (unsigned long)cbt->Xm, cbt->alpha, qnt, + circuit_build_times_timeout_rate(cbt), + (unsigned long)cbt->close_ms, + circuit_build_times_close_rate(cbt)); + + control_event_buildtimeout_set(type, args); + + tor_free(args); +} diff --git a/src/or/circuitstats.h b/src/or/circuitstats.h index 87dce99f4..3343310b8 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitstats.h +++ b/src/or/circuitstats.h @@ -12,11 +12,14 @@ #ifndef TOR_CIRCUITSTATS_H #define TOR_CIRCUITSTATS_H -extern circuit_build_times_t circ_times; +const circuit_build_times_t *get_circuit_build_times(void); +circuit_build_times_t *get_circuit_build_times_mutable(void); +double get_circuit_build_close_time_ms(void); +double get_circuit_build_timeout_ms(void); int circuit_build_times_disabled(void); -int circuit_build_times_enough_to_compute(circuit_build_times_t *cbt); -void circuit_build_times_update_state(circuit_build_times_t *cbt, +int circuit_build_times_enough_to_compute(const circuit_build_times_t *cbt); +void circuit_build_times_update_state(const circuit_build_times_t *cbt, or_state_t *state); int circuit_build_times_parse_state(circuit_build_times_t *cbt, or_state_t *state); @@ -27,9 +30,9 @@ int circuit_build_times_count_close(circuit_build_times_t *cbt, void circuit_build_times_set_timeout(circuit_build_times_t *cbt); int circuit_build_times_add_time(circuit_build_times_t *cbt, build_time_t time); -int circuit_build_times_needs_circuits(circuit_build_times_t *cbt); +int circuit_build_times_needs_circuits(const circuit_build_times_t *cbt); -int circuit_build_times_needs_circuits_now(circuit_build_times_t *cbt); +int circuit_build_times_needs_circuits_now(const circuit_build_times_t *cbt); void circuit_build_times_init(circuit_build_times_t *cbt); void circuit_build_times_free_timeouts(circuit_build_times_t *cbt); void circuit_build_times_new_consensus_params(circuit_build_times_t *cbt, @@ -37,29 +40,59 @@ void circuit_build_times_new_consensus_params(circuit_build_times_t *cbt, double circuit_build_times_timeout_rate(const circuit_build_times_t *cbt); double circuit_build_times_close_rate(const circuit_build_times_t *cbt); +void circuit_build_times_update_last_circ(circuit_build_times_t *cbt); + #ifdef CIRCUITSTATS_PRIVATE -double circuit_build_times_calculate_timeout(circuit_build_times_t *cbt, +STATIC double circuit_build_times_calculate_timeout(circuit_build_times_t *cbt, double quantile); +STATIC int circuit_build_times_update_alpha(circuit_build_times_t *cbt); +STATIC void circuit_build_times_reset(circuit_build_times_t *cbt); + +/* Network liveness functions */ +STATIC int circuit_build_times_network_check_changed( + circuit_build_times_t *cbt); +#endif + +#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS build_time_t circuit_build_times_generate_sample(circuit_build_times_t *cbt, double q_lo, double q_hi); +double circuit_build_times_cdf(circuit_build_times_t *cbt, double x); void circuit_build_times_initial_alpha(circuit_build_times_t *cbt, double quantile, double time_ms); -int circuit_build_times_update_alpha(circuit_build_times_t *cbt); -double circuit_build_times_cdf(circuit_build_times_t *cbt, double x); void circuitbuild_running_unit_tests(void); -void circuit_build_times_reset(circuit_build_times_t *cbt); - -/* Network liveness functions */ -int circuit_build_times_network_check_changed(circuit_build_times_t *cbt); #endif /* Network liveness functions */ void circuit_build_times_network_is_live(circuit_build_times_t *cbt); -int circuit_build_times_network_check_live(circuit_build_times_t *cbt); +int circuit_build_times_network_check_live(const circuit_build_times_t *cbt); void circuit_build_times_network_circ_success(circuit_build_times_t *cbt); -/* DOCDOC circuit_build_times_get_bw_scale */ -int circuit_build_times_get_bw_scale(networkstatus_t *ns); +#ifdef CIRCUITSTATS_PRIVATE +/** Structure for circuit build times history */ +struct circuit_build_times_s { + /** The circular array of recorded build times in milliseconds */ + build_time_t circuit_build_times[CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE]; + /** Current index in the circuit_build_times circular array */ + int build_times_idx; + /** Total number of build times accumulated. Max CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE */ + int total_build_times; + /** Information about the state of our local network connection */ + network_liveness_t liveness; + /** Last time we built a circuit. Used to decide to build new test circs */ + time_t last_circ_at; + /** "Minimum" value of our pareto distribution (actually mode) */ + build_time_t Xm; + /** alpha exponent for pareto dist. */ + double alpha; + /** Have we computed a timeout? */ + int have_computed_timeout; + /** The exact value for that timeout in milliseconds. Stored as a double + * to maintain precision from calculations to and from quantile value. */ + double timeout_ms; + /** How long we wait before actually closing the circuit. */ + double close_ms; +}; +#endif #endif diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index 25997ebdb..cb9e93191 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ #include "or.h" #include "addressmap.h" #include "channel.h" +#include "circpathbias.h" #include "circuitbuild.h" #include "circuitlist.h" #include "circuitstats.h" @@ -31,12 +32,6 @@ #include "router.h" #include "routerlist.h" -/********* START VARIABLES **********/ - -extern circuit_t *global_circuitlist; /* from circuitlist.c */ - -/********* END VARIABLES ************/ - static void circuit_expire_old_circuits_clientside(void); static void circuit_increment_failure_count(void); @@ -286,7 +281,7 @@ circuit_get_best(const entry_connection_t *conn, tor_gettimeofday(&now); - for (circ=global_circuitlist;circ;circ = circ->next) { + TOR_LIST_FOREACH(circ, circuit_get_global_list(), head) { origin_circuit_t *origin_circ; if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) continue; @@ -327,7 +322,7 @@ count_pending_general_client_circuits(void) int count = 0; - for (circ = global_circuitlist; circ; circ = circ->next) { + TOR_LIST_FOREACH(circ, circuit_get_global_list(), head) { if (circ->marked_for_close || circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN || circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL || @@ -375,7 +370,7 @@ circuit_conforms_to_options(const origin_circuit_t *circ, void circuit_expire_building(void) { - circuit_t *victim, *next_circ = global_circuitlist; + circuit_t *victim, *next_circ; /* circ_times.timeout_ms and circ_times.close_ms are from * circuit_build_times_get_initial_timeout() if we haven't computed * custom timeouts yet */ @@ -393,10 +388,9 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) * we want to be more lenient with timeouts, in case the * user has relocated and/or changed network connections. * See bug #3443. */ - while (next_circ) { + TOR_LIST_FOREACH(next_circ, circuit_get_global_list(), head) { if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(next_circ) || /* didn't originate here */ next_circ->marked_for_close) { /* don't mess with marked circs */ - next_circ = next_circ->next; continue; } @@ -408,9 +402,7 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) any_opened_circs = 1; break; } - next_circ = next_circ->next; } - next_circ = global_circuitlist; #define SET_CUTOFF(target, msec) do { \ long ms = tor_lround(msec); \ @@ -451,12 +443,12 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) * RTTs = 4a + 3b + 2c * RTTs = 9h */ - SET_CUTOFF(general_cutoff, circ_times.timeout_ms); - SET_CUTOFF(begindir_cutoff, circ_times.timeout_ms); + SET_CUTOFF(general_cutoff, get_circuit_build_timeout_ms()); + SET_CUTOFF(begindir_cutoff, get_circuit_build_timeout_ms()); /* > 3hop circs seem to have a 1.0 second delay on their cannibalized * 4th hop. */ - SET_CUTOFF(fourhop_cutoff, circ_times.timeout_ms * (10/6.0) + 1000); + SET_CUTOFF(fourhop_cutoff, get_circuit_build_timeout_ms() * (10/6.0) + 1000); /* CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND behaves more like a RELAY cell. * Use the stream cutoff (more or less). */ @@ -465,26 +457,25 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) /* Be lenient with cannibalized circs. They already survived the official * CBT, and they're usually not performance-critical. */ SET_CUTOFF(cannibalized_cutoff, - MAX(circ_times.close_ms*(4/6.0), + MAX(get_circuit_build_close_time_ms()*(4/6.0), options->CircuitStreamTimeout * 1000) + 1000); /* Intro circs have an extra round trip (and are also 4 hops long) */ - SET_CUTOFF(c_intro_cutoff, circ_times.timeout_ms * (14/6.0) + 1000); + SET_CUTOFF(c_intro_cutoff, get_circuit_build_timeout_ms() * (14/6.0) + 1000); /* Server intro circs have an extra round trip */ - SET_CUTOFF(s_intro_cutoff, circ_times.timeout_ms * (9/6.0) + 1000); + SET_CUTOFF(s_intro_cutoff, get_circuit_build_timeout_ms() * (9/6.0) + 1000); - SET_CUTOFF(close_cutoff, circ_times.close_ms); - SET_CUTOFF(extremely_old_cutoff, circ_times.close_ms*2 + 1000); + SET_CUTOFF(close_cutoff, get_circuit_build_close_time_ms()); + SET_CUTOFF(extremely_old_cutoff, get_circuit_build_close_time_ms()*2 + 1000); SET_CUTOFF(hs_extremely_old_cutoff, - MAX(circ_times.close_ms*2 + 1000, + MAX(get_circuit_build_close_time_ms()*2 + 1000, options->SocksTimeout * 1000)); - while (next_circ) { + TOR_LIST_FOREACH(next_circ, circuit_get_global_list(), head) { struct timeval cutoff; victim = next_circ; - next_circ = next_circ->next; if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(victim) || /* didn't originate here */ victim->marked_for_close) /* don't mess with marked circs */ continue; @@ -555,12 +546,14 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) * was a timeout, and the timeout value needs to reset if we * see enough of them. Note this means we also need to avoid * double-counting below, too. */ - circuit_build_times_count_timeout(&circ_times, first_hop_succeeded); + circuit_build_times_count_timeout(get_circuit_build_times_mutable(), + first_hop_succeeded); TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->relaxed_timeout = 1; } continue; } else { static ratelim_t relax_timeout_limit = RATELIM_INIT(3600); + const double build_close_ms = get_circuit_build_close_time_ms(); log_fn_ratelim(&relax_timeout_limit, LOG_NOTICE, LD_CIRC, "No circuits are opened. Relaxed timeout for circuit %d " "(a %s %d-hop circuit in state %s with channel state %s) to " @@ -571,7 +564,8 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->build_state->desired_path_len, circuit_state_to_string(victim->state), channel_state_to_string(victim->n_chan->state), - (long)circ_times.close_ms, num_live_entry_guards(0)); + (long)build_close_ms, + num_live_entry_guards(0)); } } @@ -651,7 +645,7 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) } if (circuit_timeout_want_to_count_circ(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)) && - circuit_build_times_enough_to_compute(&circ_times)) { + circuit_build_times_enough_to_compute(get_circuit_build_times())) { /* Circuits are allowed to last longer for measurement. * Switch their purpose and wait. */ if (victim->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT) { @@ -665,8 +659,9 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) * have a timeout. We also want to avoid double-counting * already "relaxed" circuits, which are counted above. */ if (!TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->relaxed_timeout) { - circuit_build_times_count_timeout(&circ_times, - first_hop_succeeded); + circuit_build_times_count_timeout( + get_circuit_build_times_mutable(), + first_hop_succeeded); } continue; } @@ -683,10 +678,11 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) (long)(now.tv_sec - victim->timestamp_began.tv_sec), victim->purpose, circuit_purpose_to_string(victim->purpose)); - } else if (circuit_build_times_count_close(&circ_times, + } else if (circuit_build_times_count_close( + get_circuit_build_times_mutable(), first_hop_succeeded, victim->timestamp_created.tv_sec)) { - circuit_build_times_set_timeout(&circ_times); + circuit_build_times_set_timeout(get_circuit_build_times_mutable()); } } } @@ -750,7 +746,7 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) if (victim->n_chan) log_info(LD_CIRC, - "Abandoning circ %u %s:%d (state %d,%d:%s, purpose %d, " + "Abandoning circ %u %s:%u (state %d,%d:%s, purpose %d, " "len %d)", TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->global_identifier, channel_get_canonical_remote_descr(victim->n_chan), (unsigned)victim->n_circ_id, @@ -760,7 +756,7 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->build_state->desired_path_len); else log_info(LD_CIRC, - "Abandoning circ %u %d (state %d,%d:%s, purpose %d, len %d)", + "Abandoning circ %u %u (state %d,%d:%s, purpose %d, len %d)", TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->global_identifier, (unsigned)victim->n_circ_id, TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->has_opened, @@ -818,7 +814,7 @@ circuit_stream_is_being_handled(entry_connection_t *conn, get_options()->LongLivedPorts, conn ? conn->socks_request->port : port); - for (circ=global_circuitlist;circ;circ = circ->next) { + TOR_LIST_FOREACH(circ, circuit_get_global_list(), head) { if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) && !circ->marked_for_close && circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL && @@ -869,7 +865,7 @@ circuit_predict_and_launch_new(void) int flags = 0; /* First, count how many of each type of circuit we have already. */ - for (circ=global_circuitlist;circ;circ = circ->next) { + TOR_LIST_FOREACH(circ, circuit_get_global_list(), head) { cpath_build_state_t *build_state; origin_circuit_t *origin_circ; if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) @@ -949,7 +945,7 @@ circuit_predict_and_launch_new(void) * we can still build circuits preemptively as needed. */ if (num < MAX_UNUSED_OPEN_CIRCUITS-2 && ! circuit_build_times_disabled() && - circuit_build_times_needs_circuits_now(&circ_times)) { + circuit_build_times_needs_circuits_now(get_circuit_build_times())) { flags = CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY; log_info(LD_CIRC, "Have %d clean circs need another buildtime test circ.", num); @@ -1085,7 +1081,7 @@ circuit_expire_old_circuits_clientside(void) cutoff = now; if (! circuit_build_times_disabled() && - circuit_build_times_needs_circuits(&circ_times)) { + circuit_build_times_needs_circuits(get_circuit_build_times())) { /* Circuits should be shorter lived if we need more of them * for learning a good build timeout */ cutoff.tv_sec -= IDLE_TIMEOUT_WHILE_LEARNING; @@ -1093,7 +1089,7 @@ circuit_expire_old_circuits_clientside(void) cutoff.tv_sec -= get_options()->CircuitIdleTimeout; } - for (circ = global_circuitlist; circ; circ = circ->next) { + TOR_LIST_FOREACH(circ, circuit_get_global_list(), head) { if (circ->marked_for_close || !CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) continue; /* If the circuit has been dirty for too long, and there are no streams @@ -1176,7 +1172,7 @@ circuit_expire_old_circuits_serverside(time_t now) or_circuit_t *or_circ; time_t cutoff = now - IDLE_ONE_HOP_CIRC_TIMEOUT; - for (circ = global_circuitlist; circ; circ = circ->next) { + TOR_LIST_FOREACH(circ, circuit_get_global_list(), head) { if (circ->marked_for_close || CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) continue; or_circ = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ); @@ -1223,7 +1219,7 @@ circuit_enough_testing_circs(void) if (have_performed_bandwidth_test) return 1; - for (circ = global_circuitlist; circ; circ = circ->next) { + TOR_LIST_FOREACH(circ, circuit_get_global_list(), head) { if (!circ->marked_for_close && CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) && circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING && circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN) @@ -1382,10 +1378,11 @@ circuit_build_failed(origin_circuit_t *circ) failed_at_last_hop = 1; } if (circ->cpath && - circ->cpath->state != CPATH_STATE_OPEN) { - /* We failed at the first hop. If there's an OR connection - * to blame, blame it. Also, avoid this relay for a while, and - * fail any one-hop directory fetches destined for it. */ + circ->cpath->state != CPATH_STATE_OPEN && + ! circ->base_.received_destroy) { + /* We failed at the first hop for some reason other than a DESTROY cell. + * If there's an OR connection to blame, blame it. Also, avoid this relay + * for a while, and fail any one-hop directory fetches destined for it. */ const char *n_chan_id = circ->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest; int already_marked = 0; if (circ->base_.n_chan) { diff --git a/src/or/command.c b/src/or/command.c index 699b02fb4..9b3ff16f2 100644 --- a/src/or/command.c +++ b/src/or/command.c @@ -53,6 +53,33 @@ static void command_process_created_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_t *chan); static void command_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_t *chan); static void command_process_destroy_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_t *chan); +/** Convert the cell <b>command</b> into a lower-case, human-readable + * string. */ +const char * +cell_command_to_string(uint8_t command) +{ + switch (command) { + case CELL_PADDING: return "padding"; + case CELL_CREATE: return "create"; + case CELL_CREATED: return "created"; + case CELL_RELAY: return "relay"; + case CELL_DESTROY: return "destroy"; + case CELL_CREATE_FAST: return "create_fast"; + case CELL_CREATED_FAST: return "created_fast"; + case CELL_VERSIONS: return "versions"; + case CELL_NETINFO: return "netinfo"; + case CELL_RELAY_EARLY: return "relay_early"; + case CELL_CREATE2: return "create2"; + case CELL_CREATED2: return "created2"; + case CELL_VPADDING: return "vpadding"; + case CELL_CERTS: return "certs"; + case CELL_AUTH_CHALLENGE: return "auth_challenge"; + case CELL_AUTHENTICATE: return "authenticate"; + case CELL_AUTHORIZE: return "authorize"; + default: return "unrecognized"; + } +} + #ifdef KEEP_TIMING_STATS /** This is a wrapper function around the actual function that processes the * <b>cell</b> that just arrived on <b>conn</b>. Increment <b>*time</b> @@ -499,6 +526,7 @@ command_process_destroy_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_t *chan) log_debug(LD_OR,"Received for circID %u.",(unsigned)cell->circ_id); reason = (uint8_t)cell->payload[0]; + circ->received_destroy = 1; if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) && cell->circ_id == TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_circ_id) { diff --git a/src/or/command.h b/src/or/command.h index 913f46a5c..adea6adea 100644 --- a/src/or/command.h +++ b/src/or/command.h @@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ void command_process_var_cell(channel_t *chan, var_cell_t *cell); void command_setup_channel(channel_t *chan); void command_setup_listener(channel_listener_t *chan_l); +const char *cell_command_to_string(uint8_t command); + extern uint64_t stats_n_padding_cells_processed; extern uint64_t stats_n_create_cells_processed; extern uint64_t stats_n_created_cells_processed; diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 3984755dd..87ad7d595 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ **/ #define CONFIG_PRIVATE - #include "or.h" #include "addressmap.h" #include "channel.h" @@ -40,11 +39,14 @@ #include "rendservice.h" #include "rephist.h" #include "router.h" +#include "sandbox.h" #include "util.h" #include "routerlist.h" #include "routerset.h" #include "statefile.h" #include "transports.h" +#include "ext_orport.h" +#include "torgzip.h" #ifdef _WIN32 #include <shlobj.h> #endif @@ -218,6 +220,9 @@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = { VPORT(DNSPort, LINELIST, NULL), V(DNSListenAddress, LINELIST, NULL), V(DownloadExtraInfo, BOOL, "0"), + V(TestingEnableConnBwEvent, BOOL, "0"), + V(TestingEnableCellStatsEvent, BOOL, "0"), + V(TestingEnableTbEmptyEvent, BOOL, "0"), V(EnforceDistinctSubnets, BOOL, "1"), V(EntryNodes, ROUTERSET, NULL), V(EntryStatistics, BOOL, "0"), @@ -230,13 +235,14 @@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = { V(ExitPolicyRejectPrivate, BOOL, "1"), V(ExitPortStatistics, BOOL, "0"), V(ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses, BOOL, "0"), + VPORT(ExtORPort, LINELIST, NULL), V(ExtraInfoStatistics, BOOL, "1"), V(FallbackDir, LINELIST, NULL), OBSOLETE("FallbackNetworkstatusFile"), V(FascistFirewall, BOOL, "0"), V(FirewallPorts, CSV, ""), - V(FastFirstHopPK, BOOL, "1"), + V(FastFirstHopPK, AUTOBOOL, "auto"), V(FetchDirInfoEarly, BOOL, "0"), V(FetchDirInfoExtraEarly, BOOL, "0"), V(FetchServerDescriptors, BOOL, "1"), @@ -281,6 +287,7 @@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = { V(IPv6Exit, BOOL, "0"), VAR("ServerTransportPlugin", LINELIST, ServerTransportPlugin, NULL), V(ServerTransportListenAddr, LINELIST, NULL), + V(ServerTransportOptions, LINELIST, NULL), V(Socks4Proxy, STRING, NULL), V(Socks5Proxy, STRING, NULL), V(Socks5ProxyUsername, STRING, NULL), @@ -370,6 +377,7 @@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = { V(RunAsDaemon, BOOL, "0"), // V(RunTesting, BOOL, "0"), OBSOLETE("RunTesting"), // currently unused + V(Sandbox, BOOL, "0"), V(SafeLogging, STRING, "1"), V(SafeSocks, BOOL, "0"), V(ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig, BOOL, "1"), @@ -406,7 +414,7 @@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = { V(UseEntryGuards, BOOL, "1"), V(UseEntryGuardsAsDirGuards, BOOL, "1"), V(UseMicrodescriptors, AUTOBOOL, "auto"), - V(UseNTorHandshake, AUTOBOOL, "auto"), + V(UseNTorHandshake, AUTOBOOL, "1"), V(User, STRING, NULL), V(UserspaceIOCPBuffers, BOOL, "0"), VAR("V1AuthoritativeDirectory",BOOL, V1AuthoritativeDir, "0"), @@ -415,6 +423,7 @@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = { V(TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval, INTERVAL, "30 minutes"), V(TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay, INTERVAL, "5 minutes"), V(TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay, INTERVAL, "5 minutes"), + V(TestingV3AuthVotingStartOffset, INTERVAL, "0"), V(V3AuthVotingInterval, INTERVAL, "1 hour"), V(V3AuthVoteDelay, INTERVAL, "5 minutes"), V(V3AuthDistDelay, INTERVAL, "5 minutes"), @@ -435,6 +444,24 @@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = { VAR("__OwningControllerProcess",STRING,OwningControllerProcess, NULL), V(MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2, INTERVAL, "25 hours"), V(VoteOnHidServDirectoriesV2, BOOL, "1"), + V(TestingServerDownloadSchedule, CSV_INTERVAL, "0, 0, 0, 60, 60, 120, " + "300, 900, 2147483647"), + V(TestingClientDownloadSchedule, CSV_INTERVAL, "0, 0, 60, 300, 600, " + "2147483647"), + V(TestingServerConsensusDownloadSchedule, CSV_INTERVAL, "0, 0, 60, " + "300, 600, 1800, 1800, 1800, 1800, " + "1800, 3600, 7200"), + V(TestingClientConsensusDownloadSchedule, CSV_INTERVAL, "0, 0, 60, " + "300, 600, 1800, 3600, 3600, 3600, " + "10800, 21600, 43200"), + V(TestingBridgeDownloadSchedule, CSV_INTERVAL, "3600, 900, 900, 3600"), + V(TestingClientMaxIntervalWithoutRequest, INTERVAL, "10 minutes"), + V(TestingDirConnectionMaxStall, INTERVAL, "5 minutes"), + V(TestingConsensusMaxDownloadTries, UINT, "8"), + V(TestingDescriptorMaxDownloadTries, UINT, "8"), + V(TestingMicrodescMaxDownloadTries, UINT, "8"), + V(TestingCertMaxDownloadTries, UINT, "8"), + V(TestingDirAuthVoteGuard, ROUTERSET, NULL), VAR("___UsingTestNetworkDefaults", BOOL, UsingTestNetworkDefaults_, "0"), { NULL, CONFIG_TYPE_OBSOLETE, 0, NULL } @@ -460,9 +487,28 @@ static const config_var_t testing_tor_network_defaults[] = { V(TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval, INTERVAL, "5 minutes"), V(TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay, INTERVAL, "20 seconds"), V(TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay, INTERVAL, "20 seconds"), + V(TestingV3AuthVotingStartOffset, INTERVAL, "0"), V(TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability, INTERVAL, "0 minutes"), V(TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime, INTERVAL, "0 minutes"), V(MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2, INTERVAL, "0 minutes"), + V(TestingServerDownloadSchedule, CSV_INTERVAL, "0, 0, 0, 5, 10, 15, " + "20, 30, 60"), + V(TestingClientDownloadSchedule, CSV_INTERVAL, "0, 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, " + "30, 60"), + V(TestingServerConsensusDownloadSchedule, CSV_INTERVAL, "0, 0, 5, 10, " + "15, 20, 30, 60"), + V(TestingClientConsensusDownloadSchedule, CSV_INTERVAL, "0, 0, 5, 10, " + "15, 20, 30, 60"), + V(TestingBridgeDownloadSchedule, CSV_INTERVAL, "60, 30, 30, 60"), + V(TestingClientMaxIntervalWithoutRequest, INTERVAL, "5 seconds"), + V(TestingDirConnectionMaxStall, INTERVAL, "30 seconds"), + V(TestingConsensusMaxDownloadTries, UINT, "80"), + V(TestingDescriptorMaxDownloadTries, UINT, "80"), + V(TestingMicrodescMaxDownloadTries, UINT, "80"), + V(TestingCertMaxDownloadTries, UINT, "80"), + V(TestingEnableConnBwEvent, BOOL, "1"), + V(TestingEnableCellStatsEvent, BOOL, "1"), + V(TestingEnableTbEmptyEvent, BOOL, "1"), VAR("___UsingTestNetworkDefaults", BOOL, UsingTestNetworkDefaults_, "1"), { NULL, CONFIG_TYPE_OBSOLETE, 0, NULL } @@ -475,9 +521,6 @@ static const config_var_t testing_tor_network_defaults[] = { #ifdef _WIN32 static char *get_windows_conf_root(void); #endif -static int options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, - or_options_t *options, - int from_setconf, char **msg); static int options_act_reversible(const or_options_t *old_options, char **msg); static int options_act(const or_options_t *old_options); static int options_transition_allowed(const or_options_t *old, @@ -487,9 +530,8 @@ static int options_transition_affects_workers( const or_options_t *old_options, const or_options_t *new_options); static int options_transition_affects_descriptor( const or_options_t *old_options, const or_options_t *new_options); -static int check_nickname_list(const char *lst, const char *name, char **msg); +static int check_nickname_list(char **lst, const char *name, char **msg); -static int parse_bridge_line(const char *line, int validate_only); static int parse_client_transport_line(const char *line, int validate_only); static int parse_server_transport_line(const char *line, int validate_only); @@ -517,18 +559,21 @@ static int parse_outbound_addresses(or_options_t *options, int validate_only, char **msg); static void config_maybe_load_geoip_files_(const or_options_t *options, const or_options_t *old_options); +static int options_validate_cb(void *old_options, void *options, + void *default_options, + int from_setconf, char **msg); /** Magic value for or_options_t. */ #define OR_OPTIONS_MAGIC 9090909 /** Configuration format for or_options_t. */ -static config_format_t options_format = { +STATIC config_format_t options_format = { sizeof(or_options_t), OR_OPTIONS_MAGIC, STRUCT_OFFSET(or_options_t, magic_), option_abbrevs_, option_vars_, - (validate_fn_t)options_validate, + options_validate_cb, NULL }; @@ -545,8 +590,12 @@ static or_options_t *global_default_options = NULL; static char *torrc_fname = NULL; /** Name of the most recently read torrc-defaults file.*/ static char *torrc_defaults_fname; -/** Configuration Options set by command line. */ +/** Configuration options set by command line. */ static config_line_t *global_cmdline_options = NULL; +/** Non-configuration options set by the command line */ +static config_line_t *global_cmdline_only_options = NULL; +/** Boolean: Have we parsed the command line? */ +static int have_parsed_cmdline = 0; /** Contents of most recently read DirPortFrontPage file. */ static char *global_dirfrontpagecontents = NULL; /** List of port_cfg_t for all configured ports. */ @@ -678,7 +727,7 @@ get_short_version(void) /** Release additional memory allocated in options */ -static void +STATIC void or_options_free(or_options_t *options) { if (!options) @@ -691,6 +740,7 @@ or_options_free(or_options_t *options) smartlist_free(options->NodeFamilySets); } tor_free(options->BridgePassword_AuthDigest_); + tor_free(options->command_arg); config_free(&options_format, options); } @@ -707,6 +757,9 @@ config_free_all(void) config_free_lines(global_cmdline_options); global_cmdline_options = NULL; + config_free_lines(global_cmdline_only_options); + global_cmdline_only_options = NULL; + if (configured_ports) { SMARTLIST_FOREACH(configured_ports, port_cfg_t *, p, port_cfg_free(p)); @@ -972,6 +1025,7 @@ options_act_reversible(const or_options_t *old_options, char **msg) int set_conn_limit = 0; int r = -1; int logs_marked = 0; + int old_min_log_level = get_min_log_level(); /* Daemonize _first_, since we only want to open most of this stuff in * the subprocess. Libevent bases can't be reliably inherited across @@ -1081,9 +1135,6 @@ options_act_reversible(const or_options_t *old_options, char **msg) /* No need to roll back, since you can't change the value. */ } - /* Write control ports to disk as appropriate */ - control_ports_write_to_file(); - if (directory_caches_v2_dir_info(options)) { char *fn = NULL; tor_asprintf(&fn, "%s"PATH_SEPARATOR"cached-status", @@ -1110,6 +1161,8 @@ options_act_reversible(const or_options_t *old_options, char **msg) goto rollback; } + sandbox_set_debugging_fd(get_err_logging_fd()); + commit: r = 0; if (logs_marked) { @@ -1120,6 +1173,14 @@ options_act_reversible(const or_options_t *old_options, char **msg) control_adjust_event_log_severity(); tor_free(severity); } + if (get_min_log_level() >= LOG_INFO && + get_min_log_level() != old_min_log_level) { + log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Your log may contain sensitive information: you're " + "logging more than \"notice\". Please log safely. Don't log " + "unless it serves an important reason, and overwrite the log " + "afterwards."); + } + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(replaced_listeners, connection_t *, conn, { log_notice(LD_NET, "Closing old %s on %s:%d", @@ -1272,6 +1333,9 @@ options_act(const or_options_t *old_options) } } + /* Write control ports to disk as appropriate */ + control_ports_write_to_file(); + if (running_tor && !have_lockfile()) { if (try_locking(options, 1) < 0) return -1; @@ -1302,14 +1366,23 @@ options_act(const or_options_t *old_options) } #endif + if (options->SafeLogging_ != SAFELOG_SCRUB_ALL && + (!old_options || old_options->SafeLogging_ != options->SafeLogging_)) { + log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Your log may contain sensitive information - you " + "disabled SafeLogging. Please log safely. Don't log unless it " + "serves an important reason. Overwrite the log afterwards."); + } + if (options->Bridges) { mark_bridge_list(); for (cl = options->Bridges; cl; cl = cl->next) { - if (parse_bridge_line(cl->value, 0)<0) { + bridge_line_t *bridge_line = parse_bridge_line(cl->value); + if (!bridge_line) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Previously validated Bridge line could not be added!"); return -1; } + bridge_add_from_config(bridge_line); } sweep_bridge_list(); } @@ -1423,8 +1496,14 @@ options_act(const or_options_t *old_options) return -1; } - if (init_cookie_authentication(options->CookieAuthentication) < 0) { - log_warn(LD_CONFIG,"Error creating cookie authentication file."); + if (init_control_cookie_authentication(options->CookieAuthentication) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_CONFIG,"Error creating control cookie authentication file."); + return -1; + } + + /* If we have an ExtORPort, initialize its auth cookie. */ + if (init_ext_or_cookie_authentication(!!options->ExtORPort_lines) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_CONFIG,"Error creating Extended ORPort cookie file."); return -1; } @@ -1732,40 +1811,66 @@ options_act(const or_options_t *old_options) return 0; } -/** Helper: Read a list of configuration options from the command line. - * If successful, put them in *<b>result</b> and return 0, and return - * -1 and leave *<b>result</b> alone. */ -static int -config_get_commandlines(int argc, char **argv, config_line_t **result) +static const struct { + const char *name; + int takes_argument; +} CMDLINE_ONLY_OPTIONS[] = { + { "-f", 1 }, + { "--allow-missing-torrc", 0 }, + { "--defaults-torrc", 1 }, + { "--hash-password", 1 }, + { "--dump-config", 1 }, + { "--list-fingerprint", 0 }, + { "--verify-config", 0 }, + { "--ignore-missing-torrc", 0 }, + { "--quiet", 0 }, + { "--hush", 0 }, + { "--version", 0 }, + { "--library-versions", 0 }, + { "-h", 0 }, + { "--help", 0 }, + { "--list-torrc-options", 0 }, + { "--digests", 0 }, + { "--nt-service", 0 }, + { "-nt-service", 0 }, + { NULL, 0 }, +}; + +/** Helper: Read a list of configuration options from the command line. If + * successful, or if ignore_errors is set, put them in *<b>result</b>, put the + * commandline-only options in *<b>cmdline_result</b>, and return 0; + * otherwise, return -1 and leave *<b>result</b> and <b>cmdline_result</b> + * alone. */ +int +config_parse_commandline(int argc, char **argv, int ignore_errors, + config_line_t **result, + config_line_t **cmdline_result) { + config_line_t *param = NULL; + config_line_t *front = NULL; config_line_t **new = &front; - char *s; + + config_line_t *front_cmdline = NULL; + config_line_t **new_cmdline = &front_cmdline; + + char *s, *arg; int i = 1; while (i < argc) { unsigned command = CONFIG_LINE_NORMAL; int want_arg = 1; + int is_cmdline = 0; + int j; - if (!strcmp(argv[i],"-f") || - !strcmp(argv[i],"--defaults-torrc") || - !strcmp(argv[i],"--hash-password")) { - i += 2; /* command-line option with argument. ignore them. */ - continue; - } else if (!strcmp(argv[i],"--list-fingerprint") || - !strcmp(argv[i],"--verify-config") || - !strcmp(argv[i],"--ignore-missing-torrc") || - !strcmp(argv[i],"--quiet") || - !strcmp(argv[i],"--hush")) { - i += 1; /* command-line option. ignore it. */ - continue; - } else if (!strcmp(argv[i],"--nt-service") || - !strcmp(argv[i],"-nt-service")) { - i += 1; - continue; + for (j = 0; CMDLINE_ONLY_OPTIONS[j].name != NULL; ++j) { + if (!strcmp(argv[i], CMDLINE_ONLY_OPTIONS[j].name)) { + is_cmdline = 1; + want_arg = CMDLINE_ONLY_OPTIONS[j].takes_argument; + break; + } } - *new = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(config_line_t)); s = argv[i]; /* Each keyword may be prefixed with one or two dashes. */ @@ -1785,22 +1890,38 @@ config_get_commandlines(int argc, char **argv, config_line_t **result) } if (want_arg && i == argc-1) { - log_warn(LD_CONFIG,"Command-line option '%s' with no value. Failing.", - argv[i]); - config_free_lines(front); - return -1; + if (ignore_errors) { + arg = strdup(""); + } else { + log_warn(LD_CONFIG,"Command-line option '%s' with no value. Failing.", + argv[i]); + config_free_lines(front); + config_free_lines(front_cmdline); + return -1; + } + } else { + arg = want_arg ? tor_strdup(argv[i+1]) : strdup(""); } - (*new)->key = tor_strdup(config_expand_abbrev(&options_format, s, 1, 1)); - (*new)->value = want_arg ? tor_strdup(argv[i+1]) : tor_strdup(""); - (*new)->command = command; - (*new)->next = NULL; + param = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(config_line_t)); + param->key = is_cmdline ? tor_strdup(argv[i]) : tor_strdup(s); + param->value = arg; + param->command = command; + param->next = NULL; log_debug(LD_CONFIG, "command line: parsed keyword '%s', value '%s'", - (*new)->key, (*new)->value); + param->key, param->value); + + if (is_cmdline) { + *new_cmdline = param; + new_cmdline = &((*new_cmdline)->next); + } else { + *new = param; + new = &((*new)->next); + } - new = &((*new)->next); i += want_arg ? 2 : 1; } + *cmdline_result = front_cmdline; *result = front; return 0; } @@ -1852,7 +1973,8 @@ options_trial_assign(config_line_t *list, int use_defaults, return r; } - if (options_validate(get_options_mutable(), trial_options, 1, msg) < 0) { + if (options_validate(get_options_mutable(), trial_options, + global_default_options, 1, msg) < 0) { config_free(&options_format, trial_options); return SETOPT_ERR_PARSE; /*XXX make this a separate return value. */ } @@ -2166,10 +2288,29 @@ options_init(or_options_t *options) * include options that are the same as Tor's defaults. */ char * -options_dump(const or_options_t *options, int minimal) +options_dump(const or_options_t *options, int how_to_dump) { - return config_dump(&options_format, global_default_options, - options, minimal, 0); + const or_options_t *use_defaults; + int minimal; + switch (how_to_dump) { + case OPTIONS_DUMP_MINIMAL: + use_defaults = global_default_options; + minimal = 1; + break; + case OPTIONS_DUMP_DEFAULTS: + use_defaults = NULL; + minimal = 1; + break; + case OPTIONS_DUMP_ALL: + use_defaults = NULL; + minimal = 0; + break; + default: + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Bogus value for how_to_dump==%d", how_to_dump); + return NULL; + } + + return config_dump(&options_format, use_defaults, options, minimal, 0); } /** Return 0 if every element of sl is a string holding a decimal @@ -2286,10 +2427,19 @@ compute_publishserverdescriptor(or_options_t *options) * */ #define RECOMMENDED_MIN_CIRCUIT_BUILD_TIMEOUT (10) -/** Return 0 if every setting in <b>options</b> is reasonable, and a - * permissible transition from <b>old_options</b>. Else return -1. - * Should have no side effects, except for normalizing the contents of - * <b>options</b>. +static int +options_validate_cb(void *old_options, void *options, void *default_options, + int from_setconf, char **msg) +{ + return options_validate(old_options, options, default_options, + from_setconf, msg); +} + +/** Return 0 if every setting in <b>options</b> is reasonable, is a + * permissible transition from <b>old_options</b>, and none of the + * testing-only settings differ from <b>default_options</b> unless in + * testing mode. Else return -1. Should have no side effects, except for + * normalizing the contents of <b>options</b>. * * On error, tor_strdup an error explanation into *<b>msg</b>. * @@ -2298,9 +2448,9 @@ compute_publishserverdescriptor(or_options_t *options) * Log line should stay empty. If it's 0, then give us a default log * if there are no logs defined. */ -static int +STATIC int options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, - int from_setconf, char **msg) + or_options_t *default_options, int from_setconf, char **msg) { int i; config_line_t *cl; @@ -2973,14 +3123,14 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, size_t len; len = strlen(options->Socks5ProxyUsername); - if (len < 1 || len > 255) + if (len < 1 || len > MAX_SOCKS5_AUTH_FIELD_SIZE) REJECT("Socks5ProxyUsername must be between 1 and 255 characters."); if (!options->Socks5ProxyPassword) REJECT("Socks5ProxyPassword must be included with Socks5ProxyUsername."); len = strlen(options->Socks5ProxyPassword); - if (len < 1 || len > 255) + if (len < 1 || len > MAX_SOCKS5_AUTH_FIELD_SIZE) REJECT("Socks5ProxyPassword must be between 1 and 255 characters."); } else if (options->Socks5ProxyPassword) REJECT("Socks5ProxyPassword must be included with Socks5ProxyUsername."); @@ -3040,7 +3190,7 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, "You should also make sure you aren't listing this bridge's " "fingerprint in any other MyFamily."); } - if (check_nickname_list(options->MyFamily, "MyFamily", msg)) + if (check_nickname_list(&options->MyFamily, "MyFamily", msg)) return -1; for (cl = options->NodeFamilies; cl; cl = cl->next) { routerset_t *rs = routerset_new(); @@ -3064,8 +3214,10 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, REJECT("If you set UseBridges, you must set TunnelDirConns."); for (cl = options->Bridges; cl; cl = cl->next) { - if (parse_bridge_line(cl->value, 1)<0) - REJECT("Bridge line did not parse. See logs for details."); + bridge_line_t *bridge_line = parse_bridge_line(cl->value); + if (!bridge_line) + REJECT("Bridge line did not parse. See logs for details."); + bridge_line_free(bridge_line); } for (cl = options->ClientTransportPlugin; cl; cl = cl->next) { @@ -3101,6 +3253,30 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, "ServerTransportListenAddr line will be ignored."); } + for (cl = options->ServerTransportOptions; cl; cl = cl->next) { + /** If get_options_from_transport_options_line() fails with + 'transport' being NULL, it means that something went wrong + while parsing the ServerTransportOptions line. */ + smartlist_t *options_sl = + get_options_from_transport_options_line(cl->value, NULL); + if (!options_sl) + REJECT("ServerTransportOptions did not parse. See logs for details."); + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(options_sl, char *, cp, tor_free(cp)); + smartlist_free(options_sl); + } + + /* If we are a bridge with a pluggable transport proxy but no + Extended ORPort, inform the user that she is missing out. */ + if (server_mode(options) && options->ServerTransportPlugin && + !options->ExtORPort_lines) { + log_notice(LD_CONFIG, "We are a bridge with a pluggable transport " + "proxy but the Extended ORPort is disabled. The " + "Extended ORPort helps Tor communicate with the pluggable " + "transport proxy. Please enable it using the ExtORPort " + "torrc option."); + } + if (options->ConstrainedSockets) { /* If the user wants to constrain socket buffer use, make sure the desired * limit is between MIN|MAX_TCPSOCK_BUFFER in k increments. */ @@ -3193,35 +3369,46 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, "ignore you."); } - /*XXXX checking for defaults manually like this is a bit fragile.*/ - - /* Keep changes to hard-coded values synchronous to man page and default - * values table. */ - if (options->TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval != 30*60 && - !options->TestingTorNetwork && !options->UsingTestNetworkDefaults_) { - REJECT("TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval may only be changed in testing " - "Tor networks!"); - } else if (options->TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval < MIN_VOTE_INTERVAL) { +#define CHECK_DEFAULT(arg) \ + STMT_BEGIN \ + if (!options->TestingTorNetwork && \ + !options->UsingTestNetworkDefaults_ && \ + !config_is_same(&options_format,options, \ + default_options,#arg)) { \ + REJECT(#arg " may only be changed in testing Tor " \ + "networks!"); \ + } STMT_END + CHECK_DEFAULT(TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval); + CHECK_DEFAULT(TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay); + CHECK_DEFAULT(TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay); + CHECK_DEFAULT(TestingV3AuthVotingStartOffset); + CHECK_DEFAULT(TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability); + CHECK_DEFAULT(TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime); + CHECK_DEFAULT(TestingServerDownloadSchedule); + CHECK_DEFAULT(TestingClientDownloadSchedule); + CHECK_DEFAULT(TestingServerConsensusDownloadSchedule); + CHECK_DEFAULT(TestingClientConsensusDownloadSchedule); + CHECK_DEFAULT(TestingBridgeDownloadSchedule); + CHECK_DEFAULT(TestingClientMaxIntervalWithoutRequest); + CHECK_DEFAULT(TestingDirConnectionMaxStall); + CHECK_DEFAULT(TestingConsensusMaxDownloadTries); + CHECK_DEFAULT(TestingDescriptorMaxDownloadTries); + CHECK_DEFAULT(TestingMicrodescMaxDownloadTries); + CHECK_DEFAULT(TestingCertMaxDownloadTries); +#undef CHECK_DEFAULT + + if (options->TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval < MIN_VOTE_INTERVAL) { REJECT("TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval is insanely low."); } else if (((30*60) % options->TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval) != 0) { REJECT("TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval does not divide evenly into " "30 minutes."); } - if (options->TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay != 5*60 && - !options->TestingTorNetwork && !options->UsingTestNetworkDefaults_) { - - REJECT("TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay may only be changed in testing " - "Tor networks!"); - } else if (options->TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay < MIN_VOTE_SECONDS) { + if (options->TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay < MIN_VOTE_SECONDS) { REJECT("TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay is way too low."); } - if (options->TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay != 5*60 && - !options->TestingTorNetwork && !options->UsingTestNetworkDefaults_) { - REJECT("TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay may only be changed in testing " - "Tor networks!"); - } else if (options->TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay < MIN_DIST_SECONDS) { + if (options->TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay < MIN_DIST_SECONDS) { REJECT("TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay is way too low."); } @@ -3232,26 +3419,79 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, "must be less than half TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval"); } - if (options->TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability != 30*60 && - !options->TestingTorNetwork && !options->UsingTestNetworkDefaults_) { - REJECT("TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability may only be changed in " - "testing Tor networks!"); - } else if (options->TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability < 0) { + if (options->TestingV3AuthVotingStartOffset > + MIN(options->TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval, + options->V3AuthVotingInterval)) { + REJECT("TestingV3AuthVotingStartOffset is higher than the voting " + "interval."); + } + + if (options->TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability < 0) { REJECT("TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability must be non-negative."); } else if (options->TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability > 2*60*60) { COMPLAIN("TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability is insanely high."); } - if (options->TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime != 10*60 && - !options->TestingTorNetwork && !options->UsingTestNetworkDefaults_) { - REJECT("TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime may only be changed in " - "testing Tor networks!"); - } else if (options->TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime < 0) { + if (options->TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime < 0) { REJECT("TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime must be non-negative."); } else if (options->TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime > 60*60) { COMPLAIN("TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime is insanely high."); } + if (options->TestingClientMaxIntervalWithoutRequest < 1) { + REJECT("TestingClientMaxIntervalWithoutRequest is way too low."); + } else if (options->TestingClientMaxIntervalWithoutRequest > 3600) { + COMPLAIN("TestingClientMaxIntervalWithoutRequest is insanely high."); + } + + if (options->TestingDirConnectionMaxStall < 5) { + REJECT("TestingDirConnectionMaxStall is way too low."); + } else if (options->TestingDirConnectionMaxStall > 3600) { + COMPLAIN("TestingDirConnectionMaxStall is insanely high."); + } + + if (options->TestingConsensusMaxDownloadTries < 2) { + REJECT("TestingConsensusMaxDownloadTries must be greater than 1."); + } else if (options->TestingConsensusMaxDownloadTries > 800) { + COMPLAIN("TestingConsensusMaxDownloadTries is insanely high."); + } + + if (options->TestingDescriptorMaxDownloadTries < 2) { + REJECT("TestingDescriptorMaxDownloadTries must be greater than 1."); + } else if (options->TestingDescriptorMaxDownloadTries > 800) { + COMPLAIN("TestingDescriptorMaxDownloadTries is insanely high."); + } + + if (options->TestingMicrodescMaxDownloadTries < 2) { + REJECT("TestingMicrodescMaxDownloadTries must be greater than 1."); + } else if (options->TestingMicrodescMaxDownloadTries > 800) { + COMPLAIN("TestingMicrodescMaxDownloadTries is insanely high."); + } + + if (options->TestingCertMaxDownloadTries < 2) { + REJECT("TestingCertMaxDownloadTries must be greater than 1."); + } else if (options->TestingCertMaxDownloadTries > 800) { + COMPLAIN("TestingCertMaxDownloadTries is insanely high."); + } + + if (options->TestingEnableConnBwEvent && + !options->TestingTorNetwork && !options->UsingTestNetworkDefaults_) { + REJECT("TestingEnableConnBwEvent may only be changed in testing " + "Tor networks!"); + } + + if (options->TestingEnableCellStatsEvent && + !options->TestingTorNetwork && !options->UsingTestNetworkDefaults_) { + REJECT("TestingEnableCellStatsEvent may only be changed in testing " + "Tor networks!"); + } + + if (options->TestingEnableTbEmptyEvent && + !options->TestingTorNetwork && !options->UsingTestNetworkDefaults_) { + REJECT("TestingEnableTbEmptyEvent may only be changed in testing " + "Tor networks!"); + } + if (options->TestingTorNetwork) { log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "TestingTorNetwork is set. This will make your node " "almost unusable in the public Tor network, and is " @@ -3510,31 +3750,63 @@ get_default_conf_file(int defaults_file) } /** Verify whether lst is a string containing valid-looking comma-separated - * nicknames, or NULL. Return 0 on success. Warn and return -1 on failure. + * nicknames, or NULL. Will normalise <b>lst</b> to prefix '$' to any nickname + * or fingerprint that needs it. Return 0 on success. + * Warn and return -1 on failure. */ static int -check_nickname_list(const char *lst, const char *name, char **msg) +check_nickname_list(char **lst, const char *name, char **msg) { int r = 0; smartlist_t *sl; + int changes = 0; - if (!lst) + if (!*lst) return 0; sl = smartlist_new(); - smartlist_split_string(sl, lst, ",", + smartlist_split_string(sl, *lst, ",", SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK|SPLIT_STRIP_SPACE, 0); - SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl, const char *, s, + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(sl, char *, s) { if (!is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(s)) { + // check if first char is dollar + if (s[0] != '$') { + // Try again but with a dollar symbol prepended + char *prepended; + tor_asprintf(&prepended, "$%s", s); + + if (is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(prepended)) { + // The nickname is valid when it's prepended, swap the current + // version with a prepended one + tor_free(s); + SMARTLIST_REPLACE_CURRENT(sl, s, prepended); + changes = 1; + continue; + } + + // Still not valid, free and fallback to error message + tor_free(prepended); + } + tor_asprintf(msg, "Invalid nickname '%s' in %s line", s, name); r = -1; break; } - }); + } + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(s); + + // Replace the caller's nickname list with a fixed one + if (changes && r == 0) { + char *newNicknames = smartlist_join_strings(sl, ", ", 0, NULL); + tor_free(*lst); + *lst = newNicknames; + } + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl, char *, s, tor_free(s)); smartlist_free(sl); + return r; } @@ -3550,26 +3822,26 @@ check_nickname_list(const char *lst, const char *name, char **msg) * filename if it doesn't exist. */ static char * -find_torrc_filename(int argc, char **argv, +find_torrc_filename(config_line_t *cmd_arg, int defaults_file, int *using_default_fname, int *ignore_missing_torrc) { char *fname=NULL; - int i; + config_line_t *p_index; const char *fname_opt = defaults_file ? "--defaults-torrc" : "-f"; const char *ignore_opt = defaults_file ? NULL : "--ignore-missing-torrc"; if (defaults_file) *ignore_missing_torrc = 1; - for (i = 1; i < argc; ++i) { - if (i < argc-1 && !strcmp(argv[i],fname_opt)) { + for (p_index = cmd_arg; p_index; p_index = p_index->next) { + if (!strcmp(p_index->key, fname_opt)) { if (fname) { log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Duplicate %s options on command line.", fname_opt); tor_free(fname); } - fname = expand_filename(argv[i+1]); + fname = expand_filename(p_index->value); { char *absfname; @@ -3579,8 +3851,7 @@ find_torrc_filename(int argc, char **argv, } *using_default_fname = 0; - ++i; - } else if (ignore_opt && !strcmp(argv[i],ignore_opt)) { + } else if (ignore_opt && !strcmp(p_index->key,ignore_opt)) { *ignore_missing_torrc = 1; } } @@ -3617,7 +3888,7 @@ find_torrc_filename(int argc, char **argv, * Return the contents of the file on success, and NULL on failure. */ static char * -load_torrc_from_disk(int argc, char **argv, int defaults_file) +load_torrc_from_disk(config_line_t *cmd_arg, int defaults_file) { char *fname=NULL; char *cf = NULL; @@ -3625,7 +3896,7 @@ load_torrc_from_disk(int argc, char **argv, int defaults_file) int ignore_missing_torrc = 0; char **fname_var = defaults_file ? &torrc_defaults_fname : &torrc_fname; - fname = find_torrc_filename(argc, argv, defaults_file, + fname = find_torrc_filename(cmd_arg, defaults_file, &using_default_torrc, &ignore_missing_torrc); tor_assert(fname); log_debug(LD_CONFIG, "Opening config file \"%s\"", fname); @@ -3667,59 +3938,75 @@ int options_init_from_torrc(int argc, char **argv) { char *cf=NULL, *cf_defaults=NULL; - int i, command; + int command; int retval = -1; - static char **backup_argv; - static int backup_argc; char *command_arg = NULL; char *errmsg=NULL; + config_line_t *p_index = NULL; + config_line_t *cmdline_only_options = NULL; - if (argv) { /* first time we're called. save command line args */ - backup_argv = argv; - backup_argc = argc; - } else { /* we're reloading. need to clean up old options first. */ - argv = backup_argv; - argc = backup_argc; + /* Go through command-line variables */ + if (! have_parsed_cmdline) { + /* Or we could redo the list every time we pass this place. + * It does not really matter */ + if (config_parse_commandline(argc, argv, 0, &global_cmdline_options, + &global_cmdline_only_options) < 0) { + goto err; + } + have_parsed_cmdline = 1; } - if (argc > 1 && (!strcmp(argv[1], "-h") || !strcmp(argv[1],"--help"))) { + cmdline_only_options = global_cmdline_only_options; + + if (config_line_find(cmdline_only_options, "-h") || + config_line_find(cmdline_only_options, "--help")) { print_usage(); exit(0); } - if (argc > 1 && !strcmp(argv[1], "--list-torrc-options")) { + if (config_line_find(cmdline_only_options, "--list-torrc-options")) { /* For documenting validating whether we've documented everything. */ list_torrc_options(); exit(0); } - if (argc > 1 && (!strcmp(argv[1],"--version"))) { + if (config_line_find(cmdline_only_options, "--version")) { printf("Tor version %s.\n",get_version()); exit(0); } - if (argc > 1 && (!strcmp(argv[1],"--digests"))) { + + if (config_line_find(cmdline_only_options, "--digests")) { printf("Tor version %s.\n",get_version()); printf("%s", libor_get_digests()); printf("%s", tor_get_digests()); exit(0); } - /* Go through command-line variables */ - if (!global_cmdline_options) { - /* Or we could redo the list every time we pass this place. - * It does not really matter */ - if (config_get_commandlines(argc, argv, &global_cmdline_options) < 0) { - goto err; - } + if (config_line_find(cmdline_only_options, "--library-versions")) { + printf("Tor version %s. \n", get_version()); + printf("Library versions\tCompiled\t\tRuntime\n"); + printf("Libevent\t\t%-15s\t\t%s\n", + tor_libevent_get_header_version_str(), + tor_libevent_get_version_str()); + printf("OpenSSL \t\t%-15s\t\t%s\n", + crypto_openssl_get_header_version_str(), + crypto_openssl_get_version_str()); + printf("Zlib \t\t%-15s\t\t%s\n", + tor_zlib_get_header_version_str(), + tor_zlib_get_version_str()); + //TODO: Hex versions? + exit(0); } command = CMD_RUN_TOR; - for (i = 1; i < argc; ++i) { - if (!strcmp(argv[i],"--list-fingerprint")) { + for (p_index = cmdline_only_options; p_index; p_index = p_index->next) { + if (!strcmp(p_index->key,"--list-fingerprint")) { command = CMD_LIST_FINGERPRINT; - } else if (!strcmp(argv[i],"--hash-password")) { + } else if (!strcmp(p_index->key, "--hash-password")) { command = CMD_HASH_PASSWORD; - command_arg = tor_strdup( (i < argc-1) ? argv[i+1] : ""); - ++i; - } else if (!strcmp(argv[i],"--verify-config")) { + command_arg = p_index->value; + } else if (!strcmp(p_index->key, "--dump-config")) { + command = CMD_DUMP_CONFIG; + command_arg = p_index->value; + } else if (!strcmp(p_index->key, "--verify-config")) { command = CMD_VERIFY_CONFIG; } } @@ -3728,10 +4015,15 @@ options_init_from_torrc(int argc, char **argv) cf_defaults = tor_strdup(""); cf = tor_strdup(""); } else { - cf_defaults = load_torrc_from_disk(argc, argv, 1); - cf = load_torrc_from_disk(argc, argv, 0); - if (!cf) - goto err; + cf_defaults = load_torrc_from_disk(cmdline_only_options, 1); + cf = load_torrc_from_disk(cmdline_only_options, 0); + if (!cf) { + if (config_line_find(cmdline_only_options, "--allow-missing-torrc")) { + cf = tor_strdup(""); + } else { + goto err; + } + } } retval = options_init_from_string(cf_defaults, cf, command, command_arg, @@ -3775,7 +4067,7 @@ options_init_from_string(const char *cf_defaults, const char *cf, newoptions->magic_ = OR_OPTIONS_MAGIC; options_init(newoptions); newoptions->command = command; - newoptions->command_arg = command_arg; + newoptions->command_arg = command_arg ? tor_strdup(command_arg) : NULL; for (i = 0; i < 2; ++i) { const char *body = i==0 ? cf_defaults : cf; @@ -3839,7 +4131,7 @@ options_init_from_string(const char *cf_defaults, const char *cf, newoptions->magic_ = OR_OPTIONS_MAGIC; options_init(newoptions); newoptions->command = command; - newoptions->command_arg = command_arg; + newoptions->command_arg = command_arg ? tor_strdup(command_arg) : NULL; /* Assign all options a second time. */ for (i = 0; i < 2; ++i) { @@ -3871,7 +4163,8 @@ options_init_from_string(const char *cf_defaults, const char *cf, } /* Validate newoptions */ - if (options_validate(oldoptions, newoptions, 0, msg) < 0) { + if (options_validate(oldoptions, newoptions, newdefaultoptions, + 0, msg) < 0) { err = SETOPT_ERR_PARSE; /*XXX make this a separate return value.*/ goto err; } @@ -4128,21 +4421,72 @@ options_init_logs(or_options_t *options, int validate_only) return ok?0:-1; } +/** Given a smartlist of SOCKS arguments to be passed to a transport + * proxy in <b>args</b>, validate them and return -1 if they are + * corrupted. Return 0 if they seem OK. */ +static int +validate_transport_socks_arguments(const smartlist_t *args) +{ + char *socks_string = NULL; + size_t socks_string_len; + + tor_assert(args); + tor_assert(smartlist_len(args) > 0); + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(args, const char *, s) { + if (!string_is_key_value(LOG_WARN, s)) { /* items should be k=v items */ + log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "'%s' is not a k=v item.", s); + return -1; + } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(s); + + socks_string = pt_stringify_socks_args(args); + if (!socks_string) + return -1; + + socks_string_len = strlen(socks_string); + tor_free(socks_string); + + if (socks_string_len > MAX_SOCKS5_AUTH_SIZE_TOTAL) { + log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "SOCKS arguments can't be more than %u bytes (%lu).", + MAX_SOCKS5_AUTH_SIZE_TOTAL, + (unsigned long) socks_string_len); + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** Deallocate a bridge_line_t structure. */ +/* private */ void +bridge_line_free(bridge_line_t *bridge_line) +{ + if (!bridge_line) + return; + + if (bridge_line->socks_args) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(bridge_line->socks_args, char*, s, tor_free(s)); + smartlist_free(bridge_line->socks_args); + } + tor_free(bridge_line->transport_name); + tor_free(bridge_line); +} + /** Read the contents of a Bridge line from <b>line</b>. Return 0 * if the line is well-formed, and -1 if it isn't. If * <b>validate_only</b> is 0, and the line is well-formed, then add - * the bridge described in the line to our internal bridge list. */ -static int -parse_bridge_line(const char *line, int validate_only) + * the bridge described in the line to our internal bridge list. + * + * Bridge line format: + * Bridge [transport] IP:PORT [id-fingerprint] [k=v] [k=v] ... + */ +/* private */ bridge_line_t * +parse_bridge_line(const char *line) { smartlist_t *items = NULL; - int r; char *addrport=NULL, *fingerprint=NULL; - char *transport_name=NULL; - char *field1=NULL; - tor_addr_t addr; - uint16_t port = 0; - char digest[DIGEST_LEN]; + char *field=NULL; + bridge_line_t *bridge_line = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(bridge_line_t)); items = smartlist_new(); smartlist_split_string(items, line, NULL, @@ -4152,75 +4496,110 @@ parse_bridge_line(const char *line, int validate_only) goto err; } - /* field1 is either a transport name or addrport */ - field1 = smartlist_get(items, 0); + /* first field is either a transport name or addrport */ + field = smartlist_get(items, 0); smartlist_del_keeporder(items, 0); - if (!(strstr(field1, ".") || strstr(field1, ":"))) { - /* new-style bridge line */ - transport_name = field1; + if (string_is_C_identifier(field)) { + /* It's a transport name. */ + bridge_line->transport_name = field; if (smartlist_len(items) < 1) { log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Too few items to Bridge line."); goto err; } - addrport = smartlist_get(items, 0); + addrport = smartlist_get(items, 0); /* Next field is addrport then. */ smartlist_del_keeporder(items, 0); } else { - addrport = field1; + addrport = field; } - if (tor_addr_port_lookup(addrport, &addr, &port)<0) { + /* Parse addrport. */ + if (tor_addr_port_lookup(addrport, + &bridge_line->addr, &bridge_line->port)<0) { log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Error parsing Bridge address '%s'", addrport); goto err; } - if (!port) { + if (!bridge_line->port) { log_info(LD_CONFIG, "Bridge address '%s' has no port; using default port 443.", addrport); - port = 443; + bridge_line->port = 443; } + /* If transports are enabled, next field could be a fingerprint or a + socks argument. If transports are disabled, next field must be + a fingerprint. */ if (smartlist_len(items)) { - fingerprint = smartlist_join_strings(items, "", 0, NULL); + if (bridge_line->transport_name) { /* transports enabled: */ + field = smartlist_get(items, 0); + smartlist_del_keeporder(items, 0); + + /* If it's a key=value pair, then it's a SOCKS argument for the + transport proxy... */ + if (string_is_key_value(LOG_DEBUG, field)) { + bridge_line->socks_args = smartlist_new(); + smartlist_add(bridge_line->socks_args, field); + } else { /* ...otherwise, it's the bridge fingerprint. */ + fingerprint = field; + } + + } else { /* transports disabled: */ + fingerprint = smartlist_join_strings(items, "", 0, NULL); + } + } + + /* Handle fingerprint, if it was provided. */ + if (fingerprint) { if (strlen(fingerprint) != HEX_DIGEST_LEN) { log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Key digest for Bridge is wrong length."); goto err; } - if (base16_decode(digest, DIGEST_LEN, fingerprint, HEX_DIGEST_LEN)<0) { + if (base16_decode(bridge_line->digest, DIGEST_LEN, + fingerprint, HEX_DIGEST_LEN)<0) { log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Unable to decode Bridge key digest."); goto err; } } - if (!validate_only) { - log_debug(LD_DIR, "Bridge at %s (transport: %s) (%s)", - fmt_addrport(&addr, port), - transport_name ? transport_name : "no transport", - fingerprint ? fingerprint : "no key listed"); - bridge_add_from_config(&addr, port, - fingerprint ? digest : NULL, transport_name); + /* If we are using transports, any remaining items in the smartlist + should be k=v values. */ + if (bridge_line->transport_name && smartlist_len(items)) { + if (!bridge_line->socks_args) + bridge_line->socks_args = smartlist_new(); + + /* append remaining items of 'items' to 'socks_args' */ + smartlist_add_all(bridge_line->socks_args, items); + smartlist_clear(items); + + tor_assert(smartlist_len(bridge_line->socks_args) > 0); + } + + if (bridge_line->socks_args) { + if (validate_transport_socks_arguments(bridge_line->socks_args) < 0) + goto err; } - r = 0; goto done; err: - r = -1; + bridge_line_free(bridge_line); + bridge_line = NULL; done: SMARTLIST_FOREACH(items, char*, s, tor_free(s)); smartlist_free(items); tor_free(addrport); - tor_free(transport_name); tor_free(fingerprint); - return r; + + return bridge_line; } /** Read the contents of a ClientTransportPlugin line from * <b>line</b>. Return 0 if the line is well-formed, and -1 if it * isn't. * - * If <b>validate_only</b> is 0, and the line is well-formed: + * If <b>validate_only</b> is 0, the line is well-formed, and the + * transport is needed by some bridge: * - If it's an external proxy line, add the transport described in the line to * our internal transport list. * - If it's a managed proxy line, launch the managed proxy. */ @@ -4242,7 +4621,8 @@ parse_client_transport_line(const char *line, int validate_only) int is_managed=0; char **proxy_argv=NULL; char **tmp=NULL; - int proxy_argc,i; + int proxy_argc, i; + int is_useless_proxy=1; int line_length; @@ -4264,11 +4644,16 @@ parse_client_transport_line(const char *line, int validate_only) smartlist_split_string(transport_list, transports, ",", SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0); SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(transport_list, const char *, transport_name) { + /* validate transport names */ if (!string_is_C_identifier(transport_name)) { log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Transport name is not a C identifier (%s).", transport_name); goto err; } + + /* see if we actually need the transports provided by this proxy */ + if (!validate_only && transport_is_needed(transport_name)) + is_useless_proxy = 0; } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(transport_name); /* field2 is either a SOCKS version or "exec" */ @@ -4287,9 +4672,15 @@ parse_client_transport_line(const char *line, int validate_only) } if (is_managed) { /* managed */ - if (!validate_only) { /* if we are not just validating, use the - rest of the line as the argv of the proxy - to be launched */ + if (!validate_only && is_useless_proxy) { + log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Pluggable transport proxy (%s) does not provide " + "any needed transports and will not be launched.", line); + } + + /* If we are not just validating, use the rest of the line as the + argv of the proxy to be launched. Also, make sure that we are + only launching proxies that contribute useful transports. */ + if (!validate_only && !is_useless_proxy) { proxy_argc = line_length-2; tor_assert(proxy_argc > 0); proxy_argv = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(char*)*(proxy_argc+1)); @@ -4403,6 +4794,63 @@ get_bindaddr_from_transport_listen_line(const char *line,const char *transport) return addrport; } +/** Given a ServerTransportOptions <b>line</b>, return a smartlist + * with the options. Return NULL if the line was not well-formed. + * + * If <b>transport</b> is set, return NULL if the line is not + * referring to <b>transport</b>. + * + * The returned smartlist and its strings are allocated on the heap + * and it's the responsibility of the caller to free it. */ +smartlist_t * +get_options_from_transport_options_line(const char *line,const char *transport) +{ + smartlist_t *items = smartlist_new(); + smartlist_t *options = smartlist_new(); + const char *parsed_transport = NULL; + + smartlist_split_string(items, line, NULL, + SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, -1); + + if (smartlist_len(items) < 2) { + log_warn(LD_CONFIG,"Too few arguments on ServerTransportOptions line."); + goto err; + } + + parsed_transport = smartlist_get(items, 0); + /* If 'transport' is given, check if it matches the one on the line */ + if (transport && strcmp(transport, parsed_transport)) + goto err; + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(items, const char *, option) { + if (option_sl_idx == 0) /* skip the transport field (first field)*/ + continue; + + /* validate that it's a k=v value */ + if (!string_is_key_value(LOG_WARN, option)) { + log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "%s is not a k=v value.", escaped(option)); + goto err; + } + + /* add it to the options smartlist */ + smartlist_add(options, tor_strdup(option)); + log_debug(LD_CONFIG, "Added %s to the list of options", escaped(option)); + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(option); + + goto done; + + err: + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(options, char*, s, tor_free(s)); + smartlist_free(options); + options = NULL; + + done: + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(items, char*, s, tor_free(s)); + smartlist_free(items); + + return options; +} + /** Given the name of a pluggable transport in <b>transport</b>, check * the configuration file to see if the user has explicitly asked for * it to listen on a specific port. Return a <address:port> string if @@ -4423,6 +4871,26 @@ get_transport_bindaddr_from_config(const char *transport) return NULL; } +/** Given the name of a pluggable transport in <b>transport</b>, check + * the configuration file to see if the user has asked us to pass any + * parameters to the pluggable transport. Return a smartlist + * containing the parameters, otherwise NULL. */ +smartlist_t * +get_options_for_server_transport(const char *transport) +{ + config_line_t *cl; + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + + for (cl = options->ServerTransportOptions; cl; cl = cl->next) { + smartlist_t *options_sl = + get_options_from_transport_options_line(cl->value, transport); + if (options_sl) + return options_sl; + } + + return NULL; +} + /** Read the contents of a ServerTransportPlugin line from * <b>line</b>. Return 0 if the line is well-formed, and -1 if it * isn't. @@ -4827,6 +5295,27 @@ warn_nonlocal_client_ports(const smartlist_t *ports, const char *portname, } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(port); } +/** Warn for every Extended ORPort port in <b>ports</b> that is on a + * publicly routable address. */ +static void +warn_nonlocal_ext_orports(const smartlist_t *ports, const char *portname) +{ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(ports, const port_cfg_t *, port) { + if (port->type != CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR_LISTENER) + continue; + if (port->is_unix_addr) + continue; + /* XXX maybe warn even if address is RFC1918? */ + if (!tor_addr_is_internal(&port->addr, 1)) { + log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "You specified a public address '%s' for %sPort. " + "This is not advised; this address is supposed to only be " + "exposed on localhost so that your pluggable transport " + "proxies can connect to it.", + fmt_addrport(&port->addr, port->port), portname); + } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(port); +} + /** Given a list of port_cfg_t in <b>ports</b>, warn any controller port there * is listening on any non-loopback address. If <b>forbid</b> is true, * then emit a stronger warning and remove the port from the list. @@ -4927,6 +5416,7 @@ parse_port_config(smartlist_t *out, smartlist_t *elts; int retval = -1; const unsigned is_control = (listener_type == CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER); + const unsigned is_ext_orport = (listener_type == CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR_LISTENER); const unsigned allow_no_options = flags & CL_PORT_NO_OPTIONS; const unsigned use_server_options = flags & CL_PORT_SERVER_OPTIONS; const unsigned warn_nonlocal = flags & CL_PORT_WARN_NONLOCAL; @@ -5004,6 +5494,8 @@ parse_port_config(smartlist_t *out, if (warn_nonlocal && out) { if (is_control) warn_nonlocal_controller_ports(out, forbid_nonlocal); + else if (is_ext_orport) + warn_nonlocal_ext_orports(out, portname); else warn_nonlocal_client_ports(out, portname, listener_type); } @@ -5277,6 +5769,8 @@ parse_port_config(smartlist_t *out, if (warn_nonlocal && out) { if (is_control) warn_nonlocal_controller_ports(out, forbid_nonlocal); + else if (is_ext_orport) + warn_nonlocal_ext_orports(out, portname); else warn_nonlocal_client_ports(out, portname, listener_type); } @@ -5423,6 +5917,14 @@ parse_ports(or_options_t *options, int validate_only, goto err; } if (parse_port_config(ports, + options->ExtORPort_lines, NULL, + "ExtOR", CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR_LISTENER, + "127.0.0.1", 0, + CL_PORT_SERVER_OPTIONS|CL_PORT_WARN_NONLOCAL) < 0) { + *msg = tor_strdup("Invalid ExtORPort configuration"); + goto err; + } + if (parse_port_config(ports, options->DirPort_lines, options->DirListenAddress, "Dir", CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER, "0.0.0.0", 0, @@ -5457,6 +5959,8 @@ parse_ports(or_options_t *options, int validate_only, !! count_real_listeners(ports, CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER); options->DNSPort_set = !! count_real_listeners(ports, CONN_TYPE_AP_DNS_LISTENER); + options->ExtORPort_set = + !! count_real_listeners(ports, CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR_LISTENER); if (!validate_only) { if (configured_ports) { @@ -5744,7 +6248,7 @@ write_configuration_file(const char *fname, const or_options_t *options) return -1; } - if (!(new_conf = options_dump(options, 1))) { + if (!(new_conf = options_dump(options, OPTIONS_DUMP_MINIMAL))) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't get configuration string"); goto err; } @@ -5904,6 +6408,43 @@ options_get_datadir_fname2_suffix(const or_options_t *options, return fname; } +/** Check wether the data directory has a private subdirectory + * <b>subdir</b>. If not, try to create it. Return 0 on success, + * -1 otherwise. */ +int +check_or_create_data_subdir(const char *subdir) +{ + char *statsdir = get_datadir_fname(subdir); + int return_val = 0; + + if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE, get_options()->User) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_HIST, "Unable to create %s/ directory!", subdir); + return_val = -1; + } + tor_free(statsdir); + return return_val; +} + +/** Create a file named <b>fname</b> with contents <b>str</b> in the + * subdirectory <b>subdir</b> of the data directory. <b>descr</b> + * should be a short description of the file's content and will be + * used for the warning message, if it's present and the write process + * fails. Return 0 on success, -1 otherwise.*/ +int +write_to_data_subdir(const char* subdir, const char* fname, + const char* str, const char* descr) +{ + char *filename = get_datadir_fname2(subdir, fname); + int return_val = 0; + + if (write_str_to_file(filename, str, 0) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_HIST, "Unable to write %s to disk!", descr ? descr : fname); + return_val = -1; + } + tor_free(filename); + return return_val; +} + /** Given a file name check to see whether the file exists but has not been * modified for a very long time. If so, remove it. */ void @@ -5912,7 +6453,8 @@ remove_file_if_very_old(const char *fname, time_t now) #define VERY_OLD_FILE_AGE (28*24*60*60) struct stat st; - if (stat(fname, &st)==0 && st.st_mtime < now-VERY_OLD_FILE_AGE) { + if (stat(sandbox_intern_string(fname), &st)==0 && + st.st_mtime < now-VERY_OLD_FILE_AGE) { char buf[ISO_TIME_LEN+1]; format_local_iso_time(buf, st.st_mtime); log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "Obsolete file %s hasn't been modified since %s. " @@ -5993,6 +6535,7 @@ getinfo_helper_config(control_connection_t *conn, case CONFIG_TYPE_ISOTIME: type = "Time"; break; case CONFIG_TYPE_ROUTERSET: type = "RouterList"; break; case CONFIG_TYPE_CSV: type = "CommaList"; break; + case CONFIG_TYPE_CSV_INTERVAL: type = "TimeIntervalCommaList"; break; case CONFIG_TYPE_LINELIST: type = "LineList"; break; case CONFIG_TYPE_LINELIST_S: type = "Dependant"; break; case CONFIG_TYPE_LINELIST_V: type = "Virtual"; break; @@ -6124,3 +6667,58 @@ config_maybe_load_geoip_files_(const or_options_t *options, config_load_geoip_file_(AF_INET6, options->GeoIPv6File, "geoip6"); } +/** Initialize cookie authentication (used so far by the ControlPort + * and Extended ORPort). + * + * Allocate memory and create a cookie (of length <b>cookie_len</b>) + * in <b>cookie_out</b>. + * Then write it down to <b>fname</b> and prepend it with <b>header</b>. + * + * If the whole procedure was successful, set + * <b>cookie_is_set_out</b> to True. */ +int +init_cookie_authentication(const char *fname, const char *header, + int cookie_len, + uint8_t **cookie_out, int *cookie_is_set_out) +{ + char cookie_file_str_len = strlen(header) + cookie_len; + char *cookie_file_str = tor_malloc(cookie_file_str_len); + int retval = -1; + + /* We don't want to generate a new cookie every time we call + * options_act(). One should be enough. */ + if (*cookie_is_set_out) { + retval = 0; /* we are all set */ + goto done; + } + + /* If we've already set the cookie, free it before re-setting + it. This can happen if we previously generated a cookie, but + couldn't write it to a disk. */ + if (*cookie_out) + tor_free(*cookie_out); + + /* Generate the cookie */ + *cookie_out = tor_malloc(cookie_len); + if (crypto_rand((char *)*cookie_out, cookie_len) < 0) + goto done; + + /* Create the string that should be written on the file. */ + memcpy(cookie_file_str, header, strlen(header)); + memcpy(cookie_file_str+strlen(header), *cookie_out, cookie_len); + if (write_bytes_to_file(fname, cookie_file_str, cookie_file_str_len, 1)) { + log_warn(LD_FS,"Error writing auth cookie to %s.", escaped(fname)); + goto done; + } + + /* Success! */ + log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Generated auth cookie file in '%s'.", escaped(fname)); + *cookie_is_set_out = 1; + retval = 0; + + done: + memwipe(cookie_file_str, 0, cookie_file_str_len); + tor_free(cookie_file_str); + return retval; +} + diff --git a/src/or/config.h b/src/or/config.h index ef4acac51..8ee2a4572 100644 --- a/src/or/config.h +++ b/src/or/config.h @@ -32,7 +32,11 @@ int resolve_my_address(int warn_severity, const or_options_t *options, const char **method_out, char **hostname_out); int is_local_addr(const tor_addr_t *addr); void options_init(or_options_t *options); -char *options_dump(const or_options_t *options, int minimal); + +#define OPTIONS_DUMP_MINIMAL 1 +#define OPTIONS_DUMP_DEFAULTS 2 +#define OPTIONS_DUMP_ALL 3 +char *options_dump(const or_options_t *options, int how_to_dump); int options_init_from_torrc(int argc, char **argv); setopt_err_t options_init_from_string(const char *cf_defaults, const char *cf, int command, const char *command_arg, char **msg); @@ -59,6 +63,10 @@ char *options_get_datadir_fname2_suffix(const or_options_t *options, #define get_datadir_fname_suffix(sub1, suffix) \ get_datadir_fname2_suffix((sub1), NULL, (suffix)) +int check_or_create_data_subdir(const char *subdir); +int write_to_data_subdir(const char* subdir, const char* fname, + const char* str, const char* descr); + int get_num_cpus(const or_options_t *options); const smartlist_t *get_configured_ports(void); @@ -86,10 +94,15 @@ uint32_t get_effective_bwburst(const or_options_t *options); char *get_transport_bindaddr_from_config(const char *transport); -#ifdef CONFIG_PRIVATE -/* Used only by config.c and test.c */ +int init_cookie_authentication(const char *fname, const char *header, + int cookie_len, + uint8_t **cookie_out, int *cookie_is_set_out); + or_options_t *options_new(void); -#endif + +int config_parse_commandline(int argc, char **argv, int ignore_errors, + config_line_t **result, + config_line_t **cmdline_result); void config_register_addressmaps(const or_options_t *options); /* XXXX024 move to connection_edge.h */ @@ -98,5 +111,34 @@ int addressmap_register_auto(const char *from, const char *to, addressmap_entry_source_t addrmap_source, const char **msg); +/** Represents the information stored in a torrc Bridge line. */ +typedef struct bridge_line_t { + tor_addr_t addr; /* The IP address of the bridge. */ + uint16_t port; /* The TCP port of the bridge. */ + char *transport_name; /* The name of the pluggable transport that + should be used to connect to the bridge. */ + char digest[DIGEST_LEN]; /* The bridge's identity key digest. */ + smartlist_t *socks_args; /* SOCKS arguments for the pluggable + transport proxy. */ +} bridge_line_t; + +void bridge_line_free(bridge_line_t *bridge_line); +bridge_line_t *parse_bridge_line(const char *line); +smartlist_t *get_options_from_transport_options_line(const char *line, + const char *transport); +smartlist_t *get_options_for_server_transport(const char *transport); + +#ifdef CONFIG_PRIVATE +#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS +extern struct config_format_t options_format; +#endif + +STATIC void or_options_free(or_options_t *options); +STATIC int options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, + or_options_t *options, + or_options_t *default_options, + int from_setconf, char **msg); +#endif + #endif diff --git a/src/or/confparse.c b/src/or/confparse.c index 8863d9240..c5400a651 100644 --- a/src/or/confparse.c +++ b/src/or/confparse.c @@ -79,6 +79,21 @@ config_line_append(config_line_t **lst, (*lst) = newline; } +/** Return the line in <b>lines</b> whose key is exactly <b>key</b>, or NULL + * if no such key exists. For handling commandline-only options only; other + * options should be looked up in the appropriate data structure. */ +const config_line_t * +config_line_find(const config_line_t *lines, + const char *key) +{ + const config_line_t *cl; + for (cl = lines; cl; cl = cl->next) { + if (!strcmp(cl->key, key)) + return cl; + } + return NULL; +} + /** Helper: parse the config string and strdup into key/value * strings. Set *result to the list, or NULL if parsing the string * failed. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. Warn and ignore any @@ -223,6 +238,8 @@ config_assign_value(const config_format_t *fmt, void *options, int i, ok; const config_var_t *var; void *lvalue; + int *csv_int; + smartlist_t *csv_str; CONFIG_CHECK(fmt, options); @@ -357,6 +374,36 @@ config_assign_value(const config_format_t *fmt, void *options, SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0); break; + case CONFIG_TYPE_CSV_INTERVAL: + if (*(smartlist_t**)lvalue) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(*(smartlist_t**)lvalue, int *, cp, tor_free(cp)); + smartlist_clear(*(smartlist_t**)lvalue); + } else { + *(smartlist_t**)lvalue = smartlist_new(); + } + csv_str = smartlist_new(); + smartlist_split_string(csv_str, c->value, ",", + SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(csv_str, char *, str) + { + i = config_parse_interval(str, &ok); + if (!ok) { + tor_asprintf(msg, + "Interval in '%s %s' is malformed or out of bounds.", + c->key, c->value); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(csv_str, char *, cp, tor_free(cp)); + smartlist_free(csv_str); + return -1; + } + csv_int = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(int)); + *csv_int = i; + smartlist_add(*(smartlist_t**)lvalue, csv_int); + } + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(str); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(csv_str, char *, cp, tor_free(cp)); + smartlist_free(csv_str); + break; + case CONFIG_TYPE_LINELIST: case CONFIG_TYPE_LINELIST_S: { @@ -555,6 +602,7 @@ config_get_assigned_option(const config_format_t *fmt, const void *options, const config_var_t *var; const void *value; config_line_t *result; + smartlist_t *csv_str; tor_assert(options && key); CONFIG_CHECK(fmt, options); @@ -637,6 +685,20 @@ config_get_assigned_option(const config_format_t *fmt, const void *options, else result->value = tor_strdup(""); break; + case CONFIG_TYPE_CSV_INTERVAL: + if (*(smartlist_t**)value) { + csv_str = smartlist_new(); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(*(smartlist_t**)value, int *, i) + { + smartlist_add_asprintf(csv_str, "%d", *i); + } + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(i); + result->value = smartlist_join_strings(csv_str, ",", 0, NULL); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(csv_str, char *, cp, tor_free(cp)); + smartlist_free(csv_str); + } else + result->value = tor_strdup(""); + break; case CONFIG_TYPE_OBSOLETE: log_fn(LOG_INFO, LD_CONFIG, "You asked me for the value of an obsolete config option '%s'.", @@ -826,6 +888,13 @@ config_clear(const config_format_t *fmt, void *options, *(smartlist_t **)lvalue = NULL; } break; + case CONFIG_TYPE_CSV_INTERVAL: + if (*(smartlist_t**)lvalue) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(*(smartlist_t **)lvalue, int *, cp, tor_free(cp)); + smartlist_free(*(smartlist_t **)lvalue); + *(smartlist_t **)lvalue = NULL; + } + break; case CONFIG_TYPE_LINELIST: case CONFIG_TYPE_LINELIST_S: config_free_lines(*(config_line_t **)lvalue); @@ -1005,8 +1074,8 @@ config_dump(const config_format_t *fmt, const void *default_options, /* XXX use a 1 here so we don't add a new log line while dumping */ if (default_options == NULL) { - if (fmt->validate_fn(NULL, defaults_tmp, 1, &msg) < 0) { - log_err(LD_BUG, "Failed to validate default config."); + if (fmt->validate_fn(NULL, defaults_tmp, defaults_tmp, 1, &msg) < 0) { + log_err(LD_BUG, "Failed to validate default config: %s", msg); tor_free(msg); tor_assert(0); } @@ -1072,20 +1141,36 @@ static struct unit_table_t memory_units[] = { { "kbytes", 1<<10 }, { "kilobyte", 1<<10 }, { "kilobytes", 1<<10 }, + { "kilobits", 1<<7 }, + { "kilobit", 1<<7 }, + { "kbits", 1<<7 }, + { "kbit", 1<<7 }, { "m", 1<<20 }, { "mb", 1<<20 }, { "mbyte", 1<<20 }, { "mbytes", 1<<20 }, { "megabyte", 1<<20 }, { "megabytes", 1<<20 }, + { "megabits", 1<<17 }, + { "megabit", 1<<17 }, + { "mbits", 1<<17 }, + { "mbit", 1<<17 }, { "gb", 1<<30 }, { "gbyte", 1<<30 }, { "gbytes", 1<<30 }, { "gigabyte", 1<<30 }, { "gigabytes", 1<<30 }, + { "gigabits", 1<<27 }, + { "gigabit", 1<<27 }, + { "gbits", 1<<27 }, + { "gbit", 1<<27 }, { "tb", U64_LITERAL(1)<<40 }, { "terabyte", U64_LITERAL(1)<<40 }, { "terabytes", U64_LITERAL(1)<<40 }, + { "terabits", U64_LITERAL(1)<<37 }, + { "terabit", U64_LITERAL(1)<<37 }, + { "tbits", U64_LITERAL(1)<<37 }, + { "tbit", U64_LITERAL(1)<<37 }, { NULL, 0 }, }; diff --git a/src/or/confparse.h b/src/or/confparse.h index 1b987f3bf..2cd6c49a2 100644 --- a/src/or/confparse.h +++ b/src/or/confparse.h @@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ typedef enum config_type_t { CONFIG_TYPE_ISOTIME, /**< An ISO-formatted time relative to UTC. */ CONFIG_TYPE_CSV, /**< A list of strings, separated by commas and * optional whitespace. */ + CONFIG_TYPE_CSV_INTERVAL, /**< A list of strings, separated by commas and + * optional whitespace, representing intervals in + * seconds, with optional units */ CONFIG_TYPE_LINELIST, /**< Uninterpreted config lines */ CONFIG_TYPE_LINELIST_S, /**< Uninterpreted, context-sensitive config lines, * mixed with other keywords. */ @@ -68,12 +71,12 @@ typedef struct config_var_description_t { /** Type of a callback to validate whether a given configuration is * well-formed and consistent. See options_trial_assign() for documentation * of arguments. */ -typedef int (*validate_fn_t)(void*,void*,int,char**); +typedef int (*validate_fn_t)(void*,void*,void*,int,char**); /** Information on the keys, value types, key-to-struct-member mappings, * variable descriptions, validation functions, and abbreviations for a * configuration or storage format. */ -typedef struct { +typedef struct config_format_t { size_t size; /**< Size of the struct that everything gets parsed into. */ uint32_t magic; /**< Required 'magic value' to make sure we have a struct * of the right type. */ @@ -100,6 +103,8 @@ void *config_new(const config_format_t *fmt); void config_line_append(config_line_t **lst, const char *key, const char *val); config_line_t *config_lines_dup(const config_line_t *inp); +const config_line_t *config_line_find(const config_line_t *lines, + const char *key); void config_free(const config_format_t *fmt, void *options); int config_lines_eq(config_line_t *a, config_line_t *b); int config_count_key(const config_line_t *a, const char *key); diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index 78cc31e89..1f6e11fac 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ * on connections. **/ +#define CONNECTION_PRIVATE #include "or.h" #include "buffers.h" /* @@ -17,6 +18,7 @@ * part of a subclass (channel_tls_t). */ #define TOR_CHANNEL_INTERNAL_ +#define CONNECTION_PRIVATE #include "channel.h" #include "channeltls.h" #include "circuitbuild.h" @@ -33,6 +35,7 @@ #include "dns.h" #include "dnsserv.h" #include "entrynodes.h" +#include "ext_orport.h" #include "geoip.h" #include "main.h" #include "policies.h" @@ -44,6 +47,7 @@ #include "router.h" #include "transports.h" #include "routerparse.h" +#include "transports.h" #ifdef USE_BUFFEREVENTS #include <event2/event.h> @@ -97,6 +101,7 @@ static smartlist_t *outgoing_addrs = NULL; #define CASE_ANY_LISTENER_TYPE \ case CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER: \ + case CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR_LISTENER: \ case CONN_TYPE_AP_LISTENER: \ case CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER: \ case CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER: \ @@ -128,6 +133,8 @@ conn_type_to_string(int type) case CONN_TYPE_CPUWORKER: return "CPU worker"; case CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER: return "Control listener"; case CONN_TYPE_CONTROL: return "Control"; + case CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR: return "Extended OR"; + case CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR_LISTENER: return "Extended OR listener"; default: log_warn(LD_BUG, "unknown connection type %d", type); tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "unknown [%d]", type); @@ -164,6 +171,18 @@ conn_state_to_string(int type, int state) case OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN: return "open"; } break; + case CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR: + switch (state) { + case EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_AUTH_WAIT_AUTH_TYPE: + return "waiting for authentication type"; + case EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_AUTH_WAIT_CLIENT_NONCE: + return "waiting for client nonce"; + case EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_AUTH_WAIT_CLIENT_HASH: + return "waiting for client hash"; + case EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN: return "open"; + case EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_FLUSHING: return "flushing final OKAY"; + } + break; case CONN_TYPE_EXIT: switch (state) { case EXIT_CONN_STATE_RESOLVING: return "waiting for dest info"; @@ -228,6 +247,7 @@ connection_type_uses_bufferevent(connection_t *conn) case CONN_TYPE_DIR: case CONN_TYPE_CONTROL: case CONN_TYPE_OR: + case CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR: case CONN_TYPE_CPUWORKER: return 1; default: @@ -258,14 +278,18 @@ dir_connection_new(int socket_family) * Set active_circuit_pqueue_last_recalibrated to current cell_ewma tick. */ or_connection_t * -or_connection_new(int socket_family) +or_connection_new(int type, int socket_family) { or_connection_t *or_conn = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(or_connection_t)); time_t now = time(NULL); - connection_init(now, TO_CONN(or_conn), CONN_TYPE_OR, socket_family); + tor_assert(type == CONN_TYPE_OR || type == CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR); + connection_init(now, TO_CONN(or_conn), type, socket_family); or_conn->timestamp_last_added_nonpadding = time(NULL); + if (type == CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR) + connection_or_set_ext_or_identifier(or_conn); + return or_conn; } @@ -311,7 +335,6 @@ control_connection_new(int socket_family) tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(control_connection_t)); connection_init(time(NULL), TO_CONN(control_conn), CONN_TYPE_CONTROL, socket_family); - log_notice(LD_CONTROL, "New control connection opened."); return control_conn; } @@ -334,7 +357,8 @@ connection_new(int type, int socket_family) { switch (type) { case CONN_TYPE_OR: - return TO_CONN(or_connection_new(socket_family)); + case CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR: + return TO_CONN(or_connection_new(type, socket_family)); case CONN_TYPE_EXIT: return TO_CONN(edge_connection_new(type, socket_family)); @@ -376,6 +400,7 @@ connection_init(time_t now, connection_t *conn, int type, int socket_family) switch (type) { case CONN_TYPE_OR: + case CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR: conn->magic = OR_CONNECTION_MAGIC; break; case CONN_TYPE_EXIT: @@ -434,7 +459,7 @@ connection_link_connections(connection_t *conn_a, connection_t *conn_b) * necessary, close its socket if necessary, and mark the directory as dirty * if <b>conn</b> is an OR or OP connection. */ -static void +STATIC void connection_free_(connection_t *conn) { void *mem; @@ -444,6 +469,7 @@ connection_free_(connection_t *conn) switch (conn->type) { case CONN_TYPE_OR: + case CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR: tor_assert(conn->magic == OR_CONNECTION_MAGIC); mem = TO_OR_CONN(conn); memlen = sizeof(or_connection_t); @@ -574,6 +600,13 @@ connection_free_(connection_t *conn) log_warn(LD_BUG, "called on OR conn with non-zeroed identity_digest"); connection_or_remove_from_identity_map(TO_OR_CONN(conn)); } + if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR || conn->type == CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR) { + connection_or_remove_from_ext_or_id_map(TO_OR_CONN(conn)); + tor_free(TO_OR_CONN(conn)->ext_or_conn_id); + tor_free(TO_OR_CONN(conn)->ext_or_auth_correct_client_hash); + tor_free(TO_OR_CONN(conn)->ext_or_transport); + } + #ifdef USE_BUFFEREVENTS if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR && TO_OR_CONN(conn)->bucket_cfg) { ev_token_bucket_cfg_free(TO_OR_CONN(conn)->bucket_cfg); @@ -637,6 +670,7 @@ connection_about_to_close_connection(connection_t *conn) connection_dir_about_to_close(TO_DIR_CONN(conn)); break; case CONN_TYPE_OR: + case CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR: connection_or_about_to_close(TO_OR_CONN(conn)); break; case CONN_TYPE_AP: @@ -876,8 +910,11 @@ check_location_for_unix_socket(const or_options_t *options, const char *path) int r = -1; char *p = tor_strdup(path); cpd_check_t flags = CPD_CHECK_MODE_ONLY; - if (get_parent_directory(p)<0) + if (get_parent_directory(p)<0 || p[0] != '/') { + log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Bad unix socket address '%s'. Tor does not support " + "relative paths for unix sockets.", path); goto done; + } if (options->ControlSocketsGroupWritable) flags |= CPD_GROUP_OK; @@ -926,6 +963,27 @@ make_socket_reuseable(tor_socket_t sock) #endif } +/** Max backlog to pass to listen. We start at */ +static int listen_limit = INT_MAX; + +/* Listen on <b>fd</b> with appropriate backlog. Return as for listen. */ +static int +tor_listen(tor_socket_t fd) +{ + int r; + + if ((r = listen(fd, listen_limit)) < 0) { + if (listen_limit == SOMAXCONN) + return r; + if ((r = listen(fd, SOMAXCONN)) == 0) { + listen_limit = SOMAXCONN; + log_warn(LD_NET, "Setting listen backlog to INT_MAX connections " + "didn't work, but SOMAXCONN did. Lowering backlog limit."); + } + } + return r; +} + /** Bind a new non-blocking socket listening to the socket described * by <b>listensockaddr</b>. * @@ -939,8 +997,8 @@ connection_listener_new(const struct sockaddr *listensockaddr, const port_cfg_t *port_cfg) { listener_connection_t *lis_conn; - connection_t *conn; - tor_socket_t s; /* the socket we're going to make */ + connection_t *conn = NULL; + tor_socket_t s = TOR_INVALID_SOCKET; /* the socket we're going to make */ or_options_t const *options = get_options(); #if defined(HAVE_PWD_H) && defined(HAVE_SYS_UN_H) struct passwd *pw = NULL; @@ -966,7 +1024,7 @@ connection_listener_new(const struct sockaddr *listensockaddr, log_notice(LD_NET, "Opening %s on %s", conn_type_to_string(type), fmt_addrport(&addr, usePort)); - s = tor_open_socket(tor_addr_family(&addr), + s = tor_open_socket_nonblocking(tor_addr_family(&addr), is_tcp ? SOCK_STREAM : SOCK_DGRAM, is_tcp ? IPPROTO_TCP: IPPROTO_UDP); if (!SOCKET_OK(s)) { @@ -988,7 +1046,7 @@ connection_listener_new(const struct sockaddr *listensockaddr, /* We need to set IPV6_V6ONLY so that this socket can't get used for * IPv4 connections. */ if (setsockopt(s,IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_V6ONLY, - (void*)&one, sizeof(one))<0) { + (void*)&one, sizeof(one)) < 0) { int e = tor_socket_errno(s); log_warn(LD_NET, "Error setting IPV6_V6ONLY flag: %s", tor_socket_strerror(e)); @@ -1004,15 +1062,13 @@ connection_listener_new(const struct sockaddr *listensockaddr, helpfulhint = ". Is Tor already running?"; log_warn(LD_NET, "Could not bind to %s:%u: %s%s", address, usePort, tor_socket_strerror(e), helpfulhint); - tor_close_socket(s); goto err; } if (is_tcp) { - if (listen(s,SOMAXCONN) < 0) { + if (tor_listen(s) < 0) { log_warn(LD_NET, "Could not listen on %s:%u: %s", address, usePort, tor_socket_strerror(tor_socket_errno(s))); - tor_close_socket(s); goto err; } } @@ -1052,7 +1108,7 @@ connection_listener_new(const struct sockaddr *listensockaddr, strerror(errno)); goto err; } - s = tor_open_socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + s = tor_open_socket_nonblocking(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); if (! SOCKET_OK(s)) { log_warn(LD_NET,"Socket creation failed: %s.", strerror(errno)); goto err; @@ -1061,7 +1117,6 @@ connection_listener_new(const struct sockaddr *listensockaddr, if (bind(s, listensockaddr, (socklen_t)sizeof(struct sockaddr_un)) == -1) { log_warn(LD_NET,"Bind to %s failed: %s.", address, tor_socket_strerror(tor_socket_errno(s))); - tor_close_socket(s); goto err; } #ifdef HAVE_PWD_H @@ -1070,12 +1125,10 @@ connection_listener_new(const struct sockaddr *listensockaddr, if (pw == NULL) { log_warn(LD_NET,"Unable to chown() %s socket: user %s not found.", address, options->User); - tor_close_socket(s); goto err; } else if (chown(address, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid) < 0) { log_warn(LD_NET,"Unable to chown() %s socket: %s.", address, strerror(errno)); - tor_close_socket(s); goto err; } } @@ -1085,35 +1138,29 @@ connection_listener_new(const struct sockaddr *listensockaddr, * platforms. */ if (chmod(address, 0660) < 0) { log_warn(LD_FS,"Unable to make %s group-writable.", address); - tor_close_socket(s); goto err; } } - if (listen(s,SOMAXCONN) < 0) { + if (listen(s, SOMAXCONN) < 0) { log_warn(LD_NET, "Could not listen on %s: %s", address, tor_socket_strerror(tor_socket_errno(s))); - tor_close_socket(s); goto err; } #else (void)options; #endif /* HAVE_SYS_UN_H */ } else { - log_err(LD_BUG,"Got unexpected address family %d.", - listensockaddr->sa_family); - tor_assert(0); - } - - if (set_socket_nonblocking(s) == -1) { - tor_close_socket(s); - goto err; + log_err(LD_BUG, "Got unexpected address family %d.", + listensockaddr->sa_family); + tor_assert(0); } lis_conn = listener_connection_new(type, listensockaddr->sa_family); conn = TO_CONN(lis_conn); conn->socket_family = listensockaddr->sa_family; conn->s = s; + s = TOR_INVALID_SOCKET; /* Prevent double-close */ conn->address = tor_strdup(address); conn->port = gotPort; tor_addr_copy(&conn->addr, &addr); @@ -1149,7 +1196,6 @@ connection_listener_new(const struct sockaddr *listensockaddr, if (connection_add(conn) < 0) { /* no space, forget it */ log_warn(LD_NET,"connection_add for listener failed. Giving up."); - connection_free(conn); goto err; } @@ -1168,6 +1214,11 @@ connection_listener_new(const struct sockaddr *listensockaddr, return conn; err: + if (SOCKET_OK(s)) + tor_close_socket(s); + if (conn) + connection_free(conn); + return NULL; } @@ -1252,7 +1303,7 @@ connection_handle_listener_read(connection_t *conn, int new_type) tor_assert((size_t)remotelen >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)); memset(&addrbuf, 0, sizeof(addrbuf)); - news = tor_accept_socket(conn->s,remote,&remotelen); + news = tor_accept_socket_nonblocking(conn->s,remote,&remotelen); if (!SOCKET_OK(news)) { /* accept() error */ int e = tor_socket_errno(conn->s); if (ERRNO_IS_ACCEPT_EAGAIN(e)) { @@ -1272,10 +1323,6 @@ connection_handle_listener_read(connection_t *conn, int new_type) (int)news,(int)conn->s); make_socket_reuseable(news); - if (set_socket_nonblocking(news) == -1) { - tor_close_socket(news); - return 0; - } if (options->ConstrainedSockets) set_constrained_socket_buffers(news, (int)options->ConstrainedSockSize); @@ -1330,11 +1377,17 @@ connection_handle_listener_read(connection_t *conn, int new_type) TO_ENTRY_CONN(newconn)->socks_request->socks_prefer_no_auth = TO_LISTENER_CONN(conn)->socks_prefer_no_auth; } + if (new_type == CONN_TYPE_CONTROL) { + log_notice(LD_CONTROL, "New control connection opened from %s.", + fmt_and_decorate_addr(&addr)); + } } else if (conn->socket_family == AF_UNIX) { /* For now only control ports can be Unix domain sockets * and listeners at the same time */ tor_assert(conn->type == CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER); + tor_assert(new_type == CONN_TYPE_CONTROL); + log_notice(LD_CONTROL, "New control connection opened."); newconn = connection_new(new_type, conn->socket_family); newconn->s = news; @@ -1374,6 +1427,9 @@ connection_init_accepted_conn(connection_t *conn, connection_start_reading(conn); switch (conn->type) { + case CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR: + /* Initiate Extended ORPort authentication. */ + return connection_ext_or_start_auth(TO_OR_CONN(conn)); case CONN_TYPE_OR: control_event_or_conn_status(TO_OR_CONN(conn), OR_CONN_EVENT_NEW, 0); rv = connection_tls_start_handshake(TO_OR_CONN(conn), 1); @@ -1467,7 +1523,7 @@ connection_connect(connection_t *conn, const char *address, return -1; } - s = tor_open_socket(protocol_family,SOCK_STREAM,IPPROTO_TCP); + s = tor_open_socket_nonblocking(protocol_family,SOCK_STREAM,IPPROTO_TCP); if (! SOCKET_OK(s)) { *socket_error = tor_socket_errno(-1); log_warn(LD_NET,"Error creating network socket: %s", @@ -1509,12 +1565,6 @@ connection_connect(connection_t *conn, const char *address, } } - if (set_socket_nonblocking(s) == -1) { - *socket_error = tor_socket_errno(s); - tor_close_socket(s); - return -1; - } - if (options->ConstrainedSockets) set_constrained_socket_buffers(s, (int)options->ConstrainedSockSize); @@ -1580,6 +1630,32 @@ connection_proxy_state_to_string(int state) return states[state]; } +/** Returns the global proxy type used by tor. Use this function for + * logging or high-level purposes, don't use it to fill the + * <b>proxy_type</b> field of or_connection_t; use the actual proxy + * protocol instead.*/ +static int +get_proxy_type(void) +{ + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + + if (options->HTTPSProxy) + return PROXY_CONNECT; + else if (options->Socks4Proxy) + return PROXY_SOCKS4; + else if (options->Socks5Proxy) + return PROXY_SOCKS5; + else if (options->ClientTransportPlugin) + return PROXY_PLUGGABLE; + else + return PROXY_NONE; +} + +/* One byte for the version, one for the command, two for the + port, and four for the addr... and, one more for the + username NUL: */ +#define SOCKS4_STANDARD_BUFFER_SIZE (1 + 1 + 2 + 4 + 1) + /** Write a proxy request of <b>type</b> (socks4, socks5, https) to conn * for conn->addr:conn->port, authenticating with the auth details given * in the configuration (if available). SOCKS 5 and HTTP CONNECT proxies @@ -1634,17 +1710,45 @@ connection_proxy_connect(connection_t *conn, int type) } case PROXY_SOCKS4: { - unsigned char buf[9]; + unsigned char *buf; uint16_t portn; uint32_t ip4addr; + size_t buf_size = 0; + char *socks_args_string = NULL; - /* Send a SOCKS4 connect request with empty user id */ + /* Send a SOCKS4 connect request */ if (tor_addr_family(&conn->addr) != AF_INET) { log_warn(LD_NET, "SOCKS4 client is incompatible with IPv6"); return -1; } + { /* If we are here because we are trying to connect to a + pluggable transport proxy, check if we have any SOCKS + arguments to transmit. If we do, compress all arguments to + a single string in 'socks_args_string': */ + + if (get_proxy_type() == PROXY_PLUGGABLE) { + socks_args_string = + pt_get_socks_args_for_proxy_addrport(&conn->addr, conn->port); + if (socks_args_string) + log_debug(LD_NET, "Sending out '%s' as our SOCKS argument string.", + socks_args_string); + } + } + + { /* Figure out the buffer size we need for the SOCKS message: */ + + buf_size = SOCKS4_STANDARD_BUFFER_SIZE; + + /* If we have a SOCKS argument string, consider its size when + calculating the buffer size: */ + if (socks_args_string) + buf_size += strlen(socks_args_string); + } + + buf = tor_malloc_zero(buf_size); + ip4addr = tor_addr_to_ipv4n(&conn->addr); portn = htons(conn->port); @@ -1652,9 +1756,23 @@ connection_proxy_connect(connection_t *conn, int type) buf[1] = SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT; /* command */ memcpy(buf + 2, &portn, 2); /* port */ memcpy(buf + 4, &ip4addr, 4); /* addr */ - buf[8] = 0; /* userid (empty) */ - connection_write_to_buf((char *)buf, sizeof(buf), conn); + /* Next packet field is the userid. If we have pluggable + transport SOCKS arguments, we have to embed them + there. Otherwise, we use an empty userid. */ + if (socks_args_string) { /* place the SOCKS args string: */ + tor_assert(strlen(socks_args_string) > 0); + tor_assert(buf_size >= + SOCKS4_STANDARD_BUFFER_SIZE + strlen(socks_args_string)); + strlcpy((char *)buf + 8, socks_args_string, buf_size - 8); + tor_free(socks_args_string); + } else { + buf[8] = 0; /* no userid */ + } + + connection_write_to_buf((char *)buf, buf_size, conn); + tor_free(buf); + conn->proxy_state = PROXY_SOCKS4_WANT_CONNECT_OK; break; } @@ -1666,8 +1784,13 @@ connection_proxy_connect(connection_t *conn, int type) buf[0] = 5; /* version */ + /* We have to use SOCKS5 authentication, if we have a + Socks5ProxyUsername or if we want to pass arguments to our + pluggable transport proxy: */ + if ((options->Socks5ProxyUsername) || + (get_proxy_type() == PROXY_PLUGGABLE && + (get_socks_args_by_bridge_addrport(&conn->addr, conn->port)))) { /* number of auth methods */ - if (options->Socks5ProxyUsername) { buf[1] = 2; buf[2] = 0x00; /* no authentication */ buf[3] = 0x02; /* rfc1929 Username/Passwd auth */ @@ -1861,15 +1984,49 @@ connection_read_proxy_handshake(connection_t *conn) unsigned char buf[1024]; size_t reqsize, usize, psize; const char *user, *pass; + char *socks_args_string = NULL; + + if (get_proxy_type() == PROXY_PLUGGABLE) { + socks_args_string = + pt_get_socks_args_for_proxy_addrport(&conn->addr, conn->port); + if (!socks_args_string) { + log_warn(LD_NET, "Could not create SOCKS args string."); + ret = -1; + break; + } + + log_debug(LD_NET, "SOCKS5 arguments: %s", socks_args_string); + tor_assert(strlen(socks_args_string) > 0); + tor_assert(strlen(socks_args_string) <= MAX_SOCKS5_AUTH_SIZE_TOTAL); + + if (strlen(socks_args_string) > MAX_SOCKS5_AUTH_FIELD_SIZE) { + user = socks_args_string; + usize = MAX_SOCKS5_AUTH_FIELD_SIZE; + pass = socks_args_string + MAX_SOCKS5_AUTH_FIELD_SIZE; + psize = strlen(socks_args_string) - MAX_SOCKS5_AUTH_FIELD_SIZE; + } else { + user = socks_args_string; + usize = strlen(socks_args_string); + pass = "\0"; + psize = 1; + } + } else if (get_options()->Socks5ProxyUsername) { + user = get_options()->Socks5ProxyUsername; + pass = get_options()->Socks5ProxyPassword; + tor_assert(user && pass); + usize = strlen(user); + psize = strlen(pass); + } else { + log_err(LD_BUG, "We entered %s for no reason!", __func__); + tor_fragile_assert(); + ret = -1; + break; + } - user = get_options()->Socks5ProxyUsername; - pass = get_options()->Socks5ProxyPassword; - tor_assert(user && pass); - - /* XXX len of user and pass must be <= 255 !!! */ - usize = strlen(user); - psize = strlen(pass); - tor_assert(usize <= 255 && psize <= 255); + /* Username and password lengths should have been checked + above and during torrc parsing. */ + tor_assert(usize <= MAX_SOCKS5_AUTH_FIELD_SIZE && + psize <= MAX_SOCKS5_AUTH_FIELD_SIZE); reqsize = 3 + usize + psize; buf[0] = 1; /* negotiation version */ @@ -1878,6 +2035,9 @@ connection_read_proxy_handshake(connection_t *conn) buf[2 + usize] = psize; memcpy(buf + 3 + usize, pass, psize); + if (socks_args_string) + tor_free(socks_args_string); + connection_write_to_buf((char *)buf, reqsize, conn); conn->proxy_state = PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_RFC1929_OK; @@ -2430,6 +2590,35 @@ record_num_bytes_transferred(connection_t *conn, #endif #ifndef USE_BUFFEREVENTS +/** Last time at which the global or relay buckets were emptied in msec + * since midnight. */ +static uint32_t global_relayed_read_emptied = 0, + global_relayed_write_emptied = 0, + global_read_emptied = 0, + global_write_emptied = 0; + +/** Helper: convert given <b>tvnow</b> time value to milliseconds since + * midnight. */ +static uint32_t +msec_since_midnight(const struct timeval *tvnow) +{ + return (uint32_t)(((tvnow->tv_sec % 86400L) * 1000L) + + ((uint32_t)tvnow->tv_usec / (uint32_t)1000L)); +} + +/** Check if a bucket which had <b>tokens_before</b> tokens and which got + * <b>tokens_removed</b> tokens removed at timestamp <b>tvnow</b> has run + * out of tokens, and if so, note the milliseconds since midnight in + * <b>timestamp_var</b> for the next TB_EMPTY event. */ +void +connection_buckets_note_empty_ts(uint32_t *timestamp_var, + int tokens_before, size_t tokens_removed, + const struct timeval *tvnow) +{ + if (tokens_before > 0 && (uint32_t)tokens_before <= tokens_removed) + *timestamp_var = msec_since_midnight(tvnow); +} + /** We just read <b>num_read</b> and wrote <b>num_written</b> bytes * onto <b>conn</b>. Decrement buckets appropriately. */ static void @@ -2452,6 +2641,30 @@ connection_buckets_decrement(connection_t *conn, time_t now, if (!connection_is_rate_limited(conn)) return; /* local IPs are free */ + /* If one or more of our token buckets ran dry just now, note the + * timestamp for TB_EMPTY events. */ + if (get_options()->TestingEnableTbEmptyEvent) { + struct timeval tvnow; + tor_gettimeofday_cached(&tvnow); + if (connection_counts_as_relayed_traffic(conn, now)) { + connection_buckets_note_empty_ts(&global_relayed_read_emptied, + global_relayed_read_bucket, num_read, &tvnow); + connection_buckets_note_empty_ts(&global_relayed_write_emptied, + global_relayed_write_bucket, num_written, &tvnow); + } + connection_buckets_note_empty_ts(&global_read_emptied, + global_read_bucket, num_read, &tvnow); + connection_buckets_note_empty_ts(&global_write_emptied, + global_write_bucket, num_written, &tvnow); + if (connection_speaks_cells(conn) && conn->state == OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) { + or_connection_t *or_conn = TO_OR_CONN(conn); + connection_buckets_note_empty_ts(&or_conn->read_emptied_time, + or_conn->read_bucket, num_read, &tvnow); + connection_buckets_note_empty_ts(&or_conn->write_emptied_time, + or_conn->write_bucket, num_written, &tvnow); + } + } + if (connection_counts_as_relayed_traffic(conn, now)) { global_relayed_read_bucket -= (int)num_read; global_relayed_write_bucket -= (int)num_written; @@ -2471,6 +2684,9 @@ connection_consider_empty_read_buckets(connection_t *conn) { const char *reason; + if (!connection_is_rate_limited(conn)) + return; /* Always okay. */ + if (global_read_bucket <= 0) { reason = "global read bucket exhausted. Pausing."; } else if (connection_counts_as_relayed_traffic(conn, approx_time()) && @@ -2483,9 +2699,6 @@ connection_consider_empty_read_buckets(connection_t *conn) } else return; /* all good, no need to stop it */ - if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_CPUWORKER) - return; /* Always okay. */ - LOG_FN_CONN(conn, (LOG_DEBUG, LD_NET, "%s", reason)); conn->read_blocked_on_bw = 1; connection_stop_reading(conn); @@ -2498,6 +2711,9 @@ connection_consider_empty_write_buckets(connection_t *conn) { const char *reason; + if (!connection_is_rate_limited(conn)) + return; /* Always okay. */ + if (global_write_bucket <= 0) { reason = "global write bucket exhausted. Pausing."; } else if (connection_counts_as_relayed_traffic(conn, approx_time()) && @@ -2510,9 +2726,6 @@ connection_consider_empty_write_buckets(connection_t *conn) } else return; /* all good, no need to stop it */ - if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_CPUWORKER) - return; /* Always okay. */ - LOG_FN_CONN(conn, (LOG_DEBUG, LD_NET, "%s", reason)); conn->write_blocked_on_bw = 1; connection_stop_writing(conn); @@ -2564,6 +2777,28 @@ connection_bucket_refill_helper(int *bucket, int rate, int burst, } } +/** Helper: return the time in milliseconds since <b>last_empty_time</b> + * when a bucket ran empty that previously had <b>tokens_before</b> tokens + * now has <b>tokens_after</b> tokens after refilling at timestamp + * <b>tvnow</b>, capped at <b>milliseconds_elapsed</b> milliseconds since + * last refilling that bucket. Return 0 if the bucket has not been empty + * since the last refill or has not been refilled. */ +uint32_t +bucket_millis_empty(int tokens_before, uint32_t last_empty_time, + int tokens_after, int milliseconds_elapsed, + const struct timeval *tvnow) +{ + uint32_t result = 0, refilled; + if (tokens_before <= 0 && tokens_after > tokens_before) { + refilled = msec_since_midnight(tvnow); + result = (uint32_t)((refilled + 86400L * 1000L - last_empty_time) % + (86400L * 1000L)); + if (result > (uint32_t)milliseconds_elapsed) + result = (uint32_t)milliseconds_elapsed; + } + return result; +} + /** Time has passed; increment buckets appropriately. */ void connection_bucket_refill(int milliseconds_elapsed, time_t now) @@ -2572,6 +2807,12 @@ connection_bucket_refill(int milliseconds_elapsed, time_t now) smartlist_t *conns = get_connection_array(); int bandwidthrate, bandwidthburst, relayrate, relayburst; + int prev_global_read = global_read_bucket; + int prev_global_write = global_write_bucket; + int prev_relay_read = global_relayed_read_bucket; + int prev_relay_write = global_relayed_write_bucket; + struct timeval tvnow; /*< Only used if TB_EMPTY events are enabled. */ + bandwidthrate = (int)options->BandwidthRate; bandwidthburst = (int)options->BandwidthBurst; @@ -2606,12 +2847,42 @@ connection_bucket_refill(int milliseconds_elapsed, time_t now) milliseconds_elapsed, "global_relayed_write_bucket"); + /* If buckets were empty before and have now been refilled, tell any + * interested controllers. */ + if (get_options()->TestingEnableTbEmptyEvent) { + uint32_t global_read_empty_time, global_write_empty_time, + relay_read_empty_time, relay_write_empty_time; + tor_gettimeofday_cached(&tvnow); + global_read_empty_time = bucket_millis_empty(prev_global_read, + global_read_emptied, global_read_bucket, + milliseconds_elapsed, &tvnow); + global_write_empty_time = bucket_millis_empty(prev_global_write, + global_write_emptied, global_write_bucket, + milliseconds_elapsed, &tvnow); + control_event_tb_empty("GLOBAL", global_read_empty_time, + global_write_empty_time, milliseconds_elapsed); + relay_read_empty_time = bucket_millis_empty(prev_relay_read, + global_relayed_read_emptied, + global_relayed_read_bucket, + milliseconds_elapsed, &tvnow); + relay_write_empty_time = bucket_millis_empty(prev_relay_write, + global_relayed_write_emptied, + global_relayed_write_bucket, + milliseconds_elapsed, &tvnow); + control_event_tb_empty("RELAY", relay_read_empty_time, + relay_write_empty_time, milliseconds_elapsed); + } + /* refill the per-connection buckets */ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(conns, connection_t *, conn) { if (connection_speaks_cells(conn)) { or_connection_t *or_conn = TO_OR_CONN(conn); int orbandwidthrate = or_conn->bandwidthrate; int orbandwidthburst = or_conn->bandwidthburst; + + int prev_conn_read = or_conn->read_bucket; + int prev_conn_write = or_conn->write_bucket; + if (connection_bucket_should_increase(or_conn->read_bucket, or_conn)) { connection_bucket_refill_helper(&or_conn->read_bucket, orbandwidthrate, @@ -2626,6 +2897,27 @@ connection_bucket_refill(int milliseconds_elapsed, time_t now) milliseconds_elapsed, "or_conn->write_bucket"); } + + /* If buckets were empty before and have now been refilled, tell any + * interested controllers. */ + if (get_options()->TestingEnableTbEmptyEvent) { + char *bucket; + uint32_t conn_read_empty_time, conn_write_empty_time; + tor_asprintf(&bucket, "ORCONN ID="U64_FORMAT, + U64_PRINTF_ARG(or_conn->base_.global_identifier)); + conn_read_empty_time = bucket_millis_empty(prev_conn_read, + or_conn->read_emptied_time, + or_conn->read_bucket, + milliseconds_elapsed, &tvnow); + conn_write_empty_time = bucket_millis_empty(prev_conn_write, + or_conn->write_emptied_time, + or_conn->write_bucket, + milliseconds_elapsed, &tvnow); + control_event_tb_empty(bucket, conn_read_empty_time, + conn_write_empty_time, + milliseconds_elapsed); + tor_free(bucket); + } } if (conn->read_blocked_on_bw == 1 /* marked to turn reading back on now */ @@ -2782,6 +3074,8 @@ connection_handle_read_impl(connection_t *conn) switch (conn->type) { case CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER: return connection_handle_listener_read(conn, CONN_TYPE_OR); + case CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR_LISTENER: + return connection_handle_listener_read(conn, CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR); case CONN_TYPE_AP_LISTENER: case CONN_TYPE_AP_TRANS_LISTENER: case CONN_TYPE_AP_NATD_LISTENER: @@ -3034,14 +3328,37 @@ connection_read_to_buf(connection_t *conn, ssize_t *max_to_read, /* change *max_to_read */ *max_to_read = at_most - n_read; - /* Update edge_conn->n_read */ + /* Update edge_conn->n_read and ocirc->n_read_circ_bw */ if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP) { edge_connection_t *edge_conn = TO_EDGE_CONN(conn); + circuit_t *circ = circuit_get_by_edge_conn(edge_conn); + origin_circuit_t *ocirc; + /* Check for overflow: */ if (PREDICT_LIKELY(UINT32_MAX - edge_conn->n_read > n_read)) edge_conn->n_read += (int)n_read; else edge_conn->n_read = UINT32_MAX; + + if (circ && CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { + ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); + if (PREDICT_LIKELY(UINT32_MAX - ocirc->n_read_circ_bw > n_read)) + ocirc->n_read_circ_bw += (int)n_read; + else + ocirc->n_read_circ_bw = UINT32_MAX; + } + } + + /* If CONN_BW events are enabled, update conn->n_read_conn_bw for + * OR/DIR/EXIT connections, checking for overflow. */ + if (get_options()->TestingEnableConnBwEvent && + (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR || + conn->type == CONN_TYPE_DIR || + conn->type == CONN_TYPE_EXIT)) { + if (PREDICT_LIKELY(UINT32_MAX - conn->n_read_conn_bw > n_read)) + conn->n_read_conn_bw += (int)n_read; + else + conn->n_read_conn_bw = UINT32_MAX; } } @@ -3294,8 +3611,8 @@ connection_outbuf_too_full(connection_t *conn) /** Try to flush more bytes onto <b>conn</b>-\>s. * - * This function gets called either from conn_write() in main.c - * when poll() has declared that conn wants to write, or below + * This function gets called either from conn_write_callback() in main.c + * when libevent tells us that conn wants to write, or below * from connection_write_to_buf() when an entire TLS record is ready. * * Update <b>conn</b>-\>timestamp_lastwritten to now, and call flush_buf @@ -3481,12 +3798,34 @@ connection_handle_write_impl(connection_t *conn, int force) if (n_written && conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP) { edge_connection_t *edge_conn = TO_EDGE_CONN(conn); + circuit_t *circ = circuit_get_by_edge_conn(edge_conn); + origin_circuit_t *ocirc; /* Check for overflow: */ if (PREDICT_LIKELY(UINT32_MAX - edge_conn->n_written > n_written)) edge_conn->n_written += (int)n_written; else edge_conn->n_written = UINT32_MAX; + + if (circ && CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { + ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); + if (PREDICT_LIKELY(UINT32_MAX - ocirc->n_written_circ_bw > n_written)) + ocirc->n_written_circ_bw += (int)n_written; + else + ocirc->n_written_circ_bw = UINT32_MAX; + } + } + + /* If CONN_BW events are enabled, update conn->n_written_conn_bw for + * OR/DIR/EXIT connections, checking for overflow. */ + if (n_written && get_options()->TestingEnableConnBwEvent && + (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR || + conn->type == CONN_TYPE_DIR || + conn->type == CONN_TYPE_EXIT)) { + if (PREDICT_LIKELY(UINT32_MAX - conn->n_written_conn_bw > n_written)) + conn->n_written_conn_bw += (int)n_written; + else + conn->n_written_conn_bw = UINT32_MAX; } connection_buckets_decrement(conn, approx_time(), n_read, n_written); @@ -3572,9 +3911,9 @@ connection_flush(connection_t *conn) * it all, so we don't end up with many megabytes of controller info queued at * once. */ -void -connection_write_to_buf_impl_(const char *string, size_t len, - connection_t *conn, int zlib) +MOCK_IMPL(void, +connection_write_to_buf_impl_,(const char *string, size_t len, + connection_t *conn, int zlib)) { /* XXXX This function really needs to return -1 on failure. */ int r; @@ -3814,6 +4153,7 @@ int connection_is_listener(connection_t *conn) { if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER || + conn->type == CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR_LISTENER || conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP_LISTENER || conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP_TRANS_LISTENER || conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP_DNS_LISTENER || @@ -3836,6 +4176,7 @@ connection_state_is_open(connection_t *conn) return 0; if ((conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR && conn->state == OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) || + (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR) || (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP && conn->state == AP_CONN_STATE_OPEN) || (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_EXIT && conn->state == EXIT_CONN_STATE_OPEN) || (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_CONTROL && @@ -4005,6 +4346,8 @@ connection_process_inbuf(connection_t *conn, int package_partial) switch (conn->type) { case CONN_TYPE_OR: return connection_or_process_inbuf(TO_OR_CONN(conn)); + case CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR: + return connection_ext_or_process_inbuf(TO_OR_CONN(conn)); case CONN_TYPE_EXIT: case CONN_TYPE_AP: return connection_edge_process_inbuf(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn), @@ -4065,6 +4408,8 @@ connection_finished_flushing(connection_t *conn) switch (conn->type) { case CONN_TYPE_OR: return connection_or_finished_flushing(TO_OR_CONN(conn)); + case CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR: + return connection_ext_or_finished_flushing(TO_OR_CONN(conn)); case CONN_TYPE_AP: case CONN_TYPE_EXIT: return connection_edge_finished_flushing(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)); @@ -4120,6 +4465,7 @@ connection_reached_eof(connection_t *conn) { switch (conn->type) { case CONN_TYPE_OR: + case CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR: return connection_or_reached_eof(TO_OR_CONN(conn)); case CONN_TYPE_AP: case CONN_TYPE_EXIT: @@ -4206,6 +4552,7 @@ assert_connection_ok(connection_t *conn, time_t now) switch (conn->type) { case CONN_TYPE_OR: + case CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR: tor_assert(conn->magic == OR_CONNECTION_MAGIC); break; case CONN_TYPE_AP: @@ -4311,6 +4658,10 @@ assert_connection_ok(connection_t *conn, time_t now) tor_assert(conn->state >= OR_CONN_STATE_MIN_); tor_assert(conn->state <= OR_CONN_STATE_MAX_); break; + case CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR: + tor_assert(conn->state >= EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_MIN_); + tor_assert(conn->state <= EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_MAX_); + break; case CONN_TYPE_EXIT: tor_assert(conn->state >= EXIT_CONN_STATE_MIN_); tor_assert(conn->state <= EXIT_CONN_STATE_MAX_); @@ -4372,7 +4723,7 @@ get_proxy_addrport(tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t *port, int *proxy_type, options->Bridges) { const transport_t *transport = NULL; int r; - r = find_transport_by_bridge_addrport(&conn->addr, conn->port, &transport); + r = get_transport_by_bridge_addrport(&conn->addr, conn->port, &transport); if (r<0) return -1; if (transport) { /* transport found */ @@ -4387,24 +4738,6 @@ get_proxy_addrport(tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t *port, int *proxy_type, return 0; } -/** Returns the global proxy type used by tor. */ -static int -get_proxy_type(void) -{ - const or_options_t *options = get_options(); - - if (options->HTTPSProxy) - return PROXY_CONNECT; - else if (options->Socks4Proxy) - return PROXY_SOCKS4; - else if (options->Socks5Proxy) - return PROXY_SOCKS5; - else if (options->ClientTransportPlugin) - return PROXY_PLUGGABLE; - else - return PROXY_NONE; -} - /** Log a failed connection to a proxy server. * <b>conn</b> is the connection we use the proxy server for. */ void @@ -4461,6 +4794,7 @@ connection_free_all(void) /* Unlink everything from the identity map. */ connection_or_clear_identity_map(); + connection_or_clear_ext_or_id_map(); /* Clear out our list of broken connections */ clear_broken_connection_map(0); diff --git a/src/or/connection.h b/src/or/connection.h index c78fe6e65..4073d9fc9 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.h +++ b/src/or/connection.h @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ const char *conn_type_to_string(int type); const char *conn_state_to_string(int type, int state); dir_connection_t *dir_connection_new(int socket_family); -or_connection_t *or_connection_new(int socket_family); +or_connection_t *or_connection_new(int type, int socket_family); edge_connection_t *edge_connection_new(int type, int socket_family); entry_connection_t *entry_connection_new(int type, int socket_family); control_connection_t *control_connection_new(int socket_family); @@ -89,6 +89,14 @@ int connection_connect(connection_t *conn, const char *address, const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, int *socket_error); +/** Maximum size of information that we can fit into SOCKS5 username + or password fields. */ +#define MAX_SOCKS5_AUTH_FIELD_SIZE 255 + +/** Total maximum size of information that we can fit into SOCKS5 + username and password fields. */ +#define MAX_SOCKS5_AUTH_SIZE_TOTAL 2*MAX_SOCKS5_AUTH_FIELD_SIZE + int connection_proxy_connect(connection_t *conn, int type); int connection_read_proxy_handshake(connection_t *conn); void log_failed_proxy_connection(connection_t *conn); @@ -122,8 +130,8 @@ int connection_outbuf_too_full(connection_t *conn); int connection_handle_write(connection_t *conn, int force); int connection_flush(connection_t *conn); -void connection_write_to_buf_impl_(const char *string, size_t len, - connection_t *conn, int zlib); +MOCK_DECL(void, connection_write_to_buf_impl_, + (const char *string, size_t len, connection_t *conn, int zlib)); /* DOCDOC connection_write_to_buf */ static void connection_write_to_buf(const char *string, size_t len, connection_t *conn); @@ -206,5 +214,18 @@ void connection_enable_rate_limiting(connection_t *conn); #define connection_type_uses_bufferevent(c) (0) #endif +#ifdef CONNECTION_PRIVATE +STATIC void connection_free_(connection_t *conn); + +/* Used only by connection.c and test*.c */ +uint32_t bucket_millis_empty(int tokens_before, uint32_t last_empty_time, + int tokens_after, int milliseconds_elapsed, + const struct timeval *tvnow); +void connection_buckets_note_empty_ts(uint32_t *timestamp_var, + int tokens_before, + size_t tokens_removed, + const struct timeval *tvnow); +#endif + #endif diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index bb7ffb9a4..07104c7a2 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include "addressmap.h" #include "buffers.h" #include "channel.h" +#include "circpathbias.h" #include "circuitlist.h" #include "circuituse.h" #include "config.h" @@ -407,7 +408,7 @@ connection_edge_finished_flushing(edge_connection_t *conn) * that the name resolution that led us to <b>addr</b> will be valid for * <b>ttl</b> seconds. Return -1 on error, or the number of bytes used on * success. */ -/* private */int +STATIC int connected_cell_format_payload(uint8_t *payload_out, const tor_addr_t *addr, uint32_t ttl) @@ -2265,7 +2266,7 @@ connection_ap_handshake_socks_reply(entry_connection_t *conn, char *reply, * Return -1 in the case where want to send a RELAY_END cell, and < -1 when * we don't. **/ -/* static */ int +STATIC int begin_cell_parse(const cell_t *cell, begin_cell_t *bcell, uint8_t *end_reason_out) { diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.h b/src/or/connection_edge.h index ea284cbcf..e3a95ad9e 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.h +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.h @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ #ifndef TOR_CONNECTION_EDGE_H #define TOR_CONNECTION_EDGE_H +#include "testsupport.h" + #define connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, endreason) \ connection_mark_unattached_ap_((conn), (endreason), __LINE__, SHORT_FILE__) @@ -130,9 +132,9 @@ typedef struct begin_cell_t { unsigned is_begindir : 1; } begin_cell_t; -int begin_cell_parse(const cell_t *cell, begin_cell_t *bcell, +STATIC int begin_cell_parse(const cell_t *cell, begin_cell_t *bcell, uint8_t *end_reason_out); -int connected_cell_format_payload(uint8_t *payload_out, +STATIC int connected_cell_format_payload(uint8_t *payload_out, const tor_addr_t *addr, uint32_t ttl); #endif diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c index 3d16e1453..089de93f7 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.c +++ b/src/or/connection_or.c @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ #include "rephist.h" #include "router.h" #include "routerlist.h" - +#include "ext_orport.h" #ifdef USE_BUFFEREVENTS #include <event2/bufferevent_ssl.h> #endif @@ -75,6 +75,10 @@ static void connection_or_handle_event_cb(struct bufferevent *bufev, * they form a linked list, with next_with_same_id as the next pointer. */ static digestmap_t *orconn_identity_map = NULL; +/** Global map between Extended ORPort identifiers and OR + * connections. */ +static digestmap_t *orconn_ext_or_id_map = NULL; + /** If conn is listed in orconn_identity_map, remove it, and clear * conn->identity_digest. Otherwise do nothing. */ void @@ -174,6 +178,71 @@ connection_or_set_identity_digest(or_connection_t *conn, const char *digest) #endif } +/** Remove the Extended ORPort identifier of <b>conn</b> from the + * global identifier list. Also, clear the identifier from the + * connection itself. */ +void +connection_or_remove_from_ext_or_id_map(or_connection_t *conn) +{ + or_connection_t *tmp; + if (!orconn_ext_or_id_map) + return; + if (!conn->ext_or_conn_id) + return; + + tmp = digestmap_remove(orconn_ext_or_id_map, conn->ext_or_conn_id); + if (!tor_digest_is_zero(conn->ext_or_conn_id)) + tor_assert(tmp == conn); + + memset(conn->ext_or_conn_id, 0, EXT_OR_CONN_ID_LEN); +} + +/** Return the connection whose ext_or_id is <b>id</b>. Return NULL if no such + * connection is found. */ +or_connection_t * +connection_or_get_by_ext_or_id(const char *id) +{ + if (!orconn_ext_or_id_map) + return NULL; + return digestmap_get(orconn_ext_or_id_map, id); +} + +/** Deallocate the global Extended ORPort identifier list */ +void +connection_or_clear_ext_or_id_map(void) +{ + digestmap_free(orconn_ext_or_id_map, NULL); + orconn_ext_or_id_map = NULL; +} + +/** Creates an Extended ORPort identifier for <b>conn<b/> and deposits + * it into the global list of identifiers. */ +void +connection_or_set_ext_or_identifier(or_connection_t *conn) +{ + char random_id[EXT_OR_CONN_ID_LEN]; + or_connection_t *tmp; + + if (!orconn_ext_or_id_map) + orconn_ext_or_id_map = digestmap_new(); + + /* Remove any previous identifiers: */ + if (conn->ext_or_conn_id && !tor_digest_is_zero(conn->ext_or_conn_id)) + connection_or_remove_from_ext_or_id_map(conn); + + do { + crypto_rand(random_id, sizeof(random_id)); + } while (digestmap_get(orconn_ext_or_id_map, random_id)); + + if (!conn->ext_or_conn_id) + conn->ext_or_conn_id = tor_malloc_zero(EXT_OR_CONN_ID_LEN); + + memcpy(conn->ext_or_conn_id, random_id, EXT_OR_CONN_ID_LEN); + + tmp = digestmap_set(orconn_ext_or_id_map, random_id, conn); + tor_assert(!tmp); +} + /**************************************************************/ /** Map from a string describing what a non-open OR connection was doing when @@ -228,7 +297,7 @@ connection_or_get_state_description(or_connection_t *orconn, const char *conn_state; char tls_state[256]; - tor_assert(conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR); + tor_assert(conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR || conn->type == CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR); conn_state = conn_state_to_string(conn->type, conn->state); tor_tls_get_state_description(orconn->tls, tls_state, sizeof(tls_state)); @@ -1077,7 +1146,7 @@ connection_or_connect(const tor_addr_t *_addr, uint16_t port, return NULL; } - conn = or_connection_new(tor_addr_family(&addr)); + conn = or_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_OR, tor_addr_family(&addr)); /* * Set up conn so it's got all the data we need to remember for channels @@ -1222,8 +1291,8 @@ connection_or_close_for_error(or_connection_t *orconn, int flush) * * Return -1 if <b>conn</b> is broken, else return 0. */ -int -connection_tls_start_handshake(or_connection_t *conn, int receiving) +MOCK_IMPL(int, +connection_tls_start_handshake,(or_connection_t *conn, int receiving)) { channel_listener_t *chan_listener; channel_t *chan; @@ -1480,7 +1549,8 @@ connection_or_handle_event_cb(struct bufferevent *bufev, short event, int connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(or_connection_t *conn) { - tor_assert(conn->base_.type == CONN_TYPE_OR); + tor_assert(conn->base_.type == CONN_TYPE_OR || + conn->base_.type == CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR); if (!conn->tls) return 1; /* it's still in proxy states or something */ if (conn->handshake_state) @@ -1689,7 +1759,7 @@ connection_tls_finish_handshake(or_connection_t *conn) digest_rcvd) < 0) return -1; - circuit_build_times_network_is_live(&circ_times); + circuit_build_times_network_is_live(get_circuit_build_times_mutable()); if (tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(conn->tls)) { conn->link_proto = 1; @@ -1723,7 +1793,7 @@ connection_or_launch_v3_or_handshake(or_connection_t *conn) tor_assert(connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(conn)); tor_assert(tor_tls_received_v3_certificate(conn->tls)); - circuit_build_times_network_is_live(&circ_times); + circuit_build_times_network_is_live(get_circuit_build_times_mutable()); connection_or_change_state(conn, OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3); if (connection_init_or_handshake_state(conn, 1) < 0) @@ -1956,7 +2026,7 @@ connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(or_connection_t *conn) if (conn->chan) channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan)); - circuit_build_times_network_is_live(&circ_times); + circuit_build_times_network_is_live(get_circuit_build_times_mutable()); channel_tls_handle_var_cell(var_cell, conn); var_cell_free(var_cell); } else { @@ -1972,7 +2042,7 @@ connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(or_connection_t *conn) if (conn->chan) channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan)); - circuit_build_times_network_is_live(&circ_times); + circuit_build_times_network_is_live(get_circuit_build_times_mutable()); connection_fetch_from_buf(buf, cell_network_size, TO_CONN(conn)); /* retrieve cell info from buf (create the host-order struct from the diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.h b/src/or/connection_or.h index 85e68f1a3..8d9302893 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_or.h +++ b/src/or/connection_or.h @@ -45,7 +45,8 @@ void connection_or_close_for_error(or_connection_t *orconn, int flush); void connection_or_report_broken_states(int severity, int domain); -int connection_tls_start_handshake(or_connection_t *conn, int receiving); +MOCK_DECL(int,connection_tls_start_handshake,(or_connection_t *conn, + int receiving)); int connection_tls_continue_handshake(or_connection_t *conn); int connection_init_or_handshake_state(or_connection_t *conn, diff --git a/src/or/control.c b/src/or/control.c index a88de12d6..49212de65 100644 --- a/src/or/control.c +++ b/src/or/control.c @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ #include "circuitlist.h" #include "circuitstats.h" #include "circuituse.h" +#include "command.h" #include "config.h" #include "confparse.h" #include "connection.h" @@ -52,46 +53,13 @@ * finished authentication and is accepting commands. */ #define STATE_IS_OPEN(s) ((s) == CONTROL_CONN_STATE_OPEN) -/* Recognized asynchronous event types. It's okay to expand this list - * because it is used both as a list of v0 event types, and as indices - * into the bitfield to determine which controllers want which events. - */ -#define EVENT_MIN_ 0x0001 -#define EVENT_CIRCUIT_STATUS 0x0001 -#define EVENT_STREAM_STATUS 0x0002 -#define EVENT_OR_CONN_STATUS 0x0003 -#define EVENT_BANDWIDTH_USED 0x0004 -#define EVENT_CIRCUIT_STATUS_MINOR 0x0005 -#define EVENT_NEW_DESC 0x0006 -#define EVENT_DEBUG_MSG 0x0007 -#define EVENT_INFO_MSG 0x0008 -#define EVENT_NOTICE_MSG 0x0009 -#define EVENT_WARN_MSG 0x000A -#define EVENT_ERR_MSG 0x000B -#define EVENT_ADDRMAP 0x000C -// #define EVENT_AUTHDIR_NEWDESCS 0x000D -#define EVENT_DESCCHANGED 0x000E -// #define EVENT_NS 0x000F -#define EVENT_STATUS_CLIENT 0x0010 -#define EVENT_STATUS_SERVER 0x0011 -#define EVENT_STATUS_GENERAL 0x0012 -#define EVENT_GUARD 0x0013 -#define EVENT_STREAM_BANDWIDTH_USED 0x0014 -#define EVENT_CLIENTS_SEEN 0x0015 -#define EVENT_NEWCONSENSUS 0x0016 -#define EVENT_BUILDTIMEOUT_SET 0x0017 -#define EVENT_SIGNAL 0x0018 -#define EVENT_CONF_CHANGED 0x0019 -#define EVENT_MAX_ 0x0019 -/* If EVENT_MAX_ ever hits 0x0020, we need to make the mask wider. */ - /** Bitfield: The bit 1<<e is set if <b>any</b> open control * connection is interested in events of type <b>e</b>. We use this * so that we can decide to skip generating event messages that nobody * has interest in without having to walk over the global connection * list to find out. **/ -typedef uint32_t event_mask_t; +typedef uint64_t event_mask_t; /** An event mask of all the events that any controller is interested in * receiving. */ @@ -103,7 +71,7 @@ static int disable_log_messages = 0; /** Macro: true if any control connection is interested in events of type * <b>e</b>. */ #define EVENT_IS_INTERESTING(e) \ - (global_event_mask & (1<<(e))) + (!! (global_event_mask & (((uint64_t)1)<<(e)))) /** If we're using cookie-type authentication, how long should our cookies be? */ @@ -115,7 +83,7 @@ static int authentication_cookie_is_set = 0; /** If authentication_cookie_is_set, a secret cookie that we've stored to disk * and which we're using to authenticate controllers. (If the controller can * read it off disk, it has permission to connect.) */ -static char authentication_cookie[AUTHENTICATION_COOKIE_LEN]; +static uint8_t *authentication_cookie = NULL; #define SAFECOOKIE_SERVER_TO_CONTROLLER_CONSTANT \ "Tor safe cookie authentication server-to-controller hash" @@ -130,15 +98,6 @@ static char authentication_cookie[AUTHENTICATION_COOKIE_LEN]; * of this so we can respond to getinfo status/bootstrap-phase queries. */ static char last_sent_bootstrap_message[BOOTSTRAP_MSG_LEN]; -/** Flag for event_format_t. Indicates that we should use the one standard - format. - */ -#define ALL_FORMATS 1 - -/** Bit field of flags to select how to format a controller event. Recognized - * flag is ALL_FORMATS. */ -typedef int event_format_t; - static void connection_printf_to_buf(control_connection_t *conn, const char *format, ...) CHECK_PRINTF(2,3); @@ -232,6 +191,20 @@ log_severity_to_event(int severity) } } +/** Helper: clear bandwidth counters of all origin circuits. */ +static void +clear_circ_bw_fields(void) +{ + circuit_t *circ; + origin_circuit_t *ocirc; + TOR_LIST_FOREACH(circ, circuit_get_global_list(), head) { + if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) + continue; + ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); + ocirc->n_written_circ_bw = ocirc->n_read_circ_bw = 0; + } +} + /** Set <b>global_event_mask*</b> to the bitwise OR of each live control * connection's event_mask field. */ void @@ -257,8 +230,8 @@ control_update_global_event_mask(void) * we want to hear...*/ control_adjust_event_log_severity(); - /* ...then, if we've started logging stream bw, clear the appropriate - * fields. */ + /* ...then, if we've started logging stream or circ bw, clear the + * appropriate fields. */ if (! (old_mask & EVENT_STREAM_BANDWIDTH_USED) && (new_mask & EVENT_STREAM_BANDWIDTH_USED)) { SMARTLIST_FOREACH(conns, connection_t *, conn, @@ -269,6 +242,10 @@ control_update_global_event_mask(void) } }); } + if (! (old_mask & EVENT_CIRC_BANDWIDTH_USED) && + (new_mask & EVENT_CIRC_BANDWIDTH_USED)) { + clear_circ_bw_fields(); + } } /** Adjust the log severities that result in control_event_logmsg being called @@ -334,7 +311,7 @@ connection_write_str_to_buf(const char *s, control_connection_t *conn) * the end. Replace all LF characters sequences with CRLF. Return the number * of bytes in *<b>out</b>. */ -/* static */ size_t +STATIC size_t write_escaped_data(const char *data, size_t len, char **out) { size_t sz_out = len+8; @@ -382,7 +359,7 @@ write_escaped_data(const char *data, size_t len, char **out) * that appears at the start of a line, and replacing all CRLF sequences * with LF. Return the number of * bytes in *<b>out</b>. */ -/* static */ size_t +STATIC size_t read_escaped_data(const char *data, size_t len, char **out) { char *outp; @@ -592,9 +569,9 @@ send_control_done(control_connection_t *conn) * * The EXTENDED_FORMAT and NONEXTENDED_FORMAT flags behave similarly with * respect to the EXTENDED_EVENTS feature. */ -static void -send_control_event_string(uint16_t event, event_format_t which, - const char *msg) +MOCK_IMPL(STATIC void, +send_control_event_string,(uint16_t event, event_format_t which, + const char *msg)) { smartlist_t *conns = get_connection_array(); (void)which; @@ -958,6 +935,11 @@ static const struct control_event_t control_event_table[] = { { EVENT_BUILDTIMEOUT_SET, "BUILDTIMEOUT_SET" }, { EVENT_SIGNAL, "SIGNAL" }, { EVENT_CONF_CHANGED, "CONF_CHANGED"}, + { EVENT_CONN_BW, "CONN_BW" }, + { EVENT_CELL_STATS, "CELL_STATS" }, + { EVENT_TB_EMPTY, "TB_EMPTY" }, + { EVENT_CIRC_BANDWIDTH_USED, "CIRC_BW" }, + { EVENT_TRANSPORT_LAUNCHED, "TRANSPORT_LAUNCHED" }, { 0, NULL }, }; @@ -1447,7 +1429,7 @@ getinfo_helper_misc(control_connection_t *conn, const char *question, } else if (!strcmp(question, "config-defaults-file")) { *answer = tor_strdup(get_torrc_fname(1)); } else if (!strcmp(question, "config-text")) { - *answer = options_dump(get_options(), 1); + *answer = options_dump(get_options(), OPTIONS_DUMP_MINIMAL); } else if (!strcmp(question, "info/names")) { *answer = list_getinfo_options(); } else if (!strcmp(question, "dormant")) { @@ -1572,7 +1554,8 @@ munge_extrainfo_into_routerinfo(const char *ri_body, if (!(cp = tor_memstr(ei_body, ei_len, kwd))) continue; ++cp; - eol = memchr(cp, '\n', ei_len - (cp-ei_body)); + if (!(eol = memchr(cp, '\n', ei_len - (cp-ei_body)))) + continue; memcpy(outp, cp, eol-cp+1); outp += eol-cp+1; } @@ -1927,7 +1910,7 @@ getinfo_helper_events(control_connection_t *control_conn, if (!strcmp(question, "circuit-status")) { circuit_t *circ_; smartlist_t *status = smartlist_new(); - for (circ_ = circuit_get_global_list_(); circ_; circ_ = circ_->next) { + TOR_LIST_FOREACH(circ_, circuit_get_global_list(), head) { origin_circuit_t *circ; char *circdesc; const char *state; @@ -3181,6 +3164,30 @@ handle_control_usefeature(control_connection_t *conn, return 0; } +/** Implementation for the DROPGUARDS command. */ +static int +handle_control_dropguards(control_connection_t *conn, + uint32_t len, + const char *body) +{ + smartlist_t *args; + (void) len; /* body is nul-terminated; it's safe to ignore the length */ + args = smartlist_new(); + smartlist_split_string(args, body, " ", + SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0); + + if (smartlist_len(args)) { + connection_printf_to_buf(conn, "512 Too many arguments to DROPGUARDS\r\n"); + } else { + remove_all_entry_guards(); + send_control_done(conn); + } + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(args, char *, cp, tor_free(cp)); + smartlist_free(args); + return 0; +} + /** Called when <b>conn</b> has no more bytes left on its outbuf. */ int connection_control_finished_flushing(control_connection_t *conn) @@ -3480,6 +3487,9 @@ connection_control_process_inbuf(control_connection_t *conn) } else if (!strcasecmp(conn->incoming_cmd, "AUTHCHALLENGE")) { if (handle_control_authchallenge(conn, cmd_data_len, args)) return -1; + } else if (!strcasecmp(conn->incoming_cmd, "DROPGUARDS")) { + if (handle_control_dropguards(conn, cmd_data_len, args)) + return -1; } else { connection_printf_to_buf(conn, "510 Unrecognized command \"%s\"\r\n", conn->incoming_cmd); @@ -3847,17 +3857,17 @@ control_event_or_conn_status(or_connection_t *conn, or_conn_status_event_t tp, } ncircs += connection_or_get_num_circuits(conn); if (ncircs && (tp == OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED || tp == OR_CONN_EVENT_CLOSED)) { - tor_snprintf(ncircs_buf, sizeof(ncircs_buf), "%sNCIRCS=%d", - reason ? " " : "", ncircs); + tor_snprintf(ncircs_buf, sizeof(ncircs_buf), " NCIRCS=%d", ncircs); } orconn_target_get_name(name, sizeof(name), conn); send_control_event(EVENT_OR_CONN_STATUS, ALL_FORMATS, - "650 ORCONN %s %s %s%s%s\r\n", + "650 ORCONN %s %s%s%s%s ID="U64_FORMAT"\r\n", name, status, - reason ? "REASON=" : "", + reason ? " REASON=" : "", orconn_end_reason_to_control_string(reason), - ncircs_buf); + ncircs_buf, + U64_PRINTF_ARG(conn->base_.global_identifier)); return 0; } @@ -3868,6 +3878,8 @@ control_event_or_conn_status(or_connection_t *conn, or_conn_status_event_t tp, int control_event_stream_bandwidth(edge_connection_t *edge_conn) { + circuit_t *circ; + origin_circuit_t *ocirc; if (EVENT_IS_INTERESTING(EVENT_STREAM_BANDWIDTH_USED)) { if (!edge_conn->n_read && !edge_conn->n_written) return 0; @@ -3878,6 +3890,12 @@ control_event_stream_bandwidth(edge_connection_t *edge_conn) (unsigned long)edge_conn->n_read, (unsigned long)edge_conn->n_written); + circ = circuit_get_by_edge_conn(edge_conn); + if (circ && CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { + ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); + ocirc->n_read_circ_bw += edge_conn->n_read; + ocirc->n_written_circ_bw += edge_conn->n_written; + } edge_conn->n_written = edge_conn->n_read = 0; } @@ -3915,6 +3933,235 @@ control_event_stream_bandwidth_used(void) return 0; } +/** A second or more has elapsed: tell any interested control connections + * how much bandwidth origin circuits have used. */ +int +control_event_circ_bandwidth_used(void) +{ + circuit_t *circ; + origin_circuit_t *ocirc; + if (!EVENT_IS_INTERESTING(EVENT_CIRC_BANDWIDTH_USED)) + return 0; + + TOR_LIST_FOREACH(circ, circuit_get_global_list(), head) { + if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) + continue; + ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); + if (!ocirc->n_read_circ_bw && !ocirc->n_written_circ_bw) + continue; + send_control_event(EVENT_CIRC_BANDWIDTH_USED, ALL_FORMATS, + "650 CIRC_BW ID=%d READ=%lu WRITTEN=%lu\r\n", + ocirc->global_identifier, + (unsigned long)ocirc->n_read_circ_bw, + (unsigned long)ocirc->n_written_circ_bw); + ocirc->n_written_circ_bw = ocirc->n_read_circ_bw = 0; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** Print out CONN_BW event for a single OR/DIR/EXIT <b>conn</b> and reset + * bandwidth counters. */ +int +control_event_conn_bandwidth(connection_t *conn) +{ + const char *conn_type_str; + if (!get_options()->TestingEnableConnBwEvent || + !EVENT_IS_INTERESTING(EVENT_CONN_BW)) + return 0; + if (!conn->n_read_conn_bw && !conn->n_written_conn_bw) + return 0; + switch (conn->type) { + case CONN_TYPE_OR: + conn_type_str = "OR"; + break; + case CONN_TYPE_DIR: + conn_type_str = "DIR"; + break; + case CONN_TYPE_EXIT: + conn_type_str = "EXIT"; + break; + default: + return 0; + } + send_control_event(EVENT_CONN_BW, ALL_FORMATS, + "650 CONN_BW ID="U64_FORMAT" TYPE=%s " + "READ=%lu WRITTEN=%lu\r\n", + U64_PRINTF_ARG(conn->global_identifier), + conn_type_str, + (unsigned long)conn->n_read_conn_bw, + (unsigned long)conn->n_written_conn_bw); + conn->n_written_conn_bw = conn->n_read_conn_bw = 0; + return 0; +} + +/** A second or more has elapsed: tell any interested control + * connections how much bandwidth connections have used. */ +int +control_event_conn_bandwidth_used(void) +{ + if (get_options()->TestingEnableConnBwEvent && + EVENT_IS_INTERESTING(EVENT_CONN_BW)) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(get_connection_array(), connection_t *, conn, + control_event_conn_bandwidth(conn)); + } + return 0; +} + +/** Helper: iterate over cell statistics of <b>circ</b> and sum up added + * cells, removed cells, and waiting times by cell command and direction. + * Store results in <b>cell_stats</b>. Free cell statistics of the + * circuit afterwards. */ +void +sum_up_cell_stats_by_command(circuit_t *circ, cell_stats_t *cell_stats) +{ + memset(cell_stats, 0, sizeof(cell_stats_t)); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(circ->testing_cell_stats, + testing_cell_stats_entry_t *, ent) { + tor_assert(ent->command <= CELL_COMMAND_MAX_); + if (!ent->removed && !ent->exitward) { + cell_stats->added_cells_appward[ent->command] += 1; + } else if (!ent->removed && ent->exitward) { + cell_stats->added_cells_exitward[ent->command] += 1; + } else if (!ent->exitward) { + cell_stats->removed_cells_appward[ent->command] += 1; + cell_stats->total_time_appward[ent->command] += ent->waiting_time * 10; + } else { + cell_stats->removed_cells_exitward[ent->command] += 1; + cell_stats->total_time_exitward[ent->command] += ent->waiting_time * 10; + } + tor_free(ent); + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ent); + smartlist_free(circ->testing_cell_stats); + circ->testing_cell_stats = NULL; +} + +/** Helper: append a cell statistics string to <code>event_parts</code>, + * prefixed with <code>key</code>=. Statistics consist of comma-separated + * key:value pairs with lower-case command strings as keys and cell + * numbers or total waiting times as values. A key:value pair is included + * if the entry in <code>include_if_non_zero</code> is not zero, but with + * the (possibly zero) entry from <code>number_to_include</code>. Both + * arrays are expected to have a length of CELL_COMMAND_MAX_ + 1. If no + * entry in <code>include_if_non_zero</code> is positive, no string will + * be added to <code>event_parts</code>. */ +void +append_cell_stats_by_command(smartlist_t *event_parts, const char *key, + const uint64_t *include_if_non_zero, + const uint64_t *number_to_include) +{ + smartlist_t *key_value_strings = smartlist_new(); + int i; + for (i = 0; i <= CELL_COMMAND_MAX_; i++) { + if (include_if_non_zero[i] > 0) { + smartlist_add_asprintf(key_value_strings, "%s:"U64_FORMAT, + cell_command_to_string(i), + U64_PRINTF_ARG(number_to_include[i])); + } + } + if (smartlist_len(key_value_strings) > 0) { + char *joined = smartlist_join_strings(key_value_strings, ",", 0, NULL); + smartlist_add_asprintf(event_parts, "%s=%s", key, joined); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(key_value_strings, char *, cp, tor_free(cp)); + tor_free(joined); + } + smartlist_free(key_value_strings); +} + +/** Helper: format <b>cell_stats</b> for <b>circ</b> for inclusion in a + * CELL_STATS event and write result string to <b>event_string</b>. */ +void +format_cell_stats(char **event_string, circuit_t *circ, + cell_stats_t *cell_stats) +{ + smartlist_t *event_parts = smartlist_new(); + if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { + origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); + smartlist_add_asprintf(event_parts, "ID=%lu", + (unsigned long)ocirc->global_identifier); + } else if (TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_chan) { + or_circuit_t *or_circ = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ); + smartlist_add_asprintf(event_parts, "InboundQueue=%lu", + (unsigned long)or_circ->p_circ_id); + smartlist_add_asprintf(event_parts, "InboundConn="U64_FORMAT, + U64_PRINTF_ARG(or_circ->p_chan->global_identifier)); + append_cell_stats_by_command(event_parts, "InboundAdded", + cell_stats->added_cells_appward, + cell_stats->added_cells_appward); + append_cell_stats_by_command(event_parts, "InboundRemoved", + cell_stats->removed_cells_appward, + cell_stats->removed_cells_appward); + append_cell_stats_by_command(event_parts, "InboundTime", + cell_stats->removed_cells_appward, + cell_stats->total_time_appward); + } + if (circ->n_chan) { + smartlist_add_asprintf(event_parts, "OutboundQueue=%lu", + (unsigned long)circ->n_circ_id); + smartlist_add_asprintf(event_parts, "OutboundConn="U64_FORMAT, + U64_PRINTF_ARG(circ->n_chan->global_identifier)); + append_cell_stats_by_command(event_parts, "OutboundAdded", + cell_stats->added_cells_exitward, + cell_stats->added_cells_exitward); + append_cell_stats_by_command(event_parts, "OutboundRemoved", + cell_stats->removed_cells_exitward, + cell_stats->removed_cells_exitward); + append_cell_stats_by_command(event_parts, "OutboundTime", + cell_stats->removed_cells_exitward, + cell_stats->total_time_exitward); + } + *event_string = smartlist_join_strings(event_parts, " ", 0, NULL); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(event_parts, char *, cp, tor_free(cp)); + smartlist_free(event_parts); +} + +/** A second or more has elapsed: tell any interested control connection + * how many cells have been processed for a given circuit. */ +int +control_event_circuit_cell_stats(void) +{ + circuit_t *circ; + cell_stats_t *cell_stats; + char *event_string; + if (!get_options()->TestingEnableCellStatsEvent || + !EVENT_IS_INTERESTING(EVENT_CELL_STATS)) + return 0; + cell_stats = tor_malloc(sizeof(cell_stats_t));; + TOR_LIST_FOREACH(circ, circuit_get_global_list(), head) { + if (!circ->testing_cell_stats) + continue; + sum_up_cell_stats_by_command(circ, cell_stats); + format_cell_stats(&event_string, circ, cell_stats); + send_control_event(EVENT_CELL_STATS, ALL_FORMATS, + "650 CELL_STATS %s\r\n", event_string); + tor_free(event_string); + } + tor_free(cell_stats); + return 0; +} + +/** Tokens in <b>bucket</b> have been refilled: the read bucket was empty + * for <b>read_empty_time</b> millis, the write bucket was empty for + * <b>write_empty_time</b> millis, and buckets were last refilled + * <b>milliseconds_elapsed</b> millis ago. Only emit TB_EMPTY event if + * either read or write bucket have been empty before. */ +int +control_event_tb_empty(const char *bucket, uint32_t read_empty_time, + uint32_t write_empty_time, + int milliseconds_elapsed) +{ + if (get_options()->TestingEnableTbEmptyEvent && + EVENT_IS_INTERESTING(EVENT_TB_EMPTY) && + (read_empty_time > 0 || write_empty_time > 0)) { + send_control_event(EVENT_TB_EMPTY, ALL_FORMATS, + "650 TB_EMPTY %s READ=%d WRITTEN=%d " + "LAST=%d\r\n", + bucket, read_empty_time, write_empty_time, + milliseconds_elapsed); + } + return 0; +} + /** A second or more has elapsed: tell any interested control * connections how much bandwidth we used. */ int @@ -4162,32 +4409,26 @@ control_event_newconsensus(const networkstatus_t *consensus) /** Called when we compute a new circuitbuildtimeout */ int -control_event_buildtimeout_set(const circuit_build_times_t *cbt, - buildtimeout_set_event_t type) +control_event_buildtimeout_set(buildtimeout_set_event_t type, + const char *args) { const char *type_string = NULL; - double qnt; if (!control_event_is_interesting(EVENT_BUILDTIMEOUT_SET)) return 0; - qnt = circuit_build_times_quantile_cutoff(); - switch (type) { case BUILDTIMEOUT_SET_EVENT_COMPUTED: type_string = "COMPUTED"; break; case BUILDTIMEOUT_SET_EVENT_RESET: type_string = "RESET"; - qnt = 1.0; break; case BUILDTIMEOUT_SET_EVENT_SUSPENDED: type_string = "SUSPENDED"; - qnt = 1.0; break; case BUILDTIMEOUT_SET_EVENT_DISCARD: type_string = "DISCARD"; - qnt = 1.0; break; case BUILDTIMEOUT_SET_EVENT_RESUME: type_string = "RESUME"; @@ -4198,15 +4439,8 @@ control_event_buildtimeout_set(const circuit_build_times_t *cbt, } send_control_event(EVENT_BUILDTIMEOUT_SET, ALL_FORMATS, - "650 BUILDTIMEOUT_SET %s TOTAL_TIMES=%lu " - "TIMEOUT_MS=%lu XM=%lu ALPHA=%f CUTOFF_QUANTILE=%f " - "TIMEOUT_RATE=%f CLOSE_MS=%lu CLOSE_RATE=%f\r\n", - type_string, (unsigned long)cbt->total_build_times, - (unsigned long)cbt->timeout_ms, - (unsigned long)cbt->Xm, cbt->alpha, qnt, - circuit_build_times_timeout_rate(cbt), - (unsigned long)cbt->close_ms, - circuit_build_times_close_rate(cbt)); + "650 BUILDTIMEOUT_SET %s %s\r\n", + type_string, args); return 0; } @@ -4445,44 +4679,27 @@ get_cookie_file(void) } } -/** Choose a random authentication cookie and write it to disk. - * Anybody who can read the cookie from disk will be considered - * authorized to use the control connection. Return -1 if we can't - * write the file, or 0 on success. */ +/* Initialize the cookie-based authentication system of the + * ControlPort. If <b>enabled</b> is 0, then disable the cookie + * authentication system. */ int -init_cookie_authentication(int enabled) +init_control_cookie_authentication(int enabled) { - char *fname; + char *fname = NULL; + int retval; + if (!enabled) { authentication_cookie_is_set = 0; return 0; } - /* We don't want to generate a new cookie every time we call - * options_act(). One should be enough. */ - if (authentication_cookie_is_set) - return 0; /* all set */ - fname = get_cookie_file(); - crypto_rand(authentication_cookie, AUTHENTICATION_COOKIE_LEN); - authentication_cookie_is_set = 1; - if (write_bytes_to_file(fname, authentication_cookie, - AUTHENTICATION_COOKIE_LEN, 1)) { - log_warn(LD_FS,"Error writing authentication cookie to %s.", - escaped(fname)); - tor_free(fname); - return -1; - } -#ifndef _WIN32 - if (get_options()->CookieAuthFileGroupReadable) { - if (chmod(fname, 0640)) { - log_warn(LD_FS,"Unable to make %s group-readable.", escaped(fname)); - } - } -#endif - + retval = init_cookie_authentication(fname, "", /* no header */ + AUTHENTICATION_COOKIE_LEN, + &authentication_cookie, + &authentication_cookie_is_set); tor_free(fname); - return 0; + return retval; } /** A copy of the process specifier of Tor's owning controller, or @@ -4698,8 +4915,8 @@ control_event_bootstrap(bootstrap_status_t status, int progress) * that indicates a problem. <b>warn</b> gives a hint as to why, and * <b>reason</b> provides an "or_conn_end_reason" tag. */ -void -control_event_bootstrap_problem(const char *warn, int reason) +MOCK_IMPL(void, +control_event_bootstrap_problem, (const char *warn, int reason)) { int status = bootstrap_percent; const char *tag, *summary; @@ -4766,3 +4983,35 @@ control_event_clients_seen(const char *controller_str) "650 CLIENTS_SEEN %s\r\n", controller_str); } +/** A new pluggable transport called <b>transport_name</b> was + * launched on <b>addr</b>:<b>port</b>. <b>mode</b> is either + * "server" or "client" depending on the mode of the pluggable + * transport. + * "650" SP "TRANSPORT_LAUNCHED" SP Mode SP Name SP Address SP Port + */ +void +control_event_transport_launched(const char *mode, const char *transport_name, + tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port) +{ + send_control_event(EVENT_TRANSPORT_LAUNCHED, ALL_FORMATS, + "650 TRANSPORT_LAUNCHED %s %s %s %u\r\n", + mode, transport_name, fmt_addr(addr), port); +} + +/** Free any leftover allocated memory of the control.c subsystem. */ +void +control_free_all(void) +{ + if (authentication_cookie) /* Free the auth cookie */ + tor_free(authentication_cookie); +} + +#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS +/* For testing: change the value of global_event_mask */ +void +control_testing_set_global_event_mask(uint64_t mask) +{ + global_event_mask = mask; +} +#endif + diff --git a/src/or/control.h b/src/or/control.h index 61062da2c..c8db643b7 100644 --- a/src/or/control.h +++ b/src/or/control.h @@ -50,6 +50,13 @@ int control_event_or_conn_status(or_connection_t *conn, int control_event_bandwidth_used(uint32_t n_read, uint32_t n_written); int control_event_stream_bandwidth(edge_connection_t *edge_conn); int control_event_stream_bandwidth_used(void); +int control_event_circ_bandwidth_used(void); +int control_event_conn_bandwidth(connection_t *conn); +int control_event_conn_bandwidth_used(void); +int control_event_circuit_cell_stats(void); +int control_event_tb_empty(const char *bucket, uint32_t read_empty_time, + uint32_t write_empty_time, + int milliseconds_elapsed); void control_event_logmsg(int severity, uint32_t domain, const char *msg); int control_event_descriptors_changed(smartlist_t *routers); int control_event_address_mapped(const char *from, const char *to, @@ -73,11 +80,11 @@ int control_event_server_status(int severity, const char *format, ...) int control_event_guard(const char *nickname, const char *digest, const char *status); int control_event_conf_changed(const smartlist_t *elements); -int control_event_buildtimeout_set(const circuit_build_times_t *cbt, - buildtimeout_set_event_t type); +int control_event_buildtimeout_set(buildtimeout_set_event_t type, + const char *args); int control_event_signal(uintptr_t signal); -int init_cookie_authentication(int enabled); +int init_control_cookie_authentication(int enabled); smartlist_t *decode_hashed_passwords(config_line_t *passwords); void disable_control_logging(void); void enable_control_logging(void); @@ -85,14 +92,100 @@ void enable_control_logging(void); void monitor_owning_controller_process(const char *process_spec); void control_event_bootstrap(bootstrap_status_t status, int progress); -void control_event_bootstrap_problem(const char *warn, int reason); +MOCK_DECL(void, control_event_bootstrap_problem,(const char *warn, + int reason)); void control_event_clients_seen(const char *controller_str); +void control_event_transport_launched(const char *mode, + const char *transport_name, + tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port); + +void control_free_all(void); #ifdef CONTROL_PRIVATE +/* Recognized asynchronous event types. It's okay to expand this list + * because it is used both as a list of v0 event types, and as indices + * into the bitfield to determine which controllers want which events. + */ +#define EVENT_MIN_ 0x0001 +#define EVENT_CIRCUIT_STATUS 0x0001 +#define EVENT_STREAM_STATUS 0x0002 +#define EVENT_OR_CONN_STATUS 0x0003 +#define EVENT_BANDWIDTH_USED 0x0004 +#define EVENT_CIRCUIT_STATUS_MINOR 0x0005 +#define EVENT_NEW_DESC 0x0006 +#define EVENT_DEBUG_MSG 0x0007 +#define EVENT_INFO_MSG 0x0008 +#define EVENT_NOTICE_MSG 0x0009 +#define EVENT_WARN_MSG 0x000A +#define EVENT_ERR_MSG 0x000B +#define EVENT_ADDRMAP 0x000C +/* Exposed above */ +// #define EVENT_AUTHDIR_NEWDESCS 0x000D +#define EVENT_DESCCHANGED 0x000E +/* Exposed above */ +// #define EVENT_NS 0x000F +#define EVENT_STATUS_CLIENT 0x0010 +#define EVENT_STATUS_SERVER 0x0011 +#define EVENT_STATUS_GENERAL 0x0012 +#define EVENT_GUARD 0x0013 +#define EVENT_STREAM_BANDWIDTH_USED 0x0014 +#define EVENT_CLIENTS_SEEN 0x0015 +#define EVENT_NEWCONSENSUS 0x0016 +#define EVENT_BUILDTIMEOUT_SET 0x0017 +#define EVENT_SIGNAL 0x0018 +#define EVENT_CONF_CHANGED 0x0019 +#define EVENT_CONN_BW 0x001A +#define EVENT_CELL_STATS 0x001B +#define EVENT_TB_EMPTY 0x001C +#define EVENT_CIRC_BANDWIDTH_USED 0x001D +#define EVENT_TRANSPORT_LAUNCHED 0x0020 +#define EVENT_MAX_ 0x0020 +/* If EVENT_MAX_ ever hits 0x0040, we need to make the mask into a + * different structure. */ + /* Used only by control.c and test.c */ -size_t write_escaped_data(const char *data, size_t len, char **out); -size_t read_escaped_data(const char *data, size_t len, char **out); +STATIC size_t write_escaped_data(const char *data, size_t len, char **out); +STATIC size_t read_escaped_data(const char *data, size_t len, char **out); +/** Flag for event_format_t. Indicates that we should use the one standard + format. (Other formats previous existed, and are now deprecated) + */ +#define ALL_FORMATS 1 +/** Bit field of flags to select how to format a controller event. Recognized + * flag is ALL_FORMATS. */ +typedef int event_format_t; + +#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS +MOCK_DECL(STATIC void, +send_control_event_string,(uint16_t event, event_format_t which, + const char *msg)); + +void control_testing_set_global_event_mask(uint64_t mask); +#endif + +/** Helper structure: temporarily stores cell statistics for a circuit. */ +typedef struct cell_stats_t { + /** Number of cells added in app-ward direction by command. */ + uint64_t added_cells_appward[CELL_COMMAND_MAX_ + 1]; + /** Number of cells added in exit-ward direction by command. */ + uint64_t added_cells_exitward[CELL_COMMAND_MAX_ + 1]; + /** Number of cells removed in app-ward direction by command. */ + uint64_t removed_cells_appward[CELL_COMMAND_MAX_ + 1]; + /** Number of cells removed in exit-ward direction by command. */ + uint64_t removed_cells_exitward[CELL_COMMAND_MAX_ + 1]; + /** Total waiting time of cells in app-ward direction by command. */ + uint64_t total_time_appward[CELL_COMMAND_MAX_ + 1]; + /** Total waiting time of cells in exit-ward direction by command. */ + uint64_t total_time_exitward[CELL_COMMAND_MAX_ + 1]; +} cell_stats_t; +void sum_up_cell_stats_by_command(circuit_t *circ, + cell_stats_t *cell_stats); +void append_cell_stats_by_command(smartlist_t *event_parts, + const char *key, + const uint64_t *include_if_non_zero, + const uint64_t *number_to_include); +void format_cell_stats(char **event_string, circuit_t *circ, + cell_stats_t *cell_stats); #endif #endif diff --git a/src/or/directory.c b/src/or/directory.c index 3752367c4..12c5b189f 100644 --- a/src/or/directory.c +++ b/src/or/directory.c @@ -747,7 +747,7 @@ connection_dir_request_failed(dir_connection_t *conn) conn->base_.address); } else if (conn->base_.purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_MICRODESC) { log_info(LD_DIR, "Giving up on downloading microdescriptors from " - " directory server at '%s'; will retry", conn->base_.address); + "directory server at '%s'; will retry", conn->base_.address); connection_dir_download_routerdesc_failed(conn); } } @@ -1387,7 +1387,7 @@ directory_send_command(dir_connection_t *conn, * so it does. Return 0. * Otherwise, return -1. */ -static int +STATIC int parse_http_url(const char *headers, char **url) { char *s, *start, *tmp; @@ -1416,6 +1416,19 @@ parse_http_url(const char *headers, char **url) } } + /* Check if the header is well formed (next sequence + * should be HTTP/1.X\r\n). Assumes we're supporting 1.0? */ + { + unsigned minor_ver; + char ch; + char *e = (char *)eat_whitespace_no_nl(s); + if (2 != tor_sscanf(e, "HTTP/1.%u%c", &minor_ver, &ch)) { + return -1; + } + if (ch != '\r') + return -1; + } + if (s-start < 5 || strcmpstart(start,"/tor/")) { /* need to rewrite it */ *url = tor_malloc(s - start + 5); strlcpy(*url,"/tor", s-start+5); @@ -1626,8 +1639,9 @@ load_downloaded_routers(const char *body, smartlist_t *which, added = router_load_routers_from_string(body, NULL, SAVED_NOWHERE, which, descriptor_digests, buf); - control_event_bootstrap(BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_LOADING_DESCRIPTORS, - count_loading_descriptors_progress()); + if (general) + control_event_bootstrap(BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_LOADING_DESCRIPTORS, + count_loading_descriptors_progress()); return added; } @@ -2968,7 +2982,9 @@ directory_handle_command_get(dir_connection_t *conn, const char *headers, tor_addr_t addr; if (tor_inet_aton((TO_CONN(conn))->address, &in)) { tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, ntohl(in.s_addr)); - geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_NETWORKSTATUS, &addr, time(NULL)); + geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_NETWORKSTATUS, + &addr, NULL, + time(NULL)); geoip_note_ns_response(GEOIP_SUCCESS); /* Note that a request for a network status has started, so that we * can measure the download time later on. */ @@ -3725,57 +3741,27 @@ dir_networkstatus_download_failed(smartlist_t *failed, int status_code) } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(fp); } -/** Schedule for when servers should download things in general. */ -static const int server_dl_schedule[] = { - 0, 0, 0, 60, 60, 60*2, 60*5, 60*15, INT_MAX -}; -/** Schedule for when clients should download things in general. */ -static const int client_dl_schedule[] = { - 0, 0, 60, 60*5, 60*10, INT_MAX -}; -/** Schedule for when servers should download consensuses. */ -static const int server_consensus_dl_schedule[] = { - 0, 0, 60, 60*5, 60*10, 60*30, 60*30, 60*30, 60*30, 60*30, 60*60, 60*60*2 -}; -/** Schedule for when clients should download consensuses. */ -static const int client_consensus_dl_schedule[] = { - 0, 0, 60, 60*5, 60*10, 60*30, 60*60, 60*60, 60*60, 60*60*3, 60*60*6, 60*60*12 -}; -/** Schedule for when clients should download bridge descriptors. */ -static const int bridge_dl_schedule[] = { - 60*60, 15*60, 15*60, 60*60 -}; - -/** Decide which download schedule we want to use, and then return a - * pointer to it along with a pointer to its length. Helper function for - * download_status_increment_failure() and download_status_reset(). */ -static void -find_dl_schedule_and_len(download_status_t *dls, int server, - const int **schedule, size_t *schedule_len) +/** Decide which download schedule we want to use based on descriptor type + * in <b>dls</b> and whether we are acting as directory <b>server</b>, and + * then return a list of int pointers defining download delays in seconds. + * Helper function for download_status_increment_failure() and + * download_status_reset(). */ +static const smartlist_t * +find_dl_schedule_and_len(download_status_t *dls, int server) { switch (dls->schedule) { case DL_SCHED_GENERIC: - if (server) { - *schedule = server_dl_schedule; - *schedule_len = sizeof(server_dl_schedule)/sizeof(int); - } else { - *schedule = client_dl_schedule; - *schedule_len = sizeof(client_dl_schedule)/sizeof(int); - } - break; + if (server) + return get_options()->TestingServerDownloadSchedule; + else + return get_options()->TestingClientDownloadSchedule; case DL_SCHED_CONSENSUS: - if (server) { - *schedule = server_consensus_dl_schedule; - *schedule_len = sizeof(server_consensus_dl_schedule)/sizeof(int); - } else { - *schedule = client_consensus_dl_schedule; - *schedule_len = sizeof(client_consensus_dl_schedule)/sizeof(int); - } - break; + if (server) + return get_options()->TestingServerConsensusDownloadSchedule; + else + return get_options()->TestingClientConsensusDownloadSchedule; case DL_SCHED_BRIDGE: - *schedule = bridge_dl_schedule; - *schedule_len = sizeof(bridge_dl_schedule)/sizeof(int); - break; + return get_options()->TestingBridgeDownloadSchedule; default: tor_assert(0); } @@ -3789,8 +3775,7 @@ time_t download_status_increment_failure(download_status_t *dls, int status_code, const char *item, int server, time_t now) { - const int *schedule; - size_t schedule_len; + const smartlist_t *schedule; int increment; tor_assert(dls); if (status_code != 503 || server) { @@ -3798,14 +3783,14 @@ download_status_increment_failure(download_status_t *dls, int status_code, ++dls->n_download_failures; } - find_dl_schedule_and_len(dls, server, &schedule, &schedule_len); + schedule = find_dl_schedule_and_len(dls, server); - if (dls->n_download_failures < schedule_len) - increment = schedule[dls->n_download_failures]; + if (dls->n_download_failures < smartlist_len(schedule)) + increment = *(int *)smartlist_get(schedule, dls->n_download_failures); else if (dls->n_download_failures == IMPOSSIBLE_TO_DOWNLOAD) increment = INT_MAX; else - increment = schedule[schedule_len-1]; + increment = *(int *)smartlist_get(schedule, smartlist_len(schedule) - 1); if (increment < INT_MAX) dls->next_attempt_at = now+increment; @@ -3838,14 +3823,11 @@ download_status_increment_failure(download_status_t *dls, int status_code, void download_status_reset(download_status_t *dls) { - const int *schedule; - size_t schedule_len; - - find_dl_schedule_and_len(dls, get_options()->DirPort_set, - &schedule, &schedule_len); + const smartlist_t *schedule = find_dl_schedule_and_len( + dls, get_options()->DirPort_set); dls->n_download_failures = 0; - dls->next_attempt_at = time(NULL) + schedule[0]; + dls->next_attempt_at = time(NULL) + *(int *)smartlist_get(schedule, 0); } /** Return the number of failures on <b>dls</b> since the last success (if @@ -3890,7 +3872,8 @@ dir_routerdesc_download_failed(smartlist_t *failed, int status_code, } else { dls = router_get_dl_status_by_descriptor_digest(digest); } - if (!dls || dls->n_download_failures >= MAX_ROUTERDESC_DOWNLOAD_FAILURES) + if (!dls || dls->n_download_failures >= + get_options()->TestingDescriptorMaxDownloadTries) continue; download_status_increment_failure(dls, status_code, cp, server, now); } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(cp); @@ -3921,7 +3904,8 @@ dir_microdesc_download_failed(smartlist_t *failed, if (!rs) continue; dls = &rs->dl_status; - if (dls->n_download_failures >= MAX_MICRODESC_DOWNLOAD_FAILURES) + if (dls->n_download_failures >= + get_options()->TestingMicrodescMaxDownloadTries) continue; { char buf[BASE64_DIGEST256_LEN+1]; diff --git a/src/or/directory.h b/src/or/directory.h index 41f18a172..0453160f7 100644 --- a/src/or/directory.h +++ b/src/or/directory.h @@ -118,5 +118,10 @@ download_status_mark_impossible(download_status_t *dl) int download_status_get_n_failures(const download_status_t *dls); +#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS +/* Used only by directory.c and test_dir.c */ +STATIC int parse_http_url(const char *headers, char **url); +#endif + #endif diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c index 3e46153a5..d30a47436 100644 --- a/src/or/dirserv.c +++ b/src/or/dirserv.c @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ #include "router.h" #include "routerlist.h" #include "routerparse.h" +#include "routerset.h" /** * \file dirserv.c @@ -1907,7 +1908,7 @@ router_counts_toward_thresholds(const node_t *node, time_t now, * the Weighted Fractional Uptime history, and use them to set thresholds for * the Stable, Fast, and Guard flags. Update the fields stable_uptime, * stable_mtbf, enough_mtbf_info, guard_wfu, guard_tk, fast_bandwidth, - * guard_bandwidh_including_exits, guard_bandwidth_excluding_exits, + * guard_bandwidth_including_exits, and guard_bandwidth_excluding_exits. * * Also, set the is_exit flag of each router appropriately. */ static void @@ -2082,7 +2083,7 @@ static digestmap_t *mbw_cache = NULL; /** Store a measured bandwidth cache entry when reading the measured * bandwidths file. */ -void +STATIC void dirserv_cache_measured_bw(const measured_bw_line_t *parsed_line, time_t as_of) { @@ -2112,7 +2113,7 @@ dirserv_cache_measured_bw(const measured_bw_line_t *parsed_line, } /** Clear and free the measured bandwidth cache */ -void +STATIC void dirserv_clear_measured_bw_cache(void) { if (mbw_cache) { @@ -2123,7 +2124,7 @@ dirserv_clear_measured_bw_cache(void) } /** Scan the measured bandwidth cache and remove expired entries */ -void +STATIC void dirserv_expire_measured_bw_cache(time_t now) { @@ -2145,7 +2146,7 @@ dirserv_expire_measured_bw_cache(time_t now) } /** Get the current size of the measured bandwidth cache */ -int +STATIC int dirserv_get_measured_bw_cache_size(void) { if (mbw_cache) return digestmap_size(mbw_cache); @@ -2155,7 +2156,7 @@ dirserv_get_measured_bw_cache_size(void) /** Query the cache by identity digest, return value indicates whether * we found it. The bw_out and as_of_out pointers receive the cached * bandwidth value and the time it was cached if not NULL. */ -int +STATIC int dirserv_query_measured_bw_cache_kb(const char *node_id, long *bw_kb_out, time_t *as_of_out) { @@ -2176,7 +2177,7 @@ dirserv_query_measured_bw_cache_kb(const char *node_id, long *bw_kb_out, } /** Predicate wrapper for dirserv_query_measured_bw_cache() */ -int +STATIC int dirserv_has_measured_bw(const char *node_id) { return dirserv_query_measured_bw_cache_kb(node_id, NULL, NULL); @@ -2705,6 +2706,11 @@ set_routerstatus_from_routerinfo(routerstatus_t *rs, } else { rs->is_possible_guard = 0; } + if (options->TestingTorNetwork && + routerset_contains_routerstatus(options->TestingDirAuthVoteGuard, + rs, 0)) { + rs->is_possible_guard = 1; + } rs->is_bad_directory = listbaddirs && node->is_bad_directory; rs->is_bad_exit = listbadexits && node->is_bad_exit; @@ -2754,7 +2760,7 @@ clear_status_flags_on_sybil(routerstatus_t *rs) * into a measured_bw_line_t output structure. Returns -1 on failure * or 0 on success. */ -int +STATIC int measured_bw_line_parse(measured_bw_line_t *out, const char *orig_line) { char *line = tor_strdup(orig_line); @@ -2835,7 +2841,7 @@ measured_bw_line_parse(measured_bw_line_t *out, const char *orig_line) * of bandwidth statuses. Returns true if a line is found, * false otherwise. */ -int +STATIC int measured_bw_line_apply(measured_bw_line_t *parsed_line, smartlist_t *routerstatuses) { @@ -3093,7 +3099,8 @@ dirserv_generate_networkstatus_vote_obj(crypto_pk_t *private_key, else last_consensus_interval = options->TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval; v3_out->valid_after = - dirvote_get_start_of_next_interval(now, (int)last_consensus_interval); + dirvote_get_start_of_next_interval(now, (int)last_consensus_interval, + options->TestingV3AuthVotingStartOffset); format_iso_time(tbuf, v3_out->valid_after); log_notice(LD_DIR,"Choosing valid-after time in vote as %s: " "consensus_set=%d, last_interval=%d", @@ -3167,7 +3174,7 @@ dirserv_generate_networkstatus_vote_obj(crypto_pk_t *private_key, /** For v2 authoritative directories only: Replace the contents of * <b>the_v2_networkstatus</b> with a newly generated network status * object. */ -cached_dir_t * +STATIC cached_dir_t * generate_v2_networkstatus_opinion(void) { cached_dir_t *r = NULL; diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.h b/src/or/dirserv.h index f9d36d760..7221fc995 100644 --- a/src/or/dirserv.h +++ b/src/or/dirserv.h @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ #ifndef TOR_DIRSERV_H #define TOR_DIRSERV_H +#include "testsupport.h" + /** What fraction (1 over this number) of the relay ID space do we * (as a directory authority) launch connections to at each reachability * test? */ @@ -119,20 +121,21 @@ cached_dir_t *new_cached_dir(char *s, time_t published); /* Put the MAX_MEASUREMENT_AGE #define here so unit tests can see it */ #define MAX_MEASUREMENT_AGE (3*24*60*60) /* 3 days */ -int measured_bw_line_parse(measured_bw_line_t *out, const char *line); +STATIC int measured_bw_line_parse(measured_bw_line_t *out, const char *line); -int measured_bw_line_apply(measured_bw_line_t *parsed_line, +STATIC int measured_bw_line_apply(measured_bw_line_t *parsed_line, smartlist_t *routerstatuses); -void dirserv_cache_measured_bw(const measured_bw_line_t *parsed_line, +STATIC void dirserv_cache_measured_bw(const measured_bw_line_t *parsed_line, time_t as_of); -void dirserv_clear_measured_bw_cache(void); -void dirserv_expire_measured_bw_cache(time_t now); -int dirserv_get_measured_bw_cache_size(void); -int dirserv_query_measured_bw_cache_kb(const char *node_id, long *bw_out, - time_t *as_of_out); -int dirserv_has_measured_bw(const char *node_id); -cached_dir_t *generate_v2_networkstatus_opinion(void); +STATIC void dirserv_clear_measured_bw_cache(void); +STATIC void dirserv_expire_measured_bw_cache(time_t now); +STATIC int dirserv_get_measured_bw_cache_size(void); +STATIC int dirserv_query_measured_bw_cache_kb(const char *node_id, + long *bw_out, + time_t *as_of_out); +STATIC int dirserv_has_measured_bw(const char *node_id); +STATIC cached_dir_t *generate_v2_networkstatus_opinion(void); #endif int dirserv_read_measured_bandwidths(const char *from_file, diff --git a/src/or/dirvote.c b/src/or/dirvote.c index e0af66e22..456a033ec 100644 --- a/src/or/dirvote.c +++ b/src/or/dirvote.c @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ static char *make_consensus_method_list(int low, int high, const char *sep); /** Return a new string containing the string representation of the vote in * <b>v3_ns</b>, signed with our v3 signing key <b>private_signing_key</b>. * For v3 authorities. */ -char * +STATIC char * format_networkstatus_vote(crypto_pk_t *private_signing_key, networkstatus_t *v3_ns) { @@ -587,7 +587,7 @@ compute_consensus_versions_list(smartlist_t *lst, int n_versioning) /** Helper: given a list of valid networkstatus_t, return a new string * containing the contents of the consensus network parameter set. */ -/* private */ char * +STATIC char * dirvote_compute_params(smartlist_t *votes, int method, int total_authorities) { int i; @@ -2533,12 +2533,13 @@ dirvote_get_preferred_voting_intervals(vote_timing_t *timing_out) timing_out->dist_delay = options->V3AuthDistDelay; } -/** Return the start of the next interval of size <b>interval</b> (in seconds) - * after <b>now</b>. Midnight always starts a fresh interval, and if the last - * interval of a day would be truncated to less than half its size, it is - * rolled into the previous interval. */ +/** Return the start of the next interval of size <b>interval</b> (in + * seconds) after <b>now</b>, plus <b>offset</b>. Midnight always + * starts a fresh interval, and if the last interval of a day would be + * truncated to less than half its size, it is rolled into the + * previous interval. */ time_t -dirvote_get_start_of_next_interval(time_t now, int interval) +dirvote_get_start_of_next_interval(time_t now, int interval, int offset) { struct tm tm; time_t midnight_today=0; @@ -2566,6 +2567,10 @@ dirvote_get_start_of_next_interval(time_t now, int interval) if (next + interval/2 > midnight_tomorrow) next = midnight_tomorrow; + next += offset; + if (next - interval > now) + next -= interval; + return next; } @@ -2629,8 +2634,10 @@ dirvote_recalculate_timing(const or_options_t *options, time_t now) vote_delay = dist_delay = interval / 4; start = voting_schedule.interval_starts = - dirvote_get_start_of_next_interval(now,interval); - end = dirvote_get_start_of_next_interval(start+1, interval); + dirvote_get_start_of_next_interval(now,interval, + options->TestingV3AuthVotingStartOffset); + end = dirvote_get_start_of_next_interval(start+1, interval, + options->TestingV3AuthVotingStartOffset); tor_assert(end > start); @@ -3136,7 +3143,7 @@ dirvote_compute_consensuses(void) }); votefile = get_datadir_fname("v3-status-votes"); - write_chunks_to_file(votefile, votestrings, 0); + write_chunks_to_file(votefile, votestrings, 0, 0); tor_free(votefile); SMARTLIST_FOREACH(votestrings, sized_chunk_t *, c, tor_free(c)); smartlist_free(votestrings); diff --git a/src/or/dirvote.h b/src/or/dirvote.h index b23645212..3a4951a95 100644 --- a/src/or/dirvote.h +++ b/src/or/dirvote.h @@ -12,10 +12,12 @@ #ifndef TOR_DIRVOTE_H #define TOR_DIRVOTE_H +#include "testsupport.h" + /** Lowest allowable value for VoteSeconds. */ -#define MIN_VOTE_SECONDS 20 +#define MIN_VOTE_SECONDS 2 /** Lowest allowable value for DistSeconds. */ -#define MIN_DIST_SECONDS 20 +#define MIN_DIST_SECONDS 2 /** Smallest allowable voting interval. */ #define MIN_VOTE_INTERVAL 300 @@ -86,7 +88,9 @@ authority_cert_t *authority_cert_dup(authority_cert_t *cert); /* vote scheduling */ void dirvote_get_preferred_voting_intervals(vote_timing_t *timing_out); -time_t dirvote_get_start_of_next_interval(time_t now, int interval); +time_t dirvote_get_start_of_next_interval(time_t now, + int interval, + int offset); void dirvote_recalculate_timing(const or_options_t *options, time_t now); void dirvote_act(const or_options_t *options, time_t now); @@ -134,9 +138,9 @@ document_signature_t *voter_get_sig_by_algorithm( digest_algorithm_t alg); #ifdef DIRVOTE_PRIVATE -char *format_networkstatus_vote(crypto_pk_t *private_key, +STATIC char *format_networkstatus_vote(crypto_pk_t *private_key, networkstatus_t *v3_ns); -char *dirvote_compute_params(smartlist_t *votes, int method, +STATIC char *dirvote_compute_params(smartlist_t *votes, int method, int total_authorities); #endif diff --git a/src/or/dns.c b/src/or/dns.c index f2b7eecc3..a1fe0de1d 100644 --- a/src/or/dns.c +++ b/src/or/dns.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include "relay.h" #include "router.h" #include "ht.h" +#include "../common/sandbox.h" #ifdef HAVE_EVENT2_DNS_H #include <event2/event.h> #include <event2/dns.h> @@ -1443,13 +1444,14 @@ configure_nameservers(int force) const or_options_t *options; const char *conf_fname; struct stat st; - int r; + int r, flags; options = get_options(); conf_fname = options->ServerDNSResolvConfFile; #ifndef _WIN32 if (!conf_fname) conf_fname = "/etc/resolv.conf"; #endif + flags = DNS_OPTIONS_ALL; if (!the_evdns_base) { if (!(the_evdns_base = evdns_base_new(tor_libevent_get_base(), 0))) { @@ -1477,7 +1479,7 @@ configure_nameservers(int force) evdns_set_log_fn(evdns_log_cb); if (conf_fname) { - if (stat(conf_fname, &st)) { + if (stat(sandbox_intern_string(conf_fname), &st)) { log_warn(LD_EXIT, "Unable to stat resolver configuration in '%s': %s", conf_fname, strerror(errno)); goto err; @@ -1491,9 +1493,16 @@ configure_nameservers(int force) evdns_base_search_clear(the_evdns_base); evdns_base_clear_nameservers_and_suspend(the_evdns_base); } +#if defined(DNS_OPTION_HOSTSFILE) && defined(USE_LIBSECCOMP) + if (flags & DNS_OPTION_HOSTSFILE) { + flags ^= DNS_OPTION_HOSTSFILE; + evdns_base_load_hosts(the_evdns_base, + sandbox_intern_string("/etc/hosts")); + } +#endif log_info(LD_EXIT, "Parsing resolver configuration in '%s'", conf_fname); - if ((r = evdns_base_resolv_conf_parse(the_evdns_base, - DNS_OPTIONS_ALL, conf_fname))) { + if ((r = evdns_base_resolv_conf_parse(the_evdns_base, flags, + sandbox_intern_string(conf_fname)))) { log_warn(LD_EXIT, "Unable to parse '%s', or no nameservers in '%s' (%d)", conf_fname, conf_fname, r); goto err; diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c index 2aa063cda..ebbd85c78 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ **/ #include "or.h" +#include "circpathbias.h" #include "circuitbuild.h" #include "circuitstats.h" #include "config.h" @@ -54,6 +55,10 @@ typedef struct { /** When should we next try to fetch a descriptor for this bridge? */ download_status_t fetch_status; + + /** A smartlist of k=v values to be passed to the SOCKS proxy, if + transports are used for this bridge. */ + smartlist_t *socks_args; } bridge_info_t; /** A list of our chosen entry guards. */ @@ -359,7 +364,7 @@ add_an_entry_guard(const node_t *chosen, int reset_status, int prepend, entry->can_retry = 1; } entry->is_dir_cache = node->rs && - node->rs->version_supports_microdesc_cache; + node->rs->version_supports_microdesc_cache; if (get_options()->UseBridges && node_is_a_configured_bridge(node)) entry->is_dir_cache = 1; return NULL; @@ -392,8 +397,8 @@ add_an_entry_guard(const node_t *chosen, int reset_status, int prepend, node_describe(node)); strlcpy(entry->nickname, node_get_nickname(node), sizeof(entry->nickname)); memcpy(entry->identity, node->identity, DIGEST_LEN); - entry->is_dir_cache = node_is_dir(node) && - node->rs && node->rs->version_supports_microdesc_cache; + entry->is_dir_cache = node_is_dir(node) && node->rs && + node->rs->version_supports_microdesc_cache; if (get_options()->UseBridges && node_is_a_configured_bridge(node)) entry->is_dir_cache = 1; @@ -594,6 +599,25 @@ remove_dead_entry_guards(time_t now) return changed ? 1 : 0; } +/** Remove all currently listed entry guards. So new ones will be chosen. */ +void +remove_all_entry_guards(void) +{ + char dbuf[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1]; + + while (smartlist_len(entry_guards)) { + entry_guard_t *entry = smartlist_get(entry_guards, 0); + base16_encode(dbuf, sizeof(dbuf), entry->identity, DIGEST_LEN); + log_info(LD_CIRC, "Entry guard '%s' (%s) has been dropped.", + entry->nickname, dbuf); + control_event_guard(entry->nickname, entry->identity, "DROPPED"); + entry_guard_free(entry); + smartlist_del(entry_guards, 0); + } + log_entry_guards(LOG_INFO); + entry_guards_changed(); +} + /** A new directory or router-status has arrived; update the down/listed * status of the entry guards. * @@ -1595,6 +1619,11 @@ bridge_free(bridge_info_t *bridge) return; tor_free(bridge->transport_name); + if (bridge->socks_args) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(bridge->socks_args, char*, s, tor_free(s)); + smartlist_free(bridge->socks_args); + } + tor_free(bridge); } @@ -1773,30 +1802,68 @@ bridge_resolve_conflicts(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(bridge); } -/** Remember a new bridge at <b>addr</b>:<b>port</b>. If <b>digest</b> - * is set, it tells us the identity key too. If we already had the - * bridge in our list, unmark it, and don't actually add anything new. - * If <b>transport_name</b> is non-NULL - the bridge is associated with a - * pluggable transport - we assign the transport to the bridge. */ +/** Return True if we have a bridge that uses a transport with name + * <b>transport_name</b>. */ +int +transport_is_needed(const char *transport_name) +{ + if (!bridge_list) + return 0; + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridge_list, const bridge_info_t *, bridge) { + if (bridge->transport_name && + !strcmp(bridge->transport_name, transport_name)) + return 1; + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(bridge); + + return 0; +} + +/** Register the bridge information in <b>bridge_line</b> to the + * bridge subsystem. Steals reference of <b>bridge_line</b>. */ void -bridge_add_from_config(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, - const char *digest, const char *transport_name) +bridge_add_from_config(bridge_line_t *bridge_line) { bridge_info_t *b; - bridge_resolve_conflicts(addr, port, digest, transport_name); + { /* Log the bridge we are about to register: */ + log_debug(LD_GENERAL, "Registering bridge at %s (transport: %s) (%s)", + fmt_addrport(&bridge_line->addr, bridge_line->port), + bridge_line->transport_name ? + bridge_line->transport_name : "no transport", + tor_digest_is_zero(bridge_line->digest) ? + "no key listed" : hex_str(bridge_line->digest, DIGEST_LEN)); + + if (bridge_line->socks_args) { /* print socks arguments */ + int i = 0; + + tor_assert(smartlist_len(bridge_line->socks_args) > 0); + + log_debug(LD_GENERAL, "Bridge uses %d SOCKS arguments:", + smartlist_len(bridge_line->socks_args)); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(bridge_line->socks_args, const char *, arg, + log_debug(LD_CONFIG, "%d: %s", ++i, arg)); + } + } + + bridge_resolve_conflicts(&bridge_line->addr, + bridge_line->port, + bridge_line->digest, + bridge_line->transport_name); b = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(bridge_info_t)); - tor_addr_copy(&b->addr, addr); - b->port = port; - if (digest) - memcpy(b->identity, digest, DIGEST_LEN); - if (transport_name) - b->transport_name = tor_strdup(transport_name); + tor_addr_copy(&b->addr, &bridge_line->addr); + b->port = bridge_line->port; + memcpy(b->identity, bridge_line->digest, DIGEST_LEN); + if (bridge_line->transport_name) + b->transport_name = bridge_line->transport_name; b->fetch_status.schedule = DL_SCHED_BRIDGE; + b->socks_args = bridge_line->socks_args; if (!bridge_list) bridge_list = smartlist_new(); + tor_free(bridge_line); /* Deallocate bridge_line now. */ + smartlist_add(bridge_list, b); } @@ -1857,7 +1924,7 @@ find_transport_name_by_bridge_addrport(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port) * transport, but the transport could not be found. */ int -find_transport_by_bridge_addrport(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, +get_transport_by_bridge_addrport(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, const transport_t **transport) { *transport = NULL; @@ -1884,6 +1951,17 @@ find_transport_by_bridge_addrport(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, return 0; } +/** Return a smartlist containing all the SOCKS arguments that we + * should pass to the SOCKS proxy. */ +const smartlist_t * +get_socks_args_by_bridge_addrport(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port) +{ + bridge_info_t *bridge = get_configured_bridge_by_addr_port_digest(addr, + port, + NULL); + return bridge ? bridge->socks_args : NULL; +} + /** We need to ask <b>bridge</b> for its server descriptor. */ static void launch_direct_bridge_descriptor_fetch(bridge_info_t *bridge) @@ -2250,6 +2328,6 @@ entry_guards_free_all(void) clear_bridge_list(); smartlist_free(bridge_list); bridge_list = NULL; - circuit_build_times_free_timeouts(&circ_times); + circuit_build_times_free_timeouts(get_circuit_build_times_mutable()); } diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.h b/src/or/entrynodes.h index 52b8dc00e..772c6662d 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.h +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.h @@ -77,6 +77,8 @@ int num_live_entry_guards(int for_directory); #endif +void remove_all_entry_guards(void); + void entry_guards_compute_status(const or_options_t *options, time_t now); int entry_guard_register_connect_status(const char *digest, int succeeded, int mark_relay_status, time_t now); @@ -97,9 +99,8 @@ int routerinfo_is_a_configured_bridge(const routerinfo_t *ri); int node_is_a_configured_bridge(const node_t *node); void learned_router_identity(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, const char *digest); -void bridge_add_from_config(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, - const char *digest, - const char *transport_name); +struct bridge_line_t; +void bridge_add_from_config(struct bridge_line_t *bridge_line); void retry_bridge_descriptor_fetch_directly(const char *digest); void fetch_bridge_descriptors(const or_options_t *options, time_t now); void learned_bridge_descriptor(routerinfo_t *ri, int from_cache); @@ -109,15 +110,20 @@ int entries_known_but_down(const or_options_t *options); void entries_retry_all(const or_options_t *options); int any_bridge_supports_microdescriptors(void); +const smartlist_t *get_socks_args_by_bridge_addrport(const tor_addr_t *addr, + uint16_t port); + +int any_bridges_dont_support_microdescriptors(void); void entry_guards_free_all(void); const char *find_transport_name_by_bridge_addrport(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port); struct transport_t; -int find_transport_by_bridge_addrport(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, +int get_transport_by_bridge_addrport(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, const struct transport_t **transport); +int transport_is_needed(const char *transport_name); int validate_pluggable_transports_config(void); double pathbias_get_close_success_count(entry_guard_t *guard); diff --git a/src/or/ext_orport.c b/src/or/ext_orport.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d5a0fa1ee --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/ext_orport.c @@ -0,0 +1,648 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2012, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file ext_orport.c + * \brief Code implementing the Extended ORPort. +*/ + +#define EXT_ORPORT_PRIVATE +#include "or.h" +#include "connection.h" +#include "connection_or.h" +#include "ext_orport.h" +#include "control.h" +#include "config.h" +#include "util.h" +#include "main.h" + +/** Allocate and return a structure capable of holding an Extended + * ORPort message of body length <b>len</b>. */ +ext_or_cmd_t * +ext_or_cmd_new(uint16_t len) +{ + size_t size = STRUCT_OFFSET(ext_or_cmd_t, body) + len; + ext_or_cmd_t *cmd = tor_malloc(size); + cmd->len = len; + return cmd; +} + +/** Deallocate the Extended ORPort message in <b>cmd</b>. */ +void +ext_or_cmd_free(ext_or_cmd_t *cmd) +{ + tor_free(cmd); +} + +/** Get an Extended ORPort message from <b>conn</b>, and place it in + * <b>out</b>. Return -1 on fail, 0 if we need more data, and 1 if we + * successfully extracted an Extended ORPort command from the + * buffer. */ +static int +connection_fetch_ext_or_cmd_from_buf(connection_t *conn, ext_or_cmd_t **out) +{ + IF_HAS_BUFFEREVENT(conn, { + struct evbuffer *input = bufferevent_get_input(conn->bufev); + return fetch_ext_or_command_from_evbuffer(input, out); + }) ELSE_IF_NO_BUFFEREVENT { + return fetch_ext_or_command_from_buf(conn->inbuf, out); + } +} + +/** Write an Extended ORPort message to <b>conn</b>. Use + * <b>command</b> as the command type, <b>bodylen</b> as the body + * length, and <b>body</b>, if it's present, as the body of the + * message. */ +STATIC int +connection_write_ext_or_command(connection_t *conn, + uint16_t command, + const char *body, + size_t bodylen) +{ + char header[4]; + if (bodylen > UINT16_MAX) + return -1; + set_uint16(header, htons(command)); + set_uint16(header+2, htons(bodylen)); + connection_write_to_buf(header, 4, conn); + if (bodylen) { + tor_assert(body); + connection_write_to_buf(body, bodylen, conn); + } + return 0; +} + +/** Transition from an Extended ORPort which accepts Extended ORPort + * messages, to an Extended ORport which accepts OR traffic. */ +static void +connection_ext_or_transition(or_connection_t *conn) +{ + tor_assert(conn->base_.type == CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR); + + conn->base_.type = CONN_TYPE_OR; + TO_CONN(conn)->state = 0; // set the state to a neutral value + control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_NEW, 0); + connection_tls_start_handshake(conn, 1); +} + +/** Length of authentication cookie. */ +#define EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_COOKIE_LEN 32 +/** Length of the header of the cookie file. */ +#define EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_COOKIE_HEADER_LEN 32 +/** Static cookie file header. */ +#define EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_COOKIE_HEADER "! Extended ORPort Auth Cookie !\x0a" +/** Length of safe-cookie protocol hashes. */ +#define EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_HASH_LEN DIGEST256_LEN +/** Length of safe-cookie protocol nonces. */ +#define EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_NONCE_LEN 32 +/** Safe-cookie protocol constants. */ +#define EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_SERVER_TO_CLIENT_CONST \ + "ExtORPort authentication server-to-client hash" +#define EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER_CONST \ + "ExtORPort authentication client-to-server hash" + +/* Code to indicate cookie authentication */ +#define EXT_OR_AUTHTYPE_SAFECOOKIE 0x01 + +/** If true, we've set ext_or_auth_cookie to a secret code and stored + * it to disk. */ +STATIC int ext_or_auth_cookie_is_set = 0; +/** If ext_or_auth_cookie_is_set, a secret cookie that we've stored to disk + * and which we're using to authenticate controllers. (If the controller can + * read it off disk, it has permission to connect.) */ +STATIC uint8_t *ext_or_auth_cookie = NULL; + +/** Helper: Return a newly allocated string containing a path to the + * file where we store our authentication cookie. */ +char * +get_ext_or_auth_cookie_file_name(void) +{ + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + if (options->ExtORPortCookieAuthFile && + strlen(options->ExtORPortCookieAuthFile)) { + return tor_strdup(options->ExtORPortCookieAuthFile); + } else { + return get_datadir_fname("extended_orport_auth_cookie"); + } +} + +/* Initialize the cookie-based authentication system of the + * Extended ORPort. If <b>is_enabled</b> is 0, then disable the cookie + * authentication system. */ +int +init_ext_or_cookie_authentication(int is_enabled) +{ + char *fname = NULL; + int retval; + + if (!is_enabled) { + ext_or_auth_cookie_is_set = 0; + return 0; + } + + fname = get_ext_or_auth_cookie_file_name(); + retval = init_cookie_authentication(fname, EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_COOKIE_HEADER, + EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_COOKIE_HEADER_LEN, + &ext_or_auth_cookie, + &ext_or_auth_cookie_is_set); + tor_free(fname); + return retval; +} + +/** Read data from <b>conn</b> and see if the client sent us the + * authentication type that she prefers to use in this session. + * + * Return -1 if we received corrupted data or if we don't support the + * authentication type. Return 0 if we need more data in + * <b>conn</b>. Return 1 if the authentication type negotiation was + * successful. */ +static int +connection_ext_or_auth_neg_auth_type(connection_t *conn) +{ + char authtype[1] = {0}; + + if (connection_get_inbuf_len(conn) < 1) + return 0; + + if (connection_fetch_from_buf(authtype, 1, conn) < 0) + return -1; + + log_debug(LD_GENERAL, "Client wants us to use %d auth type", authtype[0]); + if (authtype[0] != EXT_OR_AUTHTYPE_SAFECOOKIE) { + /* '1' is the only auth type supported atm */ + return -1; + } + + conn->state = EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_AUTH_WAIT_CLIENT_NONCE; + return 1; +} + +/** DOCDOC */ +STATIC int +handle_client_auth_nonce(const char *client_nonce, size_t client_nonce_len, + char **client_hash_out, + char **reply_out, size_t *reply_len_out) +{ + char server_hash[EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_HASH_LEN] = {0}; + char server_nonce[EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_NONCE_LEN] = {0}; + char *reply; + size_t reply_len; + + if (client_nonce_len != EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_NONCE_LEN) + return -1; + + /* Get our nonce */ + if (crypto_rand(server_nonce, EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_NONCE_LEN) < 0) + return -1; + + { /* set up macs */ + size_t hmac_s_msg_len = strlen(EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_SERVER_TO_CLIENT_CONST) + + 2*EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_NONCE_LEN; + size_t hmac_c_msg_len = strlen(EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER_CONST) + + 2*EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_NONCE_LEN; + + char *hmac_s_msg = tor_malloc_zero(hmac_s_msg_len); + char *hmac_c_msg = tor_malloc_zero(hmac_c_msg_len); + char *correct_client_hash = tor_malloc_zero(EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_HASH_LEN); + + memcpy(hmac_s_msg, + EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_SERVER_TO_CLIENT_CONST, + strlen(EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_SERVER_TO_CLIENT_CONST)); + memcpy(hmac_s_msg + strlen(EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_SERVER_TO_CLIENT_CONST), + client_nonce, EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_NONCE_LEN); + memcpy(hmac_s_msg + strlen(EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_SERVER_TO_CLIENT_CONST) + + EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_NONCE_LEN, + server_nonce, EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_NONCE_LEN); + + memcpy(hmac_c_msg, + EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER_CONST, + strlen(EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER_CONST)); + memcpy(hmac_c_msg + strlen(EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER_CONST), + client_nonce, EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_NONCE_LEN); + memcpy(hmac_c_msg + strlen(EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER_CONST) + + EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_NONCE_LEN, + server_nonce, EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_NONCE_LEN); + + crypto_hmac_sha256(server_hash, + (char*)ext_or_auth_cookie, + EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_COOKIE_LEN, + hmac_s_msg, + hmac_s_msg_len); + + crypto_hmac_sha256(correct_client_hash, + (char*)ext_or_auth_cookie, + EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_COOKIE_LEN, + hmac_c_msg, + hmac_c_msg_len); + + /* Store the client hash we generated. We will need to compare it + with the hash sent by the client. */ + *client_hash_out = correct_client_hash; + + memwipe(hmac_s_msg, 0, hmac_s_msg_len); + memwipe(hmac_c_msg, 0, hmac_c_msg_len); + + tor_free(hmac_s_msg); + tor_free(hmac_c_msg); + } + + { /* debug logging */ /* XXX disable this codepath if not logging on debug?*/ + char server_hash_encoded[(2*EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_HASH_LEN) + 1]; + char server_nonce_encoded[(2*EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_NONCE_LEN) + 1]; + char client_nonce_encoded[(2*EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_NONCE_LEN) + 1]; + + base16_encode(server_hash_encoded, sizeof(server_hash_encoded), + server_hash, sizeof(server_hash)); + base16_encode(server_nonce_encoded, sizeof(server_nonce_encoded), + server_nonce, sizeof(server_nonce)); + base16_encode(client_nonce_encoded, sizeof(client_nonce_encoded), + client_nonce, sizeof(client_nonce)); + + log_debug(LD_GENERAL, + "server_hash: '%s'\nserver_nonce: '%s'\nclient_nonce: '%s'", + server_hash_encoded, server_nonce_encoded, client_nonce_encoded); + + memwipe(server_hash_encoded, 0, sizeof(server_hash_encoded)); + memwipe(server_nonce_encoded, 0, sizeof(server_nonce_encoded)); + memwipe(client_nonce_encoded, 0, sizeof(client_nonce_encoded)); + } + + { /* write reply: (server_hash, server_nonce) */ + + reply_len = EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_COOKIE_LEN+EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_NONCE_LEN; + reply = tor_malloc_zero(reply_len); + memcpy(reply, server_hash, EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_HASH_LEN); + memcpy(reply + EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_HASH_LEN, server_nonce, + EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_NONCE_LEN); + } + + *reply_out = reply; + *reply_len_out = reply_len; + + return 0; +} + +/** Read the client's nonce out of <b>conn</b>, setup the safe-cookie + * crypto, and then send our own hash and nonce to the client + * + * Return -1 if there was an error; return 0 if we need more data in + * <b>conn</b>, and return 1 if we successfully retrieved the + * client's nonce and sent our own. */ +static int +connection_ext_or_auth_handle_client_nonce(connection_t *conn) +{ + char client_nonce[EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_NONCE_LEN]; + char *reply=NULL; + size_t reply_len=0; + + if (!ext_or_auth_cookie_is_set) { /* this should not happen */ + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Extended ORPort authentication cookie was not set. " + "That's weird since we should have done that on startup. " + "This might be a Tor bug, please file a bug report. "); + return -1; + } + + if (connection_get_inbuf_len(conn) < EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_NONCE_LEN) + return 0; + + if (connection_fetch_from_buf(client_nonce, + EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_NONCE_LEN, conn) < 0) + return -1; + + /* We extract the ClientNonce from the received data, and use it to + calculate ServerHash and ServerNonce according to proposal 217. + + We also calculate our own ClientHash value and save it in the + connection state. We validate it later against the ClientHash + sent by the client. */ + if (handle_client_auth_nonce(client_nonce, sizeof(client_nonce), + &TO_OR_CONN(conn)->ext_or_auth_correct_client_hash, + &reply, &reply_len) < 0) + return -1; + + connection_write_to_buf(reply, reply_len, conn); + + memwipe(reply, 0, reply_len); + tor_free(reply); + + log_debug(LD_GENERAL, "Got client nonce, and sent our own nonce and hash."); + + conn->state = EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_AUTH_WAIT_CLIENT_HASH; + return 1; +} + +#define connection_ext_or_auth_send_result_success(c) \ + connection_ext_or_auth_send_result(c, 1) +#define connection_ext_or_auth_send_result_fail(c) \ + connection_ext_or_auth_send_result(c, 0) + +/** Send authentication results to <b>conn</b>. Successful results if + * <b>success</b> is set; failure results otherwise. */ +static void +connection_ext_or_auth_send_result(connection_t *conn, int success) +{ + if (success) + connection_write_to_buf("\x01", 1, conn); + else + connection_write_to_buf("\x00", 1, conn); +} + +/** Receive the client's hash from <b>conn</b>, validate that it's + * correct, and then send the authentication results to the client. + * + * Return -1 if there was an error during validation; return 0 if we + * need more data in <b>conn</b>, and return 1 if we successfully + * validated the client's hash and sent a happy authentication + * result. */ +static int +connection_ext_or_auth_handle_client_hash(connection_t *conn) +{ + char provided_client_hash[EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_HASH_LEN] = {0}; + + if (connection_get_inbuf_len(conn) < EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_HASH_LEN) + return 0; + + if (connection_fetch_from_buf(provided_client_hash, + EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_HASH_LEN, conn) < 0) + return -1; + + if (tor_memneq(TO_OR_CONN(conn)->ext_or_auth_correct_client_hash, + provided_client_hash, EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_HASH_LEN)) { + log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Incorrect client hash. Authentication failed."); + connection_ext_or_auth_send_result_fail(conn); + return -1; + } + + log_debug(LD_GENERAL, "Got client's hash and it was legit."); + + /* send positive auth result */ + connection_ext_or_auth_send_result_success(conn); + conn->state = EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN; + return 1; +} + +/** Handle data from <b>or_conn</b> received on Extended ORPort. + * Return -1 on error. 0 on unsufficient data. 1 on correct. */ +static int +connection_ext_or_auth_process_inbuf(or_connection_t *or_conn) +{ + connection_t *conn = TO_CONN(or_conn); + + /* State transitions of the Extended ORPort authentication protocol: + + EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_AUTH_WAIT_AUTH_TYPE (start state) -> + EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_AUTH_WAIT_CLIENT_NONCE -> + EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_AUTH_WAIT_CLIENT_HASH -> + EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN + + During EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN, data is handled by + connection_ext_or_process_inbuf(). + */ + + switch (conn->state) { /* Functionify */ + case EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_AUTH_WAIT_AUTH_TYPE: + return connection_ext_or_auth_neg_auth_type(conn); + + case EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_AUTH_WAIT_CLIENT_NONCE: + return connection_ext_or_auth_handle_client_nonce(conn); + + case EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_AUTH_WAIT_CLIENT_HASH: + return connection_ext_or_auth_handle_client_hash(conn); + + default: + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Encountered unexpected connection state %d while trying " + "to process Extended ORPort authentication data.", conn->state); + return -1; + } +} + +/** Extended ORPort commands (Transport-to-Bridge) */ +#define EXT_OR_CMD_TB_DONE 0x0000 +#define EXT_OR_CMD_TB_USERADDR 0x0001 +#define EXT_OR_CMD_TB_TRANSPORT 0x0002 + +/** Extended ORPort commands (Bridge-to-Transport) */ +#define EXT_OR_CMD_BT_OKAY 0x1000 +#define EXT_OR_CMD_BT_DENY 0x1001 +#define EXT_OR_CMD_BT_CONTROL 0x1002 + +/** Process a USERADDR command from the Extended + * ORPort. <b>payload</b> is a payload of size <b>len</b>. + * + * If the USERADDR command was well formed, change the address of + * <b>conn</b> to the address on the USERADDR command. + * + * Return 0 on success and -1 on error. */ +static int +connection_ext_or_handle_cmd_useraddr(connection_t *conn, + const char *payload, uint16_t len) +{ + /* Copy address string. */ + tor_addr_t addr; + uint16_t port; + char *addr_str; + char *address_part=NULL; + int res; + if (memchr(payload, '\0', len)) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_NET, "Unexpected NUL in ExtORPort UserAddr"); + return -1; + } + + addr_str = tor_memdup_nulterm(payload, len); + + res = tor_addr_port_split(LOG_INFO, addr_str, &address_part, &port); + tor_free(addr_str); + if (res<0) + return -1; + + res = tor_addr_parse(&addr, address_part); + tor_free(address_part); + if (res<0) + return -1; + + { /* do some logging */ + char *old_address = tor_dup_addr(&conn->addr); + char *new_address = tor_dup_addr(&addr); + + log_debug(LD_NET, "Received USERADDR." + "We rewrite our address from '%s:%u' to '%s:%u'.", + safe_str(old_address), conn->port, safe_str(new_address), port); + + tor_free(old_address); + tor_free(new_address); + } + + /* record the address */ + tor_addr_copy(&conn->addr, &addr); + conn->port = port; + if (conn->address) { + tor_free(conn->address); + } + conn->address = tor_dup_addr(&addr); + + return 0; +} + +/** Process a TRANSPORT command from the Extended + * ORPort. <b>payload</b> is a payload of size <b>len</b>. + * + * If the TRANSPORT command was well formed, register the name of the + * transport on <b>conn</b>. + * + * Return 0 on success and -1 on error. */ +static int +connection_ext_or_handle_cmd_transport(or_connection_t *conn, + const char *payload, uint16_t len) +{ + char *transport_str; + if (memchr(payload, '\0', len)) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_NET, "Unexpected NUL in ExtORPort Transport"); + return -1; + } + + transport_str = tor_memdup_nulterm(payload, len); + + /* Transport names MUST be C-identifiers. */ + if (!string_is_C_identifier(transport_str)) { + tor_free(transport_str); + return -1; + } + + /* If ext_or_transport is already occupied (because the PT sent two + * TRANSPORT commands), deallocate the old name and keep the new + * one */ + if (conn->ext_or_transport) + tor_free(conn->ext_or_transport); + + conn->ext_or_transport = transport_str; + return 0; +} + +#define EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_IS_AUTHENTICATING(st) \ + ((st) <= EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_AUTH_MAX) + +/** Process Extended ORPort messages from <b>or_conn</b>. */ +int +connection_ext_or_process_inbuf(or_connection_t *or_conn) +{ + connection_t *conn = TO_CONN(or_conn); + ext_or_cmd_t *command; + int r; + + /* DOCDOC Document the state machine and transitions in this function */ + + /* If we are still in the authentication stage, process traffic as + authentication data: */ + while (EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_IS_AUTHENTICATING(conn->state)) { + log_debug(LD_GENERAL, "Got Extended ORPort authentication data (%u).", + (unsigned int) connection_get_inbuf_len(conn)); + r = connection_ext_or_auth_process_inbuf(or_conn); + if (r < 0) { + connection_mark_for_close(conn); + return -1; + } else if (r == 0) { + return 0; + } + /* if r > 0, loop and process more data (if any). */ + } + + while (1) { + log_debug(LD_GENERAL, "Got Extended ORPort data."); + command = NULL; + r = connection_fetch_ext_or_cmd_from_buf(conn, &command); + if (r < 0) + goto err; + else if (r == 0) + return 0; /* need to wait for more data */ + + /* Got a command! */ + tor_assert(command); + + if (command->cmd == EXT_OR_CMD_TB_DONE) { + if (connection_get_inbuf_len(conn)) { + /* The inbuf isn't empty; the client is misbehaving. */ + goto err; + } + + log_debug(LD_NET, "Received DONE."); + + /* If the transport proxy did not use the TRANSPORT command to + * specify the transport name, mark this as unknown transport. */ + if (!or_conn->ext_or_transport) { + /* We write this string this way to avoid ??>, which is a C + * trigraph. */ + or_conn->ext_or_transport = tor_strdup("<?" "?>"); + } + + connection_write_ext_or_command(conn, EXT_OR_CMD_BT_OKAY, NULL, 0); + + /* can't transition immediately; need to flush first. */ + conn->state = EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_FLUSHING; + connection_stop_reading(conn); + } else if (command->cmd == EXT_OR_CMD_TB_USERADDR) { + if (connection_ext_or_handle_cmd_useraddr(conn, + command->body, command->len) < 0) + goto err; + } else if (command->cmd == EXT_OR_CMD_TB_TRANSPORT) { + if (connection_ext_or_handle_cmd_transport(or_conn, + command->body, command->len) < 0) + goto err; + } else { + log_notice(LD_NET,"Got Extended ORPort command we don't regognize (%u).", + command->cmd); + } + + ext_or_cmd_free(command); + } + + return 0; + + err: + ext_or_cmd_free(command); + connection_mark_for_close(conn); + return -1; +} + +/** <b>conn</b> finished flushing Extended ORPort messages to the + * network, and is now ready to accept OR traffic. This function + * does the transition. */ +int +connection_ext_or_finished_flushing(or_connection_t *conn) +{ + if (conn->base_.state == EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_FLUSHING) { + connection_start_reading(TO_CONN(conn)); + connection_ext_or_transition(conn); + } + return 0; +} + +/** Initiate Extended ORPort authentication, by sending the list of + * supported authentication types to the client. */ +int +connection_ext_or_start_auth(or_connection_t *or_conn) +{ + connection_t *conn = TO_CONN(or_conn); + const uint8_t authtypes[] = { + /* We only support authtype '1' for now. */ + EXT_OR_AUTHTYPE_SAFECOOKIE, + /* Marks the end of the list. */ + 0 + }; + + log_debug(LD_GENERAL, + "ExtORPort authentication: Sending supported authentication types"); + + connection_write_to_buf((const char *)authtypes, sizeof(authtypes), conn); + conn->state = EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_AUTH_WAIT_AUTH_TYPE; + + return 0; +} + +/** Free any leftover allocated memory of the ext_orport.c subsystem. */ +void +ext_orport_free_all(void) +{ + if (ext_or_auth_cookie) /* Free the auth cookie */ + tor_free(ext_or_auth_cookie); +} + diff --git a/src/or/ext_orport.h b/src/or/ext_orport.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ce45e5f41 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/ext_orport.h @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2013, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#ifndef EXT_ORPORT_H +#define EXT_ORPORT_H + +int connection_ext_or_start_auth(or_connection_t *or_conn); + +ext_or_cmd_t *ext_or_cmd_new(uint16_t len); +void ext_or_cmd_free(ext_or_cmd_t *cmd); +void connection_or_set_ext_or_identifier(or_connection_t *conn); +void connection_or_remove_from_ext_or_id_map(or_connection_t *conn); +void connection_or_clear_ext_or_id_map(void); +or_connection_t *connection_or_get_by_ext_or_id(const char *id); + +int connection_ext_or_finished_flushing(or_connection_t *conn); +int connection_ext_or_process_inbuf(or_connection_t *or_conn); + +int init_ext_or_cookie_authentication(int is_enabled); +char *get_ext_or_auth_cookie_file_name(void); +void ext_orport_free_all(void); + +#ifdef EXT_ORPORT_PRIVATE +STATIC int connection_write_ext_or_command(connection_t *conn, + uint16_t command, + const char *body, + size_t bodylen); +STATIC int handle_client_auth_nonce(const char *client_nonce, + size_t client_nonce_len, + char **client_hash_out, + char **reply_out, size_t *reply_len_out); +#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS +extern uint8_t *ext_or_auth_cookie; +extern int ext_or_auth_cookie_is_set; +#endif +#endif + +#endif + diff --git a/src/or/geoip.c b/src/or/geoip.c index e2e98e8ec..dc4730c81 100644 --- a/src/or/geoip.c +++ b/src/or/geoip.c @@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ geoip_add_entry(const tor_addr_t *low, const tor_addr_t *high, /** Add an entry to the GeoIP table indicated by <b>family</b>, * parsing it from <b>line</b>. The format is as for geoip_load_file(). */ -/*private*/ int +STATIC int geoip_parse_entry(const char *line, sa_family_t family) { tor_addr_t low_addr, high_addr; @@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ geoip_load_file(sa_family_t family, const char *filename) * be less than geoip_get_n_countries(). To decode it, call * geoip_get_country_name(). */ -int +STATIC int geoip_get_country_by_ipv4(uint32_t ipaddr) { geoip_ipv4_entry_t *ent; @@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ geoip_get_country_by_ipv4(uint32_t ipaddr) * 0 for the 'unknown country'. The return value will always be less than * geoip_get_n_countries(). To decode it, call geoip_get_country_name(). */ -int +STATIC int geoip_get_country_by_ipv6(const struct in6_addr *addr) { geoip_ipv6_entry_t *ent; @@ -461,6 +461,10 @@ geoip_db_digest(sa_family_t family) typedef struct clientmap_entry_t { HT_ENTRY(clientmap_entry_t) node; tor_addr_t addr; + /* Name of pluggable transport used by this client. NULL if no + pluggable transport was used. */ + char *transport_name; + /** Time when we last saw this IP address, in MINUTES since the epoch. * * (This will run out of space around 4011 CE. If Tor is still in use around @@ -482,12 +486,18 @@ static HT_HEAD(clientmap, clientmap_entry_t) client_history = static INLINE unsigned clientmap_entry_hash(const clientmap_entry_t *a) { - return ht_improve_hash(tor_addr_hash(&a->addr)); + unsigned h = tor_addr_hash(&a->addr); + if (a->transport_name) + h += ht_string_hash(a->transport_name); + return ht_improve_hash(h); } /** Hashtable helper: compare two clientmap_entry_t values for equality. */ static INLINE int clientmap_entries_eq(const clientmap_entry_t *a, const clientmap_entry_t *b) { + if (strcmp_opt(a->transport_name, b->transport_name)) + return 0; + return !tor_addr_compare(&a->addr, &b->addr, CMP_EXACT) && a->action == b->action; } @@ -497,6 +507,17 @@ HT_PROTOTYPE(clientmap, clientmap_entry_t, node, clientmap_entry_hash, HT_GENERATE(clientmap, clientmap_entry_t, node, clientmap_entry_hash, clientmap_entries_eq, 0.6, malloc, realloc, free); +/** Free all storage held by <b>ent</b>. */ +static void +clientmap_entry_free(clientmap_entry_t *ent) +{ + if (!ent) + return; + + tor_free(ent->transport_name); + tor_free(ent); +} + /** Clear history of connecting clients used by entry and bridge stats. */ static void client_history_clear(void) @@ -507,7 +528,7 @@ client_history_clear(void) if ((*ent)->action == GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT) { this = *ent; next = HT_NEXT_RMV(clientmap, &client_history, ent); - tor_free(this); + clientmap_entry_free(this); } else { next = HT_NEXT(clientmap, &client_history, ent); } @@ -519,10 +540,14 @@ client_history_clear(void) * configured accordingly. */ void geoip_note_client_seen(geoip_client_action_t action, - const tor_addr_t *addr, time_t now) + const tor_addr_t *addr, + const char *transport_name, + time_t now) { const or_options_t *options = get_options(); clientmap_entry_t lookup, *ent; + memset(&lookup, 0, sizeof(clientmap_entry_t)); + if (action == GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT) { /* Only remember statistics as entry guard or as bridge. */ if (!options->EntryStatistics && @@ -534,12 +559,20 @@ geoip_note_client_seen(geoip_client_action_t action, return; } + log_debug(LD_GENERAL, "Seen client from '%s' with transport '%s'.", + safe_str_client(fmt_addr((addr))), + transport_name ? transport_name : "<no transport>"); + tor_addr_copy(&lookup.addr, addr); lookup.action = (int)action; + lookup.transport_name = (char*) transport_name; ent = HT_FIND(clientmap, &client_history, &lookup); + if (! ent) { ent = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(clientmap_entry_t)); tor_addr_copy(&ent->addr, addr); + if (transport_name) + ent->transport_name = tor_strdup(transport_name); ent->action = (int)action; HT_INSERT(clientmap, &client_history, ent); } @@ -566,7 +599,7 @@ remove_old_client_helper_(struct clientmap_entry_t *ent, void *_cutoff) { time_t cutoff = *(time_t*)_cutoff / 60; if (ent->last_seen_in_minutes < cutoff) { - tor_free(ent); + clientmap_entry_free(ent); return 1; } else { return 0; @@ -769,6 +802,106 @@ geoip_change_dirreq_state(uint64_t dirreq_id, dirreq_type_t type, } } +/** Return the bridge-ip-transports string that should be inserted in + * our extra-info descriptor. Return NULL if the bridge-ip-transports + * line should be empty. */ +char * +geoip_get_transport_history(void) +{ + unsigned granularity = IP_GRANULARITY; + /** String hash table <name of transport> -> <number of users>. */ + strmap_t *transport_counts = strmap_new(); + + /** Smartlist that contains copies of the names of the transports + that have been used. */ + smartlist_t *transports_used = smartlist_new(); + + /* Special string to signify that no transport was used for this + connection. Pluggable transport names can't have symbols in their + names, so this string will never collide with a real transport. */ + static const char* no_transport_str = "<OR>"; + + clientmap_entry_t **ent; + const char *transport_name = NULL; + smartlist_t *string_chunks = smartlist_new(); + char *the_string = NULL; + + /* If we haven't seen any clients yet, return NULL. */ + if (HT_EMPTY(&client_history)) + goto done; + + /** We do the following steps to form the transport history string: + * a) Foreach client that uses a pluggable transport, we increase the + * times that transport was used by one. If the client did not use + * a transport, we increase the number of times someone connected + * without obfuscation. + * b) Foreach transport we observed, we write its transport history + * string and push it to string_chunks. So, for example, if we've + * seen 665 obfs2 clients, we write "obfs2=665". + * c) We concatenate string_chunks to form the final string. + */ + + log_debug(LD_GENERAL,"Starting iteration for transport history. %d clients.", + HT_SIZE(&client_history)); + + /* Loop through all clients. */ + HT_FOREACH(ent, clientmap, &client_history) { + uintptr_t val; + void *ptr; + transport_name = (*ent)->transport_name; + if (!transport_name) + transport_name = no_transport_str; + + /* Increase the count for this transport name. */ + ptr = strmap_get(transport_counts, transport_name); + val = (uintptr_t)ptr; + val++; + ptr = (void*)val; + strmap_set(transport_counts, transport_name, ptr); + + /* If it's the first time we see this transport, note it. */ + if (val == 1) + smartlist_add(transports_used, tor_strdup(transport_name)); + + log_debug(LD_GENERAL, "Client from '%s' with transport '%s'. " + "I've now seen %d clients.", + safe_str_client(fmt_addr(&(*ent)->addr)), + transport_name ? transport_name : "<no transport>", + (int)val); + } + + /* Sort the transport names (helps with unit testing). */ + smartlist_sort_strings(transports_used); + + /* Loop through all seen transports. */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(transports_used, const char *, transport_name) { + void *transport_count_ptr = strmap_get(transport_counts, transport_name); + uintptr_t transport_count = (uintptr_t) transport_count_ptr; + + log_debug(LD_GENERAL, "We got "U64_FORMAT" clients with transport '%s'.", + U64_PRINTF_ARG((uint64_t)transport_count), transport_name); + + smartlist_add_asprintf(string_chunks, "%s="U64_FORMAT, + transport_name, + U64_PRINTF_ARG(round_uint64_to_next_multiple_of( + (uint64_t)transport_count, + granularity))); + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(transport_name); + + the_string = smartlist_join_strings(string_chunks, ",", 0, NULL); + + log_debug(LD_GENERAL, "Final bridge-ip-transports string: '%s'", the_string); + + done: + strmap_free(transport_counts, NULL); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(transports_used, char *, s, tor_free(s)); + smartlist_free(transports_used); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(string_chunks, char *, s, tor_free(s)); + smartlist_free(string_chunks); + + return the_string; +} + /** Return a newly allocated comma-separated string containing statistics * on network status downloads. The string contains the number of completed * requests, timeouts, and still running requests as well as the download @@ -1037,7 +1170,7 @@ geoip_reset_dirreq_stats(time_t now) if ((*ent)->action == GEOIP_CLIENT_NETWORKSTATUS) { this = *ent; next = HT_NEXT_RMV(clientmap, &client_history, ent); - tor_free(this); + clientmap_entry_free(this); } else { next = HT_NEXT(clientmap, &client_history, ent); } @@ -1132,7 +1265,7 @@ geoip_format_dirreq_stats(time_t now) time_t geoip_dirreq_stats_write(time_t now) { - char *statsdir = NULL, *filename = NULL, *str = NULL; + char *str = NULL; if (!start_of_dirreq_stats_interval) return 0; /* Not initialized. */ @@ -1146,21 +1279,13 @@ geoip_dirreq_stats_write(time_t now) str = geoip_format_dirreq_stats(now); /* Write dirreq-stats string to disk. */ - statsdir = get_datadir_fname("stats"); - if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE, get_options()->User) < 0) { - log_warn(LD_HIST, "Unable to create stats/ directory!"); - goto done; + if (!check_or_create_data_subdir("stats")) { + write_to_data_subdir("stats", "dirreq-stats", str, "dirreq statistics"); + /* Reset measurement interval start. */ + geoip_reset_dirreq_stats(now); } - filename = get_datadir_fname2("stats", "dirreq-stats"); - if (write_str_to_file(filename, str, 0) < 0) - log_warn(LD_HIST, "Unable to write dirreq statistics to disk!"); - - /* Reset measurement interval start. */ - geoip_reset_dirreq_stats(now); done: - tor_free(statsdir); - tor_free(filename); tor_free(str); return start_of_dirreq_stats_interval + WRITE_STATS_INTERVAL; } @@ -1197,6 +1322,8 @@ validate_bridge_stats(const char *stats_str, time_t now) const char *BRIDGE_STATS_END = "bridge-stats-end "; const char *BRIDGE_IPS = "bridge-ips "; const char *BRIDGE_IPS_EMPTY_LINE = "bridge-ips\n"; + const char *BRIDGE_TRANSPORTS = "bridge-ip-transports "; + const char *BRIDGE_TRANSPORTS_EMPTY_LINE = "bridge-ip-transports\n"; const char *tmp; time_t stats_end_time; int seconds; @@ -1231,6 +1358,15 @@ validate_bridge_stats(const char *stats_str, time_t now) return 0; } + /* Parse: "bridge-ip-transports PT=N,PT=N,..." */ + tmp = find_str_at_start_of_line(stats_str, BRIDGE_TRANSPORTS); + if (!tmp) { + /* Look if there is an empty "bridge-ip-transports" line */ + tmp = find_str_at_start_of_line(stats_str, BRIDGE_TRANSPORTS_EMPTY_LINE); + if (!tmp) + return 0; + } + return 1; } @@ -1244,7 +1380,8 @@ static char *bridge_stats_extrainfo = NULL; char * geoip_format_bridge_stats(time_t now) { - char *out = NULL, *country_data = NULL, *ipver_data = NULL; + char *out = NULL; + char *country_data = NULL, *ipver_data = NULL, *transport_data = NULL; long duration = now - start_of_bridge_stats_interval; char written[ISO_TIME_LEN+1]; @@ -1255,16 +1392,20 @@ geoip_format_bridge_stats(time_t now) format_iso_time(written, now); geoip_get_client_history(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT, &country_data, &ipver_data); + transport_data = geoip_get_transport_history(); tor_asprintf(&out, "bridge-stats-end %s (%ld s)\n" "bridge-ips %s\n" - "bridge-ip-versions %s\n", + "bridge-ip-versions %s\n" + "bridge-ip-transports %s\n", written, duration, country_data ? country_data : "", - ipver_data ? ipver_data : ""); + ipver_data ? ipver_data : "", + transport_data ? transport_data : ""); tor_free(country_data); tor_free(ipver_data); + tor_free(transport_data); return out; } @@ -1297,7 +1438,7 @@ format_bridge_stats_controller(time_t now) time_t geoip_bridge_stats_write(time_t now) { - char *filename = NULL, *val = NULL, *statsdir = NULL; + char *val = NULL; /* Check if 24 hours have passed since starting measurements. */ if (now < start_of_bridge_stats_interval + WRITE_STATS_INTERVAL) @@ -1317,24 +1458,20 @@ geoip_bridge_stats_write(time_t now) start_of_bridge_stats_interval = now; /* Write it to disk. */ - statsdir = get_datadir_fname("stats"); - if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE, get_options()->User) < 0) - goto done; - filename = get_datadir_fname2("stats", "bridge-stats"); - - write_str_to_file(filename, bridge_stats_extrainfo, 0); - - /* Tell the controller, "hey, there are clients!" */ - { - char *controller_str = format_bridge_stats_controller(now); - if (controller_str) - control_event_clients_seen(controller_str); - tor_free(controller_str); + if (!check_or_create_data_subdir("stats")) { + write_to_data_subdir("stats", "bridge-stats", + bridge_stats_extrainfo, "bridge statistics"); + + /* Tell the controller, "hey, there are clients!" */ + { + char *controller_str = format_bridge_stats_controller(now); + if (controller_str) + control_event_clients_seen(controller_str); + tor_free(controller_str); + } } - done: - tor_free(filename); - tor_free(statsdir); + done: return start_of_bridge_stats_interval + WRITE_STATS_INTERVAL; } @@ -1436,7 +1573,7 @@ geoip_format_entry_stats(time_t now) time_t geoip_entry_stats_write(time_t now) { - char *statsdir = NULL, *filename = NULL, *str = NULL; + char *str = NULL; if (!start_of_entry_stats_interval) return 0; /* Not initialized. */ @@ -1450,21 +1587,14 @@ geoip_entry_stats_write(time_t now) str = geoip_format_entry_stats(now); /* Write entry-stats string to disk. */ - statsdir = get_datadir_fname("stats"); - if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE, get_options()->User) < 0) { - log_warn(LD_HIST, "Unable to create stats/ directory!"); - goto done; - } - filename = get_datadir_fname2("stats", "entry-stats"); - if (write_str_to_file(filename, str, 0) < 0) - log_warn(LD_HIST, "Unable to write entry statistics to disk!"); + if (!check_or_create_data_subdir("stats")) { + write_to_data_subdir("stats", "entry-stats", str, "entry statistics"); - /* Reset measurement interval start. */ - geoip_reset_entry_stats(now); + /* Reset measurement interval start. */ + geoip_reset_entry_stats(now); + } done: - tor_free(statsdir); - tor_free(filename); tor_free(str); return start_of_entry_stats_interval + WRITE_STATS_INTERVAL; } @@ -1534,7 +1664,7 @@ geoip_free_all(void) for (ent = HT_START(clientmap, &client_history); ent != NULL; ent = next) { this = *ent; next = HT_NEXT_RMV(clientmap, &client_history, ent); - tor_free(this); + clientmap_entry_free(this); } HT_CLEAR(clientmap, &client_history); } @@ -1549,5 +1679,6 @@ geoip_free_all(void) } clear_geoip_db(); + tor_free(bridge_stats_extrainfo); } diff --git a/src/or/geoip.h b/src/or/geoip.h index ebefee5f4..b9b53c300 100644 --- a/src/or/geoip.h +++ b/src/or/geoip.h @@ -12,10 +12,12 @@ #ifndef TOR_GEOIP_H #define TOR_GEOIP_H +#include "testsupport.h" + #ifdef GEOIP_PRIVATE -int geoip_parse_entry(const char *line, sa_family_t family); -int geoip_get_country_by_ipv4(uint32_t ipaddr); -int geoip_get_country_by_ipv6(const struct in6_addr *addr); +STATIC int geoip_parse_entry(const char *line, sa_family_t family); +STATIC int geoip_get_country_by_ipv4(uint32_t ipaddr); +STATIC int geoip_get_country_by_ipv6(const struct in6_addr *addr); #endif int should_record_bridge_info(const or_options_t *options); int geoip_load_file(sa_family_t family, const char *filename); @@ -27,10 +29,12 @@ const char *geoip_db_digest(sa_family_t family); country_t geoip_get_country(const char *countrycode); void geoip_note_client_seen(geoip_client_action_t action, - const tor_addr_t *addr, time_t now); + const tor_addr_t *addr, const char *transport_name, + time_t now); void geoip_remove_old_clients(time_t cutoff); void geoip_note_ns_response(geoip_ns_response_t response); +char *geoip_get_transport_history(void); int geoip_get_client_history(geoip_client_action_t action, char **country_str, char **ipver_str); char *geoip_get_request_history(void); diff --git a/src/or/hibernate.c b/src/or/hibernate.c index a41257133..607dec8cd 100644 --- a/src/or/hibernate.c +++ b/src/or/hibernate.c @@ -255,6 +255,13 @@ accounting_get_interval_length(void) return (int)(interval_end_time - interval_start_time); } +/** Return the time at which the current accounting interval will end. */ +time_t +accounting_get_end_time(void) +{ + return interval_end_time; +} + /** Called from main.c to tell us that <b>seconds</b> seconds have * passed, <b>n_read</b> bytes have been read, and <b>n_written</b> * bytes have been written. */ @@ -1010,6 +1017,7 @@ getinfo_helper_accounting(control_connection_t *conn, return 0; } +#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS /** * Manually change the hibernation state. Private; used only by the unit * tests. @@ -1019,4 +1027,5 @@ hibernate_set_state_for_testing_(hibernate_state_t newstate) { hibernate_state = newstate; } +#endif diff --git a/src/or/hibernate.h b/src/or/hibernate.h index d2d6989e1..4f7331ce8 100644 --- a/src/or/hibernate.h +++ b/src/or/hibernate.h @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ int accounting_parse_options(const or_options_t *options, int validate_only); int accounting_is_enabled(const or_options_t *options); int accounting_get_interval_length(void); +time_t accounting_get_end_time(void); void configure_accounting(time_t now); void accounting_run_housekeeping(time_t now); void accounting_add_bytes(size_t n_read, size_t n_written, int seconds); @@ -45,8 +46,10 @@ typedef enum { HIBERNATE_STATE_INITIAL=5 } hibernate_state_t; +#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS void hibernate_set_state_for_testing_(hibernate_state_t newstate); #endif +#endif #endif diff --git a/src/or/include.am b/src/or/include.am index 65dbeff53..47bdd0990 100644 --- a/src/or/include.am +++ b/src/or/include.am @@ -1,5 +1,13 @@ bin_PROGRAMS+= src/or/tor -noinst_LIBRARIES+= src/or/libtor.a +noinst_LIBRARIES += \ + src/or/libtor.a +if UNITTESTS_ENABLED +noinst_LIBRARIES += \ + src/or/libtor-testing.a +endif +if COVERAGE_ENABLED +noinst_PROGRAMS+= src/or/tor-cov +endif if BUILD_NT_SERVICES tor_platform_source=src/or/ntmain.c @@ -21,11 +29,12 @@ else onion_ntor_source= endif -src_or_libtor_a_SOURCES = \ +LIBTOR_A_SOURCES = \ src/or/addressmap.c \ src/or/buffers.c \ src/or/channel.c \ src/or/channeltls.c \ + src/or/circpathbias.c \ src/or/circuitbuild.c \ src/or/circuitlist.c \ src/or/circuitmux.c \ @@ -48,6 +57,7 @@ src_or_libtor_a_SOURCES = \ src/or/fp_pair.c \ src/or/geoip.c \ src/or/entrynodes.c \ + src/or/ext_orport.c \ src/or/hibernate.c \ src/or/main.c \ src/or/microdesc.c \ @@ -77,6 +87,9 @@ src_or_libtor_a_SOURCES = \ $(onion_ntor_source) \ src/or/config_codedigest.c +src_or_libtor_a_SOURCES = $(LIBTOR_A_SOURCES) +src_or_libtor_testing_a_SOURCES = $(LIBTOR_A_SOURCES) + #libtor_a_LIBADD = ../common/libor.a ../common/libor-crypto.a \ # ../common/libor-event.a @@ -90,6 +103,9 @@ AM_CPPFLAGS += -DSHARE_DATADIR="\"$(datadir)\"" \ -DLOCALSTATEDIR="\"$(localstatedir)\"" \ -DBINDIR="\"$(bindir)\"" +src_or_libtor_testing_a_CPPFLAGS = -DTOR_UNIT_TESTS $(AM_CPPFLAGS) +src_or_libtor_testing_a_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) $(TEST_CFLAGS) + # -L flags need to go in LDFLAGS. -l flags need to go in LDADD. # This seems to matter nowhere but on windows, but I assure you that it # matters a lot there, and is quite hard to debug if you forget to do it. @@ -102,11 +118,24 @@ src_or_tor_LDADD = src/or/libtor.a src/common/libor.a \ @TOR_ZLIB_LIBS@ @TOR_LIB_MATH@ @TOR_LIBEVENT_LIBS@ @TOR_OPENSSL_LIBS@ \ @TOR_LIB_WS32@ @TOR_LIB_GDI@ @CURVE25519_LIBS@ +if COVERAGE_ENABLED +src_or_tor_cov_SOURCES = src/or/tor_main.c +src_or_tor_cov_CPPFLAGS = -DTOR_UNIT_TESTS $(AM_CPPFLAGS) +src_or_tor_cov_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) $(TEST_CFLAGS) +src_or_tor_cov_LDFLAGS = @TOR_LDFLAGS_zlib@ @TOR_LDFLAGS_openssl@ @TOR_LDFLAGS_libevent@ +src_or_tor_cov_LDADD = src/or/libtor-testing.a src/common/libor-testing.a \ + src/common/libor-crypto-testing.a $(LIBDONNA) \ + src/common/libor-event-testing.a \ + @TOR_ZLIB_LIBS@ @TOR_LIB_MATH@ @TOR_LIBEVENT_LIBS@ @TOR_OPENSSL_LIBS@ \ + @TOR_LIB_WS32@ @TOR_LIB_GDI@ @CURVE25519_LIBS@ +endif + ORHEADERS = \ src/or/addressmap.h \ src/or/buffers.h \ src/or/channel.h \ src/or/channeltls.h \ + src/or/circpathbias.h \ src/or/circuitbuild.h \ src/or/circuitlist.h \ src/or/circuitmux.h \ @@ -127,6 +156,7 @@ ORHEADERS = \ src/or/dns.h \ src/or/dnsserv.h \ src/or/eventdns_tor.h \ + src/or/ext_orport.h \ src/or/fp_pair.h \ src/or/geoip.h \ src/or/entrynodes.h \ diff --git a/src/or/main.c b/src/or/main.c index deed798e8..aa5642509 100644 --- a/src/or/main.c +++ b/src/or/main.c @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ #include "circuituse.h" #include "command.h" #include "config.h" +#include "confparse.h" #include "connection.h" #include "connection_edge.h" #include "connection_or.h" @@ -52,11 +53,13 @@ #include "routerparse.h" #include "statefile.h" #include "status.h" +#include "ext_orport.h" #ifdef USE_DMALLOC #include <dmalloc.h> #include <openssl/crypto.h> #endif #include "memarea.h" +#include "../common/sandbox.h" #ifdef HAVE_EVENT2_EVENT_H #include <event2/event.h> @@ -155,8 +158,6 @@ int can_complete_circuit=0; /** How often do we 'forgive' undownloadable router descriptors and attempt * to download them again? */ #define DESCRIPTOR_FAILURE_RESET_INTERVAL (60*60) -/** How long do we let a directory connection stall before expiring it? */ -#define DIR_CONN_MAX_STALL (5*60) /** Decides our behavior when no logs are configured/before any * logs have been configured. For 0, we log notice to stdout as normal. @@ -351,6 +352,8 @@ connection_remove(connection_t *conn) (int)conn->s, conn_type_to_string(conn->type), smartlist_len(connection_array)); + control_event_conn_bandwidth(conn); + tor_assert(conn->conn_array_index >= 0); current_index = conn->conn_array_index; connection_unregister_events(conn); /* This is redundant, but cheap. */ @@ -414,6 +417,19 @@ connection_unlink(connection_t *conn) connection_free(conn); } +/** Initialize the global connection list, closeable connection list, + * and active connection list. */ +STATIC void +init_connection_lists(void) +{ + if (!connection_array) + connection_array = smartlist_new(); + if (!closeable_connection_lst) + closeable_connection_lst = smartlist_new(); + if (!active_linked_connection_lst) + active_linked_connection_lst = smartlist_new(); +} + /** Schedule <b>conn</b> to be closed. **/ void add_connection_to_closeable_list(connection_t *conn) @@ -507,8 +523,8 @@ connection_is_reading(connection_t *conn) } /** Tell the main loop to stop notifying <b>conn</b> of any read events. */ -void -connection_stop_reading(connection_t *conn) +MOCK_IMPL(void, +connection_stop_reading,(connection_t *conn)) { tor_assert(conn); @@ -532,8 +548,8 @@ connection_stop_reading(connection_t *conn) } /** Tell the main loop to start notifying <b>conn</b> of any read events. */ -void -connection_start_reading(connection_t *conn) +MOCK_IMPL(void, +connection_start_reading,(connection_t *conn)) { tor_assert(conn); @@ -572,8 +588,8 @@ connection_is_writing(connection_t *conn) } /** Tell the main loop to stop notifying <b>conn</b> of any write events. */ -void -connection_stop_writing(connection_t *conn) +MOCK_IMPL(void, +connection_stop_writing,(connection_t *conn)) { tor_assert(conn); @@ -598,8 +614,8 @@ connection_stop_writing(connection_t *conn) } /** Tell the main loop to start notifying <b>conn</b> of any write events. */ -void -connection_start_writing(connection_t *conn) +MOCK_IMPL(void, +connection_start_writing,(connection_t *conn)) { tor_assert(conn); @@ -687,7 +703,7 @@ connection_stop_reading_from_linked_conn(connection_t *conn) } /** Close all connections that have been scheduled to get closed. */ -static void +STATIC void close_closeable_connections(void) { int i; @@ -1028,9 +1044,11 @@ run_connection_housekeeping(int i, time_t now) * if a server or received if a client) for 5 min */ if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_DIR && ((DIR_CONN_IS_SERVER(conn) && - conn->timestamp_lastwritten + DIR_CONN_MAX_STALL < now) || + conn->timestamp_lastwritten + + options->TestingDirConnectionMaxStall < now) || (!DIR_CONN_IS_SERVER(conn) && - conn->timestamp_lastread + DIR_CONN_MAX_STALL < now))) { + conn->timestamp_lastread + + options->TestingDirConnectionMaxStall < now))) { log_info(LD_DIR,"Expiring wedged directory conn (fd %d, purpose %d)", (int)conn->s, conn->purpose); /* This check is temporary; it's to let us know whether we should consider @@ -1153,6 +1171,7 @@ run_scheduled_events(time_t now) static time_t time_to_check_v3_certificate = 0; static time_t time_to_check_listeners = 0; static time_t time_to_check_descriptor = 0; + static time_t time_to_download_networkstatus = 0; static time_t time_to_shrink_memory = 0; static time_t time_to_try_getting_descriptors = 0; static time_t time_to_reset_descriptor_failures = 0; @@ -1447,10 +1466,18 @@ run_scheduled_events(time_t now) networkstatus_v2_list_clean(now); /* Remove dead routers. */ routerlist_remove_old_routers(); + } - /* Also, once per minute, check whether we want to download any - * networkstatus documents. - */ + /* 2c. Every minute (or every second if TestingTorNetwork), check + * whether we want to download any networkstatus documents. */ + +/* How often do we check whether we should download network status + * documents? */ +#define networkstatus_dl_check_interval(o) ((o)->TestingTorNetwork ? 1 : 60) + + if (time_to_download_networkstatus < now && !options->DisableNetwork) { + time_to_download_networkstatus = + now + networkstatus_dl_check_interval(options); update_networkstatus_downloads(now); } @@ -1643,6 +1670,9 @@ second_elapsed_callback(periodic_timer_t *timer, void *arg) control_event_bandwidth_used((uint32_t)bytes_read,(uint32_t)bytes_written); control_event_stream_bandwidth_used(); + control_event_conn_bandwidth_used(); + control_event_circ_bandwidth_used(); + control_event_circuit_cell_stats(); if (server_mode(options) && !net_is_disabled() && @@ -1870,7 +1900,7 @@ do_hup(void) } /** Tor main loop. */ -/* static */ int +int do_main_loop(void) { int loop_result; @@ -2297,18 +2327,13 @@ handle_signals(int is_parent) /** Main entry point for the Tor command-line client. */ -/* static */ int +int tor_init(int argc, char *argv[]) { char buf[256]; - int i, quiet = 0; + int quiet = 0; time_of_process_start = time(NULL); - if (!connection_array) - connection_array = smartlist_new(); - if (!closeable_connection_lst) - closeable_connection_lst = smartlist_new(); - if (!active_linked_connection_lst) - active_linked_connection_lst = smartlist_new(); + init_connection_lists(); /* Have the log set up with our application name. */ tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Tor %s", get_version()); log_set_application_name(buf); @@ -2319,17 +2344,31 @@ tor_init(int argc, char *argv[]) addressmap_init(); /* Init the client dns cache. Do it always, since it's * cheap. */ + { /* We search for the "quiet" option first, since it decides whether we * will log anything at all to the command line. */ - for (i=1;i<argc;++i) { - if (!strcmp(argv[i], "--hush")) - quiet = 1; - if (!strcmp(argv[i], "--quiet")) - quiet = 2; - /* --version implies --quiet */ - if (!strcmp(argv[i], "--version")) - quiet = 2; + config_line_t *opts = NULL, *cmdline_opts = NULL; + const config_line_t *cl; + (void) config_parse_commandline(argc, argv, 1, &opts, &cmdline_opts); + for (cl = cmdline_opts; cl; cl = cl->next) { + if (!strcmp(cl->key, "--hush")) + quiet = 1; + if (!strcmp(cl->key, "--quiet") || + !strcmp(cl->key, "--dump-config")) + quiet = 2; + /* --version, --digests, and --help imply --hush */ + if (!strcmp(cl->key, "--version") || !strcmp(cl->key, "--digests") || + !strcmp(cl->key, "--list-torrc-options") || + !strcmp(cl->key, "--library-versions") || + !strcmp(cl->key, "-h") || !strcmp(cl->key, "--help")) { + if (quiet < 1) + quiet = 1; + } + } + config_free_lines(opts); + config_free_lines(cmdline_opts); } + /* give it somewhere to log to initially */ switch (quiet) { case 2: @@ -2351,11 +2390,12 @@ tor_init(int argc, char *argv[]) #else ""; #endif - log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "Tor v%s %srunning on %s with Libevent %s " - "and OpenSSL %s.", version, bev_str, + log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "Tor v%s %srunning on %s with Libevent %s, " + "OpenSSL %s and Zlib %s.", version, bev_str, get_uname(), tor_libevent_get_version_str(), - crypto_openssl_get_version_str()); + crypto_openssl_get_version_str(), + tor_zlib_get_version_str()); log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "Tor can't help you if you use it wrong! " "Learn how to be safe at " @@ -2497,6 +2537,8 @@ tor_free_all(int postfork) memarea_clear_freelist(); nodelist_free_all(); microdesc_free_all(); + ext_orport_free_all(); + control_free_all(); if (!postfork) { config_free_all(); or_state_free_all(); @@ -2563,7 +2605,7 @@ tor_cleanup(void) } /** Read/create keys as needed, and echo our fingerprint to stdout. */ -/* static */ int +static int do_list_fingerprint(void) { char buf[FINGERPRINT_LEN+1]; @@ -2571,7 +2613,7 @@ do_list_fingerprint(void) const char *nickname = get_options()->Nickname; if (!server_mode(get_options())) { log_err(LD_GENERAL, - "Clients don't have long-term identity keys. Exiting.\n"); + "Clients don't have long-term identity keys. Exiting."); return -1; } tor_assert(nickname); @@ -2593,7 +2635,7 @@ do_list_fingerprint(void) /** Entry point for password hashing: take the desired password from * the command line, and print its salted hash to stdout. **/ -/* static */ void +static void do_hash_password(void) { @@ -2609,6 +2651,34 @@ do_hash_password(void) printf("16:%s\n",output); } +/** Entry point for configuration dumping: write the configuration to + * stdout. */ +static int +do_dump_config(void) +{ + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + const char *arg = options->command_arg; + int how; + char *opts; + if (!strcmp(arg, "short")) { + how = OPTIONS_DUMP_MINIMAL; + } else if (!strcmp(arg, "non-builtin")) { + how = OPTIONS_DUMP_DEFAULTS; + } else if (!strcmp(arg, "full")) { + how = OPTIONS_DUMP_ALL; + } else { + printf("%s is not a recognized argument to --dump-config. " + "Please select 'short', 'non-builtin', or 'full'", arg); + return -1; + } + + opts = options_dump(options, how); + printf("%s", opts); + tor_free(opts); + + return 0; +} + #if defined (WINCE) int find_flashcard_path(PWCHAR path, size_t size) @@ -2634,6 +2704,95 @@ find_flashcard_path(PWCHAR path, size_t size) } #endif +static void +init_addrinfo(void) +{ + char hname[256]; + + // host name to sandbox + gethostname(hname, sizeof(hname)); + sandbox_add_addrinfo(hname); +} + +static sandbox_cfg_t* +sandbox_init_filter(void) +{ + sandbox_cfg_t *cfg = sandbox_cfg_new(); + + sandbox_cfg_allow_openat_filename(&cfg, + get_datadir_fname("cached-status"), 1); + + sandbox_cfg_allow_open_filename_array(&cfg, + get_datadir_fname("cached-certs"), 1, + get_datadir_fname("cached-certs.tmp"), 1, + get_datadir_fname("cached-consensus"), 1, + get_datadir_fname("unverified-consensus"), 1, + get_datadir_fname("unverified-consensus.tmp"), 1, + get_datadir_fname("cached-microdesc-consensus"), 1, + get_datadir_fname("cached-microdesc-consensus.tmp"), 1, + get_datadir_fname("cached-microdescs"), 1, + get_datadir_fname("cached-microdescs.tmp"), 1, + get_datadir_fname("cached-microdescs.new"), 1, + get_datadir_fname("cached-microdescs.new.tmp"), 1, + get_datadir_fname("unverified-microdesc-consensus"), 1, + get_datadir_fname("cached-descriptors"), 1, + get_datadir_fname("cached-descriptors.new"), 1, + get_datadir_fname("cached-descriptors.tmp"), 1, + get_datadir_fname("cached-descriptors.new.tmp"), 1, + get_datadir_fname("cached-descriptors.tmp.tmp"), 1, + get_datadir_fname("cached-extrainfo"), 1, + get_datadir_fname("state.tmp"), 1, + get_datadir_fname("unparseable-desc.tmp"), 1, + get_datadir_fname("unparseable-desc"), 1, + "/dev/srandom", 0, + "/dev/urandom", 0, + "/dev/random", 0, + NULL, 0 + ); + + sandbox_cfg_allow_stat_filename_array(&cfg, + get_datadir_fname(NULL), 1, + get_datadir_fname("lock"), 1, + get_datadir_fname("state"), 1, + get_datadir_fname("router-stability"), 1, + get_datadir_fname("cached-extrainfo.new"), 1, + NULL, 0 + ); + + // orport + if (server_mode(get_options())) { + sandbox_cfg_allow_open_filename_array(&cfg, + get_datadir_fname2("keys", "secret_id_key"), 1, + get_datadir_fname2("keys", "secret_onion_key"), 1, + get_datadir_fname2("keys", "secret_onion_key_ntor"), 1, + get_datadir_fname2("keys", "secret_onion_key_ntor.tmp"), 1, + get_datadir_fname2("keys", "secret_id_key.old"), 1, + get_datadir_fname2("keys", "secret_onion_key.old"), 1, + get_datadir_fname2("keys", "secret_onion_key_ntor.old"), 1, + get_datadir_fname2("keys", "secret_onion_key.tmp"), 1, + get_datadir_fname2("keys", "secret_id_key.tmp"), 1, + get_datadir_fname("fingerprint"), 1, + get_datadir_fname("fingerprint.tmp"), 1, + get_datadir_fname("cached-consensus"), 1, + get_datadir_fname("cached-consensus.tmp"), 1, + "/etc/resolv.conf", 0, + NULL, 0 + ); + + sandbox_cfg_allow_stat_filename_array(&cfg, + get_datadir_fname("keys"), 1, + get_datadir_fname("stats/dirreq-stats"), 1, + NULL, 0 + ); + } + + sandbox_cfg_allow_execve(&cfg, "/usr/local/bin/tor"); + + init_addrinfo(); + + return cfg; +} + /** Main entry point for the Tor process. Called from main(). */ /* This function is distinct from main() only so we can link main.c into * the unittest binary without conflicting with the unittests' main. */ @@ -2700,6 +2859,22 @@ tor_main(int argc, char *argv[]) #endif if (tor_init(argc, argv)<0) return -1; + + if (get_options()->Sandbox) { + sandbox_cfg_t* cfg = sandbox_init_filter(); + + if (sandbox_init(cfg)) { + log_err(LD_BUG,"Failed to create syscall sandbox filter"); + return -1; + } + + // registering libevent rng +#ifdef HAVE_EVUTIL_SECURE_RNG_SET_URANDOM_DEVICE_FILE + evutil_secure_rng_set_urandom_device_file( + (char*) sandbox_intern_string("/dev/urandom")); +#endif + } + switch (get_options()->command) { case CMD_RUN_TOR: #ifdef NT_SERVICE @@ -2718,6 +2893,9 @@ tor_main(int argc, char *argv[]) printf("Configuration was valid\n"); result = 0; break; + case CMD_DUMP_CONFIG: + result = do_dump_config(); + break; case CMD_RUN_UNITTESTS: /* only set by test.c */ default: log_warn(LD_BUG,"Illegal command number %d: internal error.", diff --git a/src/or/main.h b/src/or/main.h index 338449b6a..df302ffa7 100644 --- a/src/or/main.h +++ b/src/or/main.h @@ -36,12 +36,12 @@ typedef enum watchable_events { } watchable_events_t; void connection_watch_events(connection_t *conn, watchable_events_t events); int connection_is_reading(connection_t *conn); -void connection_stop_reading(connection_t *conn); -void connection_start_reading(connection_t *conn); +MOCK_DECL(void,connection_stop_reading,(connection_t *conn)); +MOCK_DECL(void,connection_start_reading,(connection_t *conn)); int connection_is_writing(connection_t *conn); -void connection_stop_writing(connection_t *conn); -void connection_start_writing(connection_t *conn); +MOCK_DECL(void,connection_stop_writing,(connection_t *conn)); +MOCK_DECL(void,connection_start_writing,(connection_t *conn)); void connection_stop_reading_from_linked_conn(connection_t *conn); @@ -66,11 +66,12 @@ void tor_free_all(int postfork); int tor_main(int argc, char *argv[]); -#ifdef MAIN_PRIVATE int do_main_loop(void); -int do_list_fingerprint(void); -void do_hash_password(void); int tor_init(int argc, char **argv); + +#ifdef MAIN_PRIVATE +STATIC void init_connection_lists(void); +STATIC void close_closeable_connections(void); #endif #endif diff --git a/src/or/microdesc.c b/src/or/microdesc.c index 8b5581f4a..f6dd6b611 100644 --- a/src/or/microdesc.c +++ b/src/or/microdesc.c @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ get_microdesc_cache(void) * ending at <b>eos</b>, and store them in <b>cache</b>. If <b>no_save</b>, * mark them as non-writable to disk. If <b>where</b> is SAVED_IN_CACHE, * leave their bodies as pointers to the mmap'd cache. If where is - * <b>SAVED_NOWHERE</b>, do not allow annotations. If listed_at is positive, + * <b>SAVED_NOWHERE</b>, do not allow annotations. If listed_at is not -1, * set the last_listed field of every microdesc to listed_at. If * requested_digests is non-null, then it contains a list of digests we mean * to allow, so we should reject any non-requested microdesc with a different @@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ microdescs_add_to_cache(microdesc_cache_t *cache, descriptors = microdescs_parse_from_string(s, eos, allow_annotations, copy_body); - if (listed_at > 0) { + if (listed_at != (time_t)-1) { SMARTLIST_FOREACH(descriptors, microdesc_t *, md, md->last_listed = listed_at); } @@ -686,7 +686,7 @@ microdesc_list_missing_digest256(networkstatus_t *ns, microdesc_cache_t *cache, continue; if (downloadable_only && !download_status_is_ready(&rs->dl_status, now, - MAX_MICRODESC_DOWNLOAD_FAILURES)) + get_options()->TestingMicrodescMaxDownloadTries)) continue; if (skip && digestmap_get(skip, rs->descriptor_digest)) continue; diff --git a/src/or/networkstatus.c b/src/or/networkstatus.c index 1b5c6dbb3..c950731bb 100644 --- a/src/or/networkstatus.c +++ b/src/or/networkstatus.c @@ -1203,8 +1203,6 @@ we_want_to_fetch_flavor(const or_options_t *options, int flavor) return flavor == usable_consensus_flavor(); } -/** How many times will we try to fetch a consensus before we give up? */ -#define CONSENSUS_NETWORKSTATUS_MAX_DL_TRIES 8 /** How long will we hang onto a possibly live consensus for which we're * fetching certs before we check whether there is a better one? */ #define DELAY_WHILE_FETCHING_CERTS (20*60) @@ -1238,7 +1236,7 @@ update_consensus_networkstatus_downloads(time_t now) resource = networkstatus_get_flavor_name(i); if (!download_status_is_ready(&consensus_dl_status[i], now, - CONSENSUS_NETWORKSTATUS_MAX_DL_TRIES)) + options->TestingConsensusMaxDownloadTries)) continue; /* We failed downloading a consensus too recently. */ if (connection_dir_get_by_purpose_and_resource( DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_CONSENSUS, resource)) @@ -1824,7 +1822,8 @@ networkstatus_set_current_consensus(const char *consensus, * current consensus really alter our view of any OR's rate limits? */ connection_or_update_token_buckets(get_connection_array(), options); - circuit_build_times_new_consensus_params(&circ_times, current_consensus); + circuit_build_times_new_consensus_params(get_circuit_build_times_mutable(), + current_consensus); } if (directory_caches_dir_info(options)) { diff --git a/src/or/nodelist.c b/src/or/nodelist.c index 178f084b6..86219b77c 100644 --- a/src/or/nodelist.c +++ b/src/or/nodelist.c @@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ static void nodelist_drop_node(node_t *node, int remove_from_ht); static void node_free(node_t *node); static void update_router_have_minimum_dir_info(void); +static double get_frac_paths_needed_for_circs(const or_options_t *options, + const networkstatus_t *ns); /** A nodelist_t holds a node_t object for every router we're "willing to use * for something". Specifically, it should hold a node_t for every node that @@ -1317,7 +1319,7 @@ count_usable_descriptors(int *num_present, int *num_usable, md ? "microdesc" : "desc", exit_only ? " exits" : "s"); } -/** Return an extimate of which fraction of usable paths through the Tor +/** Return an estimate of which fraction of usable paths through the Tor * network we have available for use. */ static double compute_frac_paths_available(const networkstatus_t *consensus, @@ -1372,13 +1374,14 @@ compute_frac_paths_available(const networkstatus_t *consensus, if (f_myexit < f_exit) f_exit = f_myexit; - tor_asprintf(status_out, - "%d%% of guards bw, " - "%d%% of midpoint bw, and " - "%d%% of exit bw", - (int)(f_guard*100), - (int)(f_mid*100), - (int)(f_exit*100)); + if (status_out) + tor_asprintf(status_out, + "%d%% of guards bw, " + "%d%% of midpoint bw, and " + "%d%% of exit bw", + (int)(f_guard*100), + (int)(f_mid*100), + (int)(f_exit*100)); return f_guard * f_mid * f_exit; } @@ -1391,19 +1394,19 @@ count_loading_descriptors_progress(void) { int num_present = 0, num_usable=0; time_t now = time(NULL); + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); const networkstatus_t *consensus = networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus(now,usable_consensus_flavor()); - double fraction; + double paths, fraction; if (!consensus) return 0; /* can't count descriptors if we have no list of them */ - count_usable_descriptors(&num_present, &num_usable, NULL, - consensus, get_options(), now, NULL, 0); + paths = compute_frac_paths_available(consensus, options, now, + &num_present, &num_usable, + NULL); - if (num_usable == 0) - return 0; /* don't div by 0 */ - fraction = num_present / (num_usable/4.); + fraction = paths / get_frac_paths_needed_for_circs(options,consensus); if (fraction > 1.0) return 0; /* it's not the number of descriptors holding us back */ return BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_LOADING_DESCRIPTORS + (int) diff --git a/src/or/ntmain.c b/src/or/ntmain.c index 8b67b8682..e84831404 100644 --- a/src/or/ntmain.c +++ b/src/or/ntmain.c @@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ * Copyright (c) 2007-2013, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ -#define MAIN_PRIVATE #include "or.h" #include "config.h" #include "main.h" @@ -315,6 +314,7 @@ nt_service_main(void) case CMD_LIST_FINGERPRINT: case CMD_HASH_PASSWORD: case CMD_VERIFY_CONFIG: + case CMD_DUMP_CONFIG: log_err(LD_CONFIG, "Unsupported command (--list-fingerprint, " "--hash-password, or --verify-config) in NT service."); break; diff --git a/src/or/onion.c b/src/or/onion.c index 1a0bcf106..3e1d63d4e 100644 --- a/src/or/onion.c +++ b/src/or/onion.c @@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ #include "relay.h" #include "rephist.h" #include "router.h" -#include "tor_queue.h" /** Type for a linked list of circuits that are waiting for a free CPU worker * to process a waiting onion handshake. */ @@ -59,7 +58,7 @@ static void onion_queue_entry_remove(onion_queue_t *victim); * MAX_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE/REPLY_LEN." Also, make sure that we can pass * over-large values via EXTEND2/EXTENDED2, for future-compatibility.*/ -/** Return true iff we have room to queue another oninoskin of type +/** Return true iff we have room to queue another onionskin of type * <b>type</b>. */ static int have_room_for_onionskin(uint16_t type) @@ -870,7 +869,7 @@ extend_cell_parse(extend_cell_t *cell_out, const uint8_t command, cell_out->cell_type = RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND2; ++payload; /* Parse the specifiers. We'll only take the first IPv4 and first IPv6 - * addres, and the node ID, and ignore everything else */ + * address, and the node ID, and ignore everything else */ for (i = 0; i < n_specs; ++i) { if (eop - payload < 2) return -1; diff --git a/src/or/onion_fast.c b/src/or/onion_fast.c index aa034a8bd..8e778dbc6 100644 --- a/src/or/onion_fast.c +++ b/src/or/onion_fast.c @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ fast_handshake_state_free(fast_handshake_state_t *victim) tor_free(victim); } -/** Create the state needed to perform a CREATE_FAST hasnshake. Return 0 +/** Create the state needed to perform a CREATE_FAST handshake. Return 0 * on success, -1 on failure. */ int fast_onionskin_create(fast_handshake_state_t **handshake_state_out, diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 5318b0fe5..6b18f1328 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ #include "ht.h" #include "replaycache.h" #include "crypto_curve25519.h" +#include "tor_queue.h" /* These signals are defined to help handle_control_signal work. */ @@ -227,8 +228,14 @@ typedef enum { #define CONN_TYPE_AP_NATD_LISTENER 14 /** Type for sockets listening for DNS requests. */ #define CONN_TYPE_AP_DNS_LISTENER 15 -#define CONN_TYPE_MAX_ 15 -/* !!!! If CONN_TYPE_MAX_ is ever over 15, we must grow the type field in + +/** Type for connections from the Extended ORPort. */ +#define CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR 16 +/** Type for sockets listening for Extended ORPort connections. */ +#define CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR_LISTENER 17 + +#define CONN_TYPE_MAX_ 17 +/* !!!! If _CONN_TYPE_MAX is ever over 31, we must grow the type field in * connection_t. */ /* Proxy client types */ @@ -238,7 +245,9 @@ typedef enum { #define PROXY_SOCKS5 3 /* !!!! If there is ever a PROXY_* type over 2, we must grow the proxy_type * field in or_connection_t */ -/* pluggable transports proxy type */ + +/* Pluggable transport proxy type. Don't use this in or_connection_t, + * instead use the actual underlying proxy type (see above). */ #define PROXY_PLUGGABLE 4 /* Proxy client handshake states */ @@ -306,6 +315,25 @@ typedef enum { #define OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN 8 #define OR_CONN_STATE_MAX_ 8 +/** States of the Extended ORPort protocol. Be careful before changing + * the numbers: they matter. */ +#define EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_MIN_ 1 +/** Extended ORPort authentication is waiting for the authentication + * type selected by the client. */ +#define EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_AUTH_WAIT_AUTH_TYPE 1 +/** Extended ORPort authentication is waiting for the client nonce. */ +#define EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_AUTH_WAIT_CLIENT_NONCE 2 +/** Extended ORPort authentication is waiting for the client hash. */ +#define EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_AUTH_WAIT_CLIENT_HASH 3 +#define EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_AUTH_MAX 3 +/** Authentication finished and the Extended ORPort is now accepting + * traffic. */ +#define EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN 4 +/** Extended ORPort is flushing its last messages and preparing to + * start accepting OR connections. */ +#define EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_FLUSHING 5 +#define EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_MAX_ 5 + #define EXIT_CONN_STATE_MIN_ 1 /** State for an exit connection: waiting for response from DNS farm. */ #define EXIT_CONN_STATE_RESOLVING 1 @@ -823,9 +851,15 @@ typedef enum { /** Maximum number of queued cells on a circuit for which we are the * midpoint before we give up and kill it. This must be >= circwindow * to avoid killing innocent circuits, and >= circwindow*2 to give - * leaky-pipe a chance for being useful someday. + * leaky-pipe a chance of working someday. The ORCIRC_MAX_MIDDLE_KILL_THRESH + * ratio controls the margin of error between emitting a warning and + * killing the circuit. + */ +#define ORCIRC_MAX_MIDDLE_CELLS (CIRCWINDOW_START_MAX*2) +/** Ratio of hard (circuit kill) to soft (warning) thresholds for the + * ORCIRC_MAX_MIDDLE_CELLS tests. */ -#define ORCIRC_MAX_MIDDLE_CELLS (21*(CIRCWINDOW_START_MAX)/10) +#define ORCIRC_MAX_MIDDLE_KILL_THRESH (1.1f) /* Cell commands. These values are defined in tor-spec.txt. */ #define CELL_PADDING 0 @@ -846,6 +880,7 @@ typedef enum { #define CELL_AUTH_CHALLENGE 130 #define CELL_AUTHENTICATE 131 #define CELL_AUTHORIZE 132 +#define CELL_COMMAND_MAX_ 132 /** How long to test reachability before complaining to the user. */ #define TIMEOUT_UNTIL_UNREACHABILITY_COMPLAINT (20*60) @@ -1073,9 +1108,17 @@ typedef struct var_cell_t { uint8_t payload[FLEXIBLE_ARRAY_MEMBER]; } var_cell_t; +/** A parsed Extended ORPort message. */ +typedef struct ext_or_cmd_t { + uint16_t cmd; /** Command type */ + uint16_t len; /** Body length */ + char body[FLEXIBLE_ARRAY_MEMBER]; /** Message body */ +} ext_or_cmd_t; + /** A cell as packed for writing to the network. */ typedef struct packed_cell_t { - struct packed_cell_t *next; /**< Next cell queued on this circuit. */ + /** Next cell queued on this circuit. */ + TOR_SIMPLEQ_ENTRY(packed_cell_t) next; char body[CELL_MAX_NETWORK_SIZE]; /**< Cell as packed for network. */ uint32_t inserted_time; /**< Time (in milliseconds since epoch, with high * bits truncated) when this cell was inserted. */ @@ -1099,13 +1142,30 @@ typedef struct insertion_time_queue_t { struct insertion_time_elem_t *last; /**< Last element in queue. */ } insertion_time_queue_t; +/** Number of cells with the same command consecutively added to a circuit + * queue; used for cell statistics only if CELL_STATS events are enabled. */ +typedef struct insertion_command_elem_t { + struct insertion_command_elem_t *next; /**< Next element in queue. */ + /** Which command did these consecutively added cells have? */ + uint8_t command; + unsigned counter; /**< How many cells were inserted? */ +} insertion_command_elem_t; + +/** Queue of insertion commands. */ +typedef struct insertion_command_queue_t { + struct insertion_command_elem_t *first; /**< First element in queue. */ + struct insertion_command_elem_t *last; /**< Last element in queue. */ +} insertion_command_queue_t; + /** A queue of cells on a circuit, waiting to be added to the * or_connection_t's outbuf. */ typedef struct cell_queue_t { - packed_cell_t *head; /**< The first cell, or NULL if the queue is empty. */ - packed_cell_t *tail; /**< The last cell, or NULL if the queue is empty. */ + /** Linked list of packed_cell_t*/ + TOR_SIMPLEQ_HEAD(cell_simpleq, packed_cell_t) head; int n; /**< The number of cells in the queue. */ insertion_time_queue_t *insertion_times; /**< Insertion times of cells. */ + /** Commands of inserted cells. */ + insertion_command_queue_t *insertion_commands; } cell_queue_t; /** Beginning of a RELAY cell payload. */ @@ -1158,7 +1218,7 @@ typedef struct connection_t { * *_CONNECTION_MAGIC. */ uint8_t state; /**< Current state of this connection. */ - unsigned int type:4; /**< What kind of connection is this? */ + unsigned int type:5; /**< What kind of connection is this? */ unsigned int purpose:5; /**< Only used for DIR and EXIT types currently. */ /* The next fields are all one-bit booleans. Some are only applicable to @@ -1242,6 +1302,14 @@ typedef struct connection_t { /** Unique identifier for this connection on this Tor instance. */ uint64_t global_identifier; + + /** Bytes read since last call to control_event_conn_bandwidth_used(). + * Only used if we're configured to emit CONN_BW events. */ + uint32_t n_read_conn_bw; + + /** Bytes written since last call to control_event_conn_bandwidth_used(). + * Only used if we're configured to emit CONN_BW events. */ + uint32_t n_written_conn_bw; } connection_t; /** Subtype of connection_t; used for a listener socket. */ @@ -1403,6 +1471,9 @@ typedef struct or_handshake_state_t { /**@}*/ } or_handshake_state_t; +/** Length of Extended ORPort connection identifier. */ +#define EXT_OR_CONN_ID_LEN DIGEST_LEN /* 20 */ + /** Subtype of connection_t for an "OR connection" -- that is, one that speaks * cells over TLS. */ typedef struct or_connection_t { @@ -1411,6 +1482,20 @@ typedef struct or_connection_t { /** Hash of the public RSA key for the other side's identity key, or zeroes * if the other side hasn't shown us a valid identity key. */ char identity_digest[DIGEST_LEN]; + + /** Extended ORPort connection identifier. */ + char *ext_or_conn_id; + /** This is the ClientHash value we expect to receive from the + * client during the Extended ORPort authentication protocol. We + * compute it upon receiving the ClientNoce from the client, and we + * compare it with the acual ClientHash value sent by the + * client. */ + char *ext_or_auth_correct_client_hash; + /** String carrying the name of the pluggable transport + * (e.g. "obfs2") that is obfuscating this connection. If no + * pluggable transports are used, it's NULL. */ + char *ext_or_transport; + char *nickname; /**< Nickname of OR on other side (if any). */ tor_tls_t *tls; /**< TLS connection state. */ @@ -1468,6 +1553,12 @@ typedef struct or_connection_t { struct or_connection_t *next_with_same_id; /**< Next connection with same * identity digest as this one. */ + /** Last emptied read token bucket in msec since midnight; only used if + * TB_EMPTY events are enabled. */ + uint32_t read_emptied_time; + /** Last emptied write token bucket in msec since midnight; only used if + * TB_EMPTY events are enabled. */ + uint32_t write_emptied_time; } or_connection_t; /** Subtype of connection_t for an "edge connection" -- that is, an entry (ap) @@ -2294,14 +2385,6 @@ typedef struct node_t { } node_t; -/** How many times will we try to download a router's descriptor before giving - * up? */ -#define MAX_ROUTERDESC_DOWNLOAD_FAILURES 8 - -/** How many times will we try to download a microdescriptor before giving - * up? */ -#define MAX_MICRODESC_DOWNLOAD_FAILURES 8 - /** Contents of a v2 (non-consensus, non-vote) network status object. */ typedef struct networkstatus_v2_t { /** When did we receive the network-status document? */ @@ -2511,10 +2594,6 @@ typedef struct desc_store_t { * filename for a temporary file when rebuilding the store, and .new to this * filename for the journal. */ const char *fname_base; - /** Alternative (obsolete) value for fname_base: if the file named by - * fname_base isn't present, we read from here instead, but we never write - * here. */ - const char *fname_alt_base; /** Human-readable description of what this store contains. */ const char *description; @@ -2743,6 +2822,19 @@ typedef struct { struct create_cell_t; +/** Entry in the cell stats list of a circuit; used only if CELL_STATS + * events are enabled. */ +typedef struct testing_cell_stats_entry_t { + uint8_t command; /**< cell command number. */ + /** Waiting time in centiseconds if this event is for a removed cell, + * or 0 if this event is for adding a cell to the queue. 22 bits can + * store more than 11 hours, enough to assume that a circuit with this + * delay would long have been closed. */ + unsigned int waiting_time:22; + unsigned int removed:1; /**< 0 for added to, 1 for removed from queue. */ + unsigned int exitward:1; /**< 0 for app-ward, 1 for exit-ward. */ +} testing_cell_stats_entry_t; + /** * A circuit is a path over the onion routing * network. Applications can connect to one end of the circuit, and can @@ -2804,6 +2896,16 @@ typedef struct circuit_t { * allowing n_streams to add any more cells. (OR circuit only.) */ unsigned int streams_blocked_on_p_chan : 1; + /** True iff we have queued a delete backwards on this circuit, but not put + * it on the output buffer. */ + unsigned int p_delete_pending : 1; + /** True iff we have queued a delete forwards on this circuit, but not put + * it on the output buffer. */ + unsigned int n_delete_pending : 1; + + /** True iff this circuit has received a DESTROY cell in either direction */ + unsigned int received_destroy : 1; + uint8_t state; /**< Current status of this circuit. */ uint8_t purpose; /**< Why are we creating this circuit? */ @@ -2858,7 +2960,8 @@ typedef struct circuit_t { /** Unique ID for measuring tunneled network status requests. */ uint64_t dirreq_id; - struct circuit_t *next; /**< Next circuit in linked list of all circuits. */ + /** Next circuit in linked list of all circuits (global_circuitlist). */ + TOR_LIST_ENTRY(circuit_t) head; /** Next circuit in the doubly-linked ring of circuits waiting to add * cells to n_conn. NULL if we have no cells pending, or if we're not @@ -2868,6 +2971,11 @@ typedef struct circuit_t { * cells to n_conn. NULL if we have no cells pending, or if we're not * linked to an OR connection. */ struct circuit_t *prev_active_on_n_chan; + + /** Various statistics about cells being added to or removed from this + * circuit's queues; used only if CELL_STATS events are enabled and + * cleared after being sent to control port. */ + smartlist_t *testing_cell_stats; } circuit_t; /** Largest number of relay_early cells that we can send on a given @@ -2938,6 +3046,17 @@ typedef struct origin_circuit_t { /** Linked list of AP streams (or EXIT streams if hidden service) * associated with this circuit. */ edge_connection_t *p_streams; + + /** Bytes read from any attached stream since last call to + * control_event_circ_bandwidth_used(). Only used if we're configured + * to emit CIRC_BW events. */ + uint32_t n_read_circ_bw; + + /** Bytes written to any attached stream since last call to + * control_event_circ_bandwidth_used(). Only used if we're configured + * to emit CIRC_BW events. */ + uint32_t n_written_circ_bw; + /** Build state for this circuit. It includes the intended path * length, the chosen exit router, rendezvous information, etc. */ @@ -3184,6 +3303,12 @@ typedef struct or_circuit_t { * exit-ward queues of this circuit; reset every time when writing * buffer stats to disk. */ uint64_t total_cell_waiting_time; + + /** Maximum cell queue size for a middle relay; this is stored per circuit + * so append_cell_to_circuit_queue() can adjust it if it changes. If set + * to zero, it is initialized to the default value. + */ + uint32_t max_middle_cells; } or_circuit_t; /** Convert a circuit subtype to a circuit_t. */ @@ -3342,9 +3467,9 @@ typedef struct { /** What should the tor process actually do? */ enum { CMD_RUN_TOR=0, CMD_LIST_FINGERPRINT, CMD_HASH_PASSWORD, - CMD_VERIFY_CONFIG, CMD_RUN_UNITTESTS + CMD_VERIFY_CONFIG, CMD_RUN_UNITTESTS, CMD_DUMP_CONFIG } command; - const char *command_arg; /**< Argument for command-line option. */ + char *command_arg; /**< Argument for command-line option. */ config_line_t *Logs; /**< New-style list of configuration lines * for logs */ @@ -3425,6 +3550,8 @@ typedef struct { char *User; /**< Name of user to run Tor as. */ char *Group; /**< Name of group to run Tor as. */ config_line_t *ORPort_lines; /**< Ports to listen on for OR connections. */ + /** Ports to listen on for extended OR connections. */ + config_line_t *ExtORPort_lines; /** Ports to listen on for SOCKS connections. */ config_line_t *SocksPort_lines; /** Ports to listen on for transparent pf/netfilter connections. */ @@ -3460,6 +3587,7 @@ typedef struct { unsigned int ControlPort_set : 1; unsigned int DirPort_set : 1; unsigned int DNSPort_set : 1; + unsigned int ExtORPort_set : 1; /**@}*/ int AssumeReachable; /**< Whether to publish our descriptor regardless. */ @@ -3499,6 +3627,9 @@ typedef struct { /** List of TCP/IP addresses that transports should listen at. */ config_line_t *ServerTransportListenAddr; + /** List of options that must be passed to pluggable transports. */ + config_line_t *ServerTransportOptions; + int BridgeRelay; /**< Boolean: are we acting as a bridge relay? We make * this explicit so we can change how we behave in the * future. */ @@ -3736,7 +3867,10 @@ typedef struct { int CookieAuthentication; /**< Boolean: do we enable cookie-based auth for * the control system? */ - char *CookieAuthFile; /**< Location of a cookie authentication file. */ + char *CookieAuthFile; /**< Filesystem location of a ControlPort + * authentication cookie. */ + char *ExtORPortCookieAuthFile; /**< Filesystem location of Extended + * ORPort authentication cookie. */ int CookieAuthFileGroupReadable; /**< Boolean: Is the CookieAuthFile g+r? */ int LeaveStreamsUnattached; /**< Boolean: Does Tor attach new streams to * circuits itself (0), or does it expect a controller @@ -3758,6 +3892,7 @@ typedef struct { SAFELOG_SCRUB_ALL, SAFELOG_SCRUB_RELAY, SAFELOG_SCRUB_NONE } SafeLogging_; + int Sandbox; /**< Boolean: should sandboxing be enabled? */ int SafeSocks; /**< Boolean: should we outright refuse application * connections that use socks4 or socks5-with-local-dns? */ #define LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN (get_options()->ProtocolWarnings ? \ @@ -3929,6 +4064,10 @@ typedef struct { * signatures. Only altered on testing networks.*/ int TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay; + /** Offset in seconds added to the starting time for consensus + voting. Only altered on testing networks. */ + int TestingV3AuthVotingStartOffset; + /** If an authority has been around for less than this amount of time, it * does not believe its reachability information is accurate. Only * altered on testing networks. */ @@ -3939,6 +4078,51 @@ typedef struct { * networks. */ int TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime; + /** Schedule for when servers should download things in general. Only + * altered on testing networks. */ + smartlist_t *TestingServerDownloadSchedule; + + /** Schedule for when clients should download things in general. Only + * altered on testing networks. */ + smartlist_t *TestingClientDownloadSchedule; + + /** Schedule for when servers should download consensuses. Only altered + * on testing networks. */ + smartlist_t *TestingServerConsensusDownloadSchedule; + + /** Schedule for when clients should download consensuses. Only altered + * on testing networks. */ + smartlist_t *TestingClientConsensusDownloadSchedule; + + /** Schedule for when clients should download bridge descriptors. Only + * altered on testing networks. */ + smartlist_t *TestingBridgeDownloadSchedule; + + /** When directory clients have only a few descriptors to request, they + * batch them until they have more, or until this amount of time has + * passed. Only altered on testing networks. */ + int TestingClientMaxIntervalWithoutRequest; + + /** How long do we let a directory connection stall before expiring + * it? Only altered on testing networks. */ + int TestingDirConnectionMaxStall; + + /** How many times will we try to fetch a consensus before we give + * up? Only altered on testing networks. */ + int TestingConsensusMaxDownloadTries; + + /** How many times will we try to download a router's descriptor before + * giving up? Only altered on testing networks. */ + int TestingDescriptorMaxDownloadTries; + + /** How many times will we try to download a microdescriptor before + * giving up? Only altered on testing networks. */ + int TestingMicrodescMaxDownloadTries; + + /** How many times will we try to fetch a certificate before giving + * up? Only altered on testing networks. */ + int TestingCertMaxDownloadTries; + /** If true, we take part in a testing network. Change the defaults of a * couple of other configuration options and allow to change the values * of certain configuration options. */ @@ -3950,6 +4134,19 @@ typedef struct { /** Minimum value for the Fast flag threshold on testing networks. */ uint64_t TestingMinFastFlagThreshold; + /** Relays in a testing network which should be voted Guard + * regardless of uptime and bandwidth. */ + routerset_t *TestingDirAuthVoteGuard; + + /** Enable CONN_BW events. Only altered on testing networks. */ + int TestingEnableConnBwEvent; + + /** Enable CELL_STATS events. Only altered on testing networks. */ + int TestingEnableCellStatsEvent; + + /** Enable TB_EMPTY events. Only altered on testing networks. */ + int TestingEnableTbEmptyEvent; + /** If true, and we have GeoIP data, and we're a bridge, keep a per-country * count of how many client addresses have contacted us so that we can help * the bridge authority guess which countries have blocked access to us. */ @@ -4362,30 +4559,7 @@ typedef struct { int after_firsthop_idx; } network_liveness_t; -/** Structure for circuit build times history */ -typedef struct { - /** The circular array of recorded build times in milliseconds */ - build_time_t circuit_build_times[CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE]; - /** Current index in the circuit_build_times circular array */ - int build_times_idx; - /** Total number of build times accumulated. Max CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE */ - int total_build_times; - /** Information about the state of our local network connection */ - network_liveness_t liveness; - /** Last time we built a circuit. Used to decide to build new test circs */ - time_t last_circ_at; - /** "Minimum" value of our pareto distribution (actually mode) */ - build_time_t Xm; - /** alpha exponent for pareto dist. */ - double alpha; - /** Have we computed a timeout? */ - int have_computed_timeout; - /** The exact value for that timeout in milliseconds. Stored as a double - * to maintain precision from calculations to and from quantile value. */ - double timeout_ms; - /** How long we wait before actually closing the circuit. */ - double close_ms; -} circuit_build_times_t; +typedef struct circuit_build_times_s circuit_build_times_t; /********************************* config.c ***************************/ diff --git a/src/or/relay.c b/src/or/relay.c index 63119cbf0..0c9267a9a 100644 --- a/src/or/relay.c +++ b/src/or/relay.c @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include "addressmap.h" #include "buffers.h" #include "channel.h" +#include "circpathbias.h" #include "circuitbuild.h" #include "circuitlist.h" #include "circuituse.h" @@ -58,6 +59,9 @@ static void adjust_exit_policy_from_exitpolicy_failure(origin_circuit_t *circ, entry_connection_t *conn, node_t *node, const tor_addr_t *addr); +#if 0 +static int get_max_middle_cells(void); +#endif /** Stop reading on edge connections when we have this many cells * waiting on the appropriate queue. */ @@ -966,7 +970,7 @@ remap_event_helper(entry_connection_t *conn, const tor_addr_t *new_addr) * <b>addr_out</b> to the address we're connected to, and <b>ttl_out</b> to * the ttl of that address, in seconds, and return 0. On failure, return * -1. */ -int +STATIC int connected_cell_parse(const relay_header_t *rh, const cell_t *cell, tor_addr_t *addr_out, int *ttl_out) { @@ -1104,8 +1108,9 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell_not_open( break; case DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_SERVERDESC: case DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_MICRODESC: - control_event_bootstrap(BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_LOADING_DESCRIPTORS, - count_loading_descriptors_progress()); + if (TO_DIR_CONN(dirconn)->router_purpose == ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL) + control_event_bootstrap(BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_LOADING_DESCRIPTORS, + count_loading_descriptors_progress()); break; } } @@ -1495,7 +1500,8 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, if (layer_hint) { if (layer_hint->package_window + CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT > CIRCWINDOW_START_MAX) { - log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + static struct ratelim_t exit_warn_ratelim = RATELIM_INIT(600); + log_fn_ratelim(&exit_warn_ratelim, LOG_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, "Unexpected sendme cell from exit relay. " "Closing circ."); return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL; @@ -1507,7 +1513,8 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ, } else { if (circ->package_window + CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT > CIRCWINDOW_START_MAX) { - log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + static struct ratelim_t client_warn_ratelim = RATELIM_INIT(600); + log_fn_ratelim(&client_warn_ratelim, LOG_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, "Unexpected sendme cell from client. " "Closing circ (window %d).", circ->package_window); @@ -2044,6 +2051,10 @@ static mp_pool_t *cell_pool = NULL; * statistics. */ static mp_pool_t *it_pool = NULL; +/** Memory pool to allocate insertion_command_elem_t objects used for cell + * statistics if CELL_STATS events are enabled. */ +static mp_pool_t *ic_pool = NULL; + /** Allocate structures to hold cells. */ void init_cell_pool(void) @@ -2052,8 +2063,8 @@ init_cell_pool(void) cell_pool = mp_pool_new(sizeof(packed_cell_t), 128*1024); } -/** Free all storage used to hold cells (and insertion times if we measure - * cell statistics). */ +/** Free all storage used to hold cells (and insertion times/commands if we + * measure cell statistics and/or if CELL_STATS events are enabled). */ void free_cell_pool(void) { @@ -2066,6 +2077,10 @@ free_cell_pool(void) mp_pool_destroy(it_pool); it_pool = NULL; } + if (ic_pool) { + mp_pool_destroy(ic_pool); + ic_pool = NULL; + } } /** Free excess storage in cell pool. */ @@ -2085,7 +2100,7 @@ packed_cell_free_unchecked(packed_cell_t *cell) } /** Allocate and return a new packed_cell_t. */ -static INLINE packed_cell_t * +STATIC packed_cell_t * packed_cell_new(void) { ++total_cells_allocated; @@ -2096,6 +2111,8 @@ packed_cell_new(void) void packed_cell_free(packed_cell_t *cell) { + if (!cell) + return; packed_cell_free_unchecked(cell); } @@ -2107,7 +2124,7 @@ dump_cell_pool_usage(int severity) circuit_t *c; int n_circs = 0; int n_cells = 0; - for (c = circuit_get_global_list_(); c; c = c->next) { + TOR_LIST_FOREACH(c, circuit_get_global_list(), head) { n_cells += c->n_chan_cells.n; if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(c)) n_cells += TO_OR_CIRCUIT(c)->p_chan_cells.n; @@ -2125,7 +2142,6 @@ packed_cell_copy(const cell_t *cell, int wide_circ_ids) { packed_cell_t *c = packed_cell_new(); cell_pack(c, cell, wide_circ_ids); - c->next = NULL; return c; } @@ -2133,21 +2149,69 @@ packed_cell_copy(const cell_t *cell, int wide_circ_ids) void cell_queue_append(cell_queue_t *queue, packed_cell_t *cell) { - if (queue->tail) { - tor_assert(!queue->tail->next); - queue->tail->next = cell; + TOR_SIMPLEQ_INSERT_TAIL(&queue->head, cell, next); + ++queue->n; +} + +/** Append command of type <b>command</b> in direction to <b>queue</b> for + * CELL_STATS event. */ +static void +cell_command_queue_append(cell_queue_t *queue, uint8_t command) +{ + insertion_command_queue_t *ic_queue = queue->insertion_commands; + if (!ic_pool) + ic_pool = mp_pool_new(sizeof(insertion_command_elem_t), 1024); + if (!ic_queue) { + ic_queue = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(insertion_command_queue_t)); + queue->insertion_commands = ic_queue; + } + if (ic_queue->last && ic_queue->last->command == command) { + ic_queue->last->counter++; } else { - queue->head = cell; + insertion_command_elem_t *elem = mp_pool_get(ic_pool); + elem->next = NULL; + elem->command = command; + elem->counter = 1; + if (ic_queue->last) { + ic_queue->last->next = elem; + ic_queue->last = elem; + } else { + ic_queue->first = ic_queue->last = elem; + } } - queue->tail = cell; - cell->next = NULL; - ++queue->n; } -/** Append a newly allocated copy of <b>cell</b> to the end of <b>queue</b> */ +/** Retrieve oldest command from <b>queue</b> and write it to + * <b>command</b> for CELL_STATS event. Return 0 for success, -1 + * otherwise. */ +static int +cell_command_queue_pop(uint8_t *command, cell_queue_t *queue) +{ + int res = -1; + insertion_command_queue_t *ic_queue = queue->insertion_commands; + if (ic_queue && ic_queue->first) { + insertion_command_elem_t *ic_elem = ic_queue->first; + ic_elem->counter--; + if (ic_elem->counter < 1) { + ic_queue->first = ic_elem->next; + if (ic_elem == ic_queue->last) + ic_queue->last = NULL; + mp_pool_release(ic_elem); + } + *command = ic_elem->command; + res = 0; + } + return res; +} + +/** Append a newly allocated copy of <b>cell</b> to the end of the + * <b>exitward</b> (or app-ward) <b>queue</b> of <b>circ</b>. If + * <b>use_stats</b> is true, record statistics about the cell. + */ void -cell_queue_append_packed_copy(cell_queue_t *queue, const cell_t *cell, - int wide_circ_ids) +cell_queue_append_packed_copy(circuit_t *circ, cell_queue_t *queue, + int exitward, const cell_t *cell, + int wide_circ_ids, int use_stats) { struct timeval now; packed_cell_t *copy = packed_cell_copy(cell, wide_circ_ids); @@ -2156,7 +2220,9 @@ cell_queue_append_packed_copy(cell_queue_t *queue, const cell_t *cell, /* Remember the time when this cell was put in the queue. */ /*XXXX This may be obsoleted by inserted_time */ - if (get_options()->CellStatistics) { + if ((get_options()->CellStatistics || + get_options()->TestingEnableCellStatsEvent) && use_stats) { + struct timeval now; uint32_t added; insertion_time_queue_t *it_queue = queue->insertion_times; if (!it_pool) @@ -2184,21 +2250,39 @@ cell_queue_append_packed_copy(cell_queue_t *queue, const cell_t *cell, } } } + /* Remember that we added a cell to the queue, and remember the cell + * command. */ + if (get_options()->TestingEnableCellStatsEvent && circ) { + testing_cell_stats_entry_t *ent = + tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(testing_cell_stats_entry_t)); + ent->command = cell->command; + ent->exitward = exitward; + if (!circ->testing_cell_stats) + circ->testing_cell_stats = smartlist_new(); + smartlist_add(circ->testing_cell_stats, ent); + cell_command_queue_append(queue, cell->command); + } cell_queue_append(queue, copy); } +/** Initialize <b>queue</b> as an empty cell queue. */ +void +cell_queue_init(cell_queue_t *queue) +{ + memset(queue, 0, sizeof(cell_queue_t)); + TOR_SIMPLEQ_INIT(&queue->head); +} + /** Remove and free every cell in <b>queue</b>. */ void cell_queue_clear(cell_queue_t *queue) { - packed_cell_t *cell, *next; - cell = queue->head; - while (cell) { - next = cell->next; + packed_cell_t *cell; + while ((cell = TOR_SIMPLEQ_FIRST(&queue->head))) { + TOR_SIMPLEQ_REMOVE_HEAD(&queue->head, next); packed_cell_free_unchecked(cell); - cell = next; } - queue->head = queue->tail = NULL; + TOR_SIMPLEQ_INIT(&queue->head); queue->n = 0; if (queue->insertion_times) { while (queue->insertion_times->first) { @@ -2212,17 +2296,13 @@ cell_queue_clear(cell_queue_t *queue) /** Extract and return the cell at the head of <b>queue</b>; return NULL if * <b>queue</b> is empty. */ -static INLINE packed_cell_t * +STATIC packed_cell_t * cell_queue_pop(cell_queue_t *queue) { - packed_cell_t *cell = queue->head; + packed_cell_t *cell = TOR_SIMPLEQ_FIRST(&queue->head); if (!cell) return NULL; - queue->head = cell->next; - if (cell == queue->tail) { - tor_assert(!queue->head); - queue->tail = NULL; - } + TOR_SIMPLEQ_REMOVE_HEAD(&queue->head, next); --queue->n; return cell; } @@ -2373,7 +2453,7 @@ channel_flush_from_first_active_circuit(channel_t *chan, int max) { circuitmux_t *cmux = NULL; int n_flushed = 0; - cell_queue_t *queue; + cell_queue_t *queue, *destroy_queue=NULL; circuit_t *circ; or_circuit_t *or_circ; int streams_blocked; @@ -2386,7 +2466,18 @@ channel_flush_from_first_active_circuit(channel_t *chan, int max) /* Main loop: pick a circuit, send a cell, update the cmux */ while (n_flushed < max) { - circ = circuitmux_get_first_active_circuit(cmux); + circ = circuitmux_get_first_active_circuit(cmux, &destroy_queue); + if (destroy_queue) { + /* this code is duplicated from some of the logic below. Ugly! XXXX */ + tor_assert(destroy_queue->n > 0); + cell = cell_queue_pop(destroy_queue); + channel_write_packed_cell(chan, cell); + /* Update the cmux destroy counter */ + circuitmux_notify_xmit_destroy(cmux); + cell = NULL; + ++n_flushed; + continue; + } /* If it returns NULL, no cells left to send */ if (!circ) break; assert_cmux_ok_paranoid(chan); @@ -2412,7 +2503,8 @@ channel_flush_from_first_active_circuit(channel_t *chan, int max) cell = cell_queue_pop(queue); /* Calculate the exact time that this cell has spent in the queue. */ - if (get_options()->CellStatistics && !CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { + if (get_options()->CellStatistics || + get_options()->TestingEnableCellStatsEvent) { struct timeval tvnow; uint32_t flushed; uint32_t cell_waiting_time; @@ -2426,7 +2518,6 @@ channel_flush_from_first_active_circuit(channel_t *chan, int max) "recently enabled."); } else { insertion_time_elem_t *elem = it_queue->first; - or_circ = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ); cell_waiting_time = (uint32_t)((flushed * 10L + SECONDS_IN_A_DAY * 1000L - elem->insertion_time * 10L) % @@ -2439,8 +2530,30 @@ channel_flush_from_first_active_circuit(channel_t *chan, int max) it_queue->last = NULL; mp_pool_release(elem); } - or_circ->total_cell_waiting_time += cell_waiting_time; - or_circ->processed_cells++; + if (get_options()->CellStatistics && !CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { + or_circ = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ); + or_circ->total_cell_waiting_time += cell_waiting_time; + or_circ->processed_cells++; + } + if (get_options()->TestingEnableCellStatsEvent) { + uint8_t command; + if (cell_command_queue_pop(&command, queue) < 0) { + log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Cannot determine command of cell. " + "Looks like the CELL_STATS event was " + "recently enabled."); + } else { + testing_cell_stats_entry_t *ent = + tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(testing_cell_stats_entry_t)); + ent->command = command; + ent->waiting_time = (unsigned int)cell_waiting_time / 10; + ent->removed = 1; + if (circ->n_chan == chan) + ent->exitward = 1; + if (!circ->testing_cell_stats) + circ->testing_cell_stats = smartlist_new(); + smartlist_add(circ->testing_cell_stats, ent); + } + } } } @@ -2487,6 +2600,20 @@ channel_flush_from_first_active_circuit(channel_t *chan, int max) return n_flushed; } +#if 0 +/** Indicate the current preferred cap for middle circuits; zero disables + * the cap. Right now it's just a constant, ORCIRC_MAX_MIDDLE_CELLS, but + * the logic in append_cell_to_circuit_queue() is written to be correct + * if we want to base it on a consensus param or something that might change + * in the future. + */ +static int +get_max_middle_cells(void) +{ + return ORCIRC_MAX_MIDDLE_CELLS; +} +#endif + /** Add <b>cell</b> to the queue of <b>circ</b> writing to <b>chan</b> * transmitting in <b>direction</b>. */ void @@ -2497,11 +2624,16 @@ append_cell_to_circuit_queue(circuit_t *circ, channel_t *chan, or_circuit_t *orcirc = NULL; cell_queue_t *queue; int streams_blocked; +#if 0 + uint32_t tgt_max_middle_cells, p_len, n_len, tmp, hard_max_middle_cells; +#endif + int exitward; if (circ->marked_for_close) return; - if (direction == CELL_DIRECTION_OUT) { + exitward = (direction == CELL_DIRECTION_OUT); + if (exitward) { queue = &circ->n_chan_cells; streams_blocked = circ->streams_blocked_on_n_chan; } else { @@ -2518,28 +2650,82 @@ append_cell_to_circuit_queue(circuit_t *circ, channel_t *chan, if ((circ->n_chan != NULL) && CIRCUIT_IS_ORCIRC(circ)) { orcirc = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ); if (orcirc->p_chan) { - if (queue->n + 1 >= ORCIRC_MAX_MIDDLE_CELLS) { - /* Queueing this cell would put queue over the cap */ - log_warn(LD_CIRC, - "Got a cell exceeding the cap of %u in the %s direction " - "on middle circ ID %u on chan ID " U64_FORMAT - "; killing the circuit.", - ORCIRC_MAX_MIDDLE_CELLS, - (direction == CELL_DIRECTION_OUT) ? "n" : "p", - (direction == CELL_DIRECTION_OUT) ? - circ->n_circ_id : orcirc->p_circ_id, - U64_PRINTF_ARG( + /* We are a middle circuit if we have both n_chan and p_chan */ + /* We'll need to know the current preferred maximum */ + tgt_max_middle_cells = get_max_middle_cells(); + if (tgt_max_middle_cells > 0) { + /* Do we need to initialize middle_max_cells? */ + if (orcirc->max_middle_cells == 0) { + orcirc->max_middle_cells = tgt_max_middle_cells; + } else { + if (tgt_max_middle_cells > orcirc->max_middle_cells) { + /* If we want to increase the cap, we can do so right away */ + orcirc->max_middle_cells = tgt_max_middle_cells; + } else if (tgt_max_middle_cells < orcirc->max_middle_cells) { + /* + * If we're shrinking the cap, we can't shrink past either queue; + * compare tgt_max_middle_cells rather than tgt_max_middle_cells * + * ORCIRC_MAX_MIDDLE_KILL_THRESH so the queues don't shrink enough + * to generate spurious warnings, either. + */ + n_len = circ->n_chan_cells.n; + p_len = orcirc->p_chan_cells.n; + tmp = tgt_max_middle_cells; + if (tmp < n_len) tmp = n_len; + if (tmp < p_len) tmp = p_len; + orcirc->max_middle_cells = tmp; + } + /* else no change */ + } + } else { + /* tgt_max_middle_cells == 0 indicates we should disable the cap */ + orcirc->max_middle_cells = 0; + } + + /* Now we know orcirc->max_middle_cells is set correctly */ + if (orcirc->max_middle_cells > 0) { + hard_max_middle_cells = + (uint32_t)(((double)orcirc->max_middle_cells) * + ORCIRC_MAX_MIDDLE_KILL_THRESH); + + if ((unsigned)queue->n + 1 >= hard_max_middle_cells) { + /* Queueing this cell would put queue over the kill theshold */ + log_warn(LD_CIRC, + "Got a cell exceeding the hard cap of %u in the " + "%s direction on middle circ ID %u on chan ID " + U64_FORMAT "; killing the circuit.", + hard_max_middle_cells, + (direction == CELL_DIRECTION_OUT) ? "n" : "p", + (direction == CELL_DIRECTION_OUT) ? + circ->n_circ_id : orcirc->p_circ_id, + U64_PRINTF_ARG( + (direction == CELL_DIRECTION_OUT) ? + circ->n_chan->global_identifier : + orcirc->p_chan->global_identifier)); + circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT); + return; + } else if ((unsigned)queue->n + 1 == orcirc->max_middle_cells) { + /* Only use ==, not >= for this test so we don't spam the log */ + log_warn(LD_CIRC, + "While trying to queue a cell, reached the soft cap of %u " + "in the %s direction on middle circ ID %u " + "on chan ID " U64_FORMAT ".", + orcirc->max_middle_cells, + (direction == CELL_DIRECTION_OUT) ? "n" : "p", (direction == CELL_DIRECTION_OUT) ? - circ->n_chan->global_identifier : - orcirc->p_chan->global_identifier)); - circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT); - return; + circ->n_circ_id : orcirc->p_circ_id, + U64_PRINTF_ARG( + (direction == CELL_DIRECTION_OUT) ? + circ->n_chan->global_identifier : + orcirc->p_chan->global_identifier)); + } } } } #endif - cell_queue_append_packed_copy(queue, cell, chan->wide_circ_ids); + cell_queue_append_packed_copy(circ, queue, exitward, cell, + chan->wide_circ_ids, 1); if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(cell_queues_check_size())) { /* We ran the OOM handler */ diff --git a/src/or/relay.h b/src/or/relay.h index 1fef10a7d..20eecfb40 100644 --- a/src/or/relay.h +++ b/src/or/relay.h @@ -51,10 +51,12 @@ size_t packed_cell_mem_cost(void); /* For channeltls.c */ void packed_cell_free(packed_cell_t *cell); +void cell_queue_init(cell_queue_t *queue); void cell_queue_clear(cell_queue_t *queue); void cell_queue_append(cell_queue_t *queue, packed_cell_t *cell); -void cell_queue_append_packed_copy(cell_queue_t *queue, const cell_t *cell, - int wide_circ_ids); +void cell_queue_append_packed_copy(circuit_t *circ, cell_queue_t *queue, + int exitward, const cell_t *cell, + int wide_circ_ids, int use_stats); void append_cell_to_circuit_queue(circuit_t *circ, channel_t *chan, cell_t *cell, cell_direction_t direction, @@ -75,11 +77,14 @@ void circuit_clear_cell_queue(circuit_t *circ, channel_t *chan); void stream_choice_seed_weak_rng(void); -#ifdef RELAY_PRIVATE int relay_crypt(circuit_t *circ, cell_t *cell, cell_direction_t cell_direction, crypt_path_t **layer_hint, char *recognized); -int connected_cell_parse(const relay_header_t *rh, const cell_t *cell, + +#ifdef RELAY_PRIVATE +STATIC int connected_cell_parse(const relay_header_t *rh, const cell_t *cell, tor_addr_t *addr_out, int *ttl_out); +STATIC packed_cell_t *packed_cell_new(void); +STATIC packed_cell_t *cell_queue_pop(cell_queue_t *queue); #endif #endif diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index bb4bd9bfd..f00303f18 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ **/ #include "or.h" +#include "circpathbias.h" #include "circuitbuild.h" #include "circuitlist.h" #include "circuituse.h" @@ -376,7 +377,7 @@ rend_client_close_other_intros(const char *onion_address) { circuit_t *c; /* abort parallel intro circs, if any */ - for (c = circuit_get_global_list_(); c; c = c->next) { + TOR_LIST_FOREACH(c, circuit_get_global_list(), head) { if ((c->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING || c->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT) && !c->marked_for_close && CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(c)) { diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index 8a4a11e47..cb2f96299 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #define RENDSERVICE_PRIVATE #include "or.h" +#include "circpathbias.h" #include "circuitbuild.h" #include "circuitlist.h" #include "circuituse.h" @@ -543,7 +544,7 @@ rend_config_services(const or_options_t *options, int validate_only) /* XXXX it would be nicer if we had a nicer abstraction to use here, * so we could just iterate over the list of services to close, but * once again, this isn't critical-path code. */ - for (circ = circuit_get_global_list_(); circ; circ = circ->next) { + TOR_LIST_FOREACH(circ, circuit_get_global_list(), head) { if (!circ->marked_for_close && circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN && (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO || @@ -1208,7 +1209,7 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, /* check for replay of PK-encrypted portion. */ replay = replaycache_add_test_and_elapsed( intro_point->accepted_intro_rsa_parts, - parsed_req->ciphertext, (int)parsed_req->ciphertext_len, + parsed_req->ciphertext, parsed_req->ciphertext_len, &elapsed); if (replay) { @@ -2376,7 +2377,7 @@ count_established_intro_points(const char *query) { int num_ipos = 0; circuit_t *circ; - for (circ = circuit_get_global_list_(); circ; circ = circ->next) { + TOR_LIST_FOREACH(circ, circuit_get_global_list(), head) { if (!circ->marked_for_close && circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN && (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO || diff --git a/src/or/rephist.c b/src/or/rephist.c index 131e531b1..13404badf 100644 --- a/src/or/rephist.c +++ b/src/or/rephist.c @@ -2313,7 +2313,7 @@ rep_hist_format_exit_stats(time_t now) time_t rep_hist_exit_stats_write(time_t now) { - char *statsdir = NULL, *filename = NULL, *str = NULL; + char *str = NULL; if (!start_of_exit_stats_interval) return 0; /* Not initialized. */ @@ -2329,19 +2329,12 @@ rep_hist_exit_stats_write(time_t now) rep_hist_reset_exit_stats(now); /* Try to write to disk. */ - statsdir = get_datadir_fname("stats"); - if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE, get_options()->User) < 0) { - log_warn(LD_HIST, "Unable to create stats/ directory!"); - goto done; + if (!check_or_create_data_subdir("stats")) { + write_to_data_subdir("stats", "exit-stats", str, "exit port statistics"); } - filename = get_datadir_fname2("stats", "exit-stats"); - if (write_str_to_file(filename, str, 0) < 0) - log_warn(LD_HIST, "Unable to write exit port statistics to disk!"); done: tor_free(str); - tor_free(statsdir); - tor_free(filename); return start_of_exit_stats_interval + WRITE_STATS_INTERVAL; } @@ -2598,7 +2591,7 @@ time_t rep_hist_buffer_stats_write(time_t now) { circuit_t *circ; - char *statsdir = NULL, *filename = NULL, *str = NULL; + char *str = NULL; if (!start_of_buffer_stats_interval) return 0; /* Not initialized. */ @@ -2606,7 +2599,7 @@ rep_hist_buffer_stats_write(time_t now) goto done; /* Not ready to write */ /* Add open circuits to the history. */ - for (circ = circuit_get_global_list_(); circ; circ = circ->next) { + TOR_LIST_FOREACH(circ, circuit_get_global_list(), head) { rep_hist_buffer_stats_add_circ(circ, now); } @@ -2617,19 +2610,12 @@ rep_hist_buffer_stats_write(time_t now) rep_hist_reset_buffer_stats(now); /* Try to write to disk. */ - statsdir = get_datadir_fname("stats"); - if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE, get_options()->User) < 0) { - log_warn(LD_HIST, "Unable to create stats/ directory!"); - goto done; + if (!check_or_create_data_subdir("stats")) { + write_to_data_subdir("stats", "buffer-stats", str, "buffer statistics"); } - filename = get_datadir_fname2("stats", "buffer-stats"); - if (write_str_to_file(filename, str, 0) < 0) - log_warn(LD_HIST, "Unable to write buffer stats to disk!"); done: tor_free(str); - tor_free(filename); - tor_free(statsdir); return start_of_buffer_stats_interval + WRITE_STATS_INTERVAL; } @@ -2741,7 +2727,7 @@ rep_hist_format_desc_stats(time_t now) time_t rep_hist_desc_stats_write(time_t now) { - char *statsdir = NULL, *filename = NULL, *str = NULL; + char *filename = NULL, *str = NULL; if (!start_of_served_descs_stats_interval) return 0; /* We're not collecting stats. */ @@ -2751,10 +2737,8 @@ rep_hist_desc_stats_write(time_t now) str = rep_hist_format_desc_stats(now); tor_assert(str != NULL); - statsdir = get_datadir_fname("stats"); - if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE, get_options()->User) < 0) { - log_warn(LD_HIST, "Unable to create stats/ directory!"); - goto done; + if (check_or_create_data_subdir("stats") < 0) { + goto done; } filename = get_datadir_fname2("stats", "served-desc-stats"); if (append_bytes_to_file(filename, str, strlen(str), 0) < 0) @@ -2763,7 +2747,6 @@ rep_hist_desc_stats_write(time_t now) rep_hist_reset_desc_stats(now); done: - tor_free(statsdir); tor_free(filename); tor_free(str); return start_of_served_descs_stats_interval + WRITE_STATS_INTERVAL; @@ -2981,7 +2964,7 @@ rep_hist_format_conn_stats(time_t now) time_t rep_hist_conn_stats_write(time_t now) { - char *statsdir = NULL, *filename = NULL, *str = NULL; + char *str = NULL; if (!start_of_conn_stats_interval) return 0; /* Not initialized. */ @@ -2995,19 +2978,12 @@ rep_hist_conn_stats_write(time_t now) rep_hist_reset_conn_stats(now); /* Try to write to disk. */ - statsdir = get_datadir_fname("stats"); - if (check_private_dir(statsdir, CPD_CREATE, get_options()->User) < 0) { - log_warn(LD_HIST, "Unable to create stats/ directory!"); - goto done; + if (!check_or_create_data_subdir("stats")) { + write_to_data_subdir("stats", "conn-stats", str, "connection statistics"); } - filename = get_datadir_fname2("stats", "conn-stats"); - if (write_str_to_file(filename, str, 0) < 0) - log_warn(LD_HIST, "Unable to write conn stats to disk!"); done: tor_free(str); - tor_free(filename); - tor_free(statsdir); return start_of_conn_stats_interval + WRITE_STATS_INTERVAL; } diff --git a/src/or/replaycache.c b/src/or/replaycache.c index 59b98489b..90f87c12d 100644 --- a/src/or/replaycache.c +++ b/src/or/replaycache.c @@ -63,9 +63,9 @@ replaycache_new(time_t horizon, time_t interval) /** See documentation for replaycache_add_and_test() */ -int +STATIC int replaycache_add_and_test_internal( - time_t present, replaycache_t *r, const void *data, int len, + time_t present, replaycache_t *r, const void *data, size_t len, time_t *elapsed) { int rv = 0; @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ replaycache_add_and_test_internal( time_t *access_time; /* sanity check */ - if (present <= 0 || !r || !data || len <= 0) { + if (present <= 0 || !r || !data || len == 0) { log_info(LD_BUG, "replaycache_add_and_test_internal() called with stupid" " parameters; please fix this."); goto done; @@ -127,14 +127,13 @@ replaycache_add_and_test_internal( /** See documentation for replaycache_scrub_if_needed() */ -void +STATIC void replaycache_scrub_if_needed_internal(time_t present, replaycache_t *r) { digestmap_iter_t *itr = NULL; const char *digest; void *valp; time_t *access_time; - char scrub_this; /* sanity check */ if (!r || !(r->digests_seen)) { @@ -152,20 +151,10 @@ replaycache_scrub_if_needed_internal(time_t present, replaycache_t *r) /* okay, scrub time */ itr = digestmap_iter_init(r->digests_seen); while (!digestmap_iter_done(itr)) { - scrub_this = 0; digestmap_iter_get(itr, &digest, &valp); access_time = (time_t *)valp; - if (access_time) { - /* aged out yet? */ - if (*access_time < present - r->horizon) scrub_this = 1; - } else { - /* Buh? Get rid of it, anyway */ - log_info(LD_BUG, "replaycache_scrub_if_needed_internal() saw a NULL" - " entry in the digestmap."); - scrub_this = 1; - } - - if (scrub_this) { + /* aged out yet? */ + if (*access_time < present - r->horizon) { /* Advance the iterator and remove this one */ itr = digestmap_iter_next_rmv(r->digests_seen, itr); /* Free the value removed */ @@ -187,7 +176,7 @@ replaycache_scrub_if_needed_internal(time_t present, replaycache_t *r) */ int -replaycache_add_and_test(replaycache_t *r, const void *data, int len) +replaycache_add_and_test(replaycache_t *r, const void *data, size_t len) { return replaycache_add_and_test_internal(time(NULL), r, data, len, NULL); } @@ -198,7 +187,7 @@ replaycache_add_and_test(replaycache_t *r, const void *data, int len) int replaycache_add_test_and_elapsed( - replaycache_t *r, const void *data, int len, time_t *elapsed) + replaycache_t *r, const void *data, size_t len, time_t *elapsed) { return replaycache_add_and_test_internal(time(NULL), r, data, len, elapsed); } diff --git a/src/or/replaycache.h b/src/or/replaycache.h index de20cab62..cd713fe89 100644 --- a/src/or/replaycache.h +++ b/src/or/replaycache.h @@ -45,10 +45,10 @@ replaycache_t * replaycache_new(time_t horizon, time_t interval); * testing. For everything else, use the wrappers below instead. */ -int replaycache_add_and_test_internal( - time_t present, replaycache_t *r, const void *data, int len, +STATIC int replaycache_add_and_test_internal( + time_t present, replaycache_t *r, const void *data, size_t len, time_t *elapsed); -void replaycache_scrub_if_needed_internal( +STATIC void replaycache_scrub_if_needed_internal( time_t present, replaycache_t *r); #endif /* REPLAYCACHE_PRIVATE */ @@ -57,9 +57,9 @@ void replaycache_scrub_if_needed_internal( * replaycache_t methods */ -int replaycache_add_and_test(replaycache_t *r, const void *data, int len); +int replaycache_add_and_test(replaycache_t *r, const void *data, size_t len); int replaycache_add_test_and_elapsed( - replaycache_t *r, const void *data, int len, time_t *elapsed); + replaycache_t *r, const void *data, size_t len, time_t *elapsed); void replaycache_scrub_if_needed(replaycache_t *r); #endif diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c index eabd9c3f5..959e5e34c 100644 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@ -232,7 +232,8 @@ get_server_identity_key(void) return server_identitykey; } -/** Return true iff the server identity key has been set. */ +/** Return true iff we are a server and the server identity key + * has been set. */ int server_identity_key_is_set(void) { @@ -2249,7 +2250,7 @@ router_guess_address_from_dir_headers(uint32_t *guess) * string describing the version of Tor and the operating system we're * currently running on. */ -void +STATIC void get_platform_str(char *platform, size_t len) { tor_snprintf(platform, len, "Tor %s on %s", diff --git a/src/or/router.h b/src/or/router.h index 60095d087..1079ec78c 100644 --- a/src/or/router.h +++ b/src/or/router.h @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ #ifndef TOR_ROUTER_H #define TOR_ROUTER_H +#include "testsupport.h" + crypto_pk_t *get_onion_key(void); time_t get_onion_key_set_at(void); void set_server_identity_key(crypto_pk_t *k); @@ -146,7 +148,7 @@ smartlist_t *router_get_all_orports(const routerinfo_t *ri); #ifdef ROUTER_PRIVATE /* Used only by router.c and test.c */ -void get_platform_str(char *platform, size_t len); +STATIC void get_platform_str(char *platform, size_t len); #endif #endif diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index c28de24b6..c0c4d9a4c 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ #include "routerlist.h" #include "routerparse.h" #include "routerset.h" - +#include "../common/sandbox.h" // #define DEBUG_ROUTERLIST /****************************************************************************/ @@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ trusted_dirs_flush_certs_to_disk(void) } DIGESTMAP_FOREACH_END; filename = get_datadir_fname("cached-certs"); - if (write_chunks_to_file(filename, chunks, 0)) { + if (write_chunks_to_file(filename, chunks, 0, 0)) { log_warn(LD_FS, "Error writing certificates to disk."); } tor_free(filename); @@ -650,9 +650,6 @@ authority_cert_dl_looks_uncertain(const char *id_digest) return n_failures >= N_AUTH_CERT_DL_FAILURES_TO_BUG_USER; } -/** How many times will we try to fetch a certificate before giving up? */ -#define MAX_CERT_DL_FAILURES 8 - /** Try to download any v3 authority certificates that we may be missing. If * <b>status</b> is provided, try to get all the ones that were used to sign * <b>status</b>. Additionally, try to have a non-expired certificate for @@ -724,7 +721,7 @@ authority_certs_fetch_missing(networkstatus_t *status, time_t now) } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(cert); if (!found && download_status_is_ready(&(cl->dl_status_by_id), now, - MAX_CERT_DL_FAILURES) && + get_options()->TestingCertMaxDownloadTries) && !digestmap_get(pending_id, ds->v3_identity_digest)) { log_info(LD_DIR, "No current certificate known for authority %s " @@ -786,7 +783,7 @@ authority_certs_fetch_missing(networkstatus_t *status, time_t now) } if (download_status_is_ready_by_sk_in_cl( cl, sig->signing_key_digest, - now, MAX_CERT_DL_FAILURES) && + now, get_options()->TestingCertMaxDownloadTries) && !fp_pair_map_get_by_digests(pending_cert, voter->identity_digest, sig->signing_key_digest)) { @@ -1072,7 +1069,7 @@ router_rebuild_store(int flags, desc_store_t *store) smartlist_add(chunk_list, c); } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(sd); - if (write_chunks_to_file(fname_tmp, chunk_list, 1)<0) { + if (write_chunks_to_file(fname_tmp, chunk_list, 1, 1)<0) { log_warn(LD_FS, "Error writing router store to disk."); goto done; } @@ -1147,32 +1144,18 @@ router_rebuild_store(int flags, desc_store_t *store) static int router_reload_router_list_impl(desc_store_t *store) { - char *fname = NULL, *altname = NULL, *contents = NULL; + char *fname = NULL, *contents = NULL; struct stat st; - int read_from_old_location = 0; int extrainfo = (store->type == EXTRAINFO_STORE); - time_t now = time(NULL); store->journal_len = store->store_len = 0; fname = get_datadir_fname(store->fname_base); - if (store->fname_alt_base) - altname = get_datadir_fname(store->fname_alt_base); if (store->mmap) /* get rid of it first */ tor_munmap_file(store->mmap); store->mmap = NULL; store->mmap = tor_mmap_file(fname); - if (!store->mmap && altname && file_status(altname) == FN_FILE) { - read_from_old_location = 1; - log_notice(LD_DIR, "Couldn't read %s; trying to load routers from old " - "location %s.", fname, altname); - if ((store->mmap = tor_mmap_file(altname))) - read_from_old_location = 1; - } - if (altname && !read_from_old_location) { - remove_file_if_very_old(altname, now); - } if (store->mmap) { store->store_len = store->mmap->size; if (extrainfo) @@ -1189,14 +1172,6 @@ router_reload_router_list_impl(desc_store_t *store) fname = get_datadir_fname_suffix(store->fname_base, ".new"); if (file_status(fname) == FN_FILE) contents = read_file_to_str(fname, RFTS_BIN|RFTS_IGNORE_MISSING, &st); - if (read_from_old_location) { - tor_free(altname); - altname = get_datadir_fname_suffix(store->fname_alt_base, ".new"); - if (!contents) - contents = read_file_to_str(altname, RFTS_BIN|RFTS_IGNORE_MISSING, &st); - else - remove_file_if_very_old(altname, now); - } if (contents) { if (extrainfo) router_load_extrainfo_from_string(contents, NULL,SAVED_IN_JOURNAL, @@ -1209,9 +1184,8 @@ router_reload_router_list_impl(desc_store_t *store) } tor_free(fname); - tor_free(altname); - if (store->journal_len || read_from_old_location) { + if (store->journal_len) { /* Always clear the journal on startup.*/ router_rebuild_store(RRS_FORCE, store); } else if (!extrainfo) { @@ -1848,7 +1822,7 @@ router_get_advertised_bandwidth_capped(const routerinfo_t *router) * doubles, convert them to uint64_t, and try to scale them linearly so as to * much of the range of uint64_t. If <b>total_out</b> is provided, set it to * the sum of all elements in the array _before_ scaling. */ -/* private */ void +STATIC void scale_array_elements_to_u64(u64_dbl_t *entries, int n_entries, uint64_t *total_out) { @@ -1891,7 +1865,7 @@ gt_i64_timei(uint64_t a, uint64_t b) * value, and return the index of that element. If all elements are 0, choose * an index at random. Return -1 on error. */ -/* private */ int +STATIC int choose_array_element_by_weight(const u64_dbl_t *entries, int n_entries) { int i, i_chosen=-1, n_chosen=0; @@ -2591,19 +2565,6 @@ router_is_named(const routerinfo_t *router) tor_memeq(digest, router->cache_info.identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN)); } -/** Return true iff the digest of <b>router</b>'s identity key, - * encoded in hexadecimal, matches <b>hexdigest</b> (which is - * optionally prefixed with a single dollar sign). Return false if - * <b>hexdigest</b> is malformed, or it doesn't match. */ -static INLINE int -router_hex_digest_matches(const routerinfo_t *router, const char *hexdigest) -{ - return hex_digest_nickname_matches(hexdigest, - router->cache_info.identity_digest, - router->nickname, - router_is_named(router)); -} - /** Return true iff <b>digest</b> is the digest of the identity key of a * trusted directory matching at least one bit of <b>type</b>. If <b>type</b> * is zero, any authority is okay. */ @@ -2798,7 +2759,6 @@ router_get_routerlist(void) routerlist->extra_info_map = eimap_new(); routerlist->desc_store.fname_base = "cached-descriptors"; - routerlist->desc_store.fname_alt_base = "cached-routers"; routerlist->extrainfo_store.fname_base = "cached-extrainfo"; routerlist->desc_store.type = ROUTER_STORE; @@ -4502,12 +4462,8 @@ initiate_descriptor_downloads(const routerstatus_t *source, * try to split our requests into at least this many requests. */ #define MIN_REQUESTS 3 /** If we want fewer than this many descriptors, wait until we - * want more, or until MAX_CLIENT_INTERVAL_WITHOUT_REQUEST has - * passed. */ + * want more, or until TestingClientMaxIntervalWithoutRequest has passed. */ #define MAX_DL_TO_DELAY 16 -/** When directory clients have only a few servers to request, they batch - * them until they have more, or until this amount of time has passed. */ -#define MAX_CLIENT_INTERVAL_WITHOUT_REQUEST (10*60) /** Given a <b>purpose</b> (FETCH_MICRODESC or FETCH_SERVERDESC) and a list of * router descriptor digests or microdescriptor digest256s in @@ -4539,7 +4495,7 @@ launch_descriptor_downloads(int purpose, should_delay = 0; } else { should_delay = (last_descriptor_download_attempted + - MAX_CLIENT_INTERVAL_WITHOUT_REQUEST) > now; + options->TestingClientMaxIntervalWithoutRequest) > now; if (!should_delay && n_downloadable) { if (last_descriptor_download_attempted) { log_info(LD_DIR, @@ -4812,7 +4768,7 @@ update_consensus_router_descriptor_downloads(time_t now, int is_vote, continue; /* We have an in-progress download. */ } if (!download_status_is_ready(&rs->dl_status, now, - MAX_ROUTERDESC_DOWNLOAD_FAILURES)) { + options->TestingDescriptorMaxDownloadTries)) { ++n_delayed; /* Not ready for retry. */ continue; } @@ -4972,7 +4928,7 @@ update_extrainfo_downloads(time_t now) continue; } if (!download_status_is_ready(&sd->ei_dl_status, now, - MAX_ROUTERDESC_DOWNLOAD_FAILURES)) { + options->TestingDescriptorMaxDownloadTries)) { ++n_delay; continue; } diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.h b/src/or/routerlist.h index ce0f0f2e3..0162297ca 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.h +++ b/src/or/routerlist.h @@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ #ifndef TOR_ROUTERLIST_H #define TOR_ROUTERLIST_H +#include "testsupport.h" + int get_n_authorities(dirinfo_type_t type); int trusted_dirs_reload_certs(void); @@ -206,9 +208,10 @@ typedef union u64_dbl_t { double dbl; } u64_dbl_t; -int choose_array_element_by_weight(const u64_dbl_t *entries, int n_entries); -void scale_array_elements_to_u64(u64_dbl_t *entries, int n_entries, - uint64_t *total_out); +STATIC int choose_array_element_by_weight(const u64_dbl_t *entries, + int n_entries); +STATIC void scale_array_elements_to_u64(u64_dbl_t *entries, int n_entries, + uint64_t *total_out); #endif #endif diff --git a/src/or/statefile.c b/src/or/statefile.c index bcb7b0741..8ab04763d 100644 --- a/src/or/statefile.c +++ b/src/or/statefile.c @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ * Copyright (c) 2007-2013, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ +#define STATEFILE_PRIVATE #include "or.h" #include "circuitstats.h" #include "config.h" @@ -90,8 +91,11 @@ static config_var_t state_vars_[] = { #undef VAR #undef V -static int or_state_validate(or_state_t *old_options, or_state_t *options, - int from_setconf, char **msg); +static int or_state_validate(or_state_t *state, char **msg); + +static int or_state_validate_cb(void *old_options, void *options, + void *default_options, + int from_setconf, char **msg); /** Magic value for or_state_t. */ #define OR_STATE_MAGIC 0x57A73f57 @@ -109,7 +113,7 @@ static const config_format_t state_format = { STRUCT_OFFSET(or_state_t, magic_), state_abbrevs_, state_vars_, - (validate_fn_t)or_state_validate, + or_state_validate_cb, &state_extra_var, }; @@ -117,8 +121,8 @@ static const config_format_t state_format = { static or_state_t *global_state = NULL; /** Return the persistent state struct for this Tor. */ -or_state_t * -get_or_state(void) +MOCK_IMPL(or_state_t *, +get_or_state, (void)) { tor_assert(global_state); return global_state; @@ -194,21 +198,27 @@ validate_transports_in_state(or_state_t *state) return 0; } -/** Return 0 if every setting in <b>state</b> is reasonable, and a - * permissible transition from <b>old_state</b>. Else warn and return -1. - * Should have no side effects, except for normalizing the contents of - * <b>state</b>. - */ -/* XXX from_setconf is here because of bug 238 */ static int -or_state_validate(or_state_t *old_state, or_state_t *state, - int from_setconf, char **msg) +or_state_validate_cb(void *old_state, void *state, void *default_state, + int from_setconf, char **msg) { /* We don't use these; only options do. Still, we need to match that * signature. */ (void) from_setconf; + (void) default_state; (void) old_state; + return or_state_validate(state, msg); +} + +/** Return 0 if every setting in <b>state</b> is reasonable, and a + * permissible transition from <b>old_state</b>. Else warn and return -1. + * Should have no side effects, except for normalizing the contents of + * <b>state</b>. + */ +static int +or_state_validate(or_state_t *state, char **msg) +{ if (entry_guards_parse_state(state, 0, msg)<0) return -1; @@ -237,7 +247,8 @@ or_state_set(or_state_t *new_state) tor_free(err); ret = -1; } - if (circuit_build_times_parse_state(&circ_times, global_state) < 0) { + if (circuit_build_times_parse_state( + get_circuit_build_times_mutable(),global_state) < 0) { ret = -1; } return ret; @@ -322,7 +333,7 @@ or_state_load(void) } } - if (!badstate && or_state_validate(NULL, new_state, 1, &errmsg) < 0) + if (!badstate && or_state_validate(new_state, &errmsg) < 0) badstate = 1; if (errmsg) { @@ -404,7 +415,7 @@ or_state_save(time_t now) * to avoid redundant writes. */ entry_guards_update_state(global_state); rep_hist_update_state(global_state); - circuit_build_times_update_state(&circ_times, global_state); + circuit_build_times_update_state(get_circuit_build_times(), global_state); if (accounting_is_enabled(get_options())) accounting_run_housekeeping(now); @@ -449,7 +460,7 @@ or_state_save(time_t now) /** Return the config line for transport <b>transport</b> in the current state. * Return NULL if there is no config line for <b>transport</b>. */ -static config_line_t * +STATIC config_line_t * get_transport_in_state_by_name(const char *transport) { or_state_t *or_state = get_or_state(); diff --git a/src/or/statefile.h b/src/or/statefile.h index dcdee6c60..c1413ff95 100644 --- a/src/or/statefile.h +++ b/src/or/statefile.h @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ #ifndef TOR_STATEFILE_H #define TOR_STATEFILE_H -or_state_t *get_or_state(void); +MOCK_DECL(or_state_t *,get_or_state,(void)); int did_last_state_file_write_fail(void); int or_state_save(time_t now); @@ -18,5 +18,9 @@ int or_state_load(void); int or_state_loaded(void); void or_state_free_all(void); +#ifdef STATEFILE_PRIVATE +STATIC config_line_t *get_transport_in_state_by_name(const char *transport); +#endif + #endif diff --git a/src/or/status.c b/src/or/status.c index d239e6ee7..6e2206e5e 100644 --- a/src/or/status.c +++ b/src/or/status.c @@ -15,6 +15,9 @@ #include "circuitlist.h" #include "main.h" #include "hibernate.h" +#include "statefile.h" + +static void log_accounting(const time_t now, const or_options_t *options); /** Return the total number of circuits. */ static int @@ -23,7 +26,7 @@ count_circuits(void) circuit_t *circ; int nr=0; - for (circ = circuit_get_global_list_(); circ; circ = circ->next) + TOR_LIST_FOREACH(circ, circuit_get_global_list(), head) nr++; return nr; @@ -111,6 +114,10 @@ log_heartbeat(time_t now) uptime, count_circuits(),bw_sent,bw_rcvd, hibernating?" We are currently hibernating.":""); + if (server_mode(options) && accounting_is_enabled(options) && !hibernating) { + log_accounting(now, options); + } + if (stats_n_data_cells_packaged && !hibernating) log_notice(LD_HEARTBEAT, "Average packaged cell fullness: %2.3f%%", 100*(U64_TO_DBL(stats_n_data_bytes_packaged) / @@ -128,3 +135,27 @@ log_heartbeat(time_t now) return 0; } +static void +log_accounting(const time_t now, const or_options_t *options) +{ + or_state_t *state = get_or_state(); + char *acc_rcvd = bytes_to_usage(state->AccountingBytesReadInInterval); + char *acc_sent = bytes_to_usage(state->AccountingBytesWrittenInInterval); + char *acc_max = bytes_to_usage(options->AccountingMax); + time_t interval_end = accounting_get_end_time(); + char end_buf[ISO_TIME_LEN + 1]; + char *remaining = NULL; + format_local_iso_time(end_buf, interval_end); + remaining = secs_to_uptime(interval_end - now); + + log_notice(LD_HEARTBEAT, "Heartbeat: Accounting enabled. " + "Sent: %s / %s, Received: %s / %s. The " + "current accounting interval ends on %s, in %s.", + acc_sent, acc_max, acc_rcvd, acc_max, end_buf, remaining); + + tor_free(acc_rcvd); + tor_free(acc_sent); + tor_free(acc_max); + tor_free(remaining); +} + diff --git a/src/or/transports.c b/src/or/transports.c index 3749d6bb2..8b4a11882 100644 --- a/src/or/transports.c +++ b/src/or/transports.c @@ -95,18 +95,17 @@ #include "util.h" #include "router.h" #include "statefile.h" +#include "entrynodes.h" +#include "connection_or.h" +#include "ext_orport.h" +#include "control.h" static process_environment_t * create_managed_proxy_environment(const managed_proxy_t *mp); static INLINE int proxy_configuration_finished(const managed_proxy_t *mp); -static void managed_proxy_destroy(managed_proxy_t *mp, - int also_terminate_process); - static void handle_finished_proxy(managed_proxy_t *mp); -static int configure_proxy(managed_proxy_t *mp); - static void parse_method_error(const char *line, int is_server_method); #define parse_server_method_error(l) parse_method_error(l, 1) #define parse_client_method_error(l) parse_method_error(l, 0) @@ -136,7 +135,8 @@ static smartlist_t *transport_list = NULL; SOCKS version <b>socks_ver</b>. */ static transport_t * transport_new(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, - const char *name, int socks_ver) + const char *name, int socks_ver, + const char *extra_info_args) { transport_t *t = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(transport_t)); @@ -144,6 +144,8 @@ transport_new(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, t->port = port; t->name = tor_strdup(name); t->socks_version = socks_ver; + if (extra_info_args) + t->extra_info_args = tor_strdup(extra_info_args); return t; } @@ -156,6 +158,7 @@ transport_free(transport_t *transport) return; tor_free(transport->name); + tor_free(transport->extra_info_args); tor_free(transport); } @@ -323,7 +326,7 @@ int transport_add_from_config(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, const char *name, int socks_ver) { - transport_t *t = transport_new(addr, port, name, socks_ver); + transport_t *t = transport_new(addr, port, name, socks_ver, NULL); int r = transport_add(t); @@ -549,7 +552,7 @@ pt_configure_remaining_proxies(void) assert_unconfigured_count_ok(); SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(tmp, managed_proxy_t *, mp) { - tor_assert(mp->conf_state != PT_PROTO_BROKEN || + tor_assert(mp->conf_state != PT_PROTO_BROKEN && mp->conf_state != PT_PROTO_FAILED_LAUNCH); if (mp->got_hup) { @@ -589,7 +592,7 @@ pt_configure_remaining_proxies(void) * Return 1 if the transport configuration finished, and return 0 * otherwise (if we still have more configuring to do for this * proxy). */ -static int +STATIC int configure_proxy(managed_proxy_t *mp) { int configuration_finished = 0; @@ -657,6 +660,7 @@ register_server_proxy(const managed_proxy_t *mp) save_transport_to_state(t->name, &t->addr, t->port); log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "Registered server transport '%s' at '%s'", t->name, fmt_addrport(&t->addr, t->port)); + control_event_transport_launched("server", t->name, &t->addr, t->port); } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(t); } @@ -679,9 +683,11 @@ register_client_proxy(const managed_proxy_t *mp) break; case 0: log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Successfully registered transport %s", t->name); + control_event_transport_launched("client", t->name, &t->addr, t->port); break; case 1: log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Successfully registered transport %s", t->name); + control_event_transport_launched("client", t->name, &t->addr, t->port); transport_free(transport_tmp); break; } @@ -699,7 +705,7 @@ register_proxy(const managed_proxy_t *mp) } /** Free memory allocated by managed proxy <b>mp</b>. */ -static void +STATIC void managed_proxy_destroy(managed_proxy_t *mp, int also_terminate_process) { @@ -713,7 +719,8 @@ managed_proxy_destroy(managed_proxy_t *mp, smartlist_free(mp->transports_to_launch); /* remove it from the list of managed proxies */ - smartlist_remove(managed_proxy_list, mp); + if (managed_proxy_list) + smartlist_remove(managed_proxy_list, mp); /* free the argv */ free_execve_args(mp->argv); @@ -750,7 +757,6 @@ handle_finished_proxy(managed_proxy_t *mp) } unconfigured_proxies_n--; - tor_assert(unconfigured_proxies_n >= 0); } /** Return true if the configuration of the managed proxy <b>mp</b> is @@ -781,7 +787,7 @@ handle_methods_done(const managed_proxy_t *mp) /** Handle a configuration protocol <b>line</b> received from a * managed proxy <b>mp</b>. */ -void +STATIC void handle_proxy_line(const char *line, managed_proxy_t *mp) { log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Got a line from managed proxy '%s': (%s)", @@ -882,7 +888,7 @@ handle_proxy_line(const char *line, managed_proxy_t *mp) } /** Parses an ENV-ERROR <b>line</b> and warns the user accordingly. */ -void +STATIC void parse_env_error(const char *line) { /* (Length of the protocol string) plus (a space) and (the first char of @@ -898,7 +904,7 @@ parse_env_error(const char *line) /** Handles a VERSION <b>line</b>. Updates the configuration protocol * version in <b>mp</b>. */ -int +STATIC int parse_version(const char *line, managed_proxy_t *mp) { if (strlen(line) < (strlen(PROTO_NEG_SUCCESS) + 2)) { @@ -939,14 +945,14 @@ parse_method_error(const char *line, int is_server) /** Parses an SMETHOD <b>line</b> and if well-formed it registers the * new transport in <b>mp</b>. */ -int +STATIC int parse_smethod_line(const char *line, managed_proxy_t *mp) { int r; smartlist_t *items = NULL; char *method_name=NULL; - + char *args_string=NULL; char *addrport=NULL; tor_addr_t tor_addr; char *address=NULL; @@ -963,6 +969,9 @@ parse_smethod_line(const char *line, managed_proxy_t *mp) goto err; } + /* Example of legit SMETHOD line: + SMETHOD obfs2 0.0.0.0:25612 ARGS:secret=supersekrit,key=superkey */ + tor_assert(!strcmp(smartlist_get(items,0),PROTO_SMETHOD)); method_name = smartlist_get(items,1); @@ -990,7 +999,19 @@ parse_smethod_line(const char *line, managed_proxy_t *mp) goto err; } - transport = transport_new(&tor_addr, port, method_name, PROXY_NONE); + if (smartlist_len(items) > 3) { + /* Seems like there are also some [options] in the SMETHOD line. + Let's see if we can parse them. */ + char *options_string = smartlist_get(items, 3); + log_debug(LD_CONFIG, "Got options_string: %s", options_string); + if (!strcmpstart(options_string, "ARGS:")) { + args_string = options_string+strlen("ARGS:"); + log_debug(LD_CONFIG, "Got ARGS: %s", args_string); + } + } + + transport = transport_new(&tor_addr, port, method_name, + PROXY_NONE, args_string); if (!transport) goto err; @@ -1016,7 +1037,7 @@ parse_smethod_line(const char *line, managed_proxy_t *mp) /** Parses a CMETHOD <b>line</b>, and if well-formed it registers * the new transport in <b>mp</b>. */ -int +STATIC int parse_cmethod_line(const char *line, managed_proxy_t *mp) { int r; @@ -1082,7 +1103,7 @@ parse_cmethod_line(const char *line, managed_proxy_t *mp) goto err; } - transport = transport_new(&tor_addr, port, method_name, socks_ver); + transport = transport_new(&tor_addr, port, method_name, socks_ver, NULL); if (!transport) goto err; @@ -1105,6 +1126,50 @@ parse_cmethod_line(const char *line, managed_proxy_t *mp) return r; } +/** Return a newly allocated string that tor should place in + * TOR_PT_SERVER_TRANSPORT_OPTIONS while configuring the server + * manged proxy in <b>mp</b>. Return NULL if no such options are found. */ +STATIC char * +get_transport_options_for_server_proxy(const managed_proxy_t *mp) +{ + char *options_string = NULL; + smartlist_t *string_sl = smartlist_new(); + + tor_assert(mp->is_server); + + /** Loop over the transports of the proxy. If we have options for + any of them, format them appropriately and place them in our + smartlist. Finally, join our smartlist to get the final + string. */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(mp->transports_to_launch, const char *, transport) { + smartlist_t *options_tmp_sl = NULL; + options_tmp_sl = get_options_for_server_transport(transport); + if (!options_tmp_sl) + continue; + + /** Loop over the options of this transport, escape them, and + place them in the smartlist. */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(options_tmp_sl, const char *, options) { + char *escaped_opts = tor_escape_str_for_pt_args(options, ":;\\"); + smartlist_add_asprintf(string_sl, "%s:%s", + transport, escaped_opts); + tor_free(escaped_opts); + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(options); + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(options_tmp_sl, char *, c, tor_free(c)); + smartlist_free(options_tmp_sl); + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(transport); + + if (smartlist_len(string_sl)) { + options_string = smartlist_join_strings(string_sl, ";", 0, NULL); + } + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(string_sl, char *, t, tor_free(t)); + smartlist_free(string_sl); + + return options_string; +} + /** Return the string that tor should place in TOR_PT_SERVER_BINDADDR * while configuring the server managed proxy in <b>mp</b>. The * string is stored in the heap, and it's the the responsibility of @@ -1139,6 +1204,8 @@ get_bindaddr_for_server_proxy(const managed_proxy_t *mp) static process_environment_t * create_managed_proxy_environment(const managed_proxy_t *mp) { + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + /* Environment variables to be added to or set in mp's environment. */ smartlist_t *envs = smartlist_new(); /* XXXX The next time someone touches this code, shorten the name of @@ -1186,13 +1253,39 @@ create_managed_proxy_environment(const managed_proxy_t *mp) tor_free(bindaddr_tmp); } + { + char *server_transport_options = + get_transport_options_for_server_proxy(mp); + if (server_transport_options) { + smartlist_add_asprintf(envs, "TOR_PT_SERVER_TRANSPORT_OPTIONS=%s", + server_transport_options); + tor_free(server_transport_options); + } + } + /* XXX024 Remove the '=' here once versions of obfsproxy which * assert that this env var exists are sufficiently dead. * * (If we remove this line entirely, some joker will stick this * variable in Tor's environment and crash PTs that try to parse * it even when not run in server mode.) */ - smartlist_add(envs, tor_strdup("TOR_PT_EXTENDED_SERVER_PORT=")); + + if (options->ExtORPort_lines) { + char *ext_or_addrport_tmp = + get_first_listener_addrport_string(CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR_LISTENER); + char *cookie_file_loc = get_ext_or_auth_cookie_file_name(); + + smartlist_add_asprintf(envs, "TOR_PT_EXTENDED_SERVER_PORT=%s", + ext_or_addrport_tmp); + smartlist_add_asprintf(envs, "TOR_PT_AUTH_COOKIE_FILE=%s", + cookie_file_loc); + + tor_free(ext_or_addrport_tmp); + tor_free(cookie_file_loc); + + } else { + smartlist_add_asprintf(envs, "TOR_PT_EXTENDED_SERVER_PORT="); + } } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(envs, const char *, env_var) { @@ -1216,7 +1309,7 @@ create_managed_proxy_environment(const managed_proxy_t *mp) * <b>proxy_argv</b>. * * Requires that proxy_argv have at least one element. */ -static managed_proxy_t * +STATIC managed_proxy_t * managed_proxy_create(const smartlist_t *transport_list, char **proxy_argv, int is_server) { @@ -1390,6 +1483,8 @@ pt_get_extra_info_descriptor_string(void) tor_assert(mp->transports); SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(mp->transports, const transport_t *, t) { + char *transport_args = NULL; + /* If the transport proxy returned "0.0.0.0" as its address, and * we know our external IP address, use it. Otherwise, use the * returned address. */ @@ -1405,9 +1500,16 @@ pt_get_extra_info_descriptor_string(void) addrport = fmt_addrport(&t->addr, t->port); } + /* If this transport has any arguments with it, prepend a space + to them so that we can add them to the transport line. */ + if (t->extra_info_args) + tor_asprintf(&transport_args, " %s", t->extra_info_args); + smartlist_add_asprintf(string_chunks, - "transport %s %s", - t->name, addrport); + "transport %s %s%s", + t->name, addrport, + transport_args ? transport_args : ""); + tor_free(transport_args); } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(t); } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(mp); @@ -1426,6 +1528,57 @@ pt_get_extra_info_descriptor_string(void) return the_string; } +/** Stringify the SOCKS arguments in <b>socks_args</b> according to + * 180_pluggable_transport.txt. The string is allocated on the heap + * and it's the responsibility of the caller to free it after use. */ +char * +pt_stringify_socks_args(const smartlist_t *socks_args) +{ + /* tmp place to store escaped socks arguments, so that we can + concatenate them up afterwards */ + smartlist_t *sl_tmp = NULL; + char *escaped_string = NULL; + char *new_string = NULL; + + tor_assert(socks_args); + tor_assert(smartlist_len(socks_args) > 0); + + sl_tmp = smartlist_new(); + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(socks_args, const char *, s) { + /* Escape ';' and '\'. */ + escaped_string = tor_escape_str_for_pt_args(s, ";\\"); + if (!escaped_string) + goto done; + + smartlist_add(sl_tmp, escaped_string); + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(s); + + new_string = smartlist_join_strings(sl_tmp, ";", 0, NULL); + + done: + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl_tmp, char *, s, tor_free(s)); + smartlist_free(sl_tmp); + + return new_string; +} + +/** Return a string of the SOCKS arguments that we should pass to the + * pluggable transports proxy in <b>addr</b>:<b>port</b> according to + * 180_pluggable_transport.txt. The string is allocated on the heap + * and it's the responsibility of the caller to free it after use. */ +char * +pt_get_socks_args_for_proxy_addrport(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port) +{ + const smartlist_t *socks_args = NULL; + + socks_args = get_socks_args_by_bridge_addrport(addr, port); + if (!socks_args) + return NULL; + + return pt_stringify_socks_args(socks_args); +} + /** The tor config was read. * Destroy all managed proxies that were marked by a previous call to * prepare_proxy_list_for_config_read() and are not used by the new diff --git a/src/or/transports.h b/src/or/transports.h index 6ee82f455..7b524f207 100644 --- a/src/or/transports.h +++ b/src/or/transports.h @@ -25,6 +25,9 @@ typedef struct transport_t { /** Boolean: We are re-parsing our transport list, and we are going to remove * this one if we don't find it in the list of configured transports. */ unsigned marked_for_removal : 1; + /** Arguments for this transport that must be written to the + extra-info descriptor. */ + char *extra_info_args; } transport_t; void mark_transport_list(void); @@ -55,6 +58,10 @@ void pt_prepare_proxy_list_for_config_read(void); void sweep_proxy_list(void); smartlist_t *get_transport_proxy_ports(void); +char *pt_stringify_socks_args(const smartlist_t *socks_args); + +char *pt_get_socks_args_for_proxy_addrport(const tor_addr_t *addr, + uint16_t port); #ifdef PT_PRIVATE /** State of the managed proxy configuration protocol. */ @@ -100,12 +107,21 @@ typedef struct { smartlist_t *transports; } managed_proxy_t; -int parse_cmethod_line(const char *line, managed_proxy_t *mp); -int parse_smethod_line(const char *line, managed_proxy_t *mp); +STATIC int parse_cmethod_line(const char *line, managed_proxy_t *mp); +STATIC int parse_smethod_line(const char *line, managed_proxy_t *mp); + +STATIC int parse_version(const char *line, managed_proxy_t *mp); +STATIC void parse_env_error(const char *line); +STATIC void handle_proxy_line(const char *line, managed_proxy_t *mp); +STATIC char *get_transport_options_for_server_proxy(const managed_proxy_t *mp); + +STATIC void managed_proxy_destroy(managed_proxy_t *mp, + int also_terminate_process); + +STATIC managed_proxy_t *managed_proxy_create(const smartlist_t *transport_list, + char **proxy_argv, int is_server); -int parse_version(const char *line, managed_proxy_t *mp); -void parse_env_error(const char *line); -void handle_proxy_line(const char *line, managed_proxy_t *mp); +STATIC int configure_proxy(managed_proxy_t *mp); #endif diff --git a/src/test/Makefile.nmake b/src/test/Makefile.nmake index 562c8df8b..6479f9d39 100644 --- a/src/test/Makefile.nmake +++ b/src/test/Makefile.nmake @@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ LIBS = ..\..\..\build-alpha\lib\libevent.lib \ crypt32.lib gdi32.lib user32.lib TEST_OBJECTS = test.obj test_addr.obj test_containers.obj \ - test_crypto.obj test_data.obj test_dir.obj test_microdesc.obj \ - test_pt.obj test_util.obj test_config.obj test_cell_formats.obj \ - test_replay.obj test_introduce.obj tinytest.obj + test_controller_events.ogj test_crypto.obj test_data.obj test_dir.obj \ + test_microdesc.obj test_pt.obj test_util.obj test_config.obj \ + test_cell_formats.obj test_replay.obj test_introduce.obj tinytest.obj tinytest.obj: ..\ext\tinytest.c $(CC) $(CFLAGS) /D snprintf=_snprintf /c ..\ext\tinytest.c diff --git a/src/test/bench.c b/src/test/bench.c index 5a8d21d17..e650569a7 100644 --- a/src/test/bench.c +++ b/src/test/bench.c @@ -14,9 +14,6 @@ const char tor_git_revision[] = ""; #include "orconfig.h" -#define RELAY_PRIVATE -#define CONFIG_PRIVATE - #include "or.h" #include "onion_tap.h" #include "relay.h" @@ -204,6 +201,7 @@ bench_onion_ntor(void) for (i = 0; i < iters; ++i) { onion_skin_ntor_create(nodeid, &keypair1.pubkey, &state, os); ntor_handshake_state_free(state); + state = NULL; } end = perftime(); printf("Client-side, part 1: %f usec.\n", NANOCOUNT(start, end, iters)/1e3); diff --git a/src/test/include.am b/src/test/include.am index 112d1a79d..5510293cd 100644 --- a/src/test/include.am +++ b/src/test/include.am @@ -1,11 +1,15 @@ -TESTS+= src/test/test +TESTS += src/test/test -noinst_PROGRAMS+= src/test/test src/test/test-child src/test/bench +noinst_PROGRAMS+= src/test/bench +if UNITTESTS_ENABLED +noinst_PROGRAMS+= src/test/test src/test/test-child +endif src_test_AM_CPPFLAGS = -DSHARE_DATADIR="\"$(datadir)\"" \ -DLOCALSTATEDIR="\"$(localstatedir)\"" \ -DBINDIR="\"$(bindir)\"" \ - -I"$(top_srcdir)/src/or" -I"$(top_srcdir)/src/ext" + -I"$(top_srcdir)/src/or" -I"$(top_srcdir)/src/ext" \ + -DTOR_UNIT_TESTS # -L flags need to go in LDFLAGS. -l flags need to go in LDADD. # This seems to matter nowhere but on Windows, but I assure you that it @@ -14,31 +18,39 @@ src_test_AM_CPPFLAGS = -DSHARE_DATADIR="\"$(datadir)\"" \ src_test_test_SOURCES = \ src/test/test.c \ src/test/test_addr.c \ + src/test/test_buffers.c \ src/test/test_cell_formats.c \ + src/test/test_circuitlist.c \ + src/test/test_circuitmux.c \ src/test/test_containers.c \ + src/test/test_controller_events.c \ src/test/test_crypto.c \ + src/test/test_cell_queue.c \ src/test/test_data.c \ src/test/test_dir.c \ + src/test/test_extorport.c \ src/test/test_introduce.c \ src/test/test_microdesc.c \ + src/test/test_options.c \ src/test/test_pt.c \ src/test/test_replay.c \ + src/test/test_socks.c \ src/test/test_util.c \ src/test/test_config.c \ src/ext/tinytest.c +src_test_test_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) $(TEST_CFLAGS) + src_test_test_CPPFLAGS= $(src_test_AM_CPPFLAGS) src_test_bench_SOURCES = \ src/test/bench.c -src_test_bench_CPPFLAGS= $(src_test_AM_CPPFLAGS) - src_test_test_LDFLAGS = @TOR_LDFLAGS_zlib@ @TOR_LDFLAGS_openssl@ \ @TOR_LDFLAGS_libevent@ -src_test_test_LDADD = src/or/libtor.a src/common/libor.a \ - src/common/libor-crypto.a $(LIBDONNA) \ - src/common/libor-event.a \ +src_test_test_LDADD = src/or/libtor-testing.a src/common/libor-testing.a \ + src/common/libor-crypto-testing.a $(LIBDONNA) \ + src/common/libor-event-testing.a \ @TOR_ZLIB_LIBS@ @TOR_LIB_MATH@ @TOR_LIBEVENT_LIBS@ \ @TOR_OPENSSL_LIBS@ @TOR_LIB_WS32@ @TOR_LIB_GDI@ @CURVE25519_LIBS@ @@ -63,6 +75,22 @@ src_test_test_ntor_cl_LDADD = src/or/libtor.a src/common/libor.a \ @TOR_OPENSSL_LIBS@ @TOR_LIB_WS32@ @TOR_LIB_GDI@ @CURVE25519_LIBS@ src_test_test_ntor_cl_AM_CPPFLAGS = \ -I"$(top_srcdir)/src/or" +NTOR_TEST_DEPS=src/test/test-ntor-cl +else +NTOR_TEST_DEPS= +endif +if COVERAGE_ENABLED +CMDLINE_TEST_TOR = ./src/or/tor-cov +else +CMDLINE_TEST_TOR = ./src/or/tor endif +check-local: $(NTOR_TEST_DEPS) $(CMDLINE_TEST_TOR) +if USEPYTHON + $(PYTHON) $(top_srcdir)/src/test/test_cmdline_args.py $(CMDLINE_TEST_TOR) "${top_srcdir}" +if CURVE25519_ENABLED + $(PYTHON) $(top_srcdir)/src/test/ntor_ref.py test-tor + $(PYTHON) $(top_srcdir)/src/test/ntor_ref.py self-test +endif +endif diff --git a/src/test/ntor_ref.py b/src/test/ntor_ref.py index ade468da7..2a5f98460 100644..100755 --- a/src/test/ntor_ref.py +++ b/src/test/ntor_ref.py @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +#!/usr/bin/python # Copyright 2012-2013, The Tor Project, Inc # See LICENSE for licensing information @@ -27,7 +28,13 @@ commands: """ import binascii -import curve25519 +try: + import curve25519 +except ImportError: + curve25519 = None + print "SKIPPING: No Python curve25519 module installed" + import sys + sys.exit(0) import hashlib import hmac import subprocess @@ -286,6 +293,7 @@ def demo(node_id="iToldYouAboutStairs.", server_key=PrivateKey()): assert len(skeys) == 72 assert len(ckeys) == 72 assert skeys == ckeys + print "OK" # ====================================================================== def timing(): @@ -368,13 +376,15 @@ def test_tor(): assert c_keys == s_keys assert len(c_keys) == 90 - print "We just interoperated." + print "OK" # ====================================================================== if __name__ == '__main__': import sys - if sys.argv[1] == 'gen_kdf_vectors': + if len(sys.argv) < 2: + print __doc__ + elif sys.argv[1] == 'gen_kdf_vectors': kdf_vectors() elif sys.argv[1] == 'timing': timing() diff --git a/src/test/test-network.sh b/src/test/test-network.sh new file mode 100755 index 000000000..7b5986416 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/test/test-network.sh @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +#! /bin/sh + +until [ -z $1 ] +do + case $1 in + --chutney-path) + export CHUTNEY_PATH="$2" + shift + ;; + --tor-path) + export TOR_DIR="$2" + shift + ;; + --flavo?r|--network-flavo?r) + export NETWORK_FLAVOUR="$2" + shift + ;; + *) + echo "Sorry, I don't know what to do with '$1'." + exit 2 + ;; + esac + shift +done + +TOR_DIR="${TOR_DIR:-$PWD}" +NETWORK_FLAVOUR=${NETWORK_FLAVOUR:-basic} +CHUTNEY_NETWORK=networks/$NETWORK_FLAVOUR +myname=$(basename $0) + +[ -d "$CHUTNEY_PATH" ] && [ -x "$CHUTNEY_PATH/chutney" ] || { + echo "$myname: missing 'chutney' in CHUTNEY_PATH ($CHUTNEY_PATH)" + exit 1 +} +cd "$CHUTNEY_PATH" +# For picking up the right tor binaries. +PATH="$TOR_DIR/src/or:$TOR_DIR/src/tools:$PATH" +./tools/bootstrap-network.sh $NETWORK_FLAVOUR || exit 2 + +# Sleep some, waiting for the network to bootstrap. +# TODO: Add chutney command 'bootstrap-status' and use that instead. +BOOTSTRAP_TIME=18 +echo -n "$myname: sleeping for $BOOTSTRAP_TIME seconds" +n=$BOOTSTRAP_TIME; while [ $n -gt 0 ]; do + sleep 1; n=$(expr $n - 1); echo -n . +done; echo "" +./chutney verify $CHUTNEY_NETWORK diff --git a/src/test/test.c b/src/test/test.c index 4ec879234..562de4801 100644 --- a/src/test/test.c +++ b/src/test/test.c @@ -28,8 +28,6 @@ const char tor_git_revision[] = ""; /* These macros pull in declarations for some functions and structures that * are typically file-private. */ -#define BUFFERS_PRIVATE -#define CONFIG_PRIVATE #define GEOIP_PRIVATE #define ROUTER_PRIVATE #define CIRCUITSTATS_PRIVATE @@ -55,6 +53,7 @@ double fabs(double x); #include "mempool.h" #include "memarea.h" #include "onion.h" +#include "onion_ntor.h" #include "onion_tap.h" #include "policies.h" #include "rephist.h" @@ -218,667 +217,138 @@ free_pregenerated_keys(void) } } -typedef struct socks_test_data_t { - socks_request_t *req; - buf_t *buf; -} socks_test_data_t; - -static void * -socks_test_setup(const struct testcase_t *testcase) -{ - socks_test_data_t *data = tor_malloc(sizeof(socks_test_data_t)); - (void)testcase; - data->buf = buf_new_with_capacity(256); - data->req = socks_request_new(); - config_register_addressmaps(get_options()); - return data; -} -static int -socks_test_cleanup(const struct testcase_t *testcase, void *ptr) -{ - socks_test_data_t *data = ptr; - (void)testcase; - buf_free(data->buf); - socks_request_free(data->req); - tor_free(data); - return 1; -} - -const struct testcase_setup_t socks_setup = { - socks_test_setup, socks_test_cleanup -}; - -#define SOCKS_TEST_INIT() \ - socks_test_data_t *testdata = ptr; \ - buf_t *buf = testdata->buf; \ - socks_request_t *socks = testdata->req; -#define ADD_DATA(buf, s) \ - write_to_buf(s, sizeof(s)-1, buf) - -static void -socks_request_clear(socks_request_t *socks) -{ - tor_free(socks->username); - tor_free(socks->password); - memset(socks, 0, sizeof(socks_request_t)); -} - -/** Perform unsupported SOCKS 4 commands */ -static void -test_socks_4_unsupported_commands(void *ptr) -{ - SOCKS_TEST_INIT(); - - /* SOCKS 4 Send BIND [02] to IP address 2.2.2.2:4369 */ - ADD_DATA(buf, "\x04\x02\x11\x11\x02\x02\x02\x02\x00"); - test_assert(fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, get_options()->TestSocks, - get_options()->SafeSocks) == -1); - test_eq(4, socks->socks_version); - test_eq(0, socks->replylen); /* XXX: shouldn't tor reply? */ - - done: - ; -} - -/** Perform supported SOCKS 4 commands */ -static void -test_socks_4_supported_commands(void *ptr) -{ - SOCKS_TEST_INIT(); - - test_eq(0, buf_datalen(buf)); - - /* SOCKS 4 Send CONNECT [01] to IP address 2.2.2.2:4370 */ - ADD_DATA(buf, "\x04\x01\x11\x12\x02\x02\x02\x03\x00"); - test_assert(fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, get_options()->TestSocks, - get_options()->SafeSocks) == 1); - test_eq(4, socks->socks_version); - test_eq(0, socks->replylen); /* XXX: shouldn't tor reply? */ - test_eq(SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT, socks->command); - test_streq("2.2.2.3", socks->address); - test_eq(4370, socks->port); - test_assert(socks->got_auth == 0); - test_assert(! socks->username); - - test_eq(0, buf_datalen(buf)); - socks_request_clear(socks); - - /* SOCKS 4 Send CONNECT [01] to IP address 2.2.2.2:4369 with userid*/ - ADD_DATA(buf, "\x04\x01\x11\x12\x02\x02\x02\x04me\x00"); - test_assert(fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, get_options()->TestSocks, - get_options()->SafeSocks) == 1); - test_eq(4, socks->socks_version); - test_eq(0, socks->replylen); /* XXX: shouldn't tor reply? */ - test_eq(SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT, socks->command); - test_streq("2.2.2.4", socks->address); - test_eq(4370, socks->port); - test_assert(socks->got_auth == 1); - test_assert(socks->username); - test_eq(2, socks->usernamelen); - test_memeq("me", socks->username, 2); - - test_eq(0, buf_datalen(buf)); - socks_request_clear(socks); - - /* SOCKS 4a Send RESOLVE [F0] request for torproject.org */ - ADD_DATA(buf, "\x04\xF0\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x02me\x00torproject.org\x00"); - test_assert(fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, get_options()->TestSocks, - get_options()->SafeSocks) == 1); - test_eq(4, socks->socks_version); - test_eq(0, socks->replylen); /* XXX: shouldn't tor reply? */ - test_streq("torproject.org", socks->address); - - test_eq(0, buf_datalen(buf)); - - done: - ; -} - -/** Perform unsupported SOCKS 5 commands */ -static void -test_socks_5_unsupported_commands(void *ptr) -{ - SOCKS_TEST_INIT(); - - /* SOCKS 5 Send unsupported BIND [02] command */ - ADD_DATA(buf, "\x05\x02\x00\x01"); - - test_eq(fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, get_options()->TestSocks, - get_options()->SafeSocks), 0); - test_eq(0, buf_datalen(buf)); - test_eq(5, socks->socks_version); - test_eq(2, socks->replylen); - test_eq(5, socks->reply[0]); - test_eq(0, socks->reply[1]); - ADD_DATA(buf, "\x05\x02\x00\x01\x02\x02\x02\x01\x01\x01"); - test_eq(fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, get_options()->TestSocks, - get_options()->SafeSocks), -1); - /* XXX: shouldn't tor reply 'command not supported' [07]? */ - - buf_clear(buf); - socks_request_clear(socks); - - /* SOCKS 5 Send unsupported UDP_ASSOCIATE [03] command */ - ADD_DATA(buf, "\x05\x03\x00\x01\x02"); - test_eq(fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, get_options()->TestSocks, - get_options()->SafeSocks), 0); - test_eq(5, socks->socks_version); - test_eq(2, socks->replylen); - test_eq(5, socks->reply[0]); - test_eq(2, socks->reply[1]); - ADD_DATA(buf, "\x05\x03\x00\x01\x02\x02\x02\x01\x01\x01"); - test_eq(fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, get_options()->TestSocks, - get_options()->SafeSocks), -1); - /* XXX: shouldn't tor reply 'command not supported' [07]? */ - - done: - ; -} - -/** Perform supported SOCKS 5 commands */ -static void -test_socks_5_supported_commands(void *ptr) -{ - SOCKS_TEST_INIT(); - - /* SOCKS 5 Send CONNECT [01] to IP address 2.2.2.2:4369 */ - ADD_DATA(buf, "\x05\x01\x00"); - test_eq(fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, get_options()->TestSocks, - get_options()->SafeSocks), 0); - test_eq(5, socks->socks_version); - test_eq(2, socks->replylen); - test_eq(5, socks->reply[0]); - test_eq(0, socks->reply[1]); - - ADD_DATA(buf, "\x05\x01\x00\x01\x02\x02\x02\x02\x11\x11"); - test_eq(fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, get_options()->TestSocks, - get_options()->SafeSocks), 1); - test_streq("2.2.2.2", socks->address); - test_eq(4369, socks->port); - - test_eq(0, buf_datalen(buf)); - socks_request_clear(socks); - - /* SOCKS 5 Send CONNECT [01] to FQDN torproject.org:4369 */ - ADD_DATA(buf, "\x05\x01\x00"); - ADD_DATA(buf, "\x05\x01\x00\x03\x0Etorproject.org\x11\x11"); - test_eq(fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, get_options()->TestSocks, - get_options()->SafeSocks), 1); - - test_eq(5, socks->socks_version); - test_eq(2, socks->replylen); - test_eq(5, socks->reply[0]); - test_eq(0, socks->reply[1]); - test_streq("torproject.org", socks->address); - test_eq(4369, socks->port); - - test_eq(0, buf_datalen(buf)); - socks_request_clear(socks); - - /* SOCKS 5 Send RESOLVE [F0] request for torproject.org:4369 */ - ADD_DATA(buf, "\x05\x01\x00"); - ADD_DATA(buf, "\x05\xF0\x00\x03\x0Etorproject.org\x01\x02"); - test_assert(fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, get_options()->TestSocks, - get_options()->SafeSocks) == 1); - test_eq(5, socks->socks_version); - test_eq(2, socks->replylen); - test_eq(5, socks->reply[0]); - test_eq(0, socks->reply[1]); - test_streq("torproject.org", socks->address); - - test_eq(0, buf_datalen(buf)); - socks_request_clear(socks); - - /* SOCKS 5 Send RESOLVE_PTR [F1] for IP address 2.2.2.5 */ - ADD_DATA(buf, "\x05\x01\x00"); - ADD_DATA(buf, "\x05\xF1\x00\x01\x02\x02\x02\x05\x01\x03"); - test_assert(fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, get_options()->TestSocks, - get_options()->SafeSocks) == 1); - test_eq(5, socks->socks_version); - test_eq(2, socks->replylen); - test_eq(5, socks->reply[0]); - test_eq(0, socks->reply[1]); - test_streq("2.2.2.5", socks->address); - - test_eq(0, buf_datalen(buf)); - - done: - ; -} - -/** Perform SOCKS 5 authentication */ -static void -test_socks_5_no_authenticate(void *ptr) -{ - SOCKS_TEST_INIT(); - - /*SOCKS 5 No Authentication */ - ADD_DATA(buf,"\x05\x01\x00"); - test_assert(!fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, - get_options()->TestSocks, - get_options()->SafeSocks)); - test_eq(2, socks->replylen); - test_eq(5, socks->reply[0]); - test_eq(SOCKS_NO_AUTH, socks->reply[1]); - - test_eq(0, buf_datalen(buf)); - - /*SOCKS 5 Send username/password anyway - pretend to be broken */ - ADD_DATA(buf,"\x01\x02\x01\x01\x02\x01\x01"); - test_assert(!fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, - get_options()->TestSocks, - get_options()->SafeSocks)); - test_eq(5, socks->socks_version); - test_eq(2, socks->replylen); - test_eq(1, socks->reply[0]); - test_eq(0, socks->reply[1]); - - test_eq(2, socks->usernamelen); - test_eq(2, socks->passwordlen); - - test_memeq("\x01\x01", socks->username, 2); - test_memeq("\x01\x01", socks->password, 2); - - done: - ; -} - -/** Perform SOCKS 5 authentication */ -static void -test_socks_5_authenticate(void *ptr) -{ - SOCKS_TEST_INIT(); - - /* SOCKS 5 Negotiate username/password authentication */ - ADD_DATA(buf, "\x05\x01\x02"); - - test_assert(!fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, - get_options()->TestSocks, - get_options()->SafeSocks)); - test_eq(2, socks->replylen); - test_eq(5, socks->reply[0]); - test_eq(SOCKS_USER_PASS, socks->reply[1]); - test_eq(5, socks->socks_version); - - test_eq(0, buf_datalen(buf)); - - /* SOCKS 5 Send username/password */ - ADD_DATA(buf, "\x01\x02me\x08mypasswd"); - test_assert(!fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, - get_options()->TestSocks, - get_options()->SafeSocks)); - test_eq(5, socks->socks_version); - test_eq(2, socks->replylen); - test_eq(1, socks->reply[0]); - test_eq(0, socks->reply[1]); - - test_eq(2, socks->usernamelen); - test_eq(8, socks->passwordlen); - - test_memeq("me", socks->username, 2); - test_memeq("mypasswd", socks->password, 8); - - done: - ; -} - -/** Perform SOCKS 5 authentication and send data all in one go */ -static void -test_socks_5_authenticate_with_data(void *ptr) -{ - SOCKS_TEST_INIT(); - - /* SOCKS 5 Negotiate username/password authentication */ - ADD_DATA(buf, "\x05\x01\x02"); - - test_assert(!fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, - get_options()->TestSocks, - get_options()->SafeSocks)); - test_eq(2, socks->replylen); - test_eq(5, socks->reply[0]); - test_eq(SOCKS_USER_PASS, socks->reply[1]); - test_eq(5, socks->socks_version); - - test_eq(0, buf_datalen(buf)); - - /* SOCKS 5 Send username/password */ - /* SOCKS 5 Send CONNECT [01] to IP address 2.2.2.2:4369 */ - ADD_DATA(buf, "\x01\x02me\x03you\x05\x01\x00\x01\x02\x02\x02\x02\x11\x11"); - test_assert(fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, - get_options()->TestSocks, - get_options()->SafeSocks) == 1); - test_eq(5, socks->socks_version); - test_eq(2, socks->replylen); - test_eq(1, socks->reply[0]); - test_eq(0, socks->reply[1]); - - test_streq("2.2.2.2", socks->address); - test_eq(4369, socks->port); - - test_eq(2, socks->usernamelen); - test_eq(3, socks->passwordlen); - test_memeq("me", socks->username, 2); - test_memeq("you", socks->password, 3); - - done: - ; -} - -/** Perform SOCKS 5 authentication before method negotiated */ -static void -test_socks_5_auth_before_negotiation(void *ptr) -{ - SOCKS_TEST_INIT(); - - /* SOCKS 5 Send username/password */ - ADD_DATA(buf, "\x01\x02me\x02me"); - test_assert(fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, - get_options()->TestSocks, - get_options()->SafeSocks) == -1); - test_eq(0, socks->socks_version); - test_eq(0, socks->replylen); - test_eq(0, socks->reply[0]); - test_eq(0, socks->reply[1]); - - done: - ; -} - +/** Run unit tests for the onion handshake code. */ static void -test_buffer_copy(void *arg) +test_onion_handshake(void) { - generic_buffer_t *buf=NULL, *buf2=NULL; - const char *s; - size_t len; - char b[256]; + /* client-side */ + crypto_dh_t *c_dh = NULL; + char c_buf[TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN]; + char c_keys[40]; + /* server-side */ + char s_buf[TAP_ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN]; + char s_keys[40]; int i; - (void)arg; - - buf = generic_buffer_new(); - tt_assert(buf); - - /* Copy an empty buffer. */ - tt_int_op(0, ==, generic_buffer_set_to_copy(&buf2, buf)); - tt_assert(buf2); - tt_int_op(0, ==, generic_buffer_len(buf2)); - - /* Now try with a short buffer. */ - s = "And now comes an act of enormous enormance!"; - len = strlen(s); - generic_buffer_add(buf, s, len); - tt_int_op(len, ==, generic_buffer_len(buf)); - /* Add junk to buf2 so we can test replacing.*/ - generic_buffer_add(buf2, "BLARG", 5); - tt_int_op(0, ==, generic_buffer_set_to_copy(&buf2, buf)); - tt_int_op(len, ==, generic_buffer_len(buf2)); - generic_buffer_get(buf2, b, len); - test_mem_op(b, ==, s, len); - /* Now free buf2 and retry so we can test allocating */ - generic_buffer_free(buf2); - buf2 = NULL; - tt_int_op(0, ==, generic_buffer_set_to_copy(&buf2, buf)); - tt_int_op(len, ==, generic_buffer_len(buf2)); - generic_buffer_get(buf2, b, len); - test_mem_op(b, ==, s, len); - /* Clear buf for next test */ - generic_buffer_get(buf, b, len); - tt_int_op(generic_buffer_len(buf),==,0); - - /* Okay, now let's try a bigger buffer. */ - s = "Quis autem vel eum iure reprehenderit qui in ea voluptate velit " - "esse quam nihil molestiae consequatur, vel illum qui dolorem eum " - "fugiat quo voluptas nulla pariatur?"; - len = strlen(s); - for (i = 0; i < 256; ++i) { - b[0]=i; - generic_buffer_add(buf, b, 1); - generic_buffer_add(buf, s, len); - } - tt_int_op(0, ==, generic_buffer_set_to_copy(&buf2, buf)); - tt_int_op(generic_buffer_len(buf2), ==, generic_buffer_len(buf)); - for (i = 0; i < 256; ++i) { - generic_buffer_get(buf2, b, len+1); - tt_int_op((unsigned char)b[0],==,i); - test_mem_op(b+1, ==, s, len); - } - - done: - if (buf) - generic_buffer_free(buf); - if (buf2) - generic_buffer_free(buf2); -} - -/** Run unit tests for buffers.c */ -static void -test_buffers(void) -{ - char str[256]; - char str2[256]; - - buf_t *buf = NULL, *buf2 = NULL; - const char *cp; + /* shared */ + crypto_pk_t *pk = NULL, *pk2 = NULL; - int j; - size_t r; + pk = pk_generate(0); + pk2 = pk_generate(1); - /**** - * buf_new - ****/ - if (!(buf = buf_new())) - test_fail(); + /* client handshake 1. */ + memset(c_buf, 0, TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN); + test_assert(! onion_skin_TAP_create(pk, &c_dh, c_buf)); - //test_eq(buf_capacity(buf), 4096); - test_eq(buf_datalen(buf), 0); + for (i = 1; i <= 3; ++i) { + crypto_pk_t *k1, *k2; + if (i==1) { + /* server handshake: only one key known. */ + k1 = pk; k2 = NULL; + } else if (i==2) { + /* server handshake: try the right key first. */ + k1 = pk; k2 = pk2; + } else { + /* server handshake: try the right key second. */ + k1 = pk2; k2 = pk; + } - /**** - * General pointer frobbing - */ - for (j=0;j<256;++j) { - str[j] = (char)j; - } - write_to_buf(str, 256, buf); - write_to_buf(str, 256, buf); - test_eq(buf_datalen(buf), 512); - fetch_from_buf(str2, 200, buf); - test_memeq(str, str2, 200); - test_eq(buf_datalen(buf), 312); - memset(str2, 0, sizeof(str2)); - - fetch_from_buf(str2, 256, buf); - test_memeq(str+200, str2, 56); - test_memeq(str, str2+56, 200); - test_eq(buf_datalen(buf), 56); - memset(str2, 0, sizeof(str2)); - /* Okay, now we should be 512 bytes into the 4096-byte buffer. If we add - * another 3584 bytes, we hit the end. */ - for (j=0;j<15;++j) { - write_to_buf(str, 256, buf); - } - assert_buf_ok(buf); - test_eq(buf_datalen(buf), 3896); - fetch_from_buf(str2, 56, buf); - test_eq(buf_datalen(buf), 3840); - test_memeq(str+200, str2, 56); - for (j=0;j<15;++j) { - memset(str2, 0, sizeof(str2)); - fetch_from_buf(str2, 256, buf); - test_memeq(str, str2, 256); - } - test_eq(buf_datalen(buf), 0); - buf_free(buf); - buf = NULL; - - /* Okay, now make sure growing can work. */ - buf = buf_new_with_capacity(16); - //test_eq(buf_capacity(buf), 16); - write_to_buf(str+1, 255, buf); - //test_eq(buf_capacity(buf), 256); - fetch_from_buf(str2, 254, buf); - test_memeq(str+1, str2, 254); - //test_eq(buf_capacity(buf), 256); - assert_buf_ok(buf); - write_to_buf(str, 32, buf); - //test_eq(buf_capacity(buf), 256); - assert_buf_ok(buf); - write_to_buf(str, 256, buf); - assert_buf_ok(buf); - //test_eq(buf_capacity(buf), 512); - test_eq(buf_datalen(buf), 33+256); - fetch_from_buf(str2, 33, buf); - test_eq(*str2, str[255]); - - test_memeq(str2+1, str, 32); - //test_eq(buf_capacity(buf), 512); - test_eq(buf_datalen(buf), 256); - fetch_from_buf(str2, 256, buf); - test_memeq(str, str2, 256); - - /* now try shrinking: case 1. */ - buf_free(buf); - buf = buf_new_with_capacity(33668); - for (j=0;j<67;++j) { - write_to_buf(str,255, buf); - } - //test_eq(buf_capacity(buf), 33668); - test_eq(buf_datalen(buf), 17085); - for (j=0; j < 40; ++j) { - fetch_from_buf(str2, 255,buf); - test_memeq(str2, str, 255); - } + memset(s_buf, 0, TAP_ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN); + memset(s_keys, 0, 40); + test_assert(! onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(c_buf, k1, k2, + s_buf, s_keys, 40)); - /* now try shrinking: case 2. */ - buf_free(buf); - buf = buf_new_with_capacity(33668); - for (j=0;j<67;++j) { - write_to_buf(str,255, buf); - } - for (j=0; j < 20; ++j) { - fetch_from_buf(str2, 255,buf); - test_memeq(str2, str, 255); - } - for (j=0;j<80;++j) { - write_to_buf(str,255, buf); - } - //test_eq(buf_capacity(buf),33668); - for (j=0; j < 120; ++j) { - fetch_from_buf(str2, 255,buf); - test_memeq(str2, str, 255); - } + /* client handshake 2 */ + memset(c_keys, 0, 40); + test_assert(! onion_skin_TAP_client_handshake(c_dh, s_buf, c_keys, 40)); - /* Move from buf to buf. */ - buf_free(buf); - buf = buf_new_with_capacity(4096); - buf2 = buf_new_with_capacity(4096); - for (j=0;j<100;++j) - write_to_buf(str, 255, buf); - test_eq(buf_datalen(buf), 25500); - for (j=0;j<100;++j) { - r = 10; - move_buf_to_buf(buf2, buf, &r); - test_eq(r, 0); - } - test_eq(buf_datalen(buf), 24500); - test_eq(buf_datalen(buf2), 1000); - for (j=0;j<3;++j) { - fetch_from_buf(str2, 255, buf2); - test_memeq(str2, str, 255); - } - r = 8192; /*big move*/ - move_buf_to_buf(buf2, buf, &r); - test_eq(r, 0); - r = 30000; /* incomplete move */ - move_buf_to_buf(buf2, buf, &r); - test_eq(r, 13692); - for (j=0;j<97;++j) { - fetch_from_buf(str2, 255, buf2); - test_memeq(str2, str, 255); - } - buf_free(buf); - buf_free(buf2); - buf = buf2 = NULL; - - buf = buf_new_with_capacity(5); - cp = "Testing. This is a moderately long Testing string."; - for (j = 0; cp[j]; j++) - write_to_buf(cp+j, 1, buf); - test_eq(0, buf_find_string_offset(buf, "Testing", 7)); - test_eq(1, buf_find_string_offset(buf, "esting", 6)); - test_eq(1, buf_find_string_offset(buf, "est", 3)); - test_eq(39, buf_find_string_offset(buf, "ing str", 7)); - test_eq(35, buf_find_string_offset(buf, "Testing str", 11)); - test_eq(32, buf_find_string_offset(buf, "ng ", 3)); - test_eq(43, buf_find_string_offset(buf, "string.", 7)); - test_eq(-1, buf_find_string_offset(buf, "shrdlu", 6)); - test_eq(-1, buf_find_string_offset(buf, "Testing thing", 13)); - test_eq(-1, buf_find_string_offset(buf, "ngx", 3)); - buf_free(buf); - buf = NULL; - - /* Try adding a string too long for any freelist. */ - { - char *cp = tor_malloc_zero(65536); - buf = buf_new(); - write_to_buf(cp, 65536, buf); - tor_free(cp); - - tt_int_op(buf_datalen(buf), ==, 65536); - buf_free(buf); - buf = NULL; + test_memeq(c_keys, s_keys, 40); + memset(s_buf, 0, 40); + test_memneq(c_keys, s_buf, 40); } - done: - if (buf) - buf_free(buf); - if (buf2) - buf_free(buf2); + crypto_dh_free(c_dh); + crypto_pk_free(pk); + crypto_pk_free(pk2); } -/** Run unit tests for the onion handshake code. */ static void -test_onion_handshake(void) +test_bad_onion_handshake(void *arg) { + char junk_buf[TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN]; + char junk_buf2[TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN]; /* client-side */ crypto_dh_t *c_dh = NULL; char c_buf[TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN]; char c_keys[40]; - /* server-side */ char s_buf[TAP_ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN]; char s_keys[40]; - /* shared */ - crypto_pk_t *pk = NULL; + crypto_pk_t *pk = NULL, *pk2 = NULL; + + (void)arg; pk = pk_generate(0); + pk2 = pk_generate(1); - /* client handshake 1. */ + /* Server: Case 1: the encrypted data is degenerate. */ + memset(junk_buf, 0, sizeof(junk_buf)); + crypto_pk_public_hybrid_encrypt(pk, junk_buf2, TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN, + junk_buf, DH_KEY_LEN, PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, 1); + tt_int_op(-1, ==, + onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(junk_buf2, pk, NULL, + s_buf, s_keys, 40)); + + /* Server: Case 2: the encrypted data is not long enough. */ + memset(junk_buf, 0, sizeof(junk_buf)); + memset(junk_buf2, 0, sizeof(junk_buf2)); + crypto_pk_public_encrypt(pk, junk_buf2, sizeof(junk_buf2), + junk_buf, 48, PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING); + tt_int_op(-1, ==, + onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(junk_buf2, pk, NULL, + s_buf, s_keys, 40)); + + /* client handshake 1: do it straight. */ memset(c_buf, 0, TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN); test_assert(! onion_skin_TAP_create(pk, &c_dh, c_buf)); - /* server handshake */ - memset(s_buf, 0, TAP_ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN); - memset(s_keys, 0, 40); - test_assert(! onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(c_buf, pk, NULL, + /* Server: Case 3: we just don't have the right key. */ + tt_int_op(-1, ==, + onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(c_buf, pk2, NULL, s_buf, s_keys, 40)); - /* client handshake 2 */ - memset(c_keys, 0, 40); - test_assert(! onion_skin_TAP_client_handshake(c_dh, s_buf, c_keys, 40)); + /* Server: Case 4: The RSA-encrypted portion is corrupt. */ + c_buf[64] ^= 33; + tt_int_op(-1, ==, + onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(c_buf, pk, NULL, + s_buf, s_keys, 40)); + c_buf[64] ^= 33; - if (memcmp(c_keys, s_keys, 40)) { - puts("Aiiiie"); - exit(1); - } - test_memeq(c_keys, s_keys, 40); - memset(s_buf, 0, 40); - test_memneq(c_keys, s_buf, 40); + /* (Let the server procede) */ + tt_int_op(0, ==, + onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(c_buf, pk, NULL, + s_buf, s_keys, 40)); + + /* Client: Case 1: The server sent back junk. */ + s_buf[64] ^= 33; + tt_int_op(-1, ==, + onion_skin_TAP_client_handshake(c_dh, s_buf, c_keys, 40)); + s_buf[64] ^= 33; + + /* Let the client finish; make sure it can. */ + tt_int_op(0, ==, + onion_skin_TAP_client_handshake(c_dh, s_buf, c_keys, 40)); + test_memeq(s_keys, c_keys, 40); + + /* Client: Case 2: The server sent back a degenerate DH. */ + memset(s_buf, 0, sizeof(s_buf)); + tt_int_op(-1, ==, + onion_skin_TAP_client_handshake(c_dh, s_buf, c_keys, 40)); done: - if (c_dh) - crypto_dh_free(c_dh); - if (pk) - crypto_pk_free(pk); + crypto_dh_free(c_dh); + crypto_pk_free(pk); + crypto_pk_free(pk2); } #ifdef CURVE25519_ENABLED @@ -1579,6 +1049,34 @@ test_rend_fns(void) tor_free(intro_points_encrypted); } + /* Record odd numbered fake-IPs using ipv6, even numbered fake-IPs + * using ipv4. Since our fake geoip database is the same between + * ipv4 and ipv6, we should get the same result no matter which + * address family we pick for each IP. */ +#define SET_TEST_ADDRESS(i) do { \ + if ((i) & 1) { \ + SET_TEST_IPV6(i); \ + tor_addr_from_in6(&addr, &in6); \ + } else { \ + tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, (uint32_t) i); \ + } \ + } while (0) + + /* Make sure that country ID actually works. */ +#define SET_TEST_IPV6(i) \ + do { \ + set_uint32(in6.s6_addr + 12, htonl((uint32_t) (i))); \ + } while (0) +#define CHECK_COUNTRY(country, val) do { \ + /* test ipv4 country lookup */ \ + test_streq(country, \ + geoip_get_country_name(geoip_get_country_by_ipv4(val))); \ + /* test ipv6 country lookup */ \ + SET_TEST_IPV6(val); \ + test_streq(country, \ + geoip_get_country_name(geoip_get_country_by_ipv6(&in6))); \ + } while (0) + /** Run unit tests for GeoIP code. */ static void test_geoip(void) @@ -1589,7 +1087,8 @@ test_geoip(void) const char *bridge_stats_1 = "bridge-stats-end 2010-08-12 13:27:30 (86400 s)\n" "bridge-ips zz=24,xy=8\n" - "bridge-ip-versions v4=16,v6=16\n", + "bridge-ip-versions v4=16,v6=16\n" + "bridge-ip-transports <OR>=24\n", *dirreq_stats_1 = "dirreq-stats-end 2010-08-12 13:27:30 (86400 s)\n" "dirreq-v3-ips ab=8\n" @@ -1653,21 +1152,6 @@ test_geoip(void) test_eq(4, geoip_get_n_countries()); memset(&in6, 0, sizeof(in6)); - /* Make sure that country ID actually works. */ -#define SET_TEST_IPV6(i) \ - do { \ - set_uint32(in6.s6_addr + 12, htonl((uint32_t) (i))); \ - } while (0) -#define CHECK_COUNTRY(country, val) do { \ - /* test ipv4 country lookup */ \ - test_streq(country, \ - geoip_get_country_name(geoip_get_country_by_ipv4(val))); \ - /* test ipv6 country lookup */ \ - SET_TEST_IPV6(val); \ - test_streq(country, \ - geoip_get_country_name(geoip_get_country_by_ipv6(&in6))); \ - } while (0) - CHECK_COUNTRY("??", 3); CHECK_COUNTRY("ab", 32); CHECK_COUNTRY("??", 5); @@ -1680,40 +1164,25 @@ test_geoip(void) SET_TEST_IPV6(3); test_eq(0, geoip_get_country_by_ipv6(&in6)); -#undef CHECK_COUNTRY - - /* Record odd numbered fake-IPs using ipv6, even numbered fake-IPs - * using ipv4. Since our fake geoip database is the same between - * ipv4 and ipv6, we should get the same result no matter which - * address family we pick for each IP. */ -#define SET_TEST_ADDRESS(i) do { \ - if ((i) & 1) { \ - SET_TEST_IPV6(i); \ - tor_addr_from_in6(&addr, &in6); \ - } else { \ - tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, (uint32_t) i); \ - } \ - } while (0) - get_options_mutable()->BridgeRelay = 1; get_options_mutable()->BridgeRecordUsageByCountry = 1; /* Put 9 observations in AB... */ for (i=32; i < 40; ++i) { SET_TEST_ADDRESS(i); - geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT, &addr, now-7200); + geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT, &addr, NULL, now-7200); } SET_TEST_ADDRESS(225); - geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT, &addr, now-7200); + geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT, &addr, NULL, now-7200); /* and 3 observations in XY, several times. */ for (j=0; j < 10; ++j) for (i=52; i < 55; ++i) { SET_TEST_ADDRESS(i); - geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT, &addr, now-3600); + geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT, &addr, NULL, now-3600); } /* and 17 observations in ZZ... */ for (i=110; i < 127; ++i) { SET_TEST_ADDRESS(i); - geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT, &addr, now); + geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT, &addr, NULL, now); } geoip_get_client_history(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT, &s, &v); test_assert(s); @@ -1762,7 +1231,7 @@ test_geoip(void) /* Start testing dirreq statistics by making sure that we don't collect * dirreq stats without initializing them. */ SET_TEST_ADDRESS(100); - geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_NETWORKSTATUS, &addr, now); + geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_NETWORKSTATUS, &addr, NULL, now); s = geoip_format_dirreq_stats(now + 86400); test_assert(!s); @@ -1770,7 +1239,7 @@ test_geoip(void) * dirreq-stats history string. */ geoip_dirreq_stats_init(now); SET_TEST_ADDRESS(100); - geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_NETWORKSTATUS, &addr, now); + geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_NETWORKSTATUS, &addr, NULL, now); s = geoip_format_dirreq_stats(now + 86400); test_streq(dirreq_stats_1, s); tor_free(s); @@ -1779,7 +1248,7 @@ test_geoip(void) * don't generate a history string. */ geoip_dirreq_stats_term(); SET_TEST_ADDRESS(101); - geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_NETWORKSTATUS, &addr, now); + geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_NETWORKSTATUS, &addr, NULL, now); s = geoip_format_dirreq_stats(now + 86400); test_assert(!s); @@ -1787,7 +1256,7 @@ test_geoip(void) * that we get an all empty history string. */ geoip_dirreq_stats_init(now); SET_TEST_ADDRESS(100); - geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_NETWORKSTATUS, &addr, now); + geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_NETWORKSTATUS, &addr, NULL, now); geoip_reset_dirreq_stats(now); s = geoip_format_dirreq_stats(now + 86400); test_streq(dirreq_stats_2, s); @@ -1814,7 +1283,7 @@ test_geoip(void) /* Start testing entry statistics by making sure that we don't collect * anything without initializing entry stats. */ SET_TEST_ADDRESS(100); - geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT, &addr, now); + geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT, &addr, NULL, now); s = geoip_format_entry_stats(now + 86400); test_assert(!s); @@ -1822,7 +1291,7 @@ test_geoip(void) * entry-stats history string. */ geoip_entry_stats_init(now); SET_TEST_ADDRESS(100); - geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT, &addr, now); + geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT, &addr, NULL, now); s = geoip_format_entry_stats(now + 86400); test_streq(entry_stats_1, s); tor_free(s); @@ -1831,7 +1300,7 @@ test_geoip(void) * don't generate a history string. */ geoip_entry_stats_term(); SET_TEST_ADDRESS(101); - geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT, &addr, now); + geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT, &addr, NULL, now); s = geoip_format_entry_stats(now + 86400); test_assert(!s); @@ -1839,15 +1308,12 @@ test_geoip(void) * that we get an all empty history string. */ geoip_entry_stats_init(now); SET_TEST_ADDRESS(100); - geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT, &addr, now); + geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT, &addr, NULL, now); geoip_reset_entry_stats(now); s = geoip_format_entry_stats(now + 86400); test_streq(entry_stats_2, s); tor_free(s); -#undef SET_TEST_ADDRESS -#undef SET_TEST_IPV6 - /* Stop collecting entry statistics. */ geoip_entry_stats_term(); get_options_mutable()->EntryStatistics = 0; @@ -1857,6 +1323,79 @@ test_geoip(void) tor_free(v); } +static void +test_geoip_with_pt(void) +{ + time_t now = 1281533250; /* 2010-08-11 13:27:30 UTC */ + char *s = NULL; + int i; + tor_addr_t addr; + struct in6_addr in6; + + get_options_mutable()->BridgeRelay = 1; + get_options_mutable()->BridgeRecordUsageByCountry = 1; + + /* No clients seen yet. */ + s = geoip_get_transport_history(); + tor_assert(!s); + + /* 4 connections without a pluggable transport */ + for (i=0; i < 4; ++i) { + SET_TEST_ADDRESS(i); + geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT, &addr, NULL, now-7200); + } + + /* 9 connections with "alpha" */ + for (i=4; i < 13; ++i) { + SET_TEST_ADDRESS(i); + geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT, &addr, "alpha", now-7200); + } + + /* one connection with "beta" */ + SET_TEST_ADDRESS(13); + geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT, &addr, "beta", now-7200); + + /* 14 connections with "charlie" */ + for (i=14; i < 28; ++i) { + SET_TEST_ADDRESS(i); + geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT, &addr, "charlie", now-7200); + } + + /* 131 connections with "ddr" */ + for (i=28; i < 159; ++i) { + SET_TEST_ADDRESS(i); + geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT, &addr, "ddr", now-7200); + } + + /* 8 connections with "entropy" */ + for (i=159; i < 167; ++i) { + SET_TEST_ADDRESS(i); + geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT, &addr, "entropy", now-7200); + } + + /* 2 connections from the same IP with two different transports. */ + SET_TEST_ADDRESS(++i); + geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT, &addr, "fire", now-7200); + geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT, &addr, "google", now-7200); + + /* Test the transport history string. */ + s = geoip_get_transport_history(); + tor_assert(s); + test_streq(s, "<OR>=8,alpha=16,beta=8,charlie=16,ddr=136," + "entropy=8,fire=8,google=8"); + + /* Stop collecting entry statistics. */ + geoip_entry_stats_term(); + get_options_mutable()->EntryStatistics = 0; + + done: + tor_free(s); +} + +#undef SET_TEST_ADDRESS +#undef SET_TEST_IPV6 +#undef CHECK_COUNTRY + /** Run unit tests for stats code. */ static void test_stats(void) @@ -2047,9 +1586,8 @@ const struct testcase_setup_t legacy_setup = { { #name, legacy_test_helper, TT_FORK, &legacy_setup, test_ ## name } static struct testcase_t test_array[] = { - ENT(buffers), - { "buffer_copy", test_buffer_copy, 0, NULL, NULL }, ENT(onion_handshake), + { "bad_onion_handshake", test_bad_onion_handshake, 0, NULL, NULL }, ENT(onion_queues), #ifdef CURVE25519_ENABLED { "ntor_handshake", test_ntor_handshake, 0, NULL, NULL }, @@ -2058,29 +1596,14 @@ static struct testcase_t test_array[] = { ENT(policies), ENT(rend_fns), ENT(geoip), + FORK(geoip_with_pt), FORK(stats), END_OF_TESTCASES }; -#define SOCKSENT(name) \ - { #name, test_socks_##name, TT_FORK, &socks_setup, NULL } - -static struct testcase_t socks_tests[] = { - SOCKSENT(4_unsupported_commands), - SOCKSENT(4_supported_commands), - - SOCKSENT(5_unsupported_commands), - SOCKSENT(5_supported_commands), - SOCKSENT(5_no_authenticate), - SOCKSENT(5_auth_before_negotiation), - SOCKSENT(5_authenticate), - SOCKSENT(5_authenticate_with_data), - - END_OF_TESTCASES -}; - extern struct testcase_t addr_tests[]; +extern struct testcase_t buffer_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t crypto_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t container_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t util_tests[]; @@ -2091,21 +1614,35 @@ extern struct testcase_t config_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t introduce_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t replaycache_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t cell_format_tests[]; +extern struct testcase_t circuitlist_tests[]; +extern struct testcase_t circuitmux_tests[]; +extern struct testcase_t cell_queue_tests[]; +extern struct testcase_t options_tests[]; +extern struct testcase_t socks_tests[]; +extern struct testcase_t extorport_tests[]; +extern struct testcase_t controller_event_tests[]; static struct testgroup_t testgroups[] = { { "", test_array }, + { "buffer/", buffer_tests }, { "socks/", socks_tests }, { "addr/", addr_tests }, { "crypto/", crypto_tests }, { "container/", container_tests }, { "util/", util_tests }, { "cellfmt/", cell_format_tests }, + { "cellqueue/", cell_queue_tests }, { "dir/", dir_tests }, { "dir/md/", microdesc_tests }, { "pt/", pt_tests }, { "config/", config_tests }, { "replaycache/", replaycache_tests }, { "introduce/", introduce_tests }, + { "circuitlist/", circuitlist_tests }, + { "circuitmux/", circuitmux_tests }, + { "options/", options_tests }, + { "extorport/", extorport_tests }, + { "control/", controller_event_tests }, END_OF_GROUPS }; diff --git a/src/test/test_addr.c b/src/test/test_addr.c index fec85a469..4bc602df8 100644 --- a/src/test/test_addr.c +++ b/src/test/test_addr.c @@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ test_addr_basic(void) test_eq(u32, 0x7f000001u); test_eq(u16, 0); tor_free(cp); + + test_assert(addr_port_lookup(LOG_WARN, "localhost:3", &cp, &u32, NULL)); + tor_free(cp); + test_eq(0, addr_mask_get_bits(0x0u)); test_eq(32, addr_mask_get_bits(0xFFFFFFFFu)); test_eq(16, addr_mask_get_bits(0xFFFF0000u)); @@ -217,11 +221,12 @@ test_addr_ip6_helpers(void) /* ==== Converting to and from sockaddr_t. */ sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)&sa_storage; sin->sin_family = AF_INET; - sin->sin_port = 9090; + sin->sin_port = htons(9090); sin->sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(0x7f7f0102); /*127.127.1.2*/ - tor_addr_from_sockaddr(&t1, (struct sockaddr *)sin, NULL); + tor_addr_from_sockaddr(&t1, (struct sockaddr *)sin, &port1); test_eq(tor_addr_family(&t1), AF_INET); test_eq(tor_addr_to_ipv4h(&t1), 0x7f7f0102); + tt_int_op(port1, ==, 9090); memset(&sa_storage, 0, sizeof(sa_storage)); test_eq(sizeof(struct sockaddr_in), @@ -235,8 +240,9 @@ test_addr_ip6_helpers(void) sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6; sin6->sin6_port = htons(7070); sin6->sin6_addr.s6_addr[0] = 128; - tor_addr_from_sockaddr(&t1, (struct sockaddr *)sin6, NULL); + tor_addr_from_sockaddr(&t1, (struct sockaddr *)sin6, &port1); test_eq(tor_addr_family(&t1), AF_INET6); + tt_int_op(port1, ==, 7070); p1 = tor_addr_to_str(buf, &t1, sizeof(buf), 0); test_streq(p1, "8000::"); @@ -464,6 +470,9 @@ test_addr_ip6_helpers(void) test_eq(0, i); i = tor_addr_parse_PTR_name(&t1, "Foobar.baz", AF_UNSPEC, 1); test_eq(0, i); + i = tor_addr_parse_PTR_name(&t1, "9999999999999999999999999999.in-addr.arpa", + AF_UNSPEC, 1); + test_eq(-1, i); i = tor_addr_parse_PTR_name(&t1, "1.0.168.192.in-addr.arpa", AF_UNSPEC, 1); test_eq(1, i); @@ -844,6 +853,90 @@ test_virtaddrmap(void *data) } static void +test_addr_localname(void *arg) +{ + (void)arg; + tt_assert(tor_addr_hostname_is_local("localhost")); + tt_assert(tor_addr_hostname_is_local("LOCALHOST")); + tt_assert(tor_addr_hostname_is_local("LocalHost")); + tt_assert(tor_addr_hostname_is_local("local")); + tt_assert(tor_addr_hostname_is_local("LOCAL")); + tt_assert(tor_addr_hostname_is_local("here.now.local")); + tt_assert(tor_addr_hostname_is_local("here.now.LOCAL")); + + tt_assert(!tor_addr_hostname_is_local(" localhost")); + tt_assert(!tor_addr_hostname_is_local("www.torproject.org")); + done: + ; +} + +static void +test_addr_dup_ip(void *arg) +{ + char *v = NULL; + (void)arg; +#define CHECK(ip, s) do { \ + v = tor_dup_ip(ip); \ + tt_str_op(v,==,(s)); \ + tor_free(v); \ + } while (0) + + CHECK(0xffffffff, "255.255.255.255"); + CHECK(0x00000000, "0.0.0.0"); + CHECK(0x7f000001, "127.0.0.1"); + CHECK(0x01020304, "1.2.3.4"); + +#undef CHECK + done: + tor_free(v); +} + +static void +test_addr_sockaddr_to_str(void *arg) +{ + char *v = NULL; + struct sockaddr_in sin; + struct sockaddr_in6 sin6; + struct sockaddr_storage ss; +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H + struct sockaddr_un sun; +#endif +#define CHECK(sa, s) do { \ + v = tor_sockaddr_to_str((const struct sockaddr*) &(sa)); \ + tt_str_op(v,==,(s)); \ + tor_free(v); \ + } while (0) + (void)arg; + + memset(&ss,0,sizeof(ss)); + ss.ss_family = AF_UNSPEC; + CHECK(ss, "unspec"); + + memset(&sin,0,sizeof(sin)); + sin.sin_family = AF_INET; + sin.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(0x7f808001); + sin.sin_port = htons(1234); + CHECK(sin, "127.128.128.1:1234"); + +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H + memset(&sun,0,sizeof(sun)); + sun.sun_family = AF_UNIX; + strlcpy(sun.sun_path, "/here/is/a/path", sizeof(sun.sun_path)); + CHECK(sun, "unix:/here/is/a/path"); +#endif + + memset(&sin6,0,sizeof(sin6)); + sin6.sin6_family = AF_INET6; + memcpy(sin6.sin6_addr.s6_addr, "\x20\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00" + "\x00\x1a\x2b\x3c\x4d\x5e\x00\x01", 16); + sin6.sin6_port = htons(1234); + CHECK(sin6, "[2000::1a:2b3c:4d5e:1]:1234"); + + done: + tor_free(v); +} + +static void test_addr_is_loopback(void *data) { static const struct loopback_item { @@ -886,6 +979,9 @@ struct testcase_t addr_tests[] = { ADDR_LEGACY(ip6_helpers), ADDR_LEGACY(parse), { "virtaddr", test_virtaddrmap, 0, NULL, NULL }, + { "localname", test_addr_localname, 0, NULL, NULL }, + { "dup_ip", test_addr_dup_ip, 0, NULL, NULL }, + { "sockaddr_to_str", test_addr_sockaddr_to_str, 0, NULL, NULL }, { "is_loopback", test_addr_is_loopback, 0, NULL, NULL }, END_OF_TESTCASES }; diff --git a/src/test/test_buffers.c b/src/test/test_buffers.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a009faa0b --- /dev/null +++ b/src/test/test_buffers.c @@ -0,0 +1,342 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2013, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#define BUFFERS_PRIVATE +#include "or.h" +#include "buffers.h" +#include "ext_orport.h" +#include "test.h" + +/** Run unit tests for buffers.c */ +static void +test_buffers_basic(void *arg) +{ + char str[256]; + char str2[256]; + + buf_t *buf = NULL, *buf2 = NULL; + const char *cp; + + int j; + size_t r; + (void) arg; + + /**** + * buf_new + ****/ + if (!(buf = buf_new())) + test_fail(); + + //test_eq(buf_capacity(buf), 4096); + test_eq(buf_datalen(buf), 0); + + /**** + * General pointer frobbing + */ + for (j=0;j<256;++j) { + str[j] = (char)j; + } + write_to_buf(str, 256, buf); + write_to_buf(str, 256, buf); + test_eq(buf_datalen(buf), 512); + fetch_from_buf(str2, 200, buf); + test_memeq(str, str2, 200); + test_eq(buf_datalen(buf), 312); + memset(str2, 0, sizeof(str2)); + + fetch_from_buf(str2, 256, buf); + test_memeq(str+200, str2, 56); + test_memeq(str, str2+56, 200); + test_eq(buf_datalen(buf), 56); + memset(str2, 0, sizeof(str2)); + /* Okay, now we should be 512 bytes into the 4096-byte buffer. If we add + * another 3584 bytes, we hit the end. */ + for (j=0;j<15;++j) { + write_to_buf(str, 256, buf); + } + assert_buf_ok(buf); + test_eq(buf_datalen(buf), 3896); + fetch_from_buf(str2, 56, buf); + test_eq(buf_datalen(buf), 3840); + test_memeq(str+200, str2, 56); + for (j=0;j<15;++j) { + memset(str2, 0, sizeof(str2)); + fetch_from_buf(str2, 256, buf); + test_memeq(str, str2, 256); + } + test_eq(buf_datalen(buf), 0); + buf_free(buf); + buf = NULL; + + /* Okay, now make sure growing can work. */ + buf = buf_new_with_capacity(16); + //test_eq(buf_capacity(buf), 16); + write_to_buf(str+1, 255, buf); + //test_eq(buf_capacity(buf), 256); + fetch_from_buf(str2, 254, buf); + test_memeq(str+1, str2, 254); + //test_eq(buf_capacity(buf), 256); + assert_buf_ok(buf); + write_to_buf(str, 32, buf); + //test_eq(buf_capacity(buf), 256); + assert_buf_ok(buf); + write_to_buf(str, 256, buf); + assert_buf_ok(buf); + //test_eq(buf_capacity(buf), 512); + test_eq(buf_datalen(buf), 33+256); + fetch_from_buf(str2, 33, buf); + test_eq(*str2, str[255]); + + test_memeq(str2+1, str, 32); + //test_eq(buf_capacity(buf), 512); + test_eq(buf_datalen(buf), 256); + fetch_from_buf(str2, 256, buf); + test_memeq(str, str2, 256); + + /* now try shrinking: case 1. */ + buf_free(buf); + buf = buf_new_with_capacity(33668); + for (j=0;j<67;++j) { + write_to_buf(str,255, buf); + } + //test_eq(buf_capacity(buf), 33668); + test_eq(buf_datalen(buf), 17085); + for (j=0; j < 40; ++j) { + fetch_from_buf(str2, 255,buf); + test_memeq(str2, str, 255); + } + + /* now try shrinking: case 2. */ + buf_free(buf); + buf = buf_new_with_capacity(33668); + for (j=0;j<67;++j) { + write_to_buf(str,255, buf); + } + for (j=0; j < 20; ++j) { + fetch_from_buf(str2, 255,buf); + test_memeq(str2, str, 255); + } + for (j=0;j<80;++j) { + write_to_buf(str,255, buf); + } + //test_eq(buf_capacity(buf),33668); + for (j=0; j < 120; ++j) { + fetch_from_buf(str2, 255,buf); + test_memeq(str2, str, 255); + } + + /* Move from buf to buf. */ + buf_free(buf); + buf = buf_new_with_capacity(4096); + buf2 = buf_new_with_capacity(4096); + for (j=0;j<100;++j) + write_to_buf(str, 255, buf); + test_eq(buf_datalen(buf), 25500); + for (j=0;j<100;++j) { + r = 10; + move_buf_to_buf(buf2, buf, &r); + test_eq(r, 0); + } + test_eq(buf_datalen(buf), 24500); + test_eq(buf_datalen(buf2), 1000); + for (j=0;j<3;++j) { + fetch_from_buf(str2, 255, buf2); + test_memeq(str2, str, 255); + } + r = 8192; /*big move*/ + move_buf_to_buf(buf2, buf, &r); + test_eq(r, 0); + r = 30000; /* incomplete move */ + move_buf_to_buf(buf2, buf, &r); + test_eq(r, 13692); + for (j=0;j<97;++j) { + fetch_from_buf(str2, 255, buf2); + test_memeq(str2, str, 255); + } + buf_free(buf); + buf_free(buf2); + buf = buf2 = NULL; + + buf = buf_new_with_capacity(5); + cp = "Testing. This is a moderately long Testing string."; + for (j = 0; cp[j]; j++) + write_to_buf(cp+j, 1, buf); + test_eq(0, buf_find_string_offset(buf, "Testing", 7)); + test_eq(1, buf_find_string_offset(buf, "esting", 6)); + test_eq(1, buf_find_string_offset(buf, "est", 3)); + test_eq(39, buf_find_string_offset(buf, "ing str", 7)); + test_eq(35, buf_find_string_offset(buf, "Testing str", 11)); + test_eq(32, buf_find_string_offset(buf, "ng ", 3)); + test_eq(43, buf_find_string_offset(buf, "string.", 7)); + test_eq(-1, buf_find_string_offset(buf, "shrdlu", 6)); + test_eq(-1, buf_find_string_offset(buf, "Testing thing", 13)); + test_eq(-1, buf_find_string_offset(buf, "ngx", 3)); + buf_free(buf); + buf = NULL; + + /* Try adding a string too long for any freelist. */ + { + char *cp = tor_malloc_zero(65536); + buf = buf_new(); + write_to_buf(cp, 65536, buf); + tor_free(cp); + + tt_int_op(buf_datalen(buf), ==, 65536); + buf_free(buf); + buf = NULL; + } + + done: + if (buf) + buf_free(buf); + if (buf2) + buf_free(buf2); +} +static void +test_buffer_copy(void *arg) +{ + generic_buffer_t *buf=NULL, *buf2=NULL; + const char *s; + size_t len; + char b[256]; + int i; + (void)arg; + + buf = generic_buffer_new(); + tt_assert(buf); + + /* Copy an empty buffer. */ + tt_int_op(0, ==, generic_buffer_set_to_copy(&buf2, buf)); + tt_assert(buf2); + tt_int_op(0, ==, generic_buffer_len(buf2)); + + /* Now try with a short buffer. */ + s = "And now comes an act of enormous enormance!"; + len = strlen(s); + generic_buffer_add(buf, s, len); + tt_int_op(len, ==, generic_buffer_len(buf)); + /* Add junk to buf2 so we can test replacing.*/ + generic_buffer_add(buf2, "BLARG", 5); + tt_int_op(0, ==, generic_buffer_set_to_copy(&buf2, buf)); + tt_int_op(len, ==, generic_buffer_len(buf2)); + generic_buffer_get(buf2, b, len); + test_mem_op(b, ==, s, len); + /* Now free buf2 and retry so we can test allocating */ + generic_buffer_free(buf2); + buf2 = NULL; + tt_int_op(0, ==, generic_buffer_set_to_copy(&buf2, buf)); + tt_int_op(len, ==, generic_buffer_len(buf2)); + generic_buffer_get(buf2, b, len); + test_mem_op(b, ==, s, len); + /* Clear buf for next test */ + generic_buffer_get(buf, b, len); + tt_int_op(generic_buffer_len(buf),==,0); + + /* Okay, now let's try a bigger buffer. */ + s = "Quis autem vel eum iure reprehenderit qui in ea voluptate velit " + "esse quam nihil molestiae consequatur, vel illum qui dolorem eum " + "fugiat quo voluptas nulla pariatur?"; + len = strlen(s); + for (i = 0; i < 256; ++i) { + b[0]=i; + generic_buffer_add(buf, b, 1); + generic_buffer_add(buf, s, len); + } + tt_int_op(0, ==, generic_buffer_set_to_copy(&buf2, buf)); + tt_int_op(generic_buffer_len(buf2), ==, generic_buffer_len(buf)); + for (i = 0; i < 256; ++i) { + generic_buffer_get(buf2, b, len+1); + tt_int_op((unsigned char)b[0],==,i); + test_mem_op(b+1, ==, s, len); + } + + done: + if (buf) + generic_buffer_free(buf); + if (buf2) + generic_buffer_free(buf2); +} + +static void +test_buffer_ext_or_cmd(void *arg) +{ + ext_or_cmd_t *cmd = NULL; + generic_buffer_t *buf = generic_buffer_new(); + char *tmp = NULL; + (void) arg; + + /* Empty -- should give "not there. */ + tt_int_op(0, ==, generic_buffer_fetch_ext_or_cmd(buf, &cmd)); + tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, cmd); + + /* Three bytes: shouldn't work. */ + generic_buffer_add(buf, "\x00\x20\x00", 3); + tt_int_op(0, ==, generic_buffer_fetch_ext_or_cmd(buf, &cmd)); + tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, cmd); + tt_int_op(3, ==, generic_buffer_len(buf)); + + /* 0020 0000: That's a nil command. It should work. */ + generic_buffer_add(buf, "\x00", 1); + tt_int_op(1, ==, generic_buffer_fetch_ext_or_cmd(buf, &cmd)); + tt_ptr_op(NULL, !=, cmd); + tt_int_op(0x20, ==, cmd->cmd); + tt_int_op(0, ==, cmd->len); + tt_int_op(0, ==, generic_buffer_len(buf)); + ext_or_cmd_free(cmd); + cmd = NULL; + + /* Now try a length-6 command with one byte missing. */ + generic_buffer_add(buf, "\x10\x21\x00\x06""abcde", 9); + tt_int_op(0, ==, generic_buffer_fetch_ext_or_cmd(buf, &cmd)); + tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, cmd); + generic_buffer_add(buf, "f", 1); + tt_int_op(1, ==, generic_buffer_fetch_ext_or_cmd(buf, &cmd)); + tt_ptr_op(NULL, !=, cmd); + tt_int_op(0x1021, ==, cmd->cmd); + tt_int_op(6, ==, cmd->len); + test_mem_op("abcdef", ==, cmd->body, 6); + tt_int_op(0, ==, generic_buffer_len(buf)); + ext_or_cmd_free(cmd); + cmd = NULL; + + /* Now try a length-10 command with 4 extra bytes. */ + generic_buffer_add(buf, "\xff\xff\x00\x0a" + "loremipsum\x10\x00\xff\xff", 18); + tt_int_op(1, ==, generic_buffer_fetch_ext_or_cmd(buf, &cmd)); + tt_ptr_op(NULL, !=, cmd); + tt_int_op(0xffff, ==, cmd->cmd); + tt_int_op(10, ==, cmd->len); + test_mem_op("loremipsum", ==, cmd->body, 10); + tt_int_op(4, ==, generic_buffer_len(buf)); + ext_or_cmd_free(cmd); + cmd = NULL; + + /* Finally, let's try a maximum-length command. We already have the header + * waiting. */ + tt_int_op(0, ==, generic_buffer_fetch_ext_or_cmd(buf, &cmd)); + tmp = tor_malloc_zero(65535); + generic_buffer_add(buf, tmp, 65535); + tt_int_op(1, ==, generic_buffer_fetch_ext_or_cmd(buf, &cmd)); + tt_ptr_op(NULL, !=, cmd); + tt_int_op(0x1000, ==, cmd->cmd); + tt_int_op(0xffff, ==, cmd->len); + test_mem_op(tmp, ==, cmd->body, 65535); + tt_int_op(0, ==, generic_buffer_len(buf)); + ext_or_cmd_free(cmd); + cmd = NULL; + + done: + ext_or_cmd_free(cmd); + generic_buffer_free(buf); + tor_free(tmp); +} + +struct testcase_t buffer_tests[] = { + { "basic", test_buffers_basic, 0, NULL, NULL }, + { "copy", test_buffer_copy, 0, NULL, NULL }, + { "ext_or_cmd", test_buffer_ext_or_cmd, 0, NULL, NULL }, + END_OF_TESTCASES +}; + diff --git a/src/test/test_cell_queue.c b/src/test/test_cell_queue.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1eac07310 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/test/test_cell_queue.c @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2013, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#define CIRCUITLIST_PRIVATE +#define RELAY_PRIVATE +#include "or.h" +#include "circuitlist.h" +#include "relay.h" +#include "test.h" + +static void +test_cq_manip(void *arg) +{ + packed_cell_t *pc1=NULL, *pc2=NULL, *pc3=NULL, *pc4=NULL, *pc_tmp=NULL; + cell_queue_t cq; + cell_t cell; + (void) arg; + + init_cell_pool(); + cell_queue_init(&cq); + tt_int_op(cq.n, ==, 0); + + pc1 = packed_cell_new(); + pc2 = packed_cell_new(); + pc3 = packed_cell_new(); + pc4 = packed_cell_new(); + tt_assert(pc1 && pc2 && pc3 && pc4); + + tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, cell_queue_pop(&cq)); + + /* Add and remove a singleton. */ + cell_queue_append(&cq, pc1); + tt_int_op(cq.n, ==, 1); + tt_ptr_op(pc1, ==, cell_queue_pop(&cq)); + tt_int_op(cq.n, ==, 0); + + /* Add and remove four items */ + cell_queue_append(&cq, pc4); + cell_queue_append(&cq, pc3); + cell_queue_append(&cq, pc2); + cell_queue_append(&cq, pc1); + tt_int_op(cq.n, ==, 4); + tt_ptr_op(pc4, ==, cell_queue_pop(&cq)); + tt_ptr_op(pc3, ==, cell_queue_pop(&cq)); + tt_ptr_op(pc2, ==, cell_queue_pop(&cq)); + tt_ptr_op(pc1, ==, cell_queue_pop(&cq)); + tt_int_op(cq.n, ==, 0); + tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, cell_queue_pop(&cq)); + + /* Try a packed copy (wide, then narrow, which is a bit of a cheat, since a + * real cell queue has only one type.) */ + memset(&cell, 0, sizeof(cell)); + cell.circ_id = 0x12345678; + cell.command = 10; + strlcpy((char*)cell.payload, "Lorax ipsum gruvvulus thneed amet, snergelly " + "once-ler lerkim, sed do barbaloot tempor gluppitus ut labore et " + "truffula magna aliqua.", + sizeof(cell.payload)); + cell_queue_append_packed_copy(NULL /*circ*/, &cq, 0 /*exitward*/, &cell, + 1 /*wide*/, 0 /*stats*/); + cell.circ_id = 0x2013; + cell_queue_append_packed_copy(NULL /*circ*/, &cq, 0 /*exitward*/, &cell, + 0 /*wide*/, 0 /*stats*/); + tt_int_op(cq.n, ==, 2); + + pc_tmp = cell_queue_pop(&cq); + tt_int_op(cq.n, ==, 1); + tt_ptr_op(pc_tmp, !=, NULL); + test_mem_op(pc_tmp->body, ==, "\x12\x34\x56\x78\x0a", 5); + test_mem_op(pc_tmp->body+5, ==, cell.payload, sizeof(cell.payload)); + packed_cell_free(pc_tmp); + + pc_tmp = cell_queue_pop(&cq); + tt_int_op(cq.n, ==, 0); + tt_ptr_op(pc_tmp, !=, NULL); + test_mem_op(pc_tmp->body, ==, "\x20\x13\x0a", 3); + test_mem_op(pc_tmp->body+3, ==, cell.payload, sizeof(cell.payload)); + packed_cell_free(pc_tmp); + pc_tmp = NULL; + + tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, cell_queue_pop(&cq)); + + /* Now make sure cell_queue_clear works. */ + cell_queue_append(&cq, pc2); + cell_queue_append(&cq, pc1); + tt_int_op(cq.n, ==, 2); + cell_queue_clear(&cq); + pc2 = pc1 = NULL; /* prevent double-free */ + tt_int_op(cq.n, ==, 0); + + done: + packed_cell_free(pc1); + packed_cell_free(pc2); + packed_cell_free(pc3); + packed_cell_free(pc4); + packed_cell_free(pc_tmp); + + cell_queue_clear(&cq); + free_cell_pool(); +} + +static void +test_circuit_n_cells(void *arg) +{ + packed_cell_t *pc1=NULL, *pc2=NULL, *pc3=NULL, *pc4=NULL, *pc5=NULL; + origin_circuit_t *origin_c=NULL; + or_circuit_t *or_c=NULL; + + (void)arg; + + init_cell_pool(); + + pc1 = packed_cell_new(); + pc2 = packed_cell_new(); + pc3 = packed_cell_new(); + pc4 = packed_cell_new(); + pc5 = packed_cell_new(); + tt_assert(pc1 && pc2 && pc3 && pc4 && pc5); + + or_c = or_circuit_new(0, NULL); + origin_c = origin_circuit_new(); + origin_c->base_.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL; + + tt_int_op(n_cells_in_circ_queues(TO_CIRCUIT(or_c)), ==, 0); + cell_queue_append(&or_c->p_chan_cells, pc1); + tt_int_op(n_cells_in_circ_queues(TO_CIRCUIT(or_c)), ==, 1); + cell_queue_append(&or_c->base_.n_chan_cells, pc2); + cell_queue_append(&or_c->base_.n_chan_cells, pc3); + tt_int_op(n_cells_in_circ_queues(TO_CIRCUIT(or_c)), ==, 3); + + tt_int_op(n_cells_in_circ_queues(TO_CIRCUIT(origin_c)), ==, 0); + cell_queue_append(&origin_c->base_.n_chan_cells, pc4); + cell_queue_append(&origin_c->base_.n_chan_cells, pc5); + tt_int_op(n_cells_in_circ_queues(TO_CIRCUIT(origin_c)), ==, 2); + + done: + circuit_free(TO_CIRCUIT(or_c)); + circuit_free(TO_CIRCUIT(origin_c)); + + free_cell_pool(); +} + +struct testcase_t cell_queue_tests[] = { + { "basic", test_cq_manip, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL, }, + { "circ_n_cells", test_circuit_n_cells, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, + END_OF_TESTCASES +}; + diff --git a/src/test/test_circuitlist.c b/src/test/test_circuitlist.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..720b40765 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/test/test_circuitlist.c @@ -0,0 +1,168 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2013, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#define TOR_CHANNEL_INTERNAL_ +#define CIRCUITLIST_PRIVATE +#include "or.h" +#include "channel.h" +#include "circuitlist.h" +#include "test.h" + +static channel_t * +new_fake_channel(void) +{ + channel_t *chan = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(channel_t)); + channel_init(chan); + return chan; +} + +static struct { + int ncalls; + void *cmux; + void *circ; + cell_direction_t dir; +} cam; + +static void +circuitmux_attach_mock(circuitmux_t *cmux, circuit_t *circ, + cell_direction_t dir) +{ + ++cam.ncalls; + cam.cmux = cmux; + cam.circ = circ; + cam.dir = dir; +} + +static struct { + int ncalls; + void *cmux; + void *circ; +} cdm; + +static void +circuitmux_detach_mock(circuitmux_t *cmux, circuit_t *circ) +{ + ++cdm.ncalls; + cdm.cmux = cmux; + cdm.circ = circ; +} + +#define GOT_CMUX_ATTACH(mux_, circ_, dir_) do { \ + tt_int_op(cam.ncalls, ==, 1); \ + tt_ptr_op(cam.cmux, ==, (mux_)); \ + tt_ptr_op(cam.circ, ==, (circ_)); \ + tt_ptr_op(cam.dir, ==, (dir_)); \ + memset(&cam, 0, sizeof(cam)); \ + } while (0) + +#define GOT_CMUX_DETACH(mux_, circ_) do { \ + tt_int_op(cdm.ncalls, ==, 1); \ + tt_ptr_op(cdm.cmux, ==, (mux_)); \ + tt_ptr_op(cdm.circ, ==, (circ_)); \ + memset(&cdm, 0, sizeof(cdm)); \ + } while (0) + +static void +test_clist_maps(void *arg) +{ + channel_t *ch1 = new_fake_channel(); + channel_t *ch2 = new_fake_channel(); + channel_t *ch3 = new_fake_channel(); + or_circuit_t *or_c1=NULL, *or_c2=NULL; + + (void) arg; + + MOCK(circuitmux_attach_circuit, circuitmux_attach_mock); + MOCK(circuitmux_detach_circuit, circuitmux_detach_mock); + memset(&cam, 0, sizeof(cam)); + memset(&cdm, 0, sizeof(cdm)); + + ch1->cmux = (void*)0x1001; + ch2->cmux = (void*)0x1002; + ch3->cmux = (void*)0x1003; + + or_c1 = or_circuit_new(100, ch2); + tt_assert(or_c1); + GOT_CMUX_ATTACH(ch2->cmux, or_c1, CELL_DIRECTION_IN); + tt_int_op(or_c1->p_circ_id, ==, 100); + tt_ptr_op(or_c1->p_chan, ==, ch2); + + or_c2 = or_circuit_new(100, ch1); + tt_assert(or_c2); + GOT_CMUX_ATTACH(ch1->cmux, or_c2, CELL_DIRECTION_IN); + tt_int_op(or_c2->p_circ_id, ==, 100); + tt_ptr_op(or_c2->p_chan, ==, ch1); + + circuit_set_n_circid_chan(TO_CIRCUIT(or_c1), 200, ch1); + GOT_CMUX_ATTACH(ch1->cmux, or_c1, CELL_DIRECTION_OUT); + + circuit_set_n_circid_chan(TO_CIRCUIT(or_c2), 200, ch2); + GOT_CMUX_ATTACH(ch2->cmux, or_c2, CELL_DIRECTION_OUT); + + tt_ptr_op(circuit_get_by_circid_channel(200, ch1), ==, TO_CIRCUIT(or_c1)); + tt_ptr_op(circuit_get_by_circid_channel(200, ch2), ==, TO_CIRCUIT(or_c2)); + tt_ptr_op(circuit_get_by_circid_channel(100, ch2), ==, TO_CIRCUIT(or_c1)); + /* Try the same thing again, to test the "fast" path. */ + tt_ptr_op(circuit_get_by_circid_channel(100, ch2), ==, TO_CIRCUIT(or_c1)); + tt_assert(circuit_id_in_use_on_channel(100, ch2)); + tt_assert(! circuit_id_in_use_on_channel(101, ch2)); + + /* Try changing the circuitid and channel of that circuit. */ + circuit_set_p_circid_chan(or_c1, 500, ch3); + GOT_CMUX_DETACH(ch2->cmux, TO_CIRCUIT(or_c1)); + GOT_CMUX_ATTACH(ch3->cmux, TO_CIRCUIT(or_c1), CELL_DIRECTION_IN); + tt_ptr_op(circuit_get_by_circid_channel(100, ch2), ==, NULL); + tt_assert(! circuit_id_in_use_on_channel(100, ch2)); + tt_ptr_op(circuit_get_by_circid_channel(500, ch3), ==, TO_CIRCUIT(or_c1)); + + /* Now let's see about destroy handling. */ + tt_assert(! circuit_id_in_use_on_channel(205, ch2)); + tt_assert(circuit_id_in_use_on_channel(200, ch2)); + channel_note_destroy_pending(ch2, 200); + channel_note_destroy_pending(ch2, 205); + channel_note_destroy_pending(ch1, 100); + tt_assert(circuit_id_in_use_on_channel(205, ch2)) + tt_assert(circuit_id_in_use_on_channel(200, ch2)); + tt_assert(circuit_id_in_use_on_channel(100, ch1)); + + tt_assert(TO_CIRCUIT(or_c2)->n_delete_pending != 0); + tt_ptr_op(circuit_get_by_circid_channel(200, ch2), ==, TO_CIRCUIT(or_c2)); + tt_ptr_op(circuit_get_by_circid_channel(100, ch1), ==, TO_CIRCUIT(or_c2)); + + /* Okay, now free ch2 and make sure that the circuit ID is STILL not + * usable, because we haven't declared the destroy to be nonpending */ + tt_int_op(cdm.ncalls, ==, 0); + circuit_free(TO_CIRCUIT(or_c2)); + or_c2 = NULL; /* prevent free */ + tt_int_op(cdm.ncalls, ==, 2); + memset(&cdm, 0, sizeof(cdm)); + tt_assert(circuit_id_in_use_on_channel(200, ch2)); + tt_assert(circuit_id_in_use_on_channel(100, ch1)); + tt_ptr_op(circuit_get_by_circid_channel(200, ch2), ==, NULL); + tt_ptr_op(circuit_get_by_circid_channel(100, ch1), ==, NULL); + + /* Now say that the destroy is nonpending */ + channel_note_destroy_not_pending(ch2, 200); + tt_ptr_op(circuit_get_by_circid_channel(200, ch2), ==, NULL); + channel_note_destroy_not_pending(ch1, 100); + tt_ptr_op(circuit_get_by_circid_channel(100, ch1), ==, NULL); + tt_assert(! circuit_id_in_use_on_channel(200, ch2)); + tt_assert(! circuit_id_in_use_on_channel(100, ch1)); + + done: + tor_free(ch1); + tor_free(ch2); + tor_free(ch3); + if (or_c1) + circuit_free(TO_CIRCUIT(or_c1)); + if (or_c2) + circuit_free(TO_CIRCUIT(or_c2)); + UNMOCK(circuitmux_attach_circuit); + UNMOCK(circuitmux_detach_circuit); +} + +struct testcase_t circuitlist_tests[] = { + { "maps", test_clist_maps, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, + END_OF_TESTCASES +}; + diff --git a/src/test/test_circuitmux.c b/src/test/test_circuitmux.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0f592001c --- /dev/null +++ b/src/test/test_circuitmux.c @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2013, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#define TOR_CHANNEL_INTERNAL_ +#define CIRCUITMUX_PRIVATE +#define RELAY_PRIVATE +#include "or.h" +#include "channel.h" +#include "circuitmux.h" +#include "relay.h" +#include "test.h" + +/* XXXX duplicated function from test_circuitlist.c */ +static channel_t * +new_fake_channel(void) +{ + channel_t *chan = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(channel_t)); + channel_init(chan); + return chan; +} + +static int +has_queued_writes(channel_t *c) +{ + (void) c; + return 1; +} + +/** Test destroy cell queue with no interference from other queues. */ +static void +test_cmux_destroy_cell_queue(void *arg) +{ + circuitmux_t *cmux = NULL; + channel_t *ch = NULL; + circuit_t *circ = NULL; + cell_queue_t *cq = NULL; + packed_cell_t *pc = NULL; + + init_cell_pool(); + (void) arg; + + cmux = circuitmux_alloc(); + tt_assert(cmux); + ch = new_fake_channel(); + ch->has_queued_writes = has_queued_writes; + ch->wide_circ_ids = 1; + + circ = circuitmux_get_first_active_circuit(cmux, &cq); + tt_assert(!circ); + tt_assert(!cq); + + circuitmux_append_destroy_cell(ch, cmux, 100, 10); + circuitmux_append_destroy_cell(ch, cmux, 190, 6); + circuitmux_append_destroy_cell(ch, cmux, 30, 1); + + tt_int_op(circuitmux_num_cells(cmux), ==, 3); + + circ = circuitmux_get_first_active_circuit(cmux, &cq); + tt_assert(!circ); + tt_assert(cq); + + tt_int_op(cq->n, ==, 3); + + pc = cell_queue_pop(cq); + tt_assert(pc); + test_mem_op(pc->body, ==, "\x00\x00\x00\x64\x04\x0a\x00\x00\x00", 9); + packed_cell_free(pc); + pc = NULL; + + tt_int_op(circuitmux_num_cells(cmux), ==, 2); + + done: + circuitmux_free(cmux); + channel_free(ch); + packed_cell_free(pc); + + free_cell_pool(); +} + +struct testcase_t circuitmux_tests[] = { + { "destroy_cell_queue", test_cmux_destroy_cell_queue, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, + END_OF_TESTCASES +}; + diff --git a/src/test/test_cmdline_args.py b/src/test/test_cmdline_args.py new file mode 100755 index 000000000..6d9cf44db --- /dev/null +++ b/src/test/test_cmdline_args.py @@ -0,0 +1,273 @@ +#!/usr/bin/python + +import binascii +import hashlib +import os +import re +import shutil +import subprocess +import sys +import tempfile +import unittest + +TOR = "./src/or/tor" +TOP_SRCDIR = "." + +if len(sys.argv) > 1: + TOR = sys.argv[1] + del sys.argv[1] + +if len(sys.argv) > 1: + TOP_SRCDIR = sys.argv[1] + del sys.argv[1] + +class UnexpectedSuccess(Exception): + pass + +class UnexpectedFailure(Exception): + pass + +def contents(fn): + f = open(fn) + try: + return f.read() + finally: + f.close() + +def run_tor(args, failure=False): + p = subprocess.Popen([TOR] + args, stdout=subprocess.PIPE) + output, _ = p.communicate() + result = p.poll() + if result and not failure: + raise UnexpectedFailure() + elif not result and failure: + raise UnexpectedSuccess() + return output + +def spaceify_fp(fp): + for i in xrange(0, len(fp), 4): + yield fp[i:i+4] + +def lines(s): + out = s.split("\n") + if out and out[-1] == '': + del out[-1] + return out + +def strip_log_junk(line): + m = re.match(r'([^\[]+\[[a-z]*\] *)(.*)', line) + if not m: + return ""+line + return m.group(2).strip() + +def randstring(entropy_bytes): + s = os.urandom(entropy_bytes) + return binascii.b2a_hex(s) + +def findLineContaining(lines, s): + for ln in lines: + if s in ln: + return True + return False + +class CmdlineTests(unittest.TestCase): + + def test_version(self): + out = run_tor(["--version"]) + self.failUnless(out.startswith("Tor version ")) + self.assertEquals(len(lines(out)), 1) + + def test_quiet(self): + out = run_tor(["--quiet", "--quumblebluffin", "1"], failure=True) + self.assertEquals(out, "") + + def test_help(self): + out = run_tor(["--help"], failure=False) + out2 = run_tor(["-h"], failure=False) + self.assert_(out.startswith("Copyright (c) 2001")) + self.assert_(out.endswith( + "tor -f <torrc> [args]\n" + "See man page for options, or https://www.torproject.org/ for documentation.\n")) + self.assert_(out == out2) + + def test_hush(self): + torrc = tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(delete=False) + torrc.close() + try: + out = run_tor(["--hush", "-f", torrc.name, + "--quumblebluffin", "1"], failure=True) + finally: + os.unlink(torrc.name) + self.assertEquals(len(lines(out)), 2) + ln = [ strip_log_junk(l) for l in lines(out) ] + self.assertEquals(ln[0], "Failed to parse/validate config: Unknown option 'quumblebluffin'. Failing.") + self.assertEquals(ln[1], "Reading config failed--see warnings above.") + + def test_missing_argument(self): + out = run_tor(["--hush", "--hash-password"], failure=True) + self.assertEquals(len(lines(out)), 2) + ln = [ strip_log_junk(l) for l in lines(out) ] + self.assertEquals(ln[0], "Command-line option '--hash-password' with no value. Failing.") + + def test_hash_password(self): + out = run_tor(["--hash-password", "woodwose"]) + result = lines(out)[-1] + self.assertEquals(result[:3], "16:") + self.assertEquals(len(result), 61) + r = binascii.a2b_hex(result[3:]) + self.assertEquals(len(r), 29) + + salt, how, hashed = r[:8], r[8], r[9:] + self.assertEquals(len(hashed), 20) + + count = (16 + (ord(how) & 15)) << ((ord(how) >> 4) + 6) + stuff = salt + "woodwose" + repetitions = count // len(stuff) + 1 + inp = stuff * repetitions + inp = inp[:count] + + self.assertEquals(hashlib.sha1(inp).digest(), hashed) + + def test_digests(self): + main_c = os.path.join(TOP_SRCDIR, "src", "or", "main.c") + + if os.stat(TOR).st_mtime < os.stat(main_c).st_mtime: + self.skipTest(TOR+" not up to date") + out = run_tor(["--digests"]) + main_line = [ l for l in lines(out) if l.endswith("/main.c") ] + digest, name = main_line[0].split() + actual = hashlib.sha1(open(main_c).read()).hexdigest() + self.assertEquals(digest, actual) + + def test_dump_options(self): + default_torrc = tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(delete=False) + torrc = tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(delete=False) + torrc.write("SocksPort 9999") + torrc.close() + default_torrc.write("SafeLogging 0") + default_torrc.close() + out_sh = out_nb = out_fl = None + opts = [ "-f", torrc.name, + "--defaults-torrc", default_torrc.name ] + try: + out_sh = run_tor(["--dump-config", "short"]+opts) + out_nb = run_tor(["--dump-config", "non-builtin"]+opts) + out_fl = run_tor(["--dump-config", "full"]+opts) + out_nr = run_tor(["--dump-config", "bliznert"]+opts, + failure=True) + + out_verif = run_tor(["--verify-config"]+opts) + finally: + os.unlink(torrc.name) + os.unlink(default_torrc.name) + + self.assertEquals(len(lines(out_sh)), 2) + self.assert_(lines(out_sh)[0].startswith("DataDirectory ")) + self.assertEquals(lines(out_sh)[1:], + [ "SocksPort 9999" ]) + + self.assertEquals(len(lines(out_nb)), 2) + self.assertEquals(lines(out_nb), + [ "SafeLogging 0", + "SocksPort 9999" ]) + + out_fl = lines(out_fl) + self.assert_(len(out_fl) > 100) + self.assert_("SocksPort 9999" in out_fl) + self.assert_("SafeLogging 0" in out_fl) + self.assert_("ClientOnly 0" in out_fl) + + self.assert_(out_verif.endswith("Configuration was valid\n")) + + def test_list_fingerprint(self): + tmpdir = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix='ttca_') + torrc = tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(delete=False) + torrc.write("ORPort 9999\n") + torrc.write("DataDirectory %s\n"%tmpdir) + torrc.write("Nickname tippi") + torrc.close() + opts = ["-f", torrc.name] + try: + out = run_tor(["--list-fingerprint"]+opts) + fp = contents(os.path.join(tmpdir, "fingerprint")) + finally: + os.unlink(torrc.name) + shutil.rmtree(tmpdir) + + out = lines(out) + lastlog = strip_log_junk(out[-2]) + lastline = out[-1] + fp = fp.strip() + nn_fp = fp.split()[0] + space_fp = " ".join(spaceify_fp(fp.split()[1])) + self.assertEquals(lastlog, + "Your Tor server's identity key fingerprint is '%s'"%fp) + self.assertEquals(lastline, "tippi %s"%space_fp) + self.assertEquals(nn_fp, "tippi") + + def test_list_options(self): + out = lines(run_tor(["--list-torrc-options"])) + self.assert_(len(out)>100) + self.assert_(out[0] <= 'AccountingMax') + self.assert_("UseBridges" in out) + self.assert_("SocksPort" in out) + + def test_cmdline_args(self): + default_torrc = tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(delete=False) + torrc = tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(delete=False) + torrc.write("SocksPort 9999\n") + torrc.write("SocksPort 9998\n") + torrc.write("ORPort 9000\n") + torrc.write("ORPort 9001\n") + torrc.write("Nickname eleventeen\n") + torrc.write("ControlPort 9500\n") + torrc.close() + default_torrc.write("") + default_torrc.close() + out_sh = out_nb = out_fl = None + opts = [ "-f", torrc.name, + "--defaults-torrc", default_torrc.name, + "--dump-config", "short" ] + try: + out_1 = run_tor(opts) + out_2 = run_tor(opts+["+ORPort", "9003", + "SocksPort", "9090", + "/ControlPort", + "/TransPort", + "+ExtORPort", "9005"]) + finally: + os.unlink(torrc.name) + os.unlink(default_torrc.name) + + out_1 = [ l for l in lines(out_1) if not l.startswith("DataDir") ] + out_2 = [ l for l in lines(out_2) if not l.startswith("DataDir") ] + + self.assertEquals(out_1, + ["ControlPort 9500", + "Nickname eleventeen", + "ORPort 9000", + "ORPort 9001", + "SocksPort 9999", + "SocksPort 9998"]) + self.assertEquals(out_2, + ["ExtORPort 9005", + "Nickname eleventeen", + "ORPort 9000", + "ORPort 9001", + "ORPort 9003", + "SocksPort 9090"]) + + def test_missing_torrc(self): + fname = "nonexistent_file_"+randstring(8) + out = run_tor(["-f", fname, "--verify-config"], failure=True) + ln = [ strip_log_junk(l) for l in lines(out) ] + self.assert_("Unable to open configuration file" in ln[-2]) + self.assert_("Reading config failed" in ln[-1]) + + out = run_tor(["-f", fname, "--verify-config", "--ignore-missing-torrc"]) + ln = [ strip_log_junk(l) for l in lines(out) ] + self.assert_(findLineContaining(ln, ", using reasonable defaults")) + self.assert_("Configuration was valid" in ln[-1]) + +if __name__ == '__main__': + unittest.main() diff --git a/src/test/test_config.c b/src/test/test_config.c index e20fe7329..6a285db6e 100644 --- a/src/test/test_config.c +++ b/src/test/test_config.c @@ -4,12 +4,16 @@ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ #include "orconfig.h" + +#define CONFIG_PRIVATE #include "or.h" #include "addressmap.h" #include "config.h" #include "confparse.h" #include "connection_edge.h" #include "test.h" +#include "util.h" +#include "address.h" static void test_config_addressmap(void *arg) @@ -169,11 +173,391 @@ test_config_addressmap(void *arg) ; } +static int +is_private_dir(const char* path) +{ + struct stat st; + int r = stat(path, &st); + if (r) { + return 0; + } +#if !defined (_WIN32) || defined (WINCE) + if ((st.st_mode & (S_IFDIR | 0777)) != (S_IFDIR | 0700)) { + return 0; + } +#endif + return 1; +} + +static void +test_config_check_or_create_data_subdir(void *arg) +{ + or_options_t *options = get_options_mutable(); + char *datadir = options->DataDirectory = tor_strdup(get_fname("datadir-0")); + const char *subdir = "test_stats"; + char *subpath = get_datadir_fname(subdir); + struct stat st; + int r; +#if !defined (_WIN32) || defined (WINCE) + unsigned group_permission; +#endif + (void)arg; + +#if defined (_WIN32) && !defined (WINCE) + tt_int_op(mkdir(options->DataDirectory), ==, 0); +#else + tt_int_op(mkdir(options->DataDirectory, 0700), ==, 0); +#endif + + r = stat(subpath, &st); + + // The subdirectory shouldn't exist yet, + // but should be created by the call to check_or_create_data_subdir. + test_assert(r && (errno == ENOENT)); + test_assert(!check_or_create_data_subdir(subdir)); + test_assert(is_private_dir(subpath)); + + // The check should return 0, if the directory already exists + // and is private to the user. + test_assert(!check_or_create_data_subdir(subdir)); + +#if !defined (_WIN32) || defined (WINCE) + group_permission = st.st_mode | 0070; + r = chmod(subpath, group_permission); + + if (r) { + test_fail_msg("Changing permissions for the subdirectory failed."); + } + + // If the directory exists, but its mode is too permissive + // a call to check_or_create_data_subdir should reset the mode. + test_assert(!is_private_dir(subpath)); + test_assert(!check_or_create_data_subdir(subdir)); + test_assert(is_private_dir(subpath)); +#endif + + done: + rmdir(subpath); + tor_free(datadir); + tor_free(subpath); +} + +static void +test_config_write_to_data_subdir(void *arg) +{ + or_options_t* options = get_options_mutable(); + char *datadir = options->DataDirectory = tor_strdup(get_fname("datadir-1")); + const char* subdir = "test_stats"; + const char* fname = "test_file"; + const char* str = + "Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consetetur sadipscing\n" + "elitr, sed diam nonumy eirmod\n" + "tempor invidunt ut labore et dolore magna aliquyam\n" + "erat, sed diam voluptua.\n" + "At vero eos et accusam et justo duo dolores et ea\n" + "rebum. Stet clita kasd gubergren,\n" + "no sea takimata sanctus est Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet.\n" + "Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet,\n" + "consetetur sadipscing elitr, sed diam nonumy eirmod\n" + "tempor invidunt ut labore et dolore\n" + "magna aliquyam erat, sed diam voluptua. At vero eos et\n" + "accusam et justo duo dolores et\n" + "ea rebum. Stet clita kasd gubergren, no sea takimata\n" + "sanctus est Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet."; + char* filepath = get_datadir_fname2(subdir, fname); + (void)arg; + +#if defined (_WIN32) && !defined (WINCE) + tt_int_op(mkdir(options->DataDirectory), ==, 0); +#else + tt_int_op(mkdir(options->DataDirectory, 0700), ==, 0); +#endif + + // Write attempt shoudl fail, if subdirectory doesn't exist. + test_assert(write_to_data_subdir(subdir, fname, str, NULL)); + test_assert(! check_or_create_data_subdir(subdir)); + + // Content of file after write attempt should be + // equal to the original string. + test_assert(!write_to_data_subdir(subdir, fname, str, NULL)); + test_streq(read_file_to_str(filepath, 0, NULL), str); + + // A second write operation should overwrite the old content. + test_assert(!write_to_data_subdir(subdir, fname, str, NULL)); + test_streq(read_file_to_str(filepath, 0, NULL), str); + + done: + (void) unlink(filepath); + rmdir(options->DataDirectory); + tor_free(datadir); + tor_free(filepath); +} + +/* Test helper function: Make sure that a bridge line gets parsed + * properly. Also make sure that the resulting bridge_line_t structure + * has its fields set correctly. */ +static void +good_bridge_line_test(const char *string, const char *test_addrport, + const char *test_digest, const char *test_transport, + const smartlist_t *test_socks_args) +{ + char *tmp = NULL; + bridge_line_t *bridge_line = parse_bridge_line(string); + test_assert(bridge_line); + + /* test addrport */ + tmp = tor_strdup(fmt_addrport(&bridge_line->addr, bridge_line->port)); + test_streq(test_addrport, tmp); + tor_free(tmp); + + /* If we were asked to validate a digest, but we did not get a + digest after parsing, we failed. */ + if (test_digest && tor_digest_is_zero(bridge_line->digest)) + test_assert(0); + + /* If we were not asked to validate a digest, and we got a digest + after parsing, we failed again. */ + if (!test_digest && !tor_digest_is_zero(bridge_line->digest)) + test_assert(0); + + /* If we were asked to validate a digest, and we got a digest after + parsing, make sure it's correct. */ + if (test_digest) { + tmp = tor_strdup(hex_str(bridge_line->digest, DIGEST_LEN)); + tor_strlower(tmp); + test_streq(test_digest, tmp); + tor_free(tmp); + } + + /* If we were asked to validate a transport name, make sure tha it + matches with the transport name that was parsed. */ + if (test_transport && !bridge_line->transport_name) + test_assert(0); + if (!test_transport && bridge_line->transport_name) + test_assert(0); + if (test_transport) + test_streq(test_transport, bridge_line->transport_name); + + /* Validate the SOCKS argument smartlist. */ + if (test_socks_args && !bridge_line->socks_args) + test_assert(0); + if (!test_socks_args && bridge_line->socks_args) + test_assert(0); + if (test_socks_args) + test_assert(smartlist_strings_eq(test_socks_args, + bridge_line->socks_args)); + + done: + tor_free(tmp); + bridge_line_free(bridge_line); +} + +/* Test helper function: Make sure that a bridge line is + * unparseable. */ +static void +bad_bridge_line_test(const char *string) +{ + bridge_line_t *bridge_line = parse_bridge_line(string); + test_assert(!bridge_line); + + done: + bridge_line_free(bridge_line); +} + +static void +test_config_parse_bridge_line(void *arg) +{ + (void) arg; + good_bridge_line_test("192.0.2.1:4123", + "192.0.2.1:4123", NULL, NULL, NULL); + + good_bridge_line_test("192.0.2.1", + "192.0.2.1:443", NULL, NULL, NULL); + + good_bridge_line_test("transport [::1]", + "[::1]:443", NULL, "transport", NULL); + + good_bridge_line_test("transport 192.0.2.1:12 " + "4352e58420e68f5e40bf7c74faddccd9d1349413", + "192.0.2.1:12", + "4352e58420e68f5e40bf7c74faddccd9d1349413", + "transport", NULL); + + { + smartlist_t *sl_tmp = smartlist_new(); + smartlist_add_asprintf(sl_tmp, "twoandtwo=five"); + + good_bridge_line_test("transport 192.0.2.1:12 " + "4352e58420e68f5e40bf7c74faddccd9d1349413 twoandtwo=five", + "192.0.2.1:12", "4352e58420e68f5e40bf7c74faddccd9d1349413", + "transport", sl_tmp); + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl_tmp, char *, s, tor_free(s)); + smartlist_free(sl_tmp); + } + + { + smartlist_t *sl_tmp = smartlist_new(); + smartlist_add_asprintf(sl_tmp, "twoandtwo=five"); + smartlist_add_asprintf(sl_tmp, "z=z"); + + good_bridge_line_test("transport 192.0.2.1:12 twoandtwo=five z=z", + "192.0.2.1:12", NULL, "transport", sl_tmp); + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl_tmp, char *, s, tor_free(s)); + smartlist_free(sl_tmp); + } + + good_bridge_line_test("192.0.2.1:1231 " + "4352e58420e68f5e40bf7c74faddccd9d1349413", + "192.0.2.1:1231", + "4352e58420e68f5e40bf7c74faddccd9d1349413", + NULL, NULL); + + /* Empty line */ + bad_bridge_line_test(""); + /* bad transport name */ + bad_bridge_line_test("tr$n_sp0r7 190.20.2.2"); + /* weird ip address */ + bad_bridge_line_test("a.b.c.d"); + /* invalid fpr */ + bad_bridge_line_test("2.2.2.2:1231 4352e58420e68f5e40bf7c74faddccd9d1349"); + /* no k=v in the end */ + bad_bridge_line_test("obfs2 2.2.2.2:1231 " + "4352e58420e68f5e40bf7c74faddccd9d1349413 what"); + /* no addrport */ + bad_bridge_line_test("asdw"); + /* huge k=v value that can't fit in SOCKS fields */ + bad_bridge_line_test( + "obfs2 2.2.2.2:1231 aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + "aa=b"); +} + +static void +test_config_parse_transport_options_line(void *arg) +{ + smartlist_t *options_sl = NULL, *sl_tmp = NULL; + + (void) arg; + + { /* too small line */ + options_sl = get_options_from_transport_options_line("valley", NULL); + test_assert(!options_sl); + } + + { /* no k=v values */ + options_sl = get_options_from_transport_options_line("hit it!", NULL); + test_assert(!options_sl); + } + + { /* correct line, but wrong transport specified */ + options_sl = + get_options_from_transport_options_line("trebuchet k=v", "rook"); + test_assert(!options_sl); + } + + { /* correct -- no transport specified */ + sl_tmp = smartlist_new(); + smartlist_add_asprintf(sl_tmp, "ladi=dadi"); + smartlist_add_asprintf(sl_tmp, "weliketo=party"); + + options_sl = + get_options_from_transport_options_line("rook ladi=dadi weliketo=party", + NULL); + test_assert(options_sl); + test_assert(smartlist_strings_eq(options_sl, sl_tmp)); + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl_tmp, char *, s, tor_free(s)); + smartlist_free(sl_tmp); + sl_tmp = NULL; + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(options_sl, char *, s, tor_free(s)); + smartlist_free(options_sl); + options_sl = NULL; + } + + { /* correct -- correct transport specified */ + sl_tmp = smartlist_new(); + smartlist_add_asprintf(sl_tmp, "ladi=dadi"); + smartlist_add_asprintf(sl_tmp, "weliketo=party"); + + options_sl = + get_options_from_transport_options_line("rook ladi=dadi weliketo=party", + "rook"); + test_assert(options_sl); + test_assert(smartlist_strings_eq(options_sl, sl_tmp)); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl_tmp, char *, s, tor_free(s)); + smartlist_free(sl_tmp); + sl_tmp = NULL; + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(options_sl, char *, s, tor_free(s)); + smartlist_free(options_sl); + options_sl = NULL; + } + + done: + if (options_sl) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(options_sl, char *, s, tor_free(s)); + smartlist_free(options_sl); + } + if (sl_tmp) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl_tmp, char *, s, tor_free(s)); + smartlist_free(sl_tmp); + } +} + +// Tests if an options with MyFamily fingerprints missing '$' normalises +// them correctly and also ensure it also works with multiple fingerprints +static void +test_config_fix_my_family(void *arg) +{ + char *err = NULL; + const char *family = "$1111111111111111111111111111111111111111, " + "1111111111111111111111111111111111111112, " + "$1111111111111111111111111111111111111113"; + + or_options_t* options = options_new(); + or_options_t* defaults = options_new(); + (void) arg; + + options_init(options); + options_init(defaults); + options->MyFamily = tor_strdup(family); + + options_validate(NULL, options, defaults, 0, &err) ; + + if (err != NULL) { + TT_FAIL(("options_validate failed: %s", err)); + } + + test_streq(options->MyFamily, "$1111111111111111111111111111111111111111, " + "$1111111111111111111111111111111111111112, " + "$1111111111111111111111111111111111111113"); + + done: + if (err != NULL) { + tor_free(err); + } + + or_options_free(options); + or_options_free(defaults); +} + #define CONFIG_TEST(name, flags) \ { #name, test_config_ ## name, flags, NULL, NULL } struct testcase_t config_tests[] = { CONFIG_TEST(addressmap, 0), + CONFIG_TEST(parse_bridge_line, 0), + CONFIG_TEST(parse_transport_options_line, 0), + CONFIG_TEST(check_or_create_data_subdir, TT_FORK), + CONFIG_TEST(write_to_data_subdir, TT_FORK), + CONFIG_TEST(fix_my_family, 0), END_OF_TESTCASES }; diff --git a/src/test/test_containers.c b/src/test/test_containers.c index 005e102e2..067c4c190 100644 --- a/src/test/test_containers.c +++ b/src/test/test_containers.c @@ -469,6 +469,51 @@ test_container_smartlist_join(void) tor_free(joined); } +static void +test_container_smartlist_ints_eq(void *arg) +{ + smartlist_t *sl1 = NULL, *sl2 = NULL; + int x; + (void)arg; + + tt_assert(smartlist_ints_eq(NULL, NULL)); + + sl1 = smartlist_new(); + tt_assert(!smartlist_ints_eq(sl1, NULL)); + tt_assert(!smartlist_ints_eq(NULL, sl1)); + + sl2 = smartlist_new(); + tt_assert(smartlist_ints_eq(sl1, sl2)); + + x = 5; + smartlist_add(sl1, tor_memdup(&x, sizeof(int))); + smartlist_add(sl2, tor_memdup(&x, sizeof(int))); + x = 90; + smartlist_add(sl1, tor_memdup(&x, sizeof(int))); + smartlist_add(sl2, tor_memdup(&x, sizeof(int))); + tt_assert(smartlist_ints_eq(sl1, sl2)); + + x = -50; + smartlist_add(sl1, tor_memdup(&x, sizeof(int))); + tt_assert(! smartlist_ints_eq(sl1, sl2)); + tt_assert(! smartlist_ints_eq(sl2, sl1)); + smartlist_add(sl2, tor_memdup(&x, sizeof(int))); + tt_assert(smartlist_ints_eq(sl1, sl2)); + + *(int*)smartlist_get(sl1, 1) = 101010; + tt_assert(! smartlist_ints_eq(sl2, sl1)); + *(int*)smartlist_get(sl2, 1) = 101010; + tt_assert(smartlist_ints_eq(sl1, sl2)); + + done: + if (sl1) + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl1, int *, ip, tor_free(ip)); + if (sl2) + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl2, int *, ip, tor_free(ip)); + smartlist_free(sl1); + smartlist_free(sl2); +} + /** Run unit tests for bitarray code */ static void test_container_bitarray(void) @@ -784,7 +829,7 @@ test_container_order_functions(void) } static void -test_di_map(void *arg) +test_container_di_map(void *arg) { di_digest256_map_t *map = NULL; const uint8_t key1[] = "In view of the fact that it was "; @@ -856,12 +901,12 @@ test_container_fp_pair_map(void) memset(fp6.second, 0x62, DIGEST_LEN); v = fp_pair_map_set(map, &fp1, (void*)99); - test_eq(v, NULL); + tt_ptr_op(v, ==, NULL); test_assert(!fp_pair_map_isempty(map)); v = fp_pair_map_set(map, &fp2, (void*)101); - test_eq(v, NULL); + tt_ptr_op(v, ==, NULL); v = fp_pair_map_set(map, &fp1, (void*)100); - test_eq(v, (void*)99); + tt_ptr_op(v, ==, (void*)99); test_eq_ptr(fp_pair_map_get(map, &fp1), (void*)100); test_eq_ptr(fp_pair_map_get(map, &fp2), (void*)101); test_eq_ptr(fp_pair_map_get(map, &fp3), NULL); @@ -912,18 +957,22 @@ test_container_fp_pair_map(void) #define CONTAINER_LEGACY(name) \ { #name, legacy_test_helper, 0, &legacy_setup, test_container_ ## name } +#define CONTAINER(name, flags) \ + { #name, test_container_ ## name, (flags), NULL, NULL } + struct testcase_t container_tests[] = { CONTAINER_LEGACY(smartlist_basic), CONTAINER_LEGACY(smartlist_strings), CONTAINER_LEGACY(smartlist_overlap), CONTAINER_LEGACY(smartlist_digests), CONTAINER_LEGACY(smartlist_join), + CONTAINER(smartlist_ints_eq, 0), CONTAINER_LEGACY(bitarray), CONTAINER_LEGACY(digestset), CONTAINER_LEGACY(strmap), CONTAINER_LEGACY(pqueue), CONTAINER_LEGACY(order_functions), - { "di_map", test_di_map, 0, NULL, NULL }, + CONTAINER(di_map, 0), CONTAINER_LEGACY(fp_pair_map), END_OF_TESTCASES }; diff --git a/src/test/test_controller_events.c b/src/test/test_controller_events.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..04a04de5b --- /dev/null +++ b/src/test/test_controller_events.c @@ -0,0 +1,287 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2013, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#define CONNECTION_PRIVATE +#define TOR_CHANNEL_INTERNAL_ +#define CONTROL_PRIVATE +#include "or.h" +#include "channel.h" +#include "channeltls.h" +#include "connection.h" +#include "control.h" +#include "test.h" + +static void +help_test_bucket_note_empty(uint32_t expected_msec_since_midnight, + int tokens_before, size_t tokens_removed, + uint32_t msec_since_epoch) +{ + uint32_t timestamp_var = 0; + struct timeval tvnow; + tvnow.tv_sec = msec_since_epoch / 1000; + tvnow.tv_usec = (msec_since_epoch % 1000) * 1000; + connection_buckets_note_empty_ts(×tamp_var, tokens_before, + tokens_removed, &tvnow); + tt_int_op(expected_msec_since_midnight, ==, timestamp_var); + + done: + ; +} + +static void +test_cntev_bucket_note_empty(void *arg) +{ + (void)arg; + + /* Two cases with nothing to note, because bucket was empty before; + * 86442200 == 1970-01-02 00:00:42.200000 */ + help_test_bucket_note_empty(0, 0, 0, 86442200); + help_test_bucket_note_empty(0, -100, 100, 86442200); + + /* Nothing to note, because bucket has not been emptied. */ + help_test_bucket_note_empty(0, 101, 100, 86442200); + + /* Bucket was emptied, note 42200 msec since midnight. */ + help_test_bucket_note_empty(42200, 101, 101, 86442200); + help_test_bucket_note_empty(42200, 101, 102, 86442200); +} + +static void +test_cntev_bucket_millis_empty(void *arg) +{ + struct timeval tvnow; + (void)arg; + + /* 1970-01-02 00:00:42.200000 */ + tvnow.tv_sec = 86400 + 42; + tvnow.tv_usec = 200000; + + /* Bucket has not been refilled. */ + tt_int_op(0, ==, bucket_millis_empty(0, 42120, 0, 100, &tvnow)); + tt_int_op(0, ==, bucket_millis_empty(-10, 42120, -10, 100, &tvnow)); + + /* Bucket was not empty. */ + tt_int_op(0, ==, bucket_millis_empty(10, 42120, 20, 100, &tvnow)); + + /* Bucket has been emptied 80 msec ago and has just been refilled. */ + tt_int_op(80, ==, bucket_millis_empty(-20, 42120, -10, 100, &tvnow)); + tt_int_op(80, ==, bucket_millis_empty(-10, 42120, 0, 100, &tvnow)); + tt_int_op(80, ==, bucket_millis_empty(0, 42120, 10, 100, &tvnow)); + + /* Bucket has been emptied 180 msec ago, last refill was 100 msec ago + * which was insufficient to make it positive, so cap msec at 100. */ + tt_int_op(100, ==, bucket_millis_empty(0, 42020, 1, 100, &tvnow)); + + /* 1970-01-02 00:00:00:050000 */ + tvnow.tv_sec = 86400; + tvnow.tv_usec = 50000; + + /* Last emptied 30 msec before midnight, tvnow is 50 msec after + * midnight, that's 80 msec in total. */ + tt_int_op(80, ==, bucket_millis_empty(0, 86400000 - 30, 1, 100, &tvnow)); + + done: + ; +} + +static void +add_testing_cell_stats_entry(circuit_t *circ, uint8_t command, + unsigned int waiting_time, + unsigned int removed, unsigned int exitward) +{ + testing_cell_stats_entry_t *ent = tor_malloc_zero( + sizeof(testing_cell_stats_entry_t)); + ent->command = command; + ent->waiting_time = waiting_time; + ent->removed = removed; + ent->exitward = exitward; + if (!circ->testing_cell_stats) + circ->testing_cell_stats = smartlist_new(); + smartlist_add(circ->testing_cell_stats, ent); +} + +static void +test_cntev_sum_up_cell_stats(void *arg) +{ + or_circuit_t *or_circ; + circuit_t *circ; + cell_stats_t *cell_stats; + (void)arg; + + or_circ = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(or_circuit_t)); + or_circ->base_.magic = OR_CIRCUIT_MAGIC; + or_circ->base_.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR; + circ = TO_CIRCUIT(or_circ); + + /* A single RELAY cell was added to the appward queue. */ + cell_stats = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(cell_stats_t)); + add_testing_cell_stats_entry(circ, CELL_RELAY, 0, 0, 0); + sum_up_cell_stats_by_command(circ, cell_stats); + tt_int_op(1, ==, cell_stats->added_cells_appward[CELL_RELAY]); + + /* A single RELAY cell was added to the exitward queue. */ + add_testing_cell_stats_entry(circ, CELL_RELAY, 0, 0, 1); + sum_up_cell_stats_by_command(circ, cell_stats); + tt_int_op(1, ==, cell_stats->added_cells_exitward[CELL_RELAY]); + + /* A single RELAY cell was removed from the appward queue where it spent + * 20 msec. */ + add_testing_cell_stats_entry(circ, CELL_RELAY, 2, 1, 0); + sum_up_cell_stats_by_command(circ, cell_stats); + tt_int_op(20, ==, cell_stats->total_time_appward[CELL_RELAY]); + tt_int_op(1, ==, cell_stats->removed_cells_appward[CELL_RELAY]); + + /* A single RELAY cell was removed from the exitward queue where it + * spent 30 msec. */ + add_testing_cell_stats_entry(circ, CELL_RELAY, 3, 1, 1); + sum_up_cell_stats_by_command(circ, cell_stats); + tt_int_op(30, ==, cell_stats->total_time_exitward[CELL_RELAY]); + tt_int_op(1, ==, cell_stats->removed_cells_exitward[CELL_RELAY]); + + done: + ; +} + +static void +test_cntev_append_cell_stats(void *arg) +{ + smartlist_t *event_parts; + const char *key = "Z"; + uint64_t include_if_non_zero[CELL_COMMAND_MAX_ + 1], + number_to_include[CELL_COMMAND_MAX_ + 1]; + (void)arg; + + event_parts = smartlist_new(); + memset(include_if_non_zero, 0, + (CELL_COMMAND_MAX_ + 1) * sizeof(uint64_t)); + memset(number_to_include, 0, + (CELL_COMMAND_MAX_ + 1) * sizeof(uint64_t)); + + /* All array entries empty. */ + append_cell_stats_by_command(event_parts, key, + include_if_non_zero, + number_to_include); + tt_int_op(0, ==, smartlist_len(event_parts)); + + /* There's a RELAY cell to include, but the corresponding field in + * include_if_non_zero is still zero. */ + number_to_include[CELL_RELAY] = 1; + append_cell_stats_by_command(event_parts, key, + include_if_non_zero, + number_to_include); + tt_int_op(0, ==, smartlist_len(event_parts)); + + /* Now include single RELAY cell. */ + include_if_non_zero[CELL_RELAY] = 2; + append_cell_stats_by_command(event_parts, key, + include_if_non_zero, + number_to_include); + tt_str_op("Z=relay:1", ==, smartlist_pop_last(event_parts)); + + /* Add four CREATE cells. */ + include_if_non_zero[CELL_CREATE] = 3; + number_to_include[CELL_CREATE] = 4; + append_cell_stats_by_command(event_parts, key, + include_if_non_zero, + number_to_include); + tt_str_op("Z=create:4,relay:1", ==, smartlist_pop_last(event_parts)); + + done: + ; +} + +static void +test_cntev_format_cell_stats(void *arg) +{ + char *event_string; + origin_circuit_t *ocirc; + or_circuit_t *or_circ; + cell_stats_t *cell_stats; + channel_tls_t *n_chan, *p_chan; + (void)arg; + + n_chan = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(channel_tls_t)); + n_chan->base_.global_identifier = 1; + + ocirc = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(origin_circuit_t)); + ocirc->base_.magic = ORIGIN_CIRCUIT_MAGIC; + ocirc->base_.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL; + ocirc->global_identifier = 2; + ocirc->base_.n_circ_id = 3; + ocirc->base_.n_chan = &(n_chan->base_); + + /* Origin circuit was completely idle. */ + cell_stats = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(cell_stats_t)); + format_cell_stats(&event_string, TO_CIRCUIT(ocirc), cell_stats); + tt_str_op("ID=2 OutboundQueue=3 OutboundConn=1", ==, event_string); + + /* Origin circuit had 4 RELAY cells added to its exitward queue. */ + cell_stats->added_cells_exitward[CELL_RELAY] = 4; + format_cell_stats(&event_string, TO_CIRCUIT(ocirc), cell_stats); + tt_str_op("ID=2 OutboundQueue=3 OutboundConn=1 OutboundAdded=relay:4", + ==, event_string); + + /* Origin circuit also had 5 CREATE2 cells added to its exitward + * queue. */ + cell_stats->added_cells_exitward[CELL_CREATE2] = 5; + format_cell_stats(&event_string, TO_CIRCUIT(ocirc), cell_stats); + tt_str_op("ID=2 OutboundQueue=3 OutboundConn=1 OutboundAdded=relay:4," + "create2:5", ==, event_string); + + /* Origin circuit also had 7 RELAY cells removed from its exitward queue + * which together spent 6 msec in the queue. */ + cell_stats->total_time_exitward[CELL_RELAY] = 6; + cell_stats->removed_cells_exitward[CELL_RELAY] = 7; + format_cell_stats(&event_string, TO_CIRCUIT(ocirc), cell_stats); + tt_str_op("ID=2 OutboundQueue=3 OutboundConn=1 OutboundAdded=relay:4," + "create2:5 OutboundRemoved=relay:7 OutboundTime=relay:6", + ==, event_string); + + p_chan = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(channel_tls_t)); + p_chan->base_.global_identifier = 2; + + or_circ = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(or_circuit_t)); + or_circ->base_.magic = OR_CIRCUIT_MAGIC; + or_circ->base_.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR; + or_circ->p_circ_id = 8; + or_circ->p_chan = &(p_chan->base_); + or_circ->base_.n_circ_id = 9; + or_circ->base_.n_chan = &(n_chan->base_); + + /* OR circuit was idle. */ + cell_stats = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(cell_stats_t)); + format_cell_stats(&event_string, TO_CIRCUIT(or_circ), cell_stats); + tt_str_op("InboundQueue=8 InboundConn=2 OutboundQueue=9 OutboundConn=1", + ==, event_string); + + /* OR circuit had 3 RELAY cells added to its appward queue. */ + cell_stats->added_cells_appward[CELL_RELAY] = 3; + format_cell_stats(&event_string, TO_CIRCUIT(or_circ), cell_stats); + tt_str_op("InboundQueue=8 InboundConn=2 InboundAdded=relay:3 " + "OutboundQueue=9 OutboundConn=1", ==, event_string); + + /* OR circuit had 7 RELAY cells removed from its appward queue which + * together spent 6 msec in the queue. */ + cell_stats->total_time_appward[CELL_RELAY] = 6; + cell_stats->removed_cells_appward[CELL_RELAY] = 7; + format_cell_stats(&event_string, TO_CIRCUIT(or_circ), cell_stats); + tt_str_op("InboundQueue=8 InboundConn=2 InboundAdded=relay:3 " + "InboundRemoved=relay:7 InboundTime=relay:6 " + "OutboundQueue=9 OutboundConn=1", ==, event_string); + + done: + ; +} + +#define TEST(name, flags) \ + { #name, test_cntev_ ## name, flags, 0, NULL } + +struct testcase_t controller_event_tests[] = { + TEST(bucket_note_empty, 0), + TEST(bucket_millis_empty, 0), + TEST(sum_up_cell_stats, 0), + TEST(append_cell_stats, 0), + TEST(format_cell_stats, 0), + END_OF_TESTCASES +}; + diff --git a/src/test/test_crypto.c b/src/test/test_crypto.c index f92bfd673..9dc43b1d2 100644 --- a/src/test/test_crypto.c +++ b/src/test/test_crypto.c @@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ #include "orconfig.h" -#define CRYPTO_PRIVATE #define CRYPTO_CURVE25519_PRIVATE #include "or.h" #include "test.h" @@ -14,6 +13,10 @@ #include "crypto_curve25519.h" #endif +extern const char AUTHORITY_SIGNKEY_1[]; +extern const char AUTHORITY_SIGNKEY_1_DIGEST[]; +extern const char AUTHORITY_SIGNKEY_1_DIGEST256[]; + /** Run unit tests for Diffie-Hellman functionality. */ static void test_crypto_dh(void) @@ -269,34 +272,6 @@ test_crypto_sha(void) "96177A9CB410FF61F20015AD"); tt_int_op(i, ==, 0); - /* Test HMAC-SHA-1 with test cases from RFC2202. */ - - /* Case 1. */ - memset(key, 0x0b, 20); - crypto_hmac_sha1(digest, key, 20, "Hi There", 8); - test_streq(hex_str(digest, 20), - "B617318655057264E28BC0B6FB378C8EF146BE00"); - /* Case 2. */ - crypto_hmac_sha1(digest, "Jefe", 4, "what do ya want for nothing?", 28); - test_streq(hex_str(digest, 20), - "EFFCDF6AE5EB2FA2D27416D5F184DF9C259A7C79"); - - /* Case 4. */ - base16_decode(key, 25, - "0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10111213141516171819", 50); - memset(data, 0xcd, 50); - crypto_hmac_sha1(digest, key, 25, data, 50); - test_streq(hex_str(digest, 20), - "4C9007F4026250C6BC8414F9BF50C86C2D7235DA"); - - /* Case 5. */ - memset(key, 0xaa, 80); - crypto_hmac_sha1(digest, key, 80, - "Test Using Larger Than Block-Size Key - Hash Key First", - 54); - test_streq(hex_str(digest, 20), - "AA4AE5E15272D00E95705637CE8A3B55ED402112"); - /* Test HMAC-SHA256 with test cases from wikipedia and RFC 4231 */ /* Case empty (wikipedia) */ @@ -422,7 +397,7 @@ test_crypto_pk(void) char *encoded = NULL; char data1[1024], data2[1024], data3[1024]; size_t size; - int i, j, p, len; + int i, len; /* Public-key ciphers */ pk1 = pk_generate(0); @@ -506,19 +481,16 @@ test_crypto_pk(void) /* Try with hybrid encryption wrappers. */ crypto_rand(data1, 1024); - for (i = 0; i < 2; ++i) { - for (j = 85; j < 140; ++j) { - memset(data2,0,1024); - memset(data3,0,1024); - p = (i==0)?PK_PKCS1_PADDING:PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING; - len = crypto_pk_public_hybrid_encrypt(pk1,data2,sizeof(data2), - data1,j,p,0); - test_assert(len>=0); - len = crypto_pk_private_hybrid_decrypt(pk1,data3,sizeof(data3), - data2,len,p,1); - test_eq(len,j); - test_memeq(data1,data3,j); - } + for (i = 85; i < 140; ++i) { + memset(data2,0,1024); + memset(data3,0,1024); + len = crypto_pk_public_hybrid_encrypt(pk1,data2,sizeof(data2), + data1,i,PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING,0); + test_assert(len>=0); + len = crypto_pk_private_hybrid_decrypt(pk1,data3,sizeof(data3), + data2,len,PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING,1); + test_eq(len,i); + test_memeq(data1,data3,i); } /* Try copy_full */ @@ -536,6 +508,35 @@ test_crypto_pk(void) tor_free(encoded); } +/** Sanity check for crypto pk digests */ +static void +test_crypto_digests(void) +{ + crypto_pk_t *k = NULL; + ssize_t r; + digests_t pkey_digests; + char digest[DIGEST_LEN]; + + k = crypto_pk_new(); + test_assert(k); + r = crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(k, AUTHORITY_SIGNKEY_1, -1); + test_assert(!r); + + r = crypto_pk_get_digest(k, digest); + test_assert(r == 0); + test_memeq(hex_str(digest, DIGEST_LEN), + AUTHORITY_SIGNKEY_1_DIGEST, HEX_DIGEST_LEN); + + r = crypto_pk_get_all_digests(k, &pkey_digests); + + test_memeq(hex_str(pkey_digests.d[DIGEST_SHA1], DIGEST_LEN), + AUTHORITY_SIGNKEY_1_DIGEST, HEX_DIGEST_LEN); + test_memeq(hex_str(pkey_digests.d[DIGEST_SHA256], DIGEST256_LEN), + AUTHORITY_SIGNKEY_1_DIGEST256, HEX_DIGEST256_LEN); + done: + crypto_pk_free(k); +} + /** Run unit tests for misc crypto formatting functionality (base64, base32, * fingerprints, etc) */ static void @@ -630,7 +631,7 @@ test_crypto_formats(void) data1 = tor_strdup("ABCD1234ABCD56780000ABCD1234ABCD56780000"); test_eq(strlen(data1), 40); data2 = tor_malloc(FINGERPRINT_LEN+1); - add_spaces_to_fp(data2, FINGERPRINT_LEN+1, data1); + crypto_add_spaces_to_fp(data2, FINGERPRINT_LEN+1, data1); test_streq(data2, "ABCD 1234 ABCD 5678 0000 ABCD 1234 ABCD 5678 0000"); tor_free(data1); tor_free(data2); @@ -1134,6 +1135,7 @@ struct testcase_t crypto_tests[] = { { "aes_EVP", test_crypto_aes, TT_FORK, &pass_data, (void*)"evp" }, CRYPTO_LEGACY(sha), CRYPTO_LEGACY(pk), + CRYPTO_LEGACY(digests), CRYPTO_LEGACY(dh), CRYPTO_LEGACY(s2k), { "aes_iv_AES", test_crypto_aes_iv, TT_FORK, &pass_data, (void*)"aes" }, diff --git a/src/test/test_data.c b/src/test/test_data.c index 5f0f7cba0..3c68b1294 100644 --- a/src/test/test_data.c +++ b/src/test/test_data.c @@ -63,6 +63,11 @@ const char AUTHORITY_SIGNKEY_1[] = "Yx4lqK0ca5IkTp3HevwnlWaJgbaOTUspCVshzJBhDA==\n" "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n"; +const char AUTHORITY_SIGNKEY_1_DIGEST[] = + "CBF56A83368A5150F1A9AAADAFB4D77F8C4170E2"; +const char AUTHORITY_SIGNKEY_1_DIGEST256[] = + "AF7C5468DBE3BA54A052726038D7F15F3C4CA511B1952645B3D96D83A8DFB51C"; + /** Second of 3 example authority certificates for unit testing. */ const char AUTHORITY_CERT_2[] = "dir-key-certificate-version 3\n" diff --git a/src/test/test_dir.c b/src/test/test_dir.c index 56ac3b34c..a82ccb086 100644 --- a/src/test/test_dir.c +++ b/src/test/test_dir.c @@ -214,8 +214,10 @@ test_dir_formats(void) strlcat(buf2, "signing-key\n", sizeof(buf2)); strlcat(buf2, pk1_str, sizeof(buf2)); strlcat(buf2, "hidden-service-dir\n", sizeof(buf2)); +#ifdef CURVE25519_ENABLED strlcat(buf2, "ntor-onion-key " "skyinAnvardNostarsNomoonNowindormistsorsnow=\n", sizeof(buf2)); +#endif strlcat(buf2, "accept *:80\nreject 18.0.0.0/8:24\n", sizeof(buf2)); strlcat(buf2, "router-signature\n", sizeof(buf2)); @@ -235,9 +237,11 @@ test_dir_formats(void) test_eq(rp2->bandwidthrate, r2->bandwidthrate); test_eq(rp2->bandwidthburst, r2->bandwidthburst); test_eq(rp2->bandwidthcapacity, r2->bandwidthcapacity); +#ifdef CURVE25519_ENABLED test_memeq(rp2->onion_curve25519_pkey->public_key, r2->onion_curve25519_pkey->public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN); +#endif test_assert(crypto_pk_cmp_keys(rp2->onion_pkey, pk2) == 0); test_assert(crypto_pk_cmp_keys(rp2->identity_pkey, pk1) == 0); @@ -2317,9 +2321,9 @@ test_dir_v2_dir(void *arg) /* Make a directory so there's somewhere to store the thing */ #ifdef _WIN32 - mkdir(get_fname("cached-status")); + tt_int_op(mkdir(get_fname("cached-status")), ==, 0); #else - mkdir(get_fname("cached-status"), 0700); + tt_int_op(mkdir(get_fname("cached-status"), 0700), ==, 0); #endif v2 = generate_v2_networkstatus_opinion(); @@ -2364,6 +2368,74 @@ test_dir_fmt_control_ns(void *arg) tor_free(s); } +static void +test_dir_http_handling(void *args) +{ + char *url = NULL; + (void)args; + + /* Parse http url tests: */ + /* Good headers */ + test_eq(parse_http_url("GET /tor/a/b/c.txt HTTP/1.1\r\n" + "Host: example.com\r\n" + "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows;" + " U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.1.5)\r\n", + &url), 0); + test_streq(url, "/tor/a/b/c.txt"); + tor_free(url); + + test_eq(parse_http_url("GET /tor/a/b/c.txt HTTP/1.0\r\n", &url), 0); + test_streq(url, "/tor/a/b/c.txt"); + tor_free(url); + + test_eq(parse_http_url("GET /tor/a/b/c.txt HTTP/1.600\r\n", &url), 0); + test_streq(url, "/tor/a/b/c.txt"); + tor_free(url); + + /* Should prepend '/tor/' to url if required */ + test_eq(parse_http_url("GET /a/b/c.txt HTTP/1.1\r\n" + "Host: example.com\r\n" + "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows;" + " U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.1.5)\r\n", + &url), 0); + test_streq(url, "/tor/a/b/c.txt"); + tor_free(url); + + /* Bad headers -- no HTTP/1.x*/ + test_eq(parse_http_url("GET /a/b/c.txt\r\n" + "Host: example.com\r\n" + "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows;" + " U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.1.5)\r\n", + &url), -1); + tt_assert(!url); + + /* Bad headers */ + test_eq(parse_http_url("GET /a/b/c.txt\r\n" + "Host: example.com\r\n" + "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows;" + " U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.1.5)\r\n", + &url), -1); + tt_assert(!url); + + test_eq(parse_http_url("GET /tor/a/b/c.txt", &url), -1); + tt_assert(!url); + + test_eq(parse_http_url("GET /tor/a/b/c.txt HTTP/1.1", &url), -1); + tt_assert(!url); + + test_eq(parse_http_url("GET /tor/a/b/c.txt HTTP/1.1x\r\n", &url), -1); + tt_assert(!url); + + test_eq(parse_http_url("GET /tor/a/b/c.txt HTTP/1.", &url), -1); + tt_assert(!url); + + test_eq(parse_http_url("GET /tor/a/b/c.txt HTTP/1.\r", &url), -1); + tt_assert(!url); + + done: + tor_free(url); +} + #define DIR_LEGACY(name) \ { #name, legacy_test_helper, TT_FORK, &legacy_setup, test_dir_ ## name } @@ -2386,6 +2458,7 @@ struct testcase_t dir_tests[] = { DIR_LEGACY(clip_unmeasured_bw_kb_alt), DIR(v2_dir, TT_FORK), DIR(fmt_control_ns, 0), + DIR(http_handling, 0), END_OF_TESTCASES }; diff --git a/src/test/test_extorport.c b/src/test/test_extorport.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7e38ba57d --- /dev/null +++ b/src/test/test_extorport.c @@ -0,0 +1,604 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2013, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#define CONNECTION_PRIVATE +#define EXT_ORPORT_PRIVATE +#define MAIN_PRIVATE +#include "or.h" +#include "buffers.h" +#include "connection.h" +#include "connection_or.h" +#include "config.h" +#include "control.h" +#include "ext_orport.h" +#include "main.h" +#include "test.h" + +/* Test connection_or_remove_from_ext_or_id_map and + * connection_or_set_ext_or_identifier */ +static void +test_ext_or_id_map(void *arg) +{ + or_connection_t *c1 = NULL, *c2 = NULL, *c3 = NULL; + char *idp = NULL, *idp2 = NULL; + (void)arg; + + /* pre-initialization */ + tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, connection_or_get_by_ext_or_id("xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx")); + + c1 = or_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR, AF_INET); + c2 = or_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR, AF_INET); + c3 = or_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_OR, AF_INET); + + tt_ptr_op(c1->ext_or_conn_id, !=, NULL); + tt_ptr_op(c2->ext_or_conn_id, !=, NULL); + tt_ptr_op(c3->ext_or_conn_id, ==, NULL); + + tt_ptr_op(c1, ==, connection_or_get_by_ext_or_id(c1->ext_or_conn_id)); + tt_ptr_op(c2, ==, connection_or_get_by_ext_or_id(c2->ext_or_conn_id)); + tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, connection_or_get_by_ext_or_id("xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx")); + + idp = tor_memdup(c2->ext_or_conn_id, EXT_OR_CONN_ID_LEN); + + /* Give c2 a new ID. */ + connection_or_set_ext_or_identifier(c2); + test_mem_op(idp, !=, c2->ext_or_conn_id, EXT_OR_CONN_ID_LEN); + idp2 = tor_memdup(c2->ext_or_conn_id, EXT_OR_CONN_ID_LEN); + tt_assert(!tor_digest_is_zero(idp2)); + + tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, connection_or_get_by_ext_or_id(idp)); + tt_ptr_op(c2, ==, connection_or_get_by_ext_or_id(idp2)); + + /* Now remove it. */ + connection_or_remove_from_ext_or_id_map(c2); + tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, connection_or_get_by_ext_or_id(idp)); + tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, connection_or_get_by_ext_or_id(idp2)); + + done: + if (c1) + connection_free_(TO_CONN(c1)); + if (c2) + connection_free_(TO_CONN(c2)); + if (c3) + connection_free_(TO_CONN(c3)); + tor_free(idp); + tor_free(idp2); + connection_or_clear_ext_or_id_map(); +} + +/* Simple connection_write_to_buf_impl_ replacement that unconditionally + * writes to outbuf. */ +static void +connection_write_to_buf_impl_replacement(const char *string, size_t len, + connection_t *conn, int zlib) +{ + (void) zlib; + + tor_assert(string); + tor_assert(conn); + write_to_buf(string, len, conn->outbuf); +} + +static char * +buf_get_contents(buf_t *buf, size_t *sz_out) +{ + char *out; + *sz_out = buf_datalen(buf); + if (*sz_out >= ULONG_MAX) + return NULL; /* C'mon, really? */ + out = tor_malloc(*sz_out + 1); + if (fetch_from_buf(out, (unsigned long)*sz_out, buf) != 0) { + tor_free(out); + return NULL; + } + out[*sz_out] = '\0'; /* Hopefully gratuitous. */ + return out; +} + +static void +test_ext_or_write_command(void *arg) +{ + or_connection_t *c1; + char *cp = NULL; + char *buf = NULL; + size_t sz; + + (void) arg; + MOCK(connection_write_to_buf_impl_, + connection_write_to_buf_impl_replacement); + + c1 = or_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR, AF_INET); + tt_assert(c1); + + /* Length too long */ + tt_int_op(connection_write_ext_or_command(TO_CONN(c1), 100, "X", 100000), + <, 0); + + /* Empty command */ + tt_int_op(connection_write_ext_or_command(TO_CONN(c1), 0x99, NULL, 0), + ==, 0); + cp = buf_get_contents(TO_CONN(c1)->outbuf, &sz); + tt_int_op(sz, ==, 4); + test_mem_op(cp, ==, "\x00\x99\x00\x00", 4); + tor_free(cp); + + /* Medium command. */ + tt_int_op(connection_write_ext_or_command(TO_CONN(c1), 0x99, + "Wai\0Hello", 9), ==, 0); + cp = buf_get_contents(TO_CONN(c1)->outbuf, &sz); + tt_int_op(sz, ==, 13); + test_mem_op(cp, ==, "\x00\x99\x00\x09Wai\x00Hello", 13); + tor_free(cp); + + /* Long command */ + buf = tor_malloc(65535); + memset(buf, 'x', 65535); + tt_int_op(connection_write_ext_or_command(TO_CONN(c1), 0xf00d, + buf, 65535), ==, 0); + cp = buf_get_contents(TO_CONN(c1)->outbuf, &sz); + tt_int_op(sz, ==, 65539); + test_mem_op(cp, ==, "\xf0\x0d\xff\xff", 4); + test_mem_op(cp+4, ==, buf, 65535); + tor_free(cp); + + done: + if (c1) + connection_free_(TO_CONN(c1)); + tor_free(cp); + tor_free(buf); + UNMOCK(connection_write_to_buf_impl_); +} + +static int +write_bytes_to_file_fail(const char *fname, const char *str, size_t len, + int bin) +{ + (void) fname; + (void) str; + (void) len; + (void) bin; + + return -1; +} + +static void +test_ext_or_init_auth(void *arg) +{ + or_options_t *options = get_options_mutable(); + const char *fn; + char *cp = NULL; + struct stat st; + char cookie0[32]; + (void)arg; + + /* Check default filename location */ + options->DataDirectory = tor_strdup("foo"); + cp = get_ext_or_auth_cookie_file_name(); + tt_str_op(cp, ==, "foo"PATH_SEPARATOR"extended_orport_auth_cookie"); + tor_free(cp); + + /* Shouldn't be initialized already, or our tests will be a bit + * meaningless */ + ext_or_auth_cookie = tor_malloc_zero(32); + test_assert(tor_mem_is_zero((char*)ext_or_auth_cookie, 32)); + + /* Now make sure we use a temporary file */ + fn = get_fname("ext_cookie_file"); + options->ExtORPortCookieAuthFile = tor_strdup(fn); + cp = get_ext_or_auth_cookie_file_name(); + tt_str_op(cp, ==, fn); + tor_free(cp); + + /* Test the initialization function with a broken + write_bytes_to_file(). See if the problem is handled properly. */ + MOCK(write_bytes_to_file, write_bytes_to_file_fail); + tt_int_op(-1, ==, init_ext_or_cookie_authentication(1)); + tt_int_op(ext_or_auth_cookie_is_set, ==, 0); + UNMOCK(write_bytes_to_file); + + /* Now do the actual initialization. */ + tt_int_op(0, ==, init_ext_or_cookie_authentication(1)); + tt_int_op(ext_or_auth_cookie_is_set, ==, 1); + cp = read_file_to_str(fn, RFTS_BIN, &st); + tt_ptr_op(cp, !=, NULL); + tt_int_op(st.st_size, ==, 64); + test_memeq(cp, "! Extended ORPort Auth Cookie !\x0a", 32); + test_memeq(cp+32, ext_or_auth_cookie, 32); + memcpy(cookie0, ext_or_auth_cookie, 32); + test_assert(!tor_mem_is_zero((char*)ext_or_auth_cookie, 32)); + + /* Operation should be idempotent. */ + tt_int_op(0, ==, init_ext_or_cookie_authentication(1)); + test_memeq(cookie0, ext_or_auth_cookie, 32); + + done: + tor_free(cp); + ext_orport_free_all(); +} + +static void +test_ext_or_cookie_auth(void *arg) +{ + char *reply=NULL, *reply2=NULL, *client_hash=NULL, *client_hash2=NULL; + size_t reply_len=0; + char hmac1[32], hmac2[32]; + + const char client_nonce[32] = + "Who is the third who walks alway"; + char server_hash_input[] = + "ExtORPort authentication server-to-client hash" + "Who is the third who walks alway" + "................................"; + char client_hash_input[] = + "ExtORPort authentication client-to-server hash" + "Who is the third who walks alway" + "................................"; + + (void)arg; + + tt_int_op(strlen(client_hash_input), ==, 46+32+32); + tt_int_op(strlen(server_hash_input), ==, 46+32+32); + + ext_or_auth_cookie = tor_malloc_zero(32); + memcpy(ext_or_auth_cookie, "s beside you? When I count, ther", 32); + ext_or_auth_cookie_is_set = 1; + + /* For this authentication, the client sends 32 random bytes (ClientNonce) + * The server replies with 32 byte ServerHash and 32 byte ServerNonce, + * where ServerHash is: + * HMAC-SHA256(CookieString, + * "ExtORPort authentication server-to-client hash" | ClientNonce | + * ServerNonce)" + * The client must reply with 32-byte ClientHash, which we compute as: + * ClientHash is computed as: + * HMAC-SHA256(CookieString, + * "ExtORPort authentication client-to-server hash" | ClientNonce | + * ServerNonce) + */ + + /* Wrong length */ + tt_int_op(-1, ==, + handle_client_auth_nonce(client_nonce, 33, &client_hash, &reply, + &reply_len)); + tt_int_op(-1, ==, + handle_client_auth_nonce(client_nonce, 31, &client_hash, &reply, + &reply_len)); + + /* Now let's try this for real! */ + tt_int_op(0, ==, + handle_client_auth_nonce(client_nonce, 32, &client_hash, &reply, + &reply_len)); + tt_int_op(reply_len, ==, 64); + tt_ptr_op(reply, !=, NULL); + tt_ptr_op(client_hash, !=, NULL); + /* Fill in the server nonce into the hash inputs... */ + memcpy(server_hash_input+46+32, reply+32, 32); + memcpy(client_hash_input+46+32, reply+32, 32); + /* Check the HMACs are correct... */ + crypto_hmac_sha256(hmac1, (char*)ext_or_auth_cookie, 32, server_hash_input, + 46+32+32); + crypto_hmac_sha256(hmac2, (char*)ext_or_auth_cookie, 32, client_hash_input, + 46+32+32); + test_memeq(hmac1, reply, 32); + test_memeq(hmac2, client_hash, 32); + + /* Now do it again and make sure that the results are *different* */ + tt_int_op(0, ==, + handle_client_auth_nonce(client_nonce, 32, &client_hash2, &reply2, + &reply_len)); + test_memneq(reply2, reply, reply_len); + test_memneq(client_hash2, client_hash, 32); + /* But that this one checks out too. */ + memcpy(server_hash_input+46+32, reply2+32, 32); + memcpy(client_hash_input+46+32, reply2+32, 32); + /* Check the HMACs are correct... */ + crypto_hmac_sha256(hmac1, (char*)ext_or_auth_cookie, 32, server_hash_input, + 46+32+32); + crypto_hmac_sha256(hmac2, (char*)ext_or_auth_cookie, 32, client_hash_input, + 46+32+32); + test_memeq(hmac1, reply2, 32); + test_memeq(hmac2, client_hash2, 32); + + done: + tor_free(reply); + tor_free(client_hash); + tor_free(reply2); + tor_free(client_hash2); +} + +static int +crypto_rand_return_tse_str(char *to, size_t n) +{ + if (n != 32) { + TT_FAIL(("Asked for %d bytes, not 32", (int)n)); + return -1; + } + memcpy(to, "te road There is always another ", 32); + return 0; +} + +static void +test_ext_or_cookie_auth_testvec(void *arg) +{ + char *reply=NULL, *client_hash=NULL; + size_t reply_len; + char *mem_op_hex_tmp=NULL; + + const char client_nonce[] = "But when I look ahead up the whi"; + (void)arg; + + ext_or_auth_cookie = tor_malloc_zero(32); + memcpy(ext_or_auth_cookie, "Gliding wrapt in a brown mantle," , 32); + ext_or_auth_cookie_is_set = 1; + + MOCK(crypto_rand, crypto_rand_return_tse_str); + + tt_int_op(0, ==, + handle_client_auth_nonce(client_nonce, 32, &client_hash, &reply, + &reply_len)); + tt_ptr_op(reply, !=, NULL ); + tt_ptr_op(reply_len, ==, 64); + test_memeq(reply+32, "te road There is always another ", 32); + /* HMACSHA256("Gliding wrapt in a brown mantle," + * "ExtORPort authentication server-to-client hash" + * "But when I look ahead up the write road There is always another "); + */ + test_memeq_hex(reply, + "ec80ed6e546d3b36fdfc22fe1315416b" + "029f1ade7610d910878b62eeb7403821"); + /* HMACSHA256("Gliding wrapt in a brown mantle," + * "ExtORPort authentication client-to-server hash" + * "But when I look ahead up the write road There is always another "); + * (Both values computed using Python CLI.) + */ + test_memeq_hex(client_hash, + "ab391732dd2ed968cd40c087d1b1f25b" + "33b3cd77ff79bd80c2074bbf438119a2"); + + done: + UNMOCK(crypto_rand); + tor_free(reply); + tor_free(client_hash); + tor_free(mem_op_hex_tmp); +} + +static void +ignore_bootstrap_problem(const char *warn, int reason) +{ + (void)warn; + (void)reason; +} + +static int is_reading = 1; +static int handshake_start_called = 0; + +static void +note_read_stopped(connection_t *conn) +{ + (void)conn; + is_reading=0; +} +static void +note_read_started(connection_t *conn) +{ + (void)conn; + is_reading=1; +} +static int +handshake_start(or_connection_t *conn, int receiving) +{ + if (!conn || !receiving) + TT_FAIL(("Bad arguments to handshake_start")); + handshake_start_called = 1; + return 0; +} + +#define WRITE(s,n) \ + do { \ + write_to_buf((s), (n), TO_CONN(conn)->inbuf); \ + } while (0) +#define CONTAINS(s,n) \ + do { \ + tt_int_op((n), <=, sizeof(b)); \ + tt_int_op(buf_datalen(TO_CONN(conn)->outbuf), ==, (n)); \ + if ((n)) { \ + fetch_from_buf(b, (n), TO_CONN(conn)->outbuf); \ + test_memeq(b, (s), (n)); \ + } \ + } while (0) + +/* Helper: Do a successful Extended ORPort authentication handshake. */ +static void +do_ext_or_handshake(or_connection_t *conn) +{ + char b[256]; + + tt_int_op(0, ==, connection_ext_or_start_auth(conn)); + CONTAINS("\x01\x00", 2); + WRITE("\x01", 1); + WRITE("But when I look ahead up the whi", 32); + MOCK(crypto_rand, crypto_rand_return_tse_str); + tt_int_op(0, ==, connection_ext_or_process_inbuf(conn)); + UNMOCK(crypto_rand); + tt_int_op(TO_CONN(conn)->state, ==, EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_AUTH_WAIT_CLIENT_HASH); + CONTAINS("\xec\x80\xed\x6e\x54\x6d\x3b\x36\xfd\xfc\x22\xfe\x13\x15\x41\x6b" + "\x02\x9f\x1a\xde\x76\x10\xd9\x10\x87\x8b\x62\xee\xb7\x40\x38\x21" + "te road There is always another ", 64); + /* Send the right response this time. */ + WRITE("\xab\x39\x17\x32\xdd\x2e\xd9\x68\xcd\x40\xc0\x87\xd1\xb1\xf2\x5b" + "\x33\xb3\xcd\x77\xff\x79\xbd\x80\xc2\x07\x4b\xbf\x43\x81\x19\xa2", + 32); + tt_int_op(0, ==, connection_ext_or_process_inbuf(conn)); + CONTAINS("\x01", 1); + tt_assert(! TO_CONN(conn)->marked_for_close); + tt_int_op(TO_CONN(conn)->state, ==, EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN); + + done: ; +} + +static void +test_ext_or_handshake(void *arg) +{ + or_connection_t *conn=NULL; + char b[256]; + + (void) arg; + MOCK(connection_write_to_buf_impl_, + connection_write_to_buf_impl_replacement); + /* Use same authenticators as for test_ext_or_cookie_auth_testvec */ + ext_or_auth_cookie = tor_malloc_zero(32); + memcpy(ext_or_auth_cookie, "Gliding wrapt in a brown mantle," , 32); + ext_or_auth_cookie_is_set = 1; + + init_connection_lists(); + + conn = or_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR, AF_INET); + tt_int_op(0, ==, connection_ext_or_start_auth(conn)); + /* The server starts by telling us about the one supported authtype. */ + CONTAINS("\x01\x00", 2); + /* Say the client hasn't responded yet. */ + tt_int_op(0, ==, connection_ext_or_process_inbuf(conn)); + /* Let's say the client replies badly. */ + WRITE("\x99", 1); + tt_int_op(-1, ==, connection_ext_or_process_inbuf(conn)); + CONTAINS("", 0); + tt_assert(TO_CONN(conn)->marked_for_close); + close_closeable_connections(); + conn = NULL; + + /* Okay, try again. */ + conn = or_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR, AF_INET); + tt_int_op(0, ==, connection_ext_or_start_auth(conn)); + CONTAINS("\x01\x00", 2); + /* Let's say the client replies sensibly this time. "Yes, AUTHTYPE_COOKIE + * sounds delicious. Let's have some of that!" */ + WRITE("\x01", 1); + /* Let's say that the client also sends part of a nonce. */ + WRITE("But when I look ", 16); + tt_int_op(0, ==, connection_ext_or_process_inbuf(conn)); + CONTAINS("", 0); + tt_int_op(TO_CONN(conn)->state, ==, + EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_AUTH_WAIT_CLIENT_NONCE); + /* Pump it again. Nothing should happen. */ + tt_int_op(0, ==, connection_ext_or_process_inbuf(conn)); + /* send the rest of the nonce. */ + WRITE("ahead up the whi", 16); + MOCK(crypto_rand, crypto_rand_return_tse_str); + tt_int_op(0, ==, connection_ext_or_process_inbuf(conn)); + UNMOCK(crypto_rand); + /* We should get the right reply from the server. */ + CONTAINS("\xec\x80\xed\x6e\x54\x6d\x3b\x36\xfd\xfc\x22\xfe\x13\x15\x41\x6b" + "\x02\x9f\x1a\xde\x76\x10\xd9\x10\x87\x8b\x62\xee\xb7\x40\x38\x21" + "te road There is always another ", 64); + /* Send the wrong response. */ + WRITE("not with a bang but a whimper...", 32); + MOCK(control_event_bootstrap_problem, ignore_bootstrap_problem); + tt_int_op(-1, ==, connection_ext_or_process_inbuf(conn)); + CONTAINS("\x00", 1); + tt_assert(TO_CONN(conn)->marked_for_close); + /* XXXX Hold-open-until-flushed. */ + close_closeable_connections(); + conn = NULL; + UNMOCK(control_event_bootstrap_problem); + + MOCK(connection_start_reading, note_read_started); + MOCK(connection_stop_reading, note_read_stopped); + MOCK(connection_tls_start_handshake, handshake_start); + + /* Okay, this time let's succeed. */ + conn = or_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR, AF_INET); + do_ext_or_handshake(conn); + + /* Now let's run through some messages. */ + /* First let's send some junk and make sure it's ignored. */ + WRITE("\xff\xf0\x00\x03""ABC", 7); + tt_int_op(0, ==, connection_ext_or_process_inbuf(conn)); + CONTAINS("", 0); + /* Now let's send a USERADDR command. */ + WRITE("\x00\x01\x00\x0c""1.2.3.4:5678", 16); + tt_int_op(0, ==, connection_ext_or_process_inbuf(conn)); + tt_int_op(TO_CONN(conn)->port, ==, 5678); + tt_int_op(tor_addr_to_ipv4h(&TO_CONN(conn)->addr), ==, 0x01020304); + /* Now let's send a TRANSPORT command. */ + WRITE("\x00\x02\x00\x07""rfc1149", 11); + tt_int_op(0, ==, connection_ext_or_process_inbuf(conn)); + tt_ptr_op(NULL, !=, conn->ext_or_transport); + tt_str_op("rfc1149", ==, conn->ext_or_transport); + tt_int_op(is_reading,==,1); + tt_int_op(TO_CONN(conn)->state, ==, EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN); + /* DONE */ + WRITE("\x00\x00\x00\x00", 4); + tt_int_op(0, ==, connection_ext_or_process_inbuf(conn)); + tt_int_op(TO_CONN(conn)->state, ==, EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_FLUSHING); + tt_int_op(is_reading,==,0); + CONTAINS("\x10\x00\x00\x00", 4); + tt_int_op(handshake_start_called,==,0); + tt_int_op(0, ==, connection_ext_or_finished_flushing(conn)); + tt_int_op(is_reading,==,1); + tt_int_op(handshake_start_called,==,1); + tt_int_op(TO_CONN(conn)->type, ==, CONN_TYPE_OR); + tt_int_op(TO_CONN(conn)->state, ==, 0); + close_closeable_connections(); + conn = NULL; + + /* Okay, this time let's succeed the handshake but fail the USERADDR + command. */ + conn = or_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR, AF_INET); + do_ext_or_handshake(conn); + /* USERADDR command with an extra NUL byte */ + WRITE("\x00\x01\x00\x0d""1.2.3.4:5678\x00", 17); + MOCK(control_event_bootstrap_problem, ignore_bootstrap_problem); + tt_int_op(-1, ==, connection_ext_or_process_inbuf(conn)); + CONTAINS("", 0); + tt_assert(TO_CONN(conn)->marked_for_close); + close_closeable_connections(); + conn = NULL; + UNMOCK(control_event_bootstrap_problem); + + /* Now fail the TRANSPORT command. */ + conn = or_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR, AF_INET); + do_ext_or_handshake(conn); + /* TRANSPORT command with an extra NUL byte */ + WRITE("\x00\x02\x00\x08""rfc1149\x00", 12); + MOCK(control_event_bootstrap_problem, ignore_bootstrap_problem); + tt_int_op(-1, ==, connection_ext_or_process_inbuf(conn)); + CONTAINS("", 0); + tt_assert(TO_CONN(conn)->marked_for_close); + close_closeable_connections(); + conn = NULL; + UNMOCK(control_event_bootstrap_problem); + + /* Now fail the TRANSPORT command. */ + conn = or_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR, AF_INET); + do_ext_or_handshake(conn); + /* TRANSPORT command with transport name with symbols (not a + C-identifier) */ + WRITE("\x00\x02\x00\x07""rf*1149", 11); + MOCK(control_event_bootstrap_problem, ignore_bootstrap_problem); + tt_int_op(-1, ==, connection_ext_or_process_inbuf(conn)); + CONTAINS("", 0); + tt_assert(TO_CONN(conn)->marked_for_close); + close_closeable_connections(); + conn = NULL; + UNMOCK(control_event_bootstrap_problem); + + done: + UNMOCK(connection_write_to_buf_impl_); + UNMOCK(crypto_rand); + if (conn) + connection_free_(TO_CONN(conn)); +#undef CONTAINS +#undef WRITE +} + +struct testcase_t extorport_tests[] = { + { "id_map", test_ext_or_id_map, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, + { "write_command", test_ext_or_write_command, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, + { "init_auth", test_ext_or_init_auth, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, + { "cookie_auth", test_ext_or_cookie_auth, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, + { "cookie_auth_testvec", test_ext_or_cookie_auth_testvec, TT_FORK, + NULL, NULL }, + { "handshake", test_ext_or_handshake, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, + END_OF_TESTCASES +}; + diff --git a/src/test/test_options.c b/src/test/test_options.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..737f658e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/test/test_options.c @@ -0,0 +1,170 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2013, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#define CONFIG_PRIVATE +#include "or.h" +#include "confparse.h" +#include "config.h" +#include "test.h" + +typedef struct { + int severity; + uint32_t domain; + char *msg; +} logmsg_t; + +static smartlist_t *messages = NULL; + +static void +log_cback(int severity, uint32_t domain, const char *msg) +{ + logmsg_t *x = tor_malloc(sizeof(*x)); + x->severity = severity; + x->domain = domain; + x->msg = tor_strdup(msg); + if (!messages) + messages = smartlist_new(); + smartlist_add(messages, x); +} + +static void +setup_log_callback(void) +{ + log_severity_list_t lst; + memset(&lst, 0, sizeof(lst)); + lst.masks[LOG_ERR - LOG_ERR] = ~0; + lst.masks[LOG_WARN - LOG_ERR] = ~0; + lst.masks[LOG_NOTICE - LOG_ERR] = ~0; + add_callback_log(&lst, log_cback); +} + +static char * +dump_logs(void) +{ + smartlist_t *msgs; + char *out; + if (! messages) + return tor_strdup(""); + msgs = smartlist_new(); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(messages, logmsg_t *, x) { + smartlist_add_asprintf(msgs, "[%s] %s", + log_level_to_string(x->severity), x->msg); + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(x); + out = smartlist_join_strings(msgs, "", 0, NULL); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(msgs, char *, cp, tor_free(cp)); + smartlist_free(msgs); + return out; +} + +static void +clear_log_messages(void) +{ + if (!messages) + return; + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(messages, logmsg_t *, m, + { tor_free(m->msg); tor_free(m); }); + smartlist_free(messages); + messages = NULL; +} + +static void +test_options_validate_impl(const char *configuration, + const char *expect_errmsg, + int expect_log_severity, + const char *expect_log) +{ + or_options_t *opt = options_new(); + or_options_t *dflt; + config_line_t *cl=NULL; + char *msg=NULL; + int r; + opt->command = CMD_RUN_TOR; + options_init(opt); + + dflt = config_dup(&options_format, opt); + clear_log_messages(); + + r = config_get_lines(configuration, &cl, 1); + tt_int_op(r, ==, 0); + + r = config_assign(&options_format, opt, cl, 0, 0, &msg); + tt_int_op(r, ==, 0); + + r = options_validate(NULL, opt, dflt, 0, &msg); + if (expect_errmsg && !msg) { + TT_DIE(("Expected error message <%s> from <%s>, but got none.", + expect_errmsg, configuration)); + } else if (expect_errmsg && !strstr(msg, expect_errmsg)) { + TT_DIE(("Expected error message <%s> from <%s>, but got <%s>.", + expect_errmsg, configuration, msg)); + } else if (!expect_errmsg && msg) { + TT_DIE(("Expected no error message from <%s> but got <%s>.", + configuration, msg)); + } + tt_int_op((r == 0), ==, (msg == NULL)); + + if (expect_log) { + int found = 0; + if (messages) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(messages, logmsg_t *, m) { + if (m->severity == expect_log_severity && + strstr(m->msg, expect_log)) { + found = 1; + break; + } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(m); + } + if (!found) { + tor_free(msg); + msg = dump_logs(); + TT_DIE(("Expected log message [%s] %s from <%s>, but got <%s>.", + log_level_to_string(expect_log_severity), expect_log, + configuration, msg)); + } + } + + done: + config_free_lines(cl); + or_options_free(opt); + or_options_free(dflt); + tor_free(msg); + clear_log_messages(); +} + +#define WANT_ERR(config, msg) \ + test_options_validate_impl((config), (msg), 0, NULL) +#define WANT_LOG(config, severity, msg) \ + test_options_validate_impl((config), NULL, (severity), (msg)) +#define WANT_ERR_LOG(config, msg, severity, logmsg) \ + test_options_validate_impl((config), (msg), (severity), (logmsg)) +#define OK(config) \ + test_options_validate_impl((config), NULL, 0, NULL) + +static void +test_options_validate(void *arg) +{ + (void)arg; + setup_log_callback(); + + WANT_ERR("ExtORPort 500000", "Invalid ExtORPort"); + + WANT_ERR_LOG("ServerTransportOptions trebuchet", + "ServerTransportOptions did not parse", + LOG_WARN, "Too few arguments"); + OK("ServerTransportOptions trebuchet sling=snappy"); + OK("ServerTransportOptions trebuchet sling="); + WANT_ERR_LOG("ServerTransportOptions trebuchet slingsnappy", + "ServerTransportOptions did not parse", + LOG_WARN, "\"slingsnappy\" is not a k=v"); + + clear_log_messages(); + return; +} + +struct testcase_t options_tests[] = { + { "validate", test_options_validate, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, + END_OF_TESTCASES +}; + diff --git a/src/test/test_pt.c b/src/test/test_pt.c index 80707f437..327792105 100644 --- a/src/test/test_pt.c +++ b/src/test/test_pt.c @@ -5,9 +5,17 @@ #include "orconfig.h" #define PT_PRIVATE +#define UTIL_PRIVATE +#define STATEFILE_PRIVATE +#define CONTROL_PRIVATE #include "or.h" +#include "config.h" +#include "confparse.h" +#include "control.h" #include "transports.h" #include "circuitbuild.h" +#include "util.h" +#include "statefile.h" #include "test.h" static void @@ -22,64 +30,102 @@ static void test_pt_parsing(void) { char line[200]; + transport_t *transport = NULL; + tor_addr_t test_addr; managed_proxy_t *mp = tor_malloc(sizeof(managed_proxy_t)); mp->conf_state = PT_PROTO_INFANT; mp->transports = smartlist_new(); /* incomplete cmethod */ - strcpy(line,"CMETHOD trebuchet"); + strlcpy(line,"CMETHOD trebuchet",sizeof(line)); test_assert(parse_cmethod_line(line, mp) < 0); reset_mp(mp); /* wrong proxy type */ - strcpy(line,"CMETHOD trebuchet dog 127.0.0.1:1999"); + strlcpy(line,"CMETHOD trebuchet dog 127.0.0.1:1999",sizeof(line)); test_assert(parse_cmethod_line(line, mp) < 0); reset_mp(mp); /* wrong addrport */ - strcpy(line,"CMETHOD trebuchet socks4 abcd"); + strlcpy(line,"CMETHOD trebuchet socks4 abcd",sizeof(line)); test_assert(parse_cmethod_line(line, mp) < 0); reset_mp(mp); /* correct line */ - strcpy(line,"CMETHOD trebuchet socks5 127.0.0.1:1999"); + strlcpy(line,"CMETHOD trebuchet socks5 127.0.0.1:1999",sizeof(line)); test_assert(parse_cmethod_line(line, mp) == 0); - test_assert(smartlist_len(mp->transports)); + test_assert(smartlist_len(mp->transports) == 1); + transport = smartlist_get(mp->transports, 0); + /* test registered address of transport */ + tor_addr_parse(&test_addr, "127.0.0.1"); + test_assert(tor_addr_eq(&test_addr, &transport->addr)); + /* test registered port of transport */ + test_assert(transport->port == 1999); + /* test registered SOCKS version of transport */ + test_assert(transport->socks_version == PROXY_SOCKS5); + /* test registered name of transport */ + test_streq(transport->name, "trebuchet"); reset_mp(mp); /* incomplete smethod */ - strcpy(line,"SMETHOD trebuchet"); + strlcpy(line,"SMETHOD trebuchet",sizeof(line)); test_assert(parse_smethod_line(line, mp) < 0); reset_mp(mp); /* wrong addr type */ - strcpy(line,"SMETHOD trebuchet abcd"); + strlcpy(line,"SMETHOD trebuchet abcd",sizeof(line)); test_assert(parse_smethod_line(line, mp) < 0); reset_mp(mp); /* cowwect */ - strcpy(line,"SMETHOD trebuchy 127.0.0.1:1999"); + strlcpy(line,"SMETHOD trebuchy 127.0.0.2:2999",sizeof(line)); test_assert(parse_smethod_line(line, mp) == 0); + test_assert(smartlist_len(mp->transports) == 1); + transport = smartlist_get(mp->transports, 0); + /* test registered address of transport */ + tor_addr_parse(&test_addr, "127.0.0.2"); + test_assert(tor_addr_eq(&test_addr, &transport->addr)); + /* test registered port of transport */ + test_assert(transport->port == 2999); + /* test registered name of transport */ + test_streq(transport->name, "trebuchy"); reset_mp(mp); + /* Include some arguments. Good ones. */ + strlcpy(line,"SMETHOD trebuchet 127.0.0.1:9999 " + "ARGS:counterweight=3,sling=snappy", + sizeof(line)); + test_assert(parse_smethod_line(line, mp) == 0); + tt_int_op(1, ==, smartlist_len(mp->transports)); + { + const transport_t *transport = smartlist_get(mp->transports, 0); + tt_assert(transport); + tt_str_op(transport->name, ==, "trebuchet"); + tt_int_op(transport->port, ==, 9999); + tt_str_op(fmt_addr(&transport->addr), ==, "127.0.0.1"); + tt_str_op(transport->extra_info_args, ==, + "counterweight=3,sling=snappy"); + } + reset_mp(mp); + /* unsupported version */ - strcpy(line,"VERSION 666"); + strlcpy(line,"VERSION 666",sizeof(line)); test_assert(parse_version(line, mp) < 0); /* incomplete VERSION */ - strcpy(line,"VERSION "); + strlcpy(line,"VERSION ",sizeof(line)); test_assert(parse_version(line, mp) < 0); /* correct VERSION */ - strcpy(line,"VERSION 1"); + strlcpy(line,"VERSION 1",sizeof(line)); test_assert(parse_version(line, mp) == 0); done: @@ -87,6 +133,58 @@ test_pt_parsing(void) } static void +test_pt_get_transport_options(void *arg) +{ + char **execve_args; + smartlist_t *transport_list = smartlist_new(); + managed_proxy_t *mp; + or_options_t *options = get_options_mutable(); + char *opt_str = NULL; + config_line_t *cl = NULL; + (void)arg; + + execve_args = tor_malloc(sizeof(char*)*2); + execve_args[0] = tor_strdup("cheeseshop"); + execve_args[1] = NULL; + + mp = managed_proxy_create(transport_list, execve_args, 1); + tt_ptr_op(mp, !=, NULL); + opt_str = get_transport_options_for_server_proxy(mp); + tt_ptr_op(opt_str, ==, NULL); + + smartlist_add(mp->transports_to_launch, tor_strdup("gruyere")); + smartlist_add(mp->transports_to_launch, tor_strdup("roquefort")); + smartlist_add(mp->transports_to_launch, tor_strdup("stnectaire")); + + tt_assert(options); + + cl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(config_line_t)); + cl->value = tor_strdup("gruyere melty=10 hardness=se;ven"); + options->ServerTransportOptions = cl; + + cl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(config_line_t)); + cl->value = tor_strdup("stnectaire melty=4 hardness=three"); + cl->next = options->ServerTransportOptions; + options->ServerTransportOptions = cl; + + cl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(config_line_t)); + cl->value = tor_strdup("pepperjack melty=12 hardness=five"); + cl->next = options->ServerTransportOptions; + options->ServerTransportOptions = cl; + + opt_str = get_transport_options_for_server_proxy(mp); + tt_str_op(opt_str, ==, + "gruyere:melty=10;gruyere:hardness=se\\;ven;" + "stnectaire:melty=4;stnectaire:hardness=three"); + + done: + tor_free(opt_str); + config_free_lines(cl); + managed_proxy_destroy(mp, 0); + smartlist_free(transport_list); +} + +static void test_pt_protocol(void) { char line[200]; @@ -99,32 +197,32 @@ test_pt_protocol(void) /* various wrong protocol runs: */ - strcpy(line,"VERSION 1"); + strlcpy(line,"VERSION 1",sizeof(line)); handle_proxy_line(line, mp); test_assert(mp->conf_state == PT_PROTO_ACCEPTING_METHODS); - strcpy(line,"VERSION 1"); + strlcpy(line,"VERSION 1",sizeof(line)); handle_proxy_line(line, mp); test_assert(mp->conf_state == PT_PROTO_BROKEN); reset_mp(mp); - strcpy(line,"CMETHOD trebuchet socks5 127.0.0.1:1999"); + strlcpy(line,"CMETHOD trebuchet socks5 127.0.0.1:1999",sizeof(line)); handle_proxy_line(line, mp); test_assert(mp->conf_state == PT_PROTO_BROKEN); reset_mp(mp); /* correct protocol run: */ - strcpy(line,"VERSION 1"); + strlcpy(line,"VERSION 1",sizeof(line)); handle_proxy_line(line, mp); test_assert(mp->conf_state == PT_PROTO_ACCEPTING_METHODS); - strcpy(line,"CMETHOD trebuchet socks5 127.0.0.1:1999"); + strlcpy(line,"CMETHOD trebuchet socks5 127.0.0.1:1999",sizeof(line)); handle_proxy_line(line, mp); test_assert(mp->conf_state == PT_PROTO_ACCEPTING_METHODS); - strcpy(line,"CMETHODS DONE"); + strlcpy(line,"CMETHODS DONE",sizeof(line)); handle_proxy_line(line, mp); test_assert(mp->conf_state == PT_PROTO_CONFIGURED); @@ -132,12 +230,223 @@ test_pt_protocol(void) tor_free(mp); } +static void +test_pt_get_extrainfo_string(void *arg) +{ + managed_proxy_t *mp1 = NULL, *mp2 = NULL; + char **argv1, **argv2; + smartlist_t *t1 = smartlist_new(), *t2 = smartlist_new(); + int r; + char *s = NULL; + (void) arg; + + argv1 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(char*)*3); + argv1[0] = tor_strdup("ewige"); + argv1[1] = tor_strdup("Blumenkraft"); + argv1[2] = NULL; + argv2 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(char*)*4); + argv2[0] = tor_strdup("und"); + argv2[1] = tor_strdup("ewige"); + argv2[2] = tor_strdup("Schlangenkraft"); + argv2[3] = NULL; + + mp1 = managed_proxy_create(t1, argv1, 1); + mp2 = managed_proxy_create(t2, argv2, 1); + + r = parse_smethod_line("SMETHOD hagbard 127.0.0.1:5555", mp1); + tt_int_op(r, ==, 0); + r = parse_smethod_line("SMETHOD celine 127.0.0.1:1723 ARGS:card=no-enemy", + mp2); + tt_int_op(r, ==, 0); + + /* Force these proxies to look "completed" or they won't generate output. */ + mp1->conf_state = mp2->conf_state = PT_PROTO_COMPLETED; + + s = pt_get_extra_info_descriptor_string(); + tt_assert(s); + tt_str_op(s, ==, + "transport hagbard 127.0.0.1:5555\n" + "transport celine 127.0.0.1:1723 card=no-enemy\n"); + + done: + /* XXXX clean up better */ + smartlist_free(t1); + smartlist_free(t2); + tor_free(s); +} + +#ifdef _WIN32 +#define STDIN_HANDLE HANDLE +#else +#define STDIN_HANDLE FILE +#endif + +static smartlist_t * +tor_get_lines_from_handle_replacement(STDIN_HANDLE *handle, + enum stream_status *stream_status_out) +{ + static int times_called = 0; + smartlist_t *retval_sl = smartlist_new(); + + (void) handle; + (void) stream_status_out; + + /* Generate some dummy CMETHOD lines the first 5 times. The 6th + time, send 'CMETHODS DONE' to finish configuring the proxy. */ + if (times_called++ != 5) { + smartlist_add_asprintf(retval_sl, "SMETHOD mock%d 127.0.0.1:555%d", + times_called, times_called); + } else { + smartlist_add(retval_sl, tor_strdup("SMETHODS DONE")); + } + + return retval_sl; +} + +/* NOP mock */ +static void +tor_process_handle_destroy_replacement(process_handle_t *process_handle, + int also_terminate_process) +{ + (void) process_handle; + (void) also_terminate_process; +} + +static or_state_t *dummy_state = NULL; + +static or_state_t * +get_or_state_replacement(void) +{ + return dummy_state; +} + +static int controlevent_n = 0; +static uint16_t controlevent_event = 0; +static smartlist_t *controlevent_msgs = NULL; + +static void +send_control_event_string_replacement(uint16_t event, event_format_t which, + const char *msg) +{ + (void) which; + ++controlevent_n; + controlevent_event = event; + if (!controlevent_msgs) + controlevent_msgs = smartlist_new(); + smartlist_add(controlevent_msgs, tor_strdup(msg)); +} + +/* Test the configure_proxy() function. */ +static void +test_pt_configure_proxy(void *arg) +{ + int i, retval; + managed_proxy_t *mp = NULL; + (void) arg; + + dummy_state = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(or_state_t)); + + MOCK(tor_get_lines_from_handle, + tor_get_lines_from_handle_replacement); + MOCK(tor_process_handle_destroy, + tor_process_handle_destroy_replacement); + MOCK(get_or_state, + get_or_state_replacement); + MOCK(send_control_event_string, + send_control_event_string_replacement); + + control_testing_set_global_event_mask(EVENT_TRANSPORT_LAUNCHED); + + mp = tor_malloc(sizeof(managed_proxy_t)); + mp->conf_state = PT_PROTO_ACCEPTING_METHODS; + mp->transports = smartlist_new(); + mp->transports_to_launch = smartlist_new(); + mp->process_handle = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(process_handle_t)); + mp->argv = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(char*)*2); + mp->argv[0] = tor_strdup("<testcase>"); + mp->is_server = 1; + + /* Test the return value of configure_proxy() by calling it some + times while it is uninitialized and then finally finalizing its + configuration. */ + for (i = 0 ; i < 5 ; i++) { + retval = configure_proxy(mp); + /* retval should be zero because proxy hasn't finished configuring yet */ + test_assert(retval == 0); + /* check the number of registered transports */ + test_assert(smartlist_len(mp->transports) == i+1); + /* check that the mp is still waiting for transports */ + test_assert(mp->conf_state == PT_PROTO_ACCEPTING_METHODS); + } + + /* this last configure_proxy() should finalize the proxy configuration. */ + retval = configure_proxy(mp); + /* retval should be 1 since the proxy finished configuring */ + test_assert(retval == 1); + /* check the mp state */ + test_assert(mp->conf_state == PT_PROTO_COMPLETED); + + tt_int_op(controlevent_n, ==, 5); + tt_int_op(controlevent_event, ==, EVENT_TRANSPORT_LAUNCHED); + tt_int_op(smartlist_len(controlevent_msgs), ==, 5); + smartlist_sort_strings(controlevent_msgs); + tt_str_op(smartlist_get(controlevent_msgs, 0), ==, + "650 TRANSPORT_LAUNCHED server mock1 127.0.0.1 5551\r\n"); + tt_str_op(smartlist_get(controlevent_msgs, 1), ==, + "650 TRANSPORT_LAUNCHED server mock2 127.0.0.1 5552\r\n"); + tt_str_op(smartlist_get(controlevent_msgs, 2), ==, + "650 TRANSPORT_LAUNCHED server mock3 127.0.0.1 5553\r\n"); + tt_str_op(smartlist_get(controlevent_msgs, 3), ==, + "650 TRANSPORT_LAUNCHED server mock4 127.0.0.1 5554\r\n"); + tt_str_op(smartlist_get(controlevent_msgs, 4), ==, + "650 TRANSPORT_LAUNCHED server mock5 127.0.0.1 5555\r\n"); + + { /* check that the transport info were saved properly in the tor state */ + config_line_t *transport_in_state = NULL; + smartlist_t *transport_info_sl = smartlist_new(); + char *name_of_transport = NULL; + char *bindaddr = NULL; + + /* Get the bindaddr for "mock1" and check it against the bindaddr + that the mocked tor_get_lines_from_handle() generated. */ + transport_in_state = get_transport_in_state_by_name("mock1"); + test_assert(transport_in_state); + smartlist_split_string(transport_info_sl, transport_in_state->value, + NULL, 0, 0); + name_of_transport = smartlist_get(transport_info_sl, 0); + bindaddr = smartlist_get(transport_info_sl, 1); + tt_str_op(name_of_transport, ==, "mock1"); + tt_str_op(bindaddr, ==, "127.0.0.1:5551"); + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(transport_info_sl, char *, cp, tor_free(cp)); + smartlist_free(transport_info_sl); + } + + done: + tor_free(dummy_state); + UNMOCK(tor_get_lines_from_handle); + UNMOCK(tor_process_handle_destroy); + UNMOCK(get_or_state); + UNMOCK(send_control_event_string); + if (controlevent_msgs) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(controlevent_msgs, char *, cp, tor_free(cp)); + smartlist_free(controlevent_msgs); + controlevent_msgs = NULL; + } +} + #define PT_LEGACY(name) \ { #name, legacy_test_helper, 0, &legacy_setup, test_pt_ ## name } struct testcase_t pt_tests[] = { PT_LEGACY(parsing), PT_LEGACY(protocol), + { "get_transport_options", test_pt_get_transport_options, TT_FORK, + NULL, NULL }, + { "get_extrainfo_string", test_pt_get_extrainfo_string, TT_FORK, + NULL, NULL }, + { "configure_proxy",test_pt_configure_proxy, TT_FORK, + NULL, NULL }, END_OF_TESTCASES }; diff --git a/src/test/test_replay.c b/src/test/test_replay.c index de841ad59..b48f582f5 100644 --- a/src/test/test_replay.c +++ b/src/test/test_replay.c @@ -32,6 +32,40 @@ test_replaycache_alloc(void) } static void +test_replaycache_badalloc(void) +{ + replaycache_t *r = NULL; + + /* Negative horizon should fail */ + r = replaycache_new(-600, 300); + test_assert(r == NULL); + /* Negative interval should get adjusted to zero */ + r = replaycache_new(600, -300); + test_assert(r != NULL); + test_eq(r->scrub_interval, 0); + replaycache_free(r); + /* Negative horizon and negative interval should still fail */ + r = replaycache_new(-600, -300); + test_assert(r == NULL); + + done: + if (r) replaycache_free(r); + + return; +} + +static void +test_replaycache_free_null(void) +{ + replaycache_free(NULL); + /* Assert that we're here without horrible death */ + test_assert(1); + + done: + return; +} + +static void test_replaycache_miss(void) { replaycache_t *r = NULL; @@ -42,7 +76,13 @@ test_replaycache_miss(void) result = replaycache_add_and_test_internal(1200, r, test_buffer, - (int)strlen(test_buffer), NULL); + strlen(test_buffer), NULL); + test_eq(result, 0); + + /* poke the bad-parameter error case too */ + result = + replaycache_add_and_test_internal(1200, NULL, test_buffer, + strlen(test_buffer), NULL); test_eq(result, 0); done: @@ -62,12 +102,12 @@ test_replaycache_hit(void) result = replaycache_add_and_test_internal(1200, r, test_buffer, - (int)strlen(test_buffer), NULL); + strlen(test_buffer), NULL); test_eq(result, 0); result = replaycache_add_and_test_internal(1300, r, test_buffer, - (int)strlen(test_buffer), NULL); + strlen(test_buffer), NULL); test_eq(result, 1); done: @@ -87,17 +127,17 @@ test_replaycache_age(void) result = replaycache_add_and_test_internal(1200, r, test_buffer, - (int)strlen(test_buffer), NULL); + strlen(test_buffer), NULL); test_eq(result, 0); result = replaycache_add_and_test_internal(1300, r, test_buffer, - (int)strlen(test_buffer), NULL); + strlen(test_buffer), NULL); test_eq(result, 1); result = replaycache_add_and_test_internal(3000, r, test_buffer, - (int)strlen(test_buffer), NULL); + strlen(test_buffer), NULL); test_eq(result, 0); done: @@ -118,12 +158,12 @@ test_replaycache_elapsed(void) result = replaycache_add_and_test_internal(1200, r, test_buffer, - (int)strlen(test_buffer), NULL); + strlen(test_buffer), NULL); test_eq(result, 0); result = replaycache_add_and_test_internal(1300, r, test_buffer, - (int)strlen(test_buffer), &elapsed); + strlen(test_buffer), &elapsed); test_eq(result, 1); test_eq(elapsed, 100); @@ -144,18 +184,102 @@ test_replaycache_noexpire(void) result = replaycache_add_and_test_internal(1200, r, test_buffer, - (int)strlen(test_buffer), NULL); + strlen(test_buffer), NULL); test_eq(result, 0); result = replaycache_add_and_test_internal(1300, r, test_buffer, - (int)strlen(test_buffer), NULL); + strlen(test_buffer), NULL); test_eq(result, 1); result = replaycache_add_and_test_internal(3000, r, test_buffer, - (int)strlen(test_buffer), NULL); + strlen(test_buffer), NULL); + test_eq(result, 1); + + done: + if (r) replaycache_free(r); + + return; +} + +static void +test_replaycache_scrub(void) +{ + replaycache_t *r = NULL; + int result; + + r = replaycache_new(600, 300); + test_assert(r != NULL); + + /* Set up like in test_replaycache_hit() */ + result = + replaycache_add_and_test_internal(100, r, test_buffer, + strlen(test_buffer), NULL); + test_eq(result, 0); + + result = + replaycache_add_and_test_internal(200, r, test_buffer, + strlen(test_buffer), NULL); + test_eq(result, 1); + + /* + * Poke a few replaycache_scrub_if_needed_internal() error cases that + * can't happen through replaycache_add_and_test_internal() + */ + + /* Null cache */ + replaycache_scrub_if_needed_internal(300, NULL); + /* Assert we're still here */ + test_assert(1); + + /* Make sure we hit the aging-out case too */ + replaycache_scrub_if_needed_internal(1500, r); + /* Assert that we aged it */ + test_eq(digestmap_size(r->digests_seen), 0); + + done: + if (r) replaycache_free(r); + + return; +} + +static void +test_replaycache_future(void) +{ + replaycache_t *r = NULL; + int result; + time_t elapsed = 0; + + r = replaycache_new(600, 300); + test_assert(r != NULL); + + /* Set up like in test_replaycache_hit() */ + result = + replaycache_add_and_test_internal(100, r, test_buffer, + strlen(test_buffer), &elapsed); + test_eq(result, 0); + /* elapsed should still be 0, since it wasn't written */ + test_eq(elapsed, 0); + + result = + replaycache_add_and_test_internal(200, r, test_buffer, + strlen(test_buffer), &elapsed); + test_eq(result, 1); + /* elapsed should be the time since the last hit */ + test_eq(elapsed, 100); + + /* + * Now let's turn the clock back to get coverage on the cache entry from the + * future not-supposed-to-happen case. + */ + result = + replaycache_add_and_test_internal(150, r, test_buffer, + strlen(test_buffer), &elapsed); + /* We should still get a hit */ test_eq(result, 1); + /* ...but it shouldn't let us see a negative elapsed time */ + test_eq(elapsed, 0); done: if (r) replaycache_free(r); @@ -163,16 +287,62 @@ test_replaycache_noexpire(void) return; } +static void +test_replaycache_realtime(void) +{ + replaycache_t *r = NULL; + /* + * Negative so we fail if replaycache_add_test_and_elapsed() doesn't + * write to elapsed. + */ + time_t elapsed = -1; + int result; + + /* Test the realtime as well as *_internal() entry points */ + r = replaycache_new(600, 300); + test_assert(r != NULL); + + /* This should miss */ + result = + replaycache_add_and_test(r, test_buffer, strlen(test_buffer)); + test_eq(result, 0); + + /* This should hit */ + result = + replaycache_add_and_test(r, test_buffer, strlen(test_buffer)); + test_eq(result, 1); + + /* This should hit and return a small elapsed time */ + result = + replaycache_add_test_and_elapsed(r, test_buffer, + strlen(test_buffer), &elapsed); + test_eq(result, 1); + test_assert(elapsed >= 0); + test_assert(elapsed <= 5); + + /* Scrub it to exercise that entry point too */ + replaycache_scrub_if_needed(r); + + done: + if (r) replaycache_free(r); + return; +} + #define REPLAYCACHE_LEGACY(name) \ { #name, legacy_test_helper, 0, &legacy_setup, test_replaycache_ ## name } struct testcase_t replaycache_tests[] = { REPLAYCACHE_LEGACY(alloc), + REPLAYCACHE_LEGACY(badalloc), + REPLAYCACHE_LEGACY(free_null), REPLAYCACHE_LEGACY(miss), REPLAYCACHE_LEGACY(hit), REPLAYCACHE_LEGACY(age), REPLAYCACHE_LEGACY(elapsed), REPLAYCACHE_LEGACY(noexpire), + REPLAYCACHE_LEGACY(scrub), + REPLAYCACHE_LEGACY(future), + REPLAYCACHE_LEGACY(realtime), END_OF_TESTCASES }; diff --git a/src/test/test_socks.c b/src/test/test_socks.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4ce61e068 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/test/test_socks.c @@ -0,0 +1,393 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2013, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#include "or.h" +#include "buffers.h" +#include "config.h" +#include "test.h" + +typedef struct socks_test_data_t { + socks_request_t *req; + buf_t *buf; +} socks_test_data_t; + +static void * +socks_test_setup(const struct testcase_t *testcase) +{ + socks_test_data_t *data = tor_malloc(sizeof(socks_test_data_t)); + (void)testcase; + data->buf = buf_new_with_capacity(256); + data->req = socks_request_new(); + config_register_addressmaps(get_options()); + return data; +} +static int +socks_test_cleanup(const struct testcase_t *testcase, void *ptr) +{ + socks_test_data_t *data = ptr; + (void)testcase; + buf_free(data->buf); + socks_request_free(data->req); + tor_free(data); + return 1; +} + +const struct testcase_setup_t socks_setup = { + socks_test_setup, socks_test_cleanup +}; + +#define SOCKS_TEST_INIT() \ + socks_test_data_t *testdata = ptr; \ + buf_t *buf = testdata->buf; \ + socks_request_t *socks = testdata->req; +#define ADD_DATA(buf, s) \ + write_to_buf(s, sizeof(s)-1, buf) + +static void +socks_request_clear(socks_request_t *socks) +{ + tor_free(socks->username); + tor_free(socks->password); + memset(socks, 0, sizeof(socks_request_t)); +} + +/** Perform unsupported SOCKS 4 commands */ +static void +test_socks_4_unsupported_commands(void *ptr) +{ + SOCKS_TEST_INIT(); + + /* SOCKS 4 Send BIND [02] to IP address 2.2.2.2:4369 */ + ADD_DATA(buf, "\x04\x02\x11\x11\x02\x02\x02\x02\x00"); + test_assert(fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, get_options()->TestSocks, + get_options()->SafeSocks) == -1); + test_eq(4, socks->socks_version); + test_eq(0, socks->replylen); /* XXX: shouldn't tor reply? */ + + done: + ; +} + +/** Perform supported SOCKS 4 commands */ +static void +test_socks_4_supported_commands(void *ptr) +{ + SOCKS_TEST_INIT(); + + test_eq(0, buf_datalen(buf)); + + /* SOCKS 4 Send CONNECT [01] to IP address 2.2.2.2:4370 */ + ADD_DATA(buf, "\x04\x01\x11\x12\x02\x02\x02\x03\x00"); + test_assert(fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, get_options()->TestSocks, + get_options()->SafeSocks) == 1); + test_eq(4, socks->socks_version); + test_eq(0, socks->replylen); /* XXX: shouldn't tor reply? */ + test_eq(SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT, socks->command); + test_streq("2.2.2.3", socks->address); + test_eq(4370, socks->port); + test_assert(socks->got_auth == 0); + test_assert(! socks->username); + + test_eq(0, buf_datalen(buf)); + socks_request_clear(socks); + + /* SOCKS 4 Send CONNECT [01] to IP address 2.2.2.2:4369 with userid*/ + ADD_DATA(buf, "\x04\x01\x11\x12\x02\x02\x02\x04me\x00"); + test_assert(fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, get_options()->TestSocks, + get_options()->SafeSocks) == 1); + test_eq(4, socks->socks_version); + test_eq(0, socks->replylen); /* XXX: shouldn't tor reply? */ + test_eq(SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT, socks->command); + test_streq("2.2.2.4", socks->address); + test_eq(4370, socks->port); + test_assert(socks->got_auth == 1); + test_assert(socks->username); + test_eq(2, socks->usernamelen); + test_memeq("me", socks->username, 2); + + test_eq(0, buf_datalen(buf)); + socks_request_clear(socks); + + /* SOCKS 4a Send RESOLVE [F0] request for torproject.org */ + ADD_DATA(buf, "\x04\xF0\x01\x01\x00\x00\x00\x02me\x00torproject.org\x00"); + test_assert(fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, get_options()->TestSocks, + get_options()->SafeSocks) == 1); + test_eq(4, socks->socks_version); + test_eq(0, socks->replylen); /* XXX: shouldn't tor reply? */ + test_streq("torproject.org", socks->address); + + test_eq(0, buf_datalen(buf)); + + done: + ; +} + +/** Perform unsupported SOCKS 5 commands */ +static void +test_socks_5_unsupported_commands(void *ptr) +{ + SOCKS_TEST_INIT(); + + /* SOCKS 5 Send unsupported BIND [02] command */ + ADD_DATA(buf, "\x05\x02\x00\x01"); + + test_eq(fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, get_options()->TestSocks, + get_options()->SafeSocks), 0); + test_eq(0, buf_datalen(buf)); + test_eq(5, socks->socks_version); + test_eq(2, socks->replylen); + test_eq(5, socks->reply[0]); + test_eq(0, socks->reply[1]); + ADD_DATA(buf, "\x05\x02\x00\x01\x02\x02\x02\x01\x01\x01"); + test_eq(fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, get_options()->TestSocks, + get_options()->SafeSocks), -1); + /* XXX: shouldn't tor reply 'command not supported' [07]? */ + + buf_clear(buf); + socks_request_clear(socks); + + /* SOCKS 5 Send unsupported UDP_ASSOCIATE [03] command */ + ADD_DATA(buf, "\x05\x03\x00\x01\x02"); + test_eq(fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, get_options()->TestSocks, + get_options()->SafeSocks), 0); + test_eq(5, socks->socks_version); + test_eq(2, socks->replylen); + test_eq(5, socks->reply[0]); + test_eq(2, socks->reply[1]); + ADD_DATA(buf, "\x05\x03\x00\x01\x02\x02\x02\x01\x01\x01"); + test_eq(fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, get_options()->TestSocks, + get_options()->SafeSocks), -1); + /* XXX: shouldn't tor reply 'command not supported' [07]? */ + + done: + ; +} + +/** Perform supported SOCKS 5 commands */ +static void +test_socks_5_supported_commands(void *ptr) +{ + SOCKS_TEST_INIT(); + + /* SOCKS 5 Send CONNECT [01] to IP address 2.2.2.2:4369 */ + ADD_DATA(buf, "\x05\x01\x00"); + test_eq(fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, get_options()->TestSocks, + get_options()->SafeSocks), 0); + test_eq(5, socks->socks_version); + test_eq(2, socks->replylen); + test_eq(5, socks->reply[0]); + test_eq(0, socks->reply[1]); + + ADD_DATA(buf, "\x05\x01\x00\x01\x02\x02\x02\x02\x11\x11"); + test_eq(fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, get_options()->TestSocks, + get_options()->SafeSocks), 1); + test_streq("2.2.2.2", socks->address); + test_eq(4369, socks->port); + + test_eq(0, buf_datalen(buf)); + socks_request_clear(socks); + + /* SOCKS 5 Send CONNECT [01] to FQDN torproject.org:4369 */ + ADD_DATA(buf, "\x05\x01\x00"); + ADD_DATA(buf, "\x05\x01\x00\x03\x0Etorproject.org\x11\x11"); + test_eq(fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, get_options()->TestSocks, + get_options()->SafeSocks), 1); + + test_eq(5, socks->socks_version); + test_eq(2, socks->replylen); + test_eq(5, socks->reply[0]); + test_eq(0, socks->reply[1]); + test_streq("torproject.org", socks->address); + test_eq(4369, socks->port); + + test_eq(0, buf_datalen(buf)); + socks_request_clear(socks); + + /* SOCKS 5 Send RESOLVE [F0] request for torproject.org:4369 */ + ADD_DATA(buf, "\x05\x01\x00"); + ADD_DATA(buf, "\x05\xF0\x00\x03\x0Etorproject.org\x01\x02"); + test_assert(fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, get_options()->TestSocks, + get_options()->SafeSocks) == 1); + test_eq(5, socks->socks_version); + test_eq(2, socks->replylen); + test_eq(5, socks->reply[0]); + test_eq(0, socks->reply[1]); + test_streq("torproject.org", socks->address); + + test_eq(0, buf_datalen(buf)); + socks_request_clear(socks); + + /* SOCKS 5 Send RESOLVE_PTR [F1] for IP address 2.2.2.5 */ + ADD_DATA(buf, "\x05\x01\x00"); + ADD_DATA(buf, "\x05\xF1\x00\x01\x02\x02\x02\x05\x01\x03"); + test_assert(fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, get_options()->TestSocks, + get_options()->SafeSocks) == 1); + test_eq(5, socks->socks_version); + test_eq(2, socks->replylen); + test_eq(5, socks->reply[0]); + test_eq(0, socks->reply[1]); + test_streq("2.2.2.5", socks->address); + + test_eq(0, buf_datalen(buf)); + + done: + ; +} + +/** Perform SOCKS 5 authentication */ +static void +test_socks_5_no_authenticate(void *ptr) +{ + SOCKS_TEST_INIT(); + + /*SOCKS 5 No Authentication */ + ADD_DATA(buf,"\x05\x01\x00"); + test_assert(!fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, + get_options()->TestSocks, + get_options()->SafeSocks)); + test_eq(2, socks->replylen); + test_eq(5, socks->reply[0]); + test_eq(SOCKS_NO_AUTH, socks->reply[1]); + + test_eq(0, buf_datalen(buf)); + + /*SOCKS 5 Send username/password anyway - pretend to be broken */ + ADD_DATA(buf,"\x01\x02\x01\x01\x02\x01\x01"); + test_assert(!fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, + get_options()->TestSocks, + get_options()->SafeSocks)); + test_eq(5, socks->socks_version); + test_eq(2, socks->replylen); + test_eq(1, socks->reply[0]); + test_eq(0, socks->reply[1]); + + test_eq(2, socks->usernamelen); + test_eq(2, socks->passwordlen); + + test_memeq("\x01\x01", socks->username, 2); + test_memeq("\x01\x01", socks->password, 2); + + done: + ; +} + +/** Perform SOCKS 5 authentication */ +static void +test_socks_5_authenticate(void *ptr) +{ + SOCKS_TEST_INIT(); + + /* SOCKS 5 Negotiate username/password authentication */ + ADD_DATA(buf, "\x05\x01\x02"); + + test_assert(!fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, + get_options()->TestSocks, + get_options()->SafeSocks)); + test_eq(2, socks->replylen); + test_eq(5, socks->reply[0]); + test_eq(SOCKS_USER_PASS, socks->reply[1]); + test_eq(5, socks->socks_version); + + test_eq(0, buf_datalen(buf)); + + /* SOCKS 5 Send username/password */ + ADD_DATA(buf, "\x01\x02me\x08mypasswd"); + test_assert(!fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, + get_options()->TestSocks, + get_options()->SafeSocks)); + test_eq(5, socks->socks_version); + test_eq(2, socks->replylen); + test_eq(1, socks->reply[0]); + test_eq(0, socks->reply[1]); + + test_eq(2, socks->usernamelen); + test_eq(8, socks->passwordlen); + + test_memeq("me", socks->username, 2); + test_memeq("mypasswd", socks->password, 8); + + done: + ; +} + +/** Perform SOCKS 5 authentication and send data all in one go */ +static void +test_socks_5_authenticate_with_data(void *ptr) +{ + SOCKS_TEST_INIT(); + + /* SOCKS 5 Negotiate username/password authentication */ + ADD_DATA(buf, "\x05\x01\x02"); + + test_assert(!fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, + get_options()->TestSocks, + get_options()->SafeSocks)); + test_eq(2, socks->replylen); + test_eq(5, socks->reply[0]); + test_eq(SOCKS_USER_PASS, socks->reply[1]); + test_eq(5, socks->socks_version); + + test_eq(0, buf_datalen(buf)); + + /* SOCKS 5 Send username/password */ + /* SOCKS 5 Send CONNECT [01] to IP address 2.2.2.2:4369 */ + ADD_DATA(buf, "\x01\x02me\x03you\x05\x01\x00\x01\x02\x02\x02\x02\x11\x11"); + test_assert(fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, + get_options()->TestSocks, + get_options()->SafeSocks) == 1); + test_eq(5, socks->socks_version); + test_eq(2, socks->replylen); + test_eq(1, socks->reply[0]); + test_eq(0, socks->reply[1]); + + test_streq("2.2.2.2", socks->address); + test_eq(4369, socks->port); + + test_eq(2, socks->usernamelen); + test_eq(3, socks->passwordlen); + test_memeq("me", socks->username, 2); + test_memeq("you", socks->password, 3); + + done: + ; +} + +/** Perform SOCKS 5 authentication before method negotiated */ +static void +test_socks_5_auth_before_negotiation(void *ptr) +{ + SOCKS_TEST_INIT(); + + /* SOCKS 5 Send username/password */ + ADD_DATA(buf, "\x01\x02me\x02me"); + test_assert(fetch_from_buf_socks(buf, socks, + get_options()->TestSocks, + get_options()->SafeSocks) == -1); + test_eq(0, socks->socks_version); + test_eq(0, socks->replylen); + test_eq(0, socks->reply[0]); + test_eq(0, socks->reply[1]); + + done: + ; +} + +#define SOCKSENT(name) \ + { #name, test_socks_##name, TT_FORK, &socks_setup, NULL } + +struct testcase_t socks_tests[] = { + SOCKSENT(4_unsupported_commands), + SOCKSENT(4_supported_commands), + + SOCKSENT(5_unsupported_commands), + SOCKSENT(5_supported_commands), + SOCKSENT(5_no_authenticate), + SOCKSENT(5_auth_before_negotiation), + SOCKSENT(5_authenticate), + SOCKSENT(5_authenticate_with_data), + + END_OF_TESTCASES +}; + diff --git a/src/test/test_util.c b/src/test/test_util.c index 65d9d2f87..ba58b31d4 100644 --- a/src/test/test_util.c +++ b/src/test/test_util.c @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ #include "orconfig.h" +#define COMPAT_PRIVATE #define CONTROL_PRIVATE #define MEMPOOL_PRIVATE #define UTIL_PRIVATE @@ -101,6 +102,112 @@ test_util_read_file_eof_zero_bytes(void *arg) test_util_read_until_eof_impl("tor_test_fifo_empty", 0, 10000); } +/* Test the basic expected behaviour for write_chunks_to_file. + * NOTE: This will need to be updated if we ever change the tempfile location + * or extension */ +static void +test_util_write_chunks_to_file(void *arg) +{ + char *fname = NULL; + char *tempname = NULL; + char *str = NULL; + int r; + int fd = -1; + struct stat st; + + /* These should be two different sizes to ensure the data is different + * between the data file and the temp file's 'known string' */ + int temp_str_len = 1024; + int data_str_len = 512; + char *data_str = tor_malloc(data_str_len); + char *temp_str = tor_malloc(temp_str_len); + + smartlist_t *chunks = smartlist_new(); + sized_chunk_t c = {data_str, data_str_len/2}; + sized_chunk_t c2 = {data_str + data_str_len/2, data_str_len/2}; + (void)arg; + + crypto_rand(temp_str, temp_str_len); + crypto_rand(data_str, data_str_len); + + // Ensure it can write multiple chunks + + smartlist_add(chunks, &c); + smartlist_add(chunks, &c2); + + /* + * Check if it writes using a tempfile + */ + fname = tor_strdup(get_fname("write_chunks_with_tempfile")); + tor_asprintf(&tempname, "%s.tmp", fname); + + // write a known string to a file where the tempfile will be + r = write_bytes_to_file(tempname, temp_str, temp_str_len, 1); + tt_int_op(r, ==, 0); + + // call write_chunks_to_file + r = write_chunks_to_file(fname, chunks, 1, 0); + tt_int_op(r, ==, 0); + + // assert the file has been written (expected size) + str = read_file_to_str(fname, RFTS_BIN, &st); + tt_assert(str != NULL); + tt_int_op(st.st_size, ==, data_str_len); + test_mem_op(data_str, ==, str, data_str_len); + tor_free(str); + close(fd); + + // assert that the tempfile is removed (should not leave artifacts) + str = read_file_to_str(tempname, RFTS_BIN|RFTS_IGNORE_MISSING, &st); + tt_assert(str == NULL); + + // Remove old testfile for second test + r = unlink(fname); + tt_int_op(r, ==, 0); + tor_free(fname); + tor_free(tempname); + + /* + * Check if it skips using a tempfile with flags + */ + fname = tor_strdup(get_fname("write_chunks_with_no_tempfile")); + tor_asprintf(&tempname, "%s.tmp", fname); + + // write a known string to a file where the tempfile will be + r = write_bytes_to_file(tempname, temp_str, temp_str_len, 1); + tt_int_op(r, ==, 0); + + // call write_chunks_to_file with no_tempfile = true + r = write_chunks_to_file(fname, chunks, 1, 1); + tt_int_op(r, ==, 0); + + // assert the file has been written (expected size) + str = read_file_to_str(fname, RFTS_BIN, &st); + tt_assert(str != NULL); + tt_int_op(st.st_size, ==, data_str_len); + test_mem_op(data_str, ==, str, data_str_len); + tor_free(str); + close(fd); + + // assert the tempfile still contains the known string + str = read_file_to_str(tempname, RFTS_BIN, &st); + tt_assert(str != NULL); + tt_int_op(st.st_size, ==, temp_str_len); + test_mem_op(temp_str, ==, str, temp_str_len); + + done: + unlink(fname); + unlink(tempname); + smartlist_free(chunks); + tor_free(fname); + tor_free(tempname); + tor_free(str); + tor_free(data_str); + tor_free(temp_str); + if (fd >= 0) + close(fd); +} + static void test_util_time(void) { @@ -796,6 +903,64 @@ test_util_expand_filename(void) } #endif +/** Test tor_escape_str_for_pt_args(). */ +static void +test_util_escape_string_socks(void) +{ + char *escaped_string = NULL; + + /** Simple backslash escape. */ + escaped_string = tor_escape_str_for_pt_args("This is a backslash: \\",";\\"); + test_assert(escaped_string); + test_streq(escaped_string, "This is a backslash: \\\\"); + tor_free(escaped_string); + + /** Simple semicolon escape. */ + escaped_string = tor_escape_str_for_pt_args("First rule:Do not use ;",";\\"); + test_assert(escaped_string); + test_streq(escaped_string, "First rule:Do not use \\;"); + tor_free(escaped_string); + + /** Empty string. */ + escaped_string = tor_escape_str_for_pt_args("", ";\\"); + test_assert(escaped_string); + test_streq(escaped_string, ""); + tor_free(escaped_string); + + /** Escape all characters. */ + escaped_string = tor_escape_str_for_pt_args(";\\;\\", ";\\"); + test_assert(escaped_string); + test_streq(escaped_string, "\\;\\\\\\;\\\\"); + tor_free(escaped_string); + + escaped_string = tor_escape_str_for_pt_args(";", ";\\"); + test_assert(escaped_string); + test_streq(escaped_string, "\\;"); + tor_free(escaped_string); + + done: + tor_free(escaped_string); +} + +static void +test_util_string_is_key_value(void *ptr) +{ + (void)ptr; + test_assert(string_is_key_value(LOG_WARN, "key=value")); + test_assert(string_is_key_value(LOG_WARN, "k=v")); + test_assert(string_is_key_value(LOG_WARN, "key=")); + test_assert(string_is_key_value(LOG_WARN, "x=")); + test_assert(string_is_key_value(LOG_WARN, "xx=")); + test_assert(!string_is_key_value(LOG_WARN, "=value")); + test_assert(!string_is_key_value(LOG_WARN, "=x")); + test_assert(!string_is_key_value(LOG_WARN, "=")); + + /* ??? */ + /* test_assert(!string_is_key_value(LOG_WARN, "===")); */ + done: + ; +} + /** Test basic string functionality. */ static void test_util_strmisc(void) @@ -2223,6 +2388,7 @@ test_util_load_win_lib(void *ptr) } #endif +#ifndef _WIN32 static void clear_hex_errno(char *hex_errno) { @@ -2267,6 +2433,7 @@ test_util_exit_status(void *ptr) done: ; } +#endif #ifndef _WIN32 /** Check that fgets waits until a full line, and not return a partial line, on @@ -2568,14 +2735,14 @@ test_util_spawn_background_partial_read(void *ptr) } /** - * Test for format_hex_number_for_helper_exit_status() + * Test for format_hex_number_sigsafe() */ static void test_util_format_hex_number(void *ptr) { int i, len; - char buf[HEX_ERRNO_SIZE + 1]; + char buf[33]; const struct { const char *str; unsigned int x; @@ -2584,6 +2751,8 @@ test_util_format_hex_number(void *ptr) {"1", 1}, {"273A", 0x273a}, {"FFFF", 0xffff}, + {"7FFFFFFF", 0x7fffffff}, + {"FFFFFFFF", 0xffffffff}, #if UINT_MAX >= 0xffffffff {"31BC421D", 0x31bc421d}, {"FFFFFFFF", 0xffffffff}, @@ -2594,19 +2763,23 @@ test_util_format_hex_number(void *ptr) (void)ptr; for (i = 0; test_data[i].str != NULL; ++i) { - len = format_hex_number_for_helper_exit_status(test_data[i].x, - buf, HEX_ERRNO_SIZE); + len = format_hex_number_sigsafe(test_data[i].x, buf, sizeof(buf)); test_neq(len, 0); - buf[len] = '\0'; + test_eq(len, strlen(buf)); test_streq(buf, test_data[i].str); } + test_eq(4, format_hex_number_sigsafe(0xffff, buf, 5)); + test_streq(buf, "FFFF"); + test_eq(0, format_hex_number_sigsafe(0xffff, buf, 4)); + test_eq(0, format_hex_number_sigsafe(0, buf, 1)); + done: return; } /** - * Test that we can properly format q Windows command line + * Test that we can properly format a Windows command line */ static void test_util_join_win_cmdline(void *ptr) @@ -2817,7 +2990,7 @@ test_util_eat_whitespace(void *ptr) (void)ptr; /* Try one leading ws */ - strcpy(str, "fuubaar"); + strlcpy(str, "fuubaar", sizeof(str)); for (i = 0; i < sizeof(ws); ++i) { str[0] = ws[i]; test_eq_ptr(str + 1, eat_whitespace(str)); @@ -2832,14 +3005,14 @@ test_util_eat_whitespace(void *ptr) test_eq_ptr(str, eat_whitespace_eos_no_nl(str, str + strlen(str))); /* Empty string */ - strcpy(str, ""); + strlcpy(str, "", sizeof(str)); test_eq_ptr(str, eat_whitespace(str)); test_eq_ptr(str, eat_whitespace_eos(str, str)); test_eq_ptr(str, eat_whitespace_no_nl(str)); test_eq_ptr(str, eat_whitespace_eos_no_nl(str, str)); /* Only ws */ - strcpy(str, " \t\r\n"); + strlcpy(str, " \t\r\n", sizeof(str)); test_eq_ptr(str + strlen(str), eat_whitespace(str)); test_eq_ptr(str + strlen(str), eat_whitespace_eos(str, str + strlen(str))); test_eq_ptr(str + strlen(str) - 1, @@ -2847,7 +3020,7 @@ test_util_eat_whitespace(void *ptr) test_eq_ptr(str + strlen(str) - 1, eat_whitespace_eos_no_nl(str, str + strlen(str))); - strcpy(str, " \t\r "); + strlcpy(str, " \t\r ", sizeof(str)); test_eq_ptr(str + strlen(str), eat_whitespace(str)); test_eq_ptr(str + strlen(str), eat_whitespace_eos(str, str + strlen(str))); @@ -2856,7 +3029,7 @@ test_util_eat_whitespace(void *ptr) eat_whitespace_eos_no_nl(str, str + strlen(str))); /* Multiple ws */ - strcpy(str, "fuubaar"); + strlcpy(str, "fuubaar", sizeof(str)); for (i = 0; i < sizeof(ws); ++i) str[i] = ws[i]; test_eq_ptr(str + sizeof(ws), eat_whitespace(str)); @@ -2866,28 +3039,28 @@ test_util_eat_whitespace(void *ptr) eat_whitespace_eos_no_nl(str, str + strlen(str))); /* Eat comment */ - strcpy(str, "# Comment \n No Comment"); + strlcpy(str, "# Comment \n No Comment", sizeof(str)); test_streq("No Comment", eat_whitespace(str)); test_streq("No Comment", eat_whitespace_eos(str, str + strlen(str))); test_eq_ptr(str, eat_whitespace_no_nl(str)); test_eq_ptr(str, eat_whitespace_eos_no_nl(str, str + strlen(str))); /* Eat comment & ws mix */ - strcpy(str, " # \t Comment \n\t\nNo Comment"); + strlcpy(str, " # \t Comment \n\t\nNo Comment", sizeof(str)); test_streq("No Comment", eat_whitespace(str)); test_streq("No Comment", eat_whitespace_eos(str, str + strlen(str))); test_eq_ptr(str + 1, eat_whitespace_no_nl(str)); test_eq_ptr(str + 1, eat_whitespace_eos_no_nl(str, str + strlen(str))); /* Eat entire comment */ - strcpy(str, "#Comment"); + strlcpy(str, "#Comment", sizeof(str)); test_eq_ptr(str + strlen(str), eat_whitespace(str)); test_eq_ptr(str + strlen(str), eat_whitespace_eos(str, str + strlen(str))); test_eq_ptr(str, eat_whitespace_no_nl(str)); test_eq_ptr(str, eat_whitespace_eos_no_nl(str, str + strlen(str))); /* Blank line, then comment */ - strcpy(str, " \t\n # Comment"); + strlcpy(str, " \t\n # Comment", sizeof(str)); test_eq_ptr(str + strlen(str), eat_whitespace(str)); test_eq_ptr(str + strlen(str), eat_whitespace_eos(str, str + strlen(str))); test_eq_ptr(str + 2, eat_whitespace_no_nl(str)); @@ -3212,12 +3385,176 @@ test_util_mathlog(void *arg) ; } +static void +test_util_round_to_next_multiple_of(void *arg) +{ + (void)arg; + + test_assert(round_uint64_to_next_multiple_of(0,1) == 0); + test_assert(round_uint64_to_next_multiple_of(0,7) == 0); + + test_assert(round_uint64_to_next_multiple_of(99,1) == 99); + test_assert(round_uint64_to_next_multiple_of(99,7) == 105); + test_assert(round_uint64_to_next_multiple_of(99,9) == 99); + + done: + ; +} + +static void +test_util_strclear(void *arg) +{ + static const char *vals[] = { "", "a", "abcdef", "abcdefgh", NULL }; + int i; + char *v = NULL; + (void)arg; + + for (i = 0; vals[i]; ++i) { + size_t n; + v = tor_strdup(vals[i]); + n = strlen(v); + tor_strclear(v); + tt_assert(tor_mem_is_zero(v, n+1)); + tor_free(v); + } + done: + tor_free(v); +} + #define UTIL_LEGACY(name) \ { #name, legacy_test_helper, 0, &legacy_setup, test_util_ ## name } #define UTIL_TEST(name, flags) \ { #name, test_util_ ## name, flags, NULL, NULL } +#ifdef FD_CLOEXEC +#define CAN_CHECK_CLOEXEC +static int +fd_is_cloexec(tor_socket_t fd) +{ + int flags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFD, 0); + return (flags & FD_CLOEXEC) == FD_CLOEXEC; +} +#endif + +#ifndef _WIN32 +#define CAN_CHECK_NONBLOCK +static int +fd_is_nonblocking(tor_socket_t fd) +{ + int flags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0); + return (flags & O_NONBLOCK) == O_NONBLOCK; +} +#endif + +static void +test_util_socket(void *arg) +{ + tor_socket_t fd1 = TOR_INVALID_SOCKET; + tor_socket_t fd2 = TOR_INVALID_SOCKET; + tor_socket_t fd3 = TOR_INVALID_SOCKET; + tor_socket_t fd4 = TOR_INVALID_SOCKET; + int n = get_n_open_sockets(); + + TT_BLATHER(("Starting with %d open sockets.", n)); + + (void)arg; + + fd1 = tor_open_socket_with_extensions(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0, 0, 0); + fd2 = tor_open_socket_with_extensions(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0, 0, 1); + tt_assert(SOCKET_OK(fd1)); + tt_assert(SOCKET_OK(fd2)); + tt_int_op(get_n_open_sockets(), ==, n + 2); + //fd3 = tor_open_socket_with_extensions(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0, 1, 0); + //fd4 = tor_open_socket_with_extensions(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0, 1, 1); + fd3 = tor_open_socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + fd4 = tor_open_socket_nonblocking(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + tt_assert(SOCKET_OK(fd3)); + tt_assert(SOCKET_OK(fd4)); + tt_int_op(get_n_open_sockets(), ==, n + 4); + +#ifdef CAN_CHECK_CLOEXEC + tt_int_op(fd_is_cloexec(fd1), ==, 0); + tt_int_op(fd_is_cloexec(fd2), ==, 0); + tt_int_op(fd_is_cloexec(fd3), ==, 1); + tt_int_op(fd_is_cloexec(fd4), ==, 1); +#endif +#ifdef CAN_CHECK_NONBLOCK + tt_int_op(fd_is_nonblocking(fd1), ==, 0); + tt_int_op(fd_is_nonblocking(fd2), ==, 1); + tt_int_op(fd_is_nonblocking(fd3), ==, 0); + tt_int_op(fd_is_nonblocking(fd4), ==, 1); +#endif + + tor_close_socket(fd1); + tor_close_socket(fd2); + fd1 = fd2 = TOR_INVALID_SOCKET; + tt_int_op(get_n_open_sockets(), ==, n + 2); + tor_close_socket(fd3); + tor_close_socket(fd4); + fd3 = fd4 = TOR_INVALID_SOCKET; + tt_int_op(get_n_open_sockets(), ==, n); + + done: + if (SOCKET_OK(fd1)) + tor_close_socket(fd1); + if (SOCKET_OK(fd2)) + tor_close_socket(fd2); + if (SOCKET_OK(fd3)) + tor_close_socket(fd3); + if (SOCKET_OK(fd4)) + tor_close_socket(fd4); +} + +static void * +socketpair_test_setup(const struct testcase_t *testcase) +{ + return testcase->setup_data; +} +static int +socketpair_test_cleanup(const struct testcase_t *testcase, void *ptr) +{ + (void)testcase; + (void)ptr; + return 1; +} + +static const struct testcase_setup_t socketpair_setup = { + socketpair_test_setup, socketpair_test_cleanup +}; + +/* Test for socketpair and ersatz_socketpair(). We test them both, since + * the latter is a tolerably good way to exersize tor_accept_socket(). */ +static void +test_util_socketpair(void *arg) +{ + const int ersatz = !strcmp(arg, "1"); + int (*const tor_socketpair_fn)(int, int, int, tor_socket_t[2]) = + ersatz ? tor_ersatz_socketpair : tor_socketpair; + int n = get_n_open_sockets(); + tor_socket_t fds[2] = {TOR_INVALID_SOCKET, TOR_INVALID_SOCKET}; + const int family = AF_UNIX; + + tt_int_op(0, ==, tor_socketpair_fn(family, SOCK_STREAM, 0, fds)); + tt_assert(SOCKET_OK(fds[0])); + tt_assert(SOCKET_OK(fds[1])); + tt_int_op(get_n_open_sockets(), ==, n + 2); +#ifdef CAN_CHECK_CLOEXEC + tt_int_op(fd_is_cloexec(fds[0]), ==, 1); + tt_int_op(fd_is_cloexec(fds[1]), ==, 1); +#endif +#ifdef CAN_CHECK_NONBLOCK + tt_int_op(fd_is_nonblocking(fds[0]), ==, 0); + tt_int_op(fd_is_nonblocking(fds[1]), ==, 0); +#endif + + done: + if (SOCKET_OK(fds[0])) + tor_close_socket(fds[0]); + if (SOCKET_OK(fds[1])) + tor_close_socket(fds[1]); +} + struct testcase_t util_tests[] = { UTIL_LEGACY(time), UTIL_TEST(parse_http_time, 0), @@ -3228,6 +3565,8 @@ struct testcase_t util_tests[] = { #ifndef _WIN32 UTIL_LEGACY(expand_filename), #endif + UTIL_LEGACY(escape_string_socks), + UTIL_LEGACY(string_is_key_value), UTIL_LEGACY(strmisc), UTIL_LEGACY(pow2), UTIL_LEGACY(gzip), @@ -3241,6 +3580,8 @@ struct testcase_t util_tests[] = { UTIL_LEGACY(path_is_relative), UTIL_LEGACY(strtok), UTIL_LEGACY(di_ops), + UTIL_TEST(round_to_next_multiple_of, 0), + UTIL_TEST(strclear, 0), UTIL_TEST(find_str_at_start_of_line, 0), UTIL_TEST(string_is_C_identifier, 0), UTIL_TEST(asprintf, 0), @@ -3249,8 +3590,8 @@ struct testcase_t util_tests[] = { #ifdef _WIN32 UTIL_TEST(load_win_lib, 0), #endif - UTIL_TEST(exit_status, 0), #ifndef _WIN32 + UTIL_TEST(exit_status, 0), UTIL_TEST(fgets_eagain, TT_SKIP), #endif UTIL_TEST(spawn_background_ok, 0), @@ -3268,8 +3609,14 @@ struct testcase_t util_tests[] = { UTIL_TEST(read_file_eof_tiny_limit, 0), UTIL_TEST(read_file_eof_two_loops, 0), UTIL_TEST(read_file_eof_zero_bytes, 0), + UTIL_TEST(write_chunks_to_file, 0), UTIL_TEST(mathlog, 0), UTIL_TEST(weak_random, 0), + UTIL_TEST(socket, TT_FORK), + { "socketpair", test_util_socketpair, TT_FORK, &socketpair_setup, + (void*)"0" }, + { "socketpair_ersatz", test_util_socketpair, TT_FORK, + &socketpair_setup, (void*)"1" }, END_OF_TESTCASES }; diff --git a/src/tools/tor-checkkey.c b/src/tools/tor-checkkey.c index a3860ca4b..d50f12ed2 100644 --- a/src/tools/tor-checkkey.c +++ b/src/tools/tor-checkkey.c @@ -1,8 +1,6 @@ /* Copyright (c) 2008-2013, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ -#define CRYPTO_PRIVATE - #include "orconfig.h" #include <stdio.h> diff --git a/src/tools/tor-fw-helper/tor-fw-helper.c b/src/tools/tor-fw-helper/tor-fw-helper.c index bb6e70aaa..84cc21e34 100644 --- a/src/tools/tor-fw-helper/tor-fw-helper.c +++ b/src/tools/tor-fw-helper/tor-fw-helper.c @@ -496,6 +496,6 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) smartlist_free(tor_fw_options.ports_to_forward); } - exit(r); + exit(0); } diff --git a/src/tools/tor-gencert.c b/src/tools/tor-gencert.c index 3809b22d4..25beb2aae 100644 --- a/src/tools/tor-gencert.c +++ b/src/tools/tor-gencert.c @@ -27,8 +27,6 @@ #include <assert.h> #endif -#define CRYPTO_PRIVATE - #include "compat.h" #include "../common/util.h" #include "../common/torlog.h" diff --git a/src/win32/orconfig.h b/src/win32/orconfig.h index f5d5cf446..0d6fe692b 100644 --- a/src/win32/orconfig.h +++ b/src/win32/orconfig.h @@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ #define USING_TWOS_COMPLEMENT /* Version number of package */ -#define VERSION "0.2.4.10-alpha-dev" +#define VERSION "0.2.5.1-alpha-dev" diff --git a/ticket9839 b/ticket9839 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a71c23104 --- /dev/null +++ b/ticket9839 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Documentation: + - Update manpage to describe some of the files one could find + in data directory. Fixes bug 9839. |